RESUMO
This latest article in the Federal Funding for Health Security series assesses FY2017 US government funding in 5 domains critical to strengthening health security: biosecurity, radiological and nuclear security, chemical security, pandemic influenza and emerging infectious disease, and multiple-hazard and general preparedness.
Assuntos
Defesa Civil/economia , Planejamento em Desastres/economia , Governo Federal , Financiamento Governamental , Medidas de Segurança/economia , Guerra Biológica/economia , Guerra Biológica/prevenção & controle , Guerra Química/economia , Guerra Química/prevenção & controle , Controle de Doenças Transmissíveis/economia , Humanos , Guerra Nuclear/economia , Guerra Nuclear/prevenção & controle , Terrorismo/economia , Terrorismo/prevenção & controle , Estados Unidos , United States Government Agencies/economiaRESUMO
The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first international treaty to outlaw an entire class of weapons, was held in Geneva in December 2011. On 7 December, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton became the highest-ranking US government official to address a BWC meeting. Secretary Clinton told the assembled delegation that 'we view the risk of bioweapons attack as both a serious national security challenge and a foreign policy priority'. At the same time, she warned that a large-scale disease outbreak 'could cripple an already fragile global economy'. Secretary Clinton's speech reflected a new understanding that the range of biological threats to international security has expanded from state-sponsored biological warfare programmes to include biological terrorism, dual-use research and naturally occurring infectious diseases such as pandemics. Recognizing these changes, President Barack Obama released a new national strategy for countering biological threats in 2009. This strategy represents a shift in thinking away from the George W. Bush administration's focus on biodefence, which emphasized preparing for and responding to biological weapon attacks, to the concept of biosecurity, which includes measures to prevent, prepare for and respond to naturally occurring and man-made biological threats. The Obama administration's biosecurity strategy seeks to reduce the global risk of naturally occurring and deliberate disease outbreaks through prevention, international cooperation, and maximizing synergies between health and security. The biosecurity strategy is closely aligned with the Obama administration's broader approach to foreign policy, which emphasizes the pragmatic use of smart power, multilateralism and engagement to further the national interest. This article describes the Obama administration's biosecurity strategy; highlights elements of continuity and change from the policies of the Bush administration; discusses how it fits into Obama's broader foreign policy agenda; and analyses critical issues that will have to be addressed in order to implement the strategy successfully.
Assuntos
Armas Biológicas , Guerra Biológica , Bioterrorismo , Defesa Civil , Surtos de Doenças , Governo , Saúde Pública , Guerra Biológica/economia , Guerra Biológica/etnologia , Guerra Biológica/história , Guerra Biológica/legislação & jurisprudência , Guerra Biológica/psicologia , Armas Biológicas/economia , Armas Biológicas/história , Armas Biológicas/legislação & jurisprudência , Bioterrorismo/economia , Bioterrorismo/etnologia , Bioterrorismo/história , Bioterrorismo/legislação & jurisprudência , Bioterrorismo/psicologia , Defesa Civil/economia , Defesa Civil/educação , Defesa Civil/história , Defesa Civil/legislação & jurisprudência , Surtos de Doenças/economia , Surtos de Doenças/história , Surtos de Doenças/legislação & jurisprudência , Governo/história , História do Século XXI , Cooperação Internacional/história , Cooperação Internacional/legislação & jurisprudência , Pandemias/economia , Pandemias/história , Pandemias/legislação & jurisprudência , Saúde Pública/economia , Saúde Pública/educação , Saúde Pública/história , Saúde Pública/legislação & jurisprudência , Medidas de Segurança/economia , Medidas de Segurança/história , Medidas de Segurança/legislação & jurisprudência , Estados Unidos/etnologiaRESUMO
At present, much attention is being given to the potential of plant pathogens, including plant-pathogenic bacteria, as biological weapons/bioterror weapons. These two terms are sometimes used interchangeably and there is need for care in their application. It has been claimed that clandestine introduction of certain plant-pathogenic bacteria could cause such crop losses as to impact so significantly on a national economy and thus constitute a threat to national security. As a separate outcome, it is suggested that they could cause serious public alarm, perhaps constituting a source of terror. Legislation is now in place to regulate selected plant-pathogenic bacteria as potential weapons. However, we consider it highly doubtful that any plant-pathogenic bacterium has the requisite capabilities to justify such a classification. Even if they were so capable, the differentiation of pathogens into a special category with regulations that are even more restrictive than those currently applied in quarantine legislation of most jurisdictions offers no obvious benefit. Moreover, we believe that such regulations are disadvantageous insofar as they limit research on precisely those pathogens most in need of study. Whereas some human and animal pathogens may have potential as biological or bioterror weapons, we conclude that it is unlikely that any plant-pathogenic bacterium realistically falls into this category.
