Effectiveness of Covid-19 Vaccines over a 9-Month Period in North Carolina.

BACKGROUND: The duration of protection afforded by coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) vaccines in the United States is unclear. Whether the increase in postvaccination infections during the summer of 2021 was caused by declining immunity over time, the emergence of the B.1.617.2 (delta) variant, or both is unknown. METHODS: We extracted data regarding Covid-19-related vaccination and outcomes during a 9-month period (December 11, 2020, to September 8, 2021) for approximately 10.6 million North Carolina residents by linking data from the North Carolina Covid-19 Surveillance System and the Covid-19 Vaccine Management System. We used a Cox regression model to estimate the effectiveness of the BNT162b2 (Pfizer-BioNTech), mRNA-1273 (Moderna), and Ad26.COV2.S (Johnson & Johnson-Janssen) vaccines in reducing the current risks of Covid-19, hospitalization, and death, as a function of time elapsed since vaccination. RESULTS: For the two-dose regimens of messenger RNA (mRNA) vaccines BNT162b2 (30 µg per dose) and mRNA-1273 (100 µg per dose), vaccine effectiveness against Covid-19 was 94.5% (95% confidence interval [CI], 94.1 to 94.9) and 95.9% (95% CI, 95.5 to 96.2), respectively, at 2 months after the first dose and decreased to 66.6% (95% CI, 65.2 to 67.8) and 80.3% (95% CI, 79.3 to 81.2), respectively, at 7 months. Among early recipients of BNT162b2 and mRNA-1273, effectiveness decreased by approximately 15 and 10 percentage points, respectively, from mid-June to mid-July, when the delta variant became dominant. For the one-dose regimen of Ad26.COV2.S (5 × 1010 viral particles), effectiveness against Covid-19 was 74.8% (95% CI, 72.5 to 76.9) at 1 month and decreased to 59.4% (95% CI, 57.2 to 61.5) at 5 months. All three vaccines maintained better effectiveness in preventing hospitalization and death than in preventing infection over time, although the two mRNA vaccines provided higher levels of protection than Ad26.COV2.S. CONCLUSIONS: All three Covid-19 vaccines had durable effectiveness in reducing the risks of hospitalization and death. Waning protection against infection over time was due to both declining immunity and the emergence of the delta variant. (Funded by a Dennis Gillings Distinguished Professorship and the National Institutes of Health.).

Association of Primary and Booster Vaccination and Prior Infection With SARS-CoV-2 Infection and Severe COVID-19 Outcomes.

Importance: Data about the association of COVID-19 vaccination and prior SARS-CoV-2 infection with risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection and severe COVID-19 outcomes may guide prevention strategies. Objective: To estimate the time-varying association of primary and booster COVID-19 vaccination and prior SARS-CoV-2 infection with subsequent SARS-CoV-2 infection, hospitalization, and death. Design, Setting, and Participants: Cohort study of 10.6 million residents in North Carolina from March 2, 2020, through June 3, 2022. Exposures: COVID-19 primary vaccine series and boosters and prior SARS-CoV-2 infection. Main Outcomes and Measures: Rate ratio (RR) of SARS-CoV-2 infection and hazard ratio (HR) of COVID-19-related hospitalization and death. Results: The median age among the 10.6 million participants was 39 years; 51.3% were female, 71.5% were White, and 9.9% were Hispanic. As of June 3, 2022, 67% of participants had been vaccinated. There were 2 771 364 SARS-CoV-2 infections, with a hospitalization rate of 6.3% and mortality rate of 1.4%. The adjusted RR of the primary vaccine series compared with being unvaccinated against infection became 0.53 (95% CI, 0.52-0.53) for BNT162b2, 0.52 (95% CI, 0.51-0.53) for mRNA-1273, and 0.51 (95% CI, 0.50-0.53) for Ad26.COV2.S 10 months after the first dose, but the adjusted HR for hospitalization remained at 0.29 (95% CI, 0.24-0.35) for BNT162b2, 0.27 (95% CI, 0.23-0.32) for mRNA-1273, and 0.35 (95% CI, 0.29-0.42) for Ad26.COV2.S and the adjusted HR of death remained at 0.23 (95% CI, 0.17-0.29) for BNT162b2, 0.15 (95% CI, 0.11-0.20) for mRNA-1273, and 0.24 (95% CI, 0.19-0.31) for Ad26.COV2.S. For the BNT162b2 primary series, boosting in December 2021 with BNT162b2 had the adjusted RR relative to primary series of 0.39 (95% CI, 0.38-0.40) and boosting with mRNA-1273 had the adjusted RR of 0.32 (95% CI, 0.30-0.34) against infection after 1 month and boosting with BNT162b2 had the adjusted RR of 0.84 (95% CI, 0.82-0.86) and boosting with mRNA-1273 had the adjusted RR of 0.60 (95% CI, 0.57-0.62) after 3 months. Among all participants, the adjusted RR of Omicron infection compared with no prior infection was estimated at 0.23 (95% CI, 0.22-0.24) against infection, and the adjusted HRs were 0.10 (95% CI, 0.07-0.14) against hospitalization and 0.11 (95% CI, 0.08-0.15) against death after 4 months. Conclusions and Relevance: Receipt of primary COVID-19 vaccine series compared with being unvaccinated, receipt of boosters compared with primary vaccination, and prior infection compared with no prior infection were all significantly associated with lower risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection (including Omicron) and resulting hospitalization and death. The associated protection waned over time, especially against infection.

Characteristics of an Outbreak of E-cigarette, or Vaping, Product Use-Associated Lung Injury-North Carolina, 2019.

BACKGROUND In August 2019, the North Carolina Division of Public Health (NCDPH) began investigating e-cigarette, or vaping, product use-associated lung injury (EVALI) cases as part of a national response. We describe clinical, epidemiologic, and laboratory findings of North Carolina EVALI patients.METHODS NCDPH requested that physicians report cases of respiratory illness or bilateral pulmonary infiltrates or opacities in patients who reported using e-cigarette, or vaping, products and had no infection or alternative plausible diagnoses. We reviewed medical records, interviewed patients, and tested vaping products for substances.RESULTS During August 13, 2019-February 18, 2020, 78 EVALI cases were reported in North Carolina. Median age of cases was 24 years (range: 13-72 years); 49 (63%) patients were male. Symptoms included cough (n = 70; 90%), shortness of breath (n = 66; 85%), and gastrointestinal symptoms (n = 63; 81%). Seventy-five patients (96%) were hospitalized, 32 (41%) required intensive care, and 12 (16%) required mechanical ventilation; none died. Among 20 patients interviewed, