Dangerous Pathogens as a Potential Problem for Public Health.

Pathogens are various organisms, such as viruses, bacteria, fungi, and protozoa, which can cause severe illnesses to their hosts. Throughout history, pathogens have accompanied human populations and caused various epidemics. One of the most significant outbreaks was the Black Death, which occurred in the 14th century and caused the death of one-third of Europe's population. Pathogens have also been studied for their use as biological warfare agents by the former Soviet Union, Japan, and the USA. Among bacteria and viruses, there are high priority agents that have a significant impact on public health. Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Yersinia pestis, Variola virus, Filoviruses (Ebola, Marburg), Arenoviruses (Lassa), and influenza viruses are included in this group of agents. Outbreaks and infections caused by them might result in social disruption and panic, which is why special operations are needed for public health preparedness. Antibiotic-resistant bacteria that significantly impede treatment and recovery of patients are also valid threats. Furthermore, recent events related to the massive spread of Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) are an example of how virus-induced diseases cannot be ignored. The impact of outbreaks, such as SARS-CoV-2, have had far-reaching consequences beyond public health. The economic losses due to lockdowns are difficult to estimate, but it would take years to restore countries to pre-outbreak status. For countries affected by the 2019 coronavirus disease (COVID-19), their health systems have been overwhelmed, resulting in an increase in the mortality rate caused by diseases or injuries. Furthermore, outbreaks, such as SARS-CoV-2, will induce serious, wide-ranging (and possibly long-lasting) psychological problems among, not only health workers, but ordinary citizens (this is due to isolation, quarantine, etc.). The aim of this paper is to present the most dangerous pathogens, as well as general characterizations, mechanisms of action, and treatments.

Dual-Use Nano-Neurotechnology: An assessment of the implications of trends in science and technology.

The chemical and biological nonproliferation regime stands at a watershed moment, when failure seems a real possibility. After the unsuccessful outcome of the 2016 Eighth Review Conference, the future of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is uncertain. As the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) approaches its Fourth Review Conference in 2018, it has almost completed removing the huge stocks of chemical weapons, but it now faces the difficult organizational task of moving its focus to preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons at a time when the international security situation appears to be increasingly more difficult and dangerous. In this article, we assess the current and near-term state (5-10 years) and impact of three related areas of science and technology that could be of dual-use concern: targeted delivery of agents to the central nervous system (CNS), particularly by means of nanotechnology; direct impact of nanomaterials on synaptic functions in the CNS; and neuronal circuits in the brain that might be targeted by those with hostile intent. We attempt to assess the implications of our findings, particularly for the consideration of the problem of state-level interest in so-called nonlethal incapacitating chemical agents for law enforcement at the CWC Review Conference in 2018, but also more generally for the longer-term future of the chemical and biological nonproliferation regime.

Plant-pathogenic bacteria as biological weapons - real threats?

At present, much attention is being given to the potential of plant pathogens, including plant-pathogenic bacteria, as biological weapons/bioterror weapons. These two terms are sometimes used interchangeably and there is need for care in their application. It has been claimed that clandestine introduction of certain plant-pathogenic bacteria could cause such crop losses as to impact so significantly on a national economy and thus constitute a threat to national security. As a separate outcome, it is suggested that they could cause serious public alarm, perhaps constituting a source of terror. Legislation is now in place to regulate selected plant-pathogenic bacteria as potential weapons. However, we consider it highly doubtful that any plant-pathogenic bacterium has the requisite capabilities to justify such a classification. Even if they were so capable, the differentiation of pathogens into a special category with regulations that are even more restrictive than those currently applied in quarantine legislation of most jurisdictions offers no obvious benefit. Moreover, we believe that such regulations are disadvantageous insofar as they limit research on precisely those pathogens most in need of study. Whereas some human and animal pathogens may have potential as biological or bioterror weapons, we conclude that it is unlikely that any plant-pathogenic bacterium realistically falls into this category.

[Viruses as biological weapons]. / Biyolojik silah olarak viruslar.

The destruction made by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons used by governments and terrorist groups in the near history is posing anxiety and fear for human being. Rumour about the possible use of these agents leads to the development of serious negative effects on populations. Since there are no vaccine and therapy for most viral agents and cost of production as biological weapons is low, interest rate is rising for viruses. In this review, general characteristics, diagnosis, therapy and protective measures for viral agents such as variola virus, hemorrhagic fever viruses, encephalitis viruses, Hantaviruses and Nipah viruses, those can be used as biological weapon, have been summarized.

Bioweapons, bioterrorism and biodiversity: potential impacts of biological weapons attacks on agricultural and biological diversity.

Diseases and biological toxins have been used as weapons of war throughout recorded history, from Biblical times through to the present day. Bioweapon uses have historically been directed primarily, although not exclusively, against human populations. Specialised technicians and state-of-the-art research facilities are no longer necessary for the production or deployment of many known bioweapon agents and commercially available technologies now permit the large-scale production of bioweapon agents in small-scale facilities at relatively low cost. Failures in the detection and containment of bioweapon and emerging disease outbreaks among populations of wildlife and indigenous peoples in developing countries could result in severe erosion of genetic diversity in local and regional populations of both wild and domestic animals, the extinction of endangered species and the extirpation of indigenous peoples and their cultures. Our ability to understand and control the spread of diseases within and among human and animal populations is increasing but is still insufficient to counter the threats presented by existing bioweapon diseases and the growing number of highly pathogenic emergent infections. Interdisciplinary and international efforts to increase the monitoring, surveillance, identification and reporting of disease agents and to better understand the potential dynamics of disease transmission within human and animal populations in both industrialised and developing country settings will greatly enhance our ability to combat the effects of bioweapons and emerging diseases on biological communities and biodiversity.

[Viruses, bacteria and toxins as biological warfare]. / Virus, bakterier og toksiner som biologiske kampstoffer.

Biological weapons are an important part of the level of international threat. Technological development has made biological weapon production relatively simple and cheap, and although a UN convention from 1972 bans biological weapons, governments as well as non-governmental organisations or individuals have developed biological weapons for offensive use in war or terrorism. This article reviews the publically available literature, and clinical and therapeutic possibilities are described. The possibilities for protection of military and civilian groups are discussed and the need for a national contingency plan is emphasized.