Environmental Surveillance for Risk Assessment in the Context of a Phase 2 Clinical Trial of Type 2 Novel Oral Polio Vaccine in Panama.

Environmental surveillance was recommended for risk mitigation in a novel oral polio vaccine-2 (nOPV2) clinical trial (M5-ABMG) to monitor excretion, potential circulation, and loss of attenuation of the two nOPV2 candidates. The nOPV2 candidates were developed to address the risk of poliovirus (PV) type 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) as part of the global eradication strategy. Between November 2018 and January 2020, an environmental surveillance study for the clinical trial was conducted in parallel to the M5-ABMG clinical trial at five locations in Panama. The collection sites were located upstream from local treatment plant inlets, to capture the excreta from trial participants and their community. Laboratory analyses of 49 environmental samples were conducted using the two-phase separation method. Novel OPV2 strains were not detected in sewage samples collected during the study period. However, six samples were positive for Sabin-like type 3 PV, two samples were positive for Sabin-like type 1 PV, and non-polio enteroviruses NPEVs were detected in 27 samples. One of the nOPV2 candidates has been granted Emergency Use Listing by the World Health Organization and initial use started in March 2021. This environmental surveillance study provided valuable risk mitigation information to support the Emergency Use Listing application.

Global Transmission of Live Polioviruses: Updated Dynamic Modeling of the Polio Endgame.

Nearly 20 years after the year 2000 target for global wild poliovirus (WPV) eradication, live polioviruses continue to circulate with all three serotypes posing challenges for the polio endgame. We updated a global differential equation-based poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to include programmatic and epidemiological experience through January 2020. We used the model to explore the likely dynamics of poliovirus transmission for 2019-2023, which coincides with a new Global Polio Eradication Initiative Strategic Plan. The model stratifies the global population into 72 blocks, each containing 10 subpopulations of approximately 10.7 million people. Exported viruses go into subpopulations within the same block and within groups of blocks that represent large preferentially mixing geographical areas (e.g., continents). We assign representative World Bank income levels to the blocks along with polio immunization and transmission assumptions, which capture some of the heterogeneity across countries while still focusing on global poliovirus transmission dynamics. We also updated estimates of reintroduction risks using available evidence. The updated model characterizes transmission dynamics and resulting polio cases consistent with the evidence through 2019. Based on recent epidemiological experience and prospective immunization assumptions for the 2019-2023 Strategic Plan, the updated model does not show successful eradication of serotype 1 WPV by 2023 or successful cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine serotype 2-related viruses.

Insights From Modeling Preventive Supplemental Immunization Activities as a Strategy to Eliminate Wild Poliovirus Transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Many countries use supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) with oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) to keep their population immunity to transmission high using preventive, planned SIAs (pSIAs) and outbreaks response SIAs (oSIAs). Prior studies suggested that investment in pSIAs saved substantial health and financial costs due to avoided outbreaks. However, questions remain about the benefits of SIAs, particularly with the recent introduction of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) into routine immunization in all OPV-using countries. The mounting costs of polio eradication activities and the need to respond to oSIAs threatens the use of limited financial resources for pSIAs, including in the remaining countries with endemic transmission of serotype 1 wild poliovirus (WPV1) (i.e., Pakistan and Afghanistan). A recent updated global poliovirus transmission model suggested that the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) is not on track to stop transmission of WPV1 in Pakistan and Afghanistan. We use the updated global model to explore the role of pSIAs to achieve WPV1 eradication. We find that unless Pakistan and Afghanistan manage to increase the quality of bivalent OPV (bOPV) pSIAs, which we model as intensity (i.e., sufficiently high-coverage bOPV pSIAs that reach missed children), the model does not lead to successful eradication of WPV1. Achieving WPV1 eradication, the global objectives of the GPEI, and a successful polio endgame depend on effective and sufficient use of OPV. IPV use plays a negligible role in stopping transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan and most other countries supported by the GPEI, and more IPV use will not help to stop transmission.

Potential Future Use, Costs, and Value of Poliovirus Vaccines.

Countries face different poliovirus risks, which imply different benefits associated with continued and future use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) and/or inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV). With the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) continuing to extend its timeline for ending the transmission of all wild polioviruses and to introduce new poliovirus vaccines, the polio vaccine supply chain continues to expand in complexity. The increased complexity leads to significant uncertainty about supply and costs. Notably, the strategy of phased OPV cessation of all three serotypes to stop all future incidence of poliomyelitis depends on successfully stopping the transmission of all wild polioviruses. Countries also face challenges associated with responding to any outbreaks that occur after OPV cessation, because stopping transmission of such outbreaks requires reintroducing the use of the stopped OPV in most countries. National immunization program leaders will likely consider differences in their risks and willingness-to-pay for risk reduction as they evaluate their investments in current and future polio vaccination. Information about the costs and benefits of future poliovirus vaccines, and discussion of the complex situation that currently exists, should prove useful to national, regional, and global decisionmakers and support health economic modeling. Delays in achieving polio eradication combined with increasing costs of poliovirus vaccines continue to increase financial risks for the GPEI.

Updated Characterization of Outbreak Response Strategies for 2019-2029: Impacts of Using a Novel Type 2 Oral Poliovirus Vaccine Strain.

Delays in achieving the global eradication of wild poliovirus transmission continue to postpone subsequent cessation of all oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use. Countries must stop OPV use to end all cases of poliomyelitis, including vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) and cases caused by vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of all type 2 OPV (OPV2) use in routine immunization in 2016 but did not successfully end the transmission of type 2 VDPVs (VDPV2s), and consequently continues to use type 2 OPV (OPV2) for outbreak response activities. Using an updated global poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model, we characterize outbreak response options for 2019-2029 related to responding to VDPV2 outbreaks with a genetically stabilized novel OPV (nOPV2) strain or with the currently licensed monovalent OPV2 (mOPV2). Given uncertainties about the properties of nOPV2, we model different assumptions that appear consistent with the evidence on nOPV2 to date. Using nOPV2 to respond to detected cases may reduce the expected VDPV and VAPP cases and the risk of needing to restart OPV2 use in routine immunization compared to mOPV2 use for outbreak response. The actual properties, availability, and use of nOPV2 will determine its effects on type 2 poliovirus transmission in populations. Even with optimal nOPV2 performance, countries and the GPEI would still likely need to restart OPV2 use in routine immunization in OPV-using countries if operational improvements in outbreak response to stop the transmission of cVDPV2s are not implemented effectively.

Assessment of a poly-epitope candidate vaccine against Hepatitis B, C, and poliovirus in interaction with monocyte-derived dendritic cells: An ex-vivo study.

Design and application of epitope-based polyvalent vaccines have recently garnered attention as an efficient alternative for conventional vaccines. We previously have reported the in silico design of HHP antigen which encompasses the immune-dominant epitopes of Hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg), Hepatitis C core protein (HCVcp) and Poliovirus viral proteins (VPs). It has been shown that the HHP has desirable conformation to expose the epitopes, high antigenicity and other desired physicochemical and immunological properties. To confirm the accuracy of these predictions, the ex-vivo immunogenicity of the HHP was assessed. The HHP gene was chemically synthesized in pET28a and expressed in E. coli (BL21). The expressed protein was purified and its immunological potency was evaluated on dendritic cells (DCs) as antigen presenting cells (APCs). Functional analysis was assessed in co-cultivation of autologous T-cells with matured DCs (mDCs). T-cell activation, proliferation and cytokines secretion were evaluated using flowcytometry and ELISA methods. Our results indicated that the HHP could induce the DC maturation. The mDCs were able to trigger T-cell activation and proliferation. In silico design and ex-vivo confirmation of immunological potential could pave the way to introduce efficient immunogens for further analysis. The ability of HHP in DC maturation and T-cell activation makes it an amenable vaccine candidate for further in-vivo studies.

A comparative assessment of cold chain management using the outbreak of circulating vaccine-derived polio virus type 2 as a surrogate marker in Oyo State, Nigeria-2019.

INTRODUCTION: inspite of the demonstrable evidence of the preventive and protective ability of vaccines to reduce the outbreak of vaccine-preventable diseases, there are still some significant disease outbreaks recorded in our communities. In some settings, these outbreaks have been linked with poor vaccine management. Therefore, this study was conducted to compare the cold chain practices in Oyo State, Nigeria. METHODS: we conducted a cross-sectional survey among health workers in the local government areas of Oyo State between October and November 2019. Using purposive sampling, we recruited all the 84 routine immunization focal persons for the study. A self-administered questionnaire was used to collect data on cold chain management. Data were analyzed using SPSS version 24 and bivariate analysis was done using Chi-square. Statistical significance was set at p < 0.05. RESULTS: the mean age of the respondents was 46.4 ± 6.7 years. Most prevalent cadre in the rural facilities was health assistants (87.5%) while Community Extension Health Workers (54.8%) were prevalent in the urban (p = 0.002). The proportion of respondents with adequate cold chain equipment was significantly higher in the urban compared with the rural area. The cold boxes were the only adequate cold chain equipment found in the rural health facilities compared with the urban (p = 0.036). CONCLUSION: there was a low proportion of qualified health workers and inadequate cold chain equipment in the rural area compared with the urban facilities. Engagement of skilled health workers and supply of the cold chain equipment are recommended.

Projection of Costs of Polio Eradication Compared to Permanent Control.

Despite increased efforts and spending toward polio eradication, it has yet to be eliminated worldwide. We aimed to project economic costs of polio eradication compared to permanent control. We used historical Financial Resource Requirements from the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, as well as vaccination and population data from publicly available sources, to project costs for routine immunization, immunization campaigns, surveillance and laboratory resources, technical assistance, social mobilization, treatment, and overhead. We found that cumulative spending for a control strategy would exceed that for an eradication strategy in 2032 (range, 2027-2051). Eradication of polio would likely be cost-saving compared to permanent control.

Polio endgame risks and the possibility of restarting the use of oral poliovirus vaccine.

INTRODUCTION: Ending all cases of poliomyelitis requires successful cessation of all oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), but the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) partners should consider the possibility of an OPV restart. AREAS COVERED: We review the risks of continued live poliovirus transmission after OPV cessation and characterize events that led to OPV restart in a global model that focused on identifying optimal strategies for OPV cessation and the polio endgame. Numerous different types of events that occurred since the globally coordinated cessation of serotype 2-containing OPV in 2016 highlight the possibility of continued outbreaks after homotypic OPV cessation. Modeling suggests a high risk of uncontrolled outbreaks once more than around 5,000 homotypic polio cases occur after cessation of an OPV serotype, at which point restarting OPV would become necessary to protect most populations. Current efforts to sunset the GPEI and transition its responsibilities to national governments poses risks that may limit the ability to implement management strategies needed to minimize the probability of an OPV restart. EXPERT COMMENTARY: OPV restart remains a real possibility, but risk management choices made by the GPEI partners and national governments can reduce the risks of this low-probability but high-consequence event.

Planning for globally coordinated cessation of bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine: risks of non-synchronous cessation and unauthorized oral poliovirus vaccine use.

BACKGROUND: Oral polio vaccine (OPV) containing attenuated serotype 2 polioviruses was globally withdrawn in 2016, and bivalent OPV (bOPV) containing attenuated serotype 1 and 3 polioviruses needs to be withdrawn after the certification of eradication of all wild polioviruses to eliminate future risks from vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). To minimize risks from VDPVs, the planning and implementation of bOPV withdrawal should build on the experience with withdrawing OPV containing serotype 2 polioviruses while taking into account similarities and differences between the three poliovirus serotypes. METHODS: We explored the risks from (i) a failure to synchronize OPV cessation and (ii) unauthorized post-cessation OPV use for serotypes 1 and 3 in the context of globally-coordinated future bOPV cessation and compared the results to similar analyses for serotype 2 OPV cessation. RESULTS: While the risks associated with a failure to synchronize cessation and unauthorized post-cessation OPV use appear to be substantially lower for serotype 3 polioviruses than for serotype 2 polioviruses, the risks for serotype 1 appear similar to those for serotype 2. Increasing population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 poliovirus transmission using pre-cessation bOPV supplemental immunization activities and inactivated poliovirus vaccine in routine immunization reduces the risks of circulating VDPVs associated with non-synchronized cessation or unauthorized OPV use. CONCLUSIONS: The Global Polio Eradication Initiative should synchronize global bOPV cessation during a similar window of time as occurred for the global cessation of OPV containing serotype 2 polioviruses and should rigorously verify the absence of bOPV in immunization systems after its cessation.

Modeling Poliovirus Transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan to Inform Vaccination Strategies in Undervaccinated Subpopulations.

Due to security, access, and programmatic challenges in areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, both countries continue to sustain indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission and threaten the success of global polio eradication and oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation. We fitted an existing differential-equation-based poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to Pakistan and Afghanistan using four subpopulations to characterize the well-vaccinated and undervaccinated subpopulations in each country. We explored retrospective and prospective scenarios for using inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in routine immunization or supplemental immunization activities (SIAs). The undervaccinated subpopulations sustain the circulation of serotype 1 WPV and serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus. We find a moderate impact of past IPV use on polio incidence and population immunity to transmission mainly due to (1) the boosting effect of IPV for individuals with preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection and (2) the effect of IPV-only on oropharyngeal transmission for individuals without preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection. Future IPV use may similarly yield moderate benefits, particularly if access to undervaccinated subpopulations dramatically improves. However, OPV provides a much greater impact on transmission and the incremental benefit of IPV in addition to OPV remains limited. This study suggests that despite the moderate effect of using IPV in SIAs, using OPV in SIAs remains the most effective means to stop transmission, while limited IPV resources should prioritize IPV use in routine immunization.

Assessment of poliovirus antibody seroprevalence in polio high risk areas of West Africa.

We conducted a serological survey of anti-polio antibodies in polio high-risk areas of Mali, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire to assess risk of future poliovirus outbreaks. Random community sampling of children 6-11 and 36-48 months-old was conducted; neutralizing antibodies against poliovirus were detected using microneutralization assay. We analysed 1059/1064 (99.5%) of enrolled children. Seroprevalence to poliovirus type 1 (PV1) across all age groups and locations ranged between 92 and 100%, for PV2 it was 77-100%, and 89-95% for PV3. PV2 seroprevalence in the younger age group in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire was <80%. History of <4 polio vaccine doses and acute malnutrition were associated with seronegativity (OR = 2.1 CI95% = 1.5-3.1, OR = 1.8 CI95% = 1.1-3.3 respectively). The risk of poliovirus outbreak following importation is low because of high population immunity to PV1, however, due to large cohort of PV2 seronegative children any future detection of vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 requires urgent response to arrest rapid spread.

Evaluating cessation of the type 2 oral polio vaccine by modeling pre- and post-cessation detection rates.

The globally synchronized removal of the attenuated Sabin type 2 strain from the oral polio vaccine (OPV) in April 2016 marked a major change in polio vaccination policy. This change will provide a significant reduction in the burden of vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP), but may increase the risk of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreaks during the transition period. This risk can be monitored by tracking the disappearance of Sabin-like type 2 (SL2) using data from the polio surveillance system. We studied SL2 prevalence in 17 countries in Africa and Asia, from 2010 to 2016 using acute flaccid paralysis surveillance data. We modeled the peak and decay of SL2 prevalence following mass vaccination events using a beta-binomial model for the detection rate, and a Ricker function for the temporal dependence. We found type 2 circulated the longest of all serotypes after a vaccination campaign, but that SL2 prevalence returned to baseline levels in approximately 50days. Post-cessation model predictions identified 19 anomalous SL2 detections outside of model predictions in Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and western Africa. Our models established benchmarks for the duration of SL2 detection after OPV2 cessation. As predicted, SL2 detection rates have plummeted, except in Nigeria where OPV2 use continued for some time in response to recent cVDPV2 detections. However, the anomalous SL2 detections suggest specific areas that merit enhanced monitoring for signs of cVDPV2 outbreaks.

Intradermal Administration of Fractional Doses of Inactivated Poliovirus Vaccine: A Dose-Sparing Option for Polio Immunization.

A fractional dose of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (fIPV) administered by the intradermal route delivers one fifth of the full vaccine dose administered by the intramuscular route and offers a potential dose-sparing strategy to stretch the limited global IPV supply while further improving population immunity. Multiple studies have assessed immunogenicity of intradermal fIPV compared with the full intramuscular dose and demonstrated encouraging results. Novel intradermal devices, including intradermal adapters and disposable-syringe jet injectors, have also been developed and evaluated as alternatives to traditional Bacillus Calmette-Guérin needles and syringes for the administration of fIPV. Initial experience in India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka suggests that it is operationally feasible to implement fIPV vaccination on a large scale. Given the available scientific data and operational feasibility shown in early-adopter countries, countries are encouraged to consider introducing a fIPV strategy into their routine immunization and supplementary immunization activities.

