Private management of African protected areas improves wildlife and tourism outcomes but with security concerns in conflict regions.

Protected areas can conserve wildlife and benefit people when managed effectively. African governments increasingly delegate the management of protected areas to private, nongovernmental organizations, hoping that private organizations' significant resources and technical capacities actualize protected areas' potential. Does private sector management improve outcomes compared to a counterfactual of government management? We leverage the transfer of management authority from governments to African Parks (AP)-the largest private manager of protected areas in Africa-to show that private management significantly improves wildlife outcomes via reduced elephant poaching and increased bird abundances. Our results also suggest that AP's management augments tourism, while the effect on rural wealth is inconclusive. However, AP's management increases the risk of armed groups targeting civilians, which could be an unintended outcome of AP's improved monitoring and enforcement systems. These findings reveal an intricate interplay between conservation, economic development, and security under privately managed protected areas in Africa.

Global expansion of marine protected areas and the redistribution of fishing effort.

The expansion of marine protected areas (MPAs) is a core focus of global conservation efforts, with the "30x30" initiative to protect 30% of the ocean by 2030 serving as a prominent example of this trend. We consider a series of proposed MPA network expansions of various sizes, and we forecast the impact this increase in protection would have on global patterns of fishing effort. We do so by building a predictive machine learning model trained on a global dataset of satellite-based fishing vessel monitoring data, current MPA locations, and spatiotemporal environmental, geographic, political, and economic features. We then use this model to predict future fishing effort under various MPA expansion scenarios compared to a business-as-usual counterfactual scenario that includes no new MPAs. The difference between these scenarios represents the predicted change in fishing effort associated with MPA expansion. We find that regardless of the MPA network objectives or size, fishing effort would decrease inside the MPAs, though by much less than 100%. Moreover, we find that the reduction in fishing effort inside MPAs does not simply redistribute outside-rather, fishing effort outside MPAs would also decline. The overall magnitude of the predicted decrease in global fishing effort principally depends on where networks are placed in relation to existing fishing effort. MPA expansion will lead to a global redistribution of fishing effort that should be accounted for in network design, implementation, and impact evaluation.

A fish cartel for Africa.

Many countries sell fishing rights to foreign nations and fishers. Although African coastal waters are among the world's most biologically rich, African countries earn much less than their peers from selling access to foreign fishers. African countries sell fishing access individually (in contrast to some Pacific countries who sell access as a bloc). We develop a bilateral oligopoly model to simulate the effects of an African fish cartel. The model shows that wielding market power entails both ecological and economic dimensions. Africa would substantially restrict access catch, which raises biomass by 16%. But this also confers economic benefits to all African nations, raising profits by an average of 23%. These benefits arise because market power shifts from foreign buyers to African sellers. While impediments to sustainable development like corruption are hard to change in the medium-term, deeper African integration is an already-emerging solution to African countries' economic and ecological challenges.