Emergent neural dynamics and geometry for generalization in a transitive inference task.

Relational cognition-the ability to infer relationships that generalize to novel combinations of objects-is fundamental to human and animal intelligence. Despite this importance, it remains unclear how relational cognition is implemented in the brain due in part to a lack of hypotheses and predictions at the levels of collective neural activity and behavior. Here we discovered, analyzed, and experimentally tested neural networks (NNs) that perform transitive inference (TI), a classic relational task (if A > B and B > C, then A > C). We found NNs that (i) generalized perfectly, despite lacking overt transitive structure prior to training, (ii) generalized when the task required working memory (WM), a capacity thought to be essential to inference in the brain, (iii) emergently expressed behaviors long observed in living subjects, in addition to a novel order-dependent behavior, and (iv) expressed different task solutions yielding alternative behavioral and neural predictions. Further, in a large-scale experiment, we found that human subjects performing WM-based TI showed behavior inconsistent with a class of NNs that characteristically expressed an intuitive task solution. These findings provide neural insights into a classical relational ability, with wider implications for how the brain realizes relational cognition.

Using virtual reality to induce multi-trial inattentional blindness despite trial-by-trial measures of awareness.

Unconscious processing has been widely examined using diverse and well-controlled methodologies. However, the extent to which these findings are relevant to real-life instances of information processing without awareness is limited. Here, we present a novel inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm in virtual reality (VR). In three experiments, we managed to repeatedly induce IB while participants foveally viewed salient stimuli for prolonged durations. The effectiveness of this paradigm demonstrates the close relationship between top-down attention and subjective experience. Thus, this method provides an ecologically valid setup to examine processing without awareness.

Working Memory Has Better Fidelity Than Long-Term Memory: The Fidelity Constraint Is Not a General Property of Memory After All.

How detailed are long-term-memory representations compared with working memory representations? Recent research has found an equal fidelity bound for both memory systems, suggesting a novel general constraint on memory. Here, we assessed the replicability of this discovery. Participants (total N = 72) were presented with colored real-life objects and were asked to recall the colors using a continuous color wheel. Deviations from study colors were modeled to generate two estimates of color memory: the variability of remembered colors-fidelity-and the probability of forgetting the color. Estimating model parameters using both maximum-likelihood estimation and Bayesian hierarchical modeling, we found that working memory had better fidelity than long-term memory (Experiments 1 and 2). Furthermore, within each system, fidelity worsened as a function of time-correlated mechanisms (Experiments 2 and 3). We conclude that fidelity is subject to decline across and within memory systems. Thus, the justification for a general fidelity constraint in memory does not seem to be valid.

Evidence for Implicit-But Not Unconscious-Processing of Object-Scene Relations.

Is consciousness necessary for integration? Findings of seemingly high-level object-scene integration in the absence of awareness have challenged major theories in the field and attracted considerable scientific interest. Lately, one of these findings has been questioned because of a failure to replicate, yet the other finding was still uncontested. Here, we show that this latter finding-slowed-down performance on a visible target following a masked prime scene that includes an incongruent object-is also not reproducible. Using Bayesian statistics, we found evidence against unconscious integration of objects and scenes. Put differently, at the moment, there is no compelling evidence for object-scene congruency processing in the absence of awareness. Intriguingly, however, our results do suggest that consciously experienced yet briefly presented incongruent scenes take longer to process, even when subjects do not explicitly detect their incongruency.

The role of memory in counterfactual valuation.

Value-based decisions are often guided by past experience. If a choice led to a good outcome, we are more likely to repeat it. This basic idea is well-captured by reinforcement-learning models. However, open questions remain about how we assign value to options we did not choose and which we therefore never had the chance to learn about directly. One solution to this problem is proposed by policy gradient reinforcement-learning models; these do not require direct learning of value, instead optimizing choices according to a behavioral policy. For example, a logistic policy predicts that if a chosen option was rewarded, the unchosen option would be deemed less desirable. Here, we test the relevance of these models to human behavior and explore the role of memory in this phenomenon. We hypothesize that a policy may emerge from an associative memory trace formed during deliberation between choice options. In a preregistered study (n = 315) we show that people tend to invert the value of unchosen options relative to the outcome of chosen options, a phenomenon we term inverse decision bias. The inverse decision bias is correlated with memory for the association between choice options; moreover, it is reduced when memory formation is experimentally interfered with. Finally, we present a new memory-based policy gradient model that predicts both the inverse decision bias and its dependence on memory. Our findings point to a significant role of associative memory in valuation of unchosen options and introduce a new perspective on the interaction between decision-making, memory, and counterfactual reasoning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Memory and decision making interact to shape the value of unchosen options.

The goal of deliberation is to separate between options so that we can commit to one and leave the other behind. However, deliberation can, paradoxically, also form an association in memory between the chosen and unchosen options. Here, we consider this possibility and examine its consequences for how outcomes affect not only the value of the options we chose, but also, by association, the value of options we did not choose. In five experiments (total n = 612), including a preregistered experiment (n = 235), we found that the value assigned to unchosen options is inversely related to their chosen counterparts. Moreover, this inverse relationship was associated with participants' memory of the pairs they chose between. Our findings suggest that deciding between options does not end the competition between them. Deliberation binds choice options together in memory such that the learned value of one can affect the inferred value of the other.

What Are Memories For? The Hippocampus Bridges Past Experience with Future Decisions.

Many decisions require flexible reasoning that depends on inference, generalization, and deliberation. Here, we review emerging findings indicating that the hippocampus, known for its role in long-term memory, contributes to these flexible aspects of value-based decision-making. This work offers new insights into the role of memory in decision-making and suggests that memory may shape decisions even in situations that do not appear, at first glance, to depend on memory at all. Uncovering the pervasive role of memory in decision-making challenges the way we define what memory is and what it does, suggesting that memory's primary purpose may be to guide future behavior and that storing a record of the past is just one way to do so.

Fronto-parietal engagement in response inhibition is inversely scaled with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder symptom severity.

BACKGROUND: Impaired response inhibition is one of the most consistent findings in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). However, the underlying brain mechanisms are not clear. This study aimed to underpin atypical inhibition-related brain activation and connectivity patterns in ADHD using a novel Go/No-go task design, and to determine its association with clinical symptoms of the disorder. METHODS: Forty-eight adults with ADHD performed a Go/No-go task in which target frequency was manipulated during functional MRI. Specific inhibition-related brain activation was correlated with ADHD symptom severity, to assess the relationship of individual differences in engagement of inhibition-related brain circuits with the magnitude of every-day functioning impairments. Finally, generalized psychophysical interaction analyses were carried out to examine whether not only engagement but also functional connectivity between regions implicated in response inhibition is related to symptom severity. RESULTS: We found no evidence for the expected parietal modulation by increased demand for inhibition at the group-level results. However, this lack of modulation was mediated by individual differences in ADHD symptom severity - increased engagement of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) in inhibition-demanding events was evident in individuals with less severe symptoms but dissipated with increase in symptomatology. Similarly, functional connectivity between the IPS and the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) was elevated under high inhibitory demand conditions, but this effect diminished with increased symptom severity. CONCLUSIONS: The results highlight the importance of IPS engagement in response inhibition and suggest that IPS modulation may be driven by top-down control from the IFG. Moreover, the current findings force the point of treating ADHD as a continuum whereby brain correlates are scaled with severity of the disorder, and point to the potential use of individual differences in the modulation of IPS activation and connectivity as a neuromarker of ADHD.

Contingent capture is weakened in search for multiple features from different dimensions.

Can observers maintain more than 1 attentional set and search for 2 features in parallel? Previous studies that relied on attentional capture by irrelevant distractors to answer this question focused on features from the same dimension and specifically, on color. They showed that 2 separate color templates can guide attention selectively and simultaneously. Here, the authors investigated attentional guidance by 2 features from different dimensions. In three spatial-cueing experiments, they compared contingent capture during single-set versus dual-set search. The results showed that attention was guided less efficiently by 2 features than by just 1. This impairment varied considerably across target-feature dimensions (color, size, shape and orientation). Confronted with previous studies, our findings suggest avenues for future research to determine whether impaired attentional guidance by multiple templates occurs only in cross-dimensional disjunctive search or also in within-dimension search. The present findings also showed that although performance improved when the target feature repeated on successive trials, a relevant-feature cue did not capture attention to a larger extent when its feature matched that of the previous target. These findings suggest that selection history cannot account for contingent capture and affects processes subsequent to target selection. (PsycINFO Database Record