The potential benefits of a new poliovirus vaccine for long-term poliovirus risk management.

AIM: To estimate the incremental net benefits (INBs) of a hypothetical ideal vaccine with all of the advantages and no disadvantages of existing oral and inactivated poliovirus vaccines compared with current vaccines available for future outbreak response. METHODS: INB estimates based on expected costs and polio cases from an existing global model of long-term poliovirus risk management. RESULTS: Excluding the development costs, an ideal poliovirus vaccine could offer expected INBs of US$1.6 billion. The ideal vaccine yields small benefits in most realizations of long-term risks, but great benefits in low-probability-high-consequence realizations. CONCLUSION: New poliovirus vaccines may offer valuable insurance against long-term poliovirus risks and new vaccine development efforts should continue as the world gathers more evidence about polio endgame risks.

Cross-sectional Serologic Assessment of Immunity to Poliovirus in Differential Risk Areas of India: India Seroprevalence Survey - 2014.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the seroprevalence against all three poliovirus serotypes in traditional high risk areas in Bihar, lowest routine immunization coverage areas in Madhya Pradesh and migrant population living in Mumbai urban slums. DESIGN: Cross-sectional Survey. SETTING: Subjects selected by house to house visit (community based) and transported to government health facilities for further study procedures. PARTICIPANTS: 1137 randomly selected healthy infants 6-11 months of age residing in the selected high-risk areas. METHODS: Serum samples from the study site were shipped to Enterovirus Research Centre (ERC), Mumbai to determine the neutralizing antibodies against all three poliovirus serotypes. Children with a reciprocal antibody titer ≥1:8 were considered seropositive to the specific poliovirus. RESULTS: Overall, seroprevalence in all the three study areas was 98%, 98% and 91% against poliovirus type-1, type-2 and type-3, respectively. Bihar had a seroprevalence of 99%, 99% and 92% against type-1, type-2 and type-3 respectively. Corresponding figures for Madhya Pradesh and Mumbai were 98%, 99% and 88% and 98%, 97% and 94%, respectively. CONCLUSION: The study found high seroprevalence against all three poliovirus types not only in the traditional high-risk areas for polio in India, but even in the areas known to have low routine immunization coverage and among the migratory clusters living in Mumbai urban slums. Type-2 seroprevalence was found to be high. These findings are reassuring against the threat of emergence of circulating vaccine derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) in the country subsequent to switch from trivalent oral polio vaccine to bivalent oral polio vaccine in the routine immunization schedule from April 2016.

Implementation of coordinated global serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine cessation: risks of inadvertent trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine use.

BACKGROUND: The endgame for polio eradication includes coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), starting with the cessation of vaccine containing OPV serotype 2 (OPV2) by switching all trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV). The logistics associated with this global switch represent a significant undertaking, with some possibility of inadvertent tOPV use after the switch. METHODS: We used a previously developed poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to explore the relationships between the extent of inadvertent tOPV use, the time after the switch of the inadvertent tOPV use and corresponding population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission, and the ability of the inadvertently introduced viruses to cause a serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreak in a hypothetical population. We then estimated the minimum time until inadvertent tOPV use in a supplemental immunization activity (SIA) or in routine immunization (RI) can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak in realistic populations with properties like those of northern India, northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, northern Nigeria, and Ukraine. RESULTS: At low levels of inadvertent tOPV use, the minimum time after the switch for the inadvertent use to cause a cVDPV2 outbreak decreases sharply with increasing proportions of children inadvertently receiving tOPV. The minimum times until inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA or in RI can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak varies widely among populations, with higher basic reproduction numbers, lower tOPV-induced population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission prior to the switch, and a lower proportion of transmission occurring via the oropharyngeal route all resulting in shorter times. In populations with the lowest expected immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission after the switch, inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak if it occurs as soon as 9 months after the switch with 0.5 % of children aged 0-4 years inadvertently receiving tOPV, and as short as 6 months after the switch with 10-20 % of children aged 0-1 years inadvertently receiving tOPV. In the same populations, inadvertent tOPV use in RI leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak if 0.5 % of OPV RI doses given use tOPV instead of bOPV for at least 20 months after the switch, with the minimum length of use dropping to at least 9 months if inadvertent tOPV use occurs in 50 % of OPV RI doses. CONCLUSIONS: Efforts to ensure timely and complete tOPV withdrawal at all levels, particularly from locations storing large amounts of tOPV, will help minimize risks associated with the tOPV-bOPV switch. Under-vaccinated populations with poor hygiene become at risk of a cVDPV2 outbreak in the event of inadvertent tOPV use the soonest after the tOPV-bOPV switch and therefore should represent priority areas to ensure tOPV withdrawal from all OPV stocks.

Implementation of coordinated global serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine cessation: risks of potential non-synchronous cessation.

BACKGROUND: The endgame for polio eradication involves coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) with cessation of serotype 2 OPV (OPV2 cessation) implemented in late April and early May 2016 and cessation of serotypes 1 and 3 OPV (OPV13 cessation) currently planned for after 2018. The logistics associated with globally switching all use of trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) represent a significant undertaking, which may cause some complications, including delays that lead to different timing of the switch across shared borders. METHODS: Building on an integrated global model for long-term poliovirus risk management, we consider the expected vulnerability of different populations to transmission of OPV2-related polioviruses as a function of time following the switch. We explore the relationship between the net reproduction number (Rn) of OPV2 at the time of the switch and the time until OPV2-related viruses imported from countries still using OPV2 can establish transmission. We also analyze some specific situations modeled after populations at high potential risk of circulating serotype 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreaks in the event of a non-synchronous switch. RESULTS: Well-implemented tOPV immunization activities prior to the tOPV to bOPV switch (i.e., tOPV intensification sufficient to prevent the creation of indigenous cVDPV2 outbreaks) lead to sufficient population immunity to transmission to cause die-out of any imported OPV2-related viruses for over 6 months after the switch in all populations in the global model. Higher Rn of OPV2 at the time of the switch reduces the time until imported OPV2-related viruses can establish transmission and increases the time during which indigenous OPV2-related viruses circulate. Modeling specific connected populations suggests a relatively low vulnerability to importations of OPV2-related viruses that could establish transmission in the context of a non-synchronous switch from tOPV to bOPV, unless the gap between switch times becomes very long (>6 months) or a high risk of indigenous cVDPV2s already exists in the importing and/or the exporting population. CONCLUSIONS: Short national discrepancies in the timing of the tOPV to bOPV switch will likely not significantly increase cVDPV2 risks due to the insurance provided by tOPV intensification efforts, although the goal to coordinate national switches within the globally agreed April 17-May 1, 2016 time window minimized the risks associated with cross-border importations.

An economic analysis of poliovirus risk management policy options for 2013-2052.

BACKGROUND: The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) after interrupting all wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission, but many questions remain related to long-term poliovirus risk management policies. METHODS: We used an integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to simulate possible futures and estimate the health and economic outcomes of maintaining the 2013 status quo of continued OPV use in most developing countries compared with OPV cessation policies with various assumptions about global inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) adoption. RESULTS: Continued OPV use after global WPV eradication leads to continued high costs and/or high cases. Global OPV cessation comes with a high probability of at least one outbreak, which aggressive outbreak response can successfully control in most instances. A low but non-zero probability exists of uncontrolled outbreaks following a poliovirus reintroduction long after OPV cessation in a population in which IPV-alone cannot prevent poliovirus transmission. We estimate global incremental net benefits during 2013-2052 of approximately $16 billion (US$2013) for OPV cessation with at least one IPV routine immunization dose in all countries until 2024 compared to continued OPV use, although significant uncertainty remains associated with the frequency of exportations between populations and the implementation of long term risk management policies. CONCLUSIONS: Global OPV cessation offers the possibility of large future health and economic benefits compared to continued OPV use. Long-term poliovirus risk management interventions matter (e.g., IPV use duration, outbreak response, containment, continued surveillance, stockpile size and contents, vaccine production site requirements, potential antiviral drugs, and potential safer vaccines) and require careful consideration. Risk management activities can help to ensure a low risk of uncontrolled outbreaks and preserve or further increase the positive net benefits of OPV cessation. Important uncertainties will require more research, including characterizing immunodeficient long-term poliovirus excretor risks, containment risks, and the kinetics of outbreaks and response in an unprecedented world without widespread live poliovirus exposure.