Assuntos
Bactérias/patogenicidade , Guerra Biológica/métodos , Doenças das Plantas/microbiologia , Guerra Biológica/economia , União Europeia , Estados UnidosRESUMO
The destruction made by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons used by governments and terrorist groups in the near history is posing anxiety and fear for human being. Rumour about the possible use of these agents leads to the development of serious negative effects on populations. Since there are no vaccine and therapy for most viral agents and cost of production as biological weapons is low, interest rate is rising for viruses. In this review, general characteristics, diagnosis, therapy and protective measures for viral agents such as variola virus, hemorrhagic fever viruses, encephalitis viruses, Hantaviruses and Nipah viruses, those can be used as biological weapon, have been summarized.
Assuntos
Guerra Biológica/métodos , Bioterrorismo , Viroses/psicologia , Guerra Biológica/economia , Guerra Biológica/prevenção & controle , Bioterrorismo/economia , Bioterrorismo/prevenção & controle , Bioterrorismo/psicologia , Humanos , Viroses/diagnóstico , Viroses/terapiaAssuntos
Guerra Biológica/economia , Guerra Biológica/prevenção & controle , National Institutes of Health (U.S.)/economia , National Institutes of Health (U.S.)/organização & administração , Síndrome da Imunodeficiência Adquirida/tratamento farmacológico , Vacinas contra Antraz/economia , Pesquisa Biomédica/economia , Orçamentos , Humanos , Estados Unidos , United States Dept. of Health and Human Services/economia , United States Dept. of Health and Human Services/organização & administraçãoAssuntos
Bioterrorismo/prevenção & controle , Defesa Civil/economia , Defesa Civil/métodos , Países em Desenvolvimento/economia , Apoio à Pesquisa como Assunto , Pesquisa/economia , Guerra Biológica/economia , Guerra Biológica/prevenção & controle , Biotecnologia/economia , Biotecnologia/educação , Bioterrorismo/economia , Genômica/economia , Genômica/educação , Cooperação Internacional , National Institutes of Health (U.S.) , Pesquisa/educação , Medidas de Segurança , Estados UnidosAssuntos
Bioterrorismo/prevenção & controle , Bioterrorismo/tendências , Órgãos Governamentais/organização & administração , Medidas de Segurança/organização & administração , Guerra Biológica/economia , Guerra Biológica/prevenção & controle , Bioterrorismo/economia , Guerra Química/economia , Guerra Química/prevenção & controle , Técnicas e Procedimentos Diagnósticos , Doenças Transmitidas por Alimentos/economia , Doenças Transmitidas por Alimentos/prevenção & controle , Órgãos Governamentais/economia , Órgãos Governamentais/legislação & jurisprudência , Preparações Farmacêuticas/provisão & distribuição , Saúde Pública/economia , Saúde Pública/métodos , Medidas de Segurança/economia , Medidas de Segurança/legislação & jurisprudência , Estados Unidos , Vacinas/provisão & distribuiçãoAssuntos
Guerra Biológica/economia , Guerra Biológica/prevenção & controle , Bioterrorismo/economia , Bioterrorismo/prevenção & controle , Pesquisa/economia , Antraz , Escolha da Profissão , Emprego/economia , Emprego/tendências , Organização do Financiamento , Genoma Bacteriano , Genômica/tendências , National Institutes of Health (U.S.)/economia , National Institutes of Health (U.S.)/tendências , Pesquisa/educação , Pesquisa/tendências , Estados UnidosAssuntos
Guerra Biológica , Guerra Química , Militares , Armas , I Guerra Mundial , Guerra Biológica/economia , Guerra Biológica/etnologia , Guerra Biológica/história , Guerra Química/economia , Guerra Química/etnologia , Guerra Química/história , Europa (Continente)/etnologia , História do Século XX , Militares/educação , Militares/história , Militares/psicologia , Armas/economia , Armas/históriaRESUMO
Though many agents have been proposed as potential biological weapons, the feasibility of biological warfare is largely a matter of conjecture. The unpredictable and indiscriminate devastation caused by natural epidemics during wartime should warn us of the dangers of employing microbes as weapons.