Diagnosis, management and prevention of Candida auris in hospitals: position statement of the Australasian Society for Infectious Diseases.

Candida auris is an emerging drug-resistant yeast responsible for hospital outbreaks. This statement reviews the evidence regarding diagnosis, treatment and prevention of this organism and provides consensus recommendations for clinicians and microbiologists in Australia and New Zealand. C. auris has been isolated in over 30 countries (including Australia). Bloodstream infections are the most frequently reported infections. Infections have crude mortality of 30-60%. Acquisition is generally healthcare-associated and risks include underlying chronic disease, immunocompromise and presence of indwelling medical devices. C. auris may be misidentified by conventional phenotypic methods. Matrix-assisted laser desorption ionisation time-of-flight mass spectrometry or sequencing of the internal transcribed spacer regions and/or the D1/D2 regions of the 28S ribosomal DNA are therefore required for definitive laboratory identification. Antifungal drug resistance, particularly to fluconazole, is common, with variable resistance to amphotericin B and echinocandins. Echinocandins are currently recommended as first-line therapy for infection in adults and children ≥2 months of age. For neonates and infants <2 months of age, amphotericin B deoxycholate is recommended. Healthcare facilities with C. auris should implement a multimodal control response. Colonised or infected patients should be isolated in single rooms with Standard and Contact Precautions. Close contacts, patients transferred from facilities with endemic C. auris or admitted following stay in overseas healthcare institutions should be pre-emptively isolated and screened for colonisation. Composite swabs of the axilla and groin should be collected. Routine screening of healthcare workers and the environment is not recommended. Detergents and sporicidal disinfectants should be used for environmental decontamination.

Carriage of multiple subtypes of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus by intensive care unit patients.

OBJECTIVE: To determine how consistently patients are colonized with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) at various sites and how many subtypes can be carried simultaneously by a single patient. SETTING: A 28-bed Intensive care unit in a tertiary-care referral hospital. METHODS: A total of 1,181 patients were screened by culture of swab specimens obtained from the nose, throat, groin, and axilla on admission to the intensive care unit (ICU), twice weekly during their ICU stay, and at discharge. RESULTS: MRSA was isolated at least once from 224 patients. Of these isolates, 359 were selected from 32 patients to be subtyped using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. The rate of compliance with collection of swab specimens was 79.9%. The combination of sites colonized varied frequently over time for many patients. Of patients who had swab specimens obtained twice in 1 day, 8.7% had discordant results from the 2 swab sets. No patient had a clinical isolate that was not of an identical subtype to an isolate from an anatomical site that was sampled for screening. Half the patients carried multiple subtypes during their stay, with up to 4 subtypes per patient. CONCLUSIONS: The findings of this study may indicate that these patients have been colonized with MRSA on more than one occasion, possibly because of multiple breaches in infection control procedure. In MRSA-colonized patients, anatomical sites were intermittently colonized and carriage of multiple subtypes was common. These findings indicate that MRSA carriage is not a fixed state but may vary over time.

ASID (HICSIG) position statement: infection control guidelines for patients with influenza-like illnesses, including pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009, in Australian health care facilities.

Standard and Droplet Precautions are considered adequate to control the transmission of influenza in most health care situations. Vaccination of health care staff, carers and vulnerable patients against seasonal and, eventually, pandemic influenza strains is an essential protective strategy. Management principles include: performance of hand hygiene before and after every patient contact or contact with the patient environment, in accord with the national 5 Moments for Hand Hygiene Standard; disinfection of the patient environment; early identification and isolation of patients with suspected or proven influenza; adoption of a greater minimum distance of patient separation (2 metres) than previously recommended; use of a surgical mask and eye protection for personal protection on entry to infectious areas or within 2 metres of an infectious patient; contact tracing for patient and health care staff and restriction of prophylactic antivirals mainly to those at high risk of severe disease; in high aerosol-risk settings, use of particulate mask, eye protection, impervious long-sleeved gown, and gloves donned in that sequence and removed in reverse sequence, avoiding self-contamination; exclusion of symptomatic staff from the workplace until criteria for non-infectious status are met; reserving negative-pressure ventilation rooms (if available) for intensive care patients, especially those receiving non-invasive ventilation; ensuring that infectious postpartum women wear surgical masks when caring for their newborn infants and practise strict hand hygiene; and implementation of special arrangements for potentially infected newborns who require nursery or intensive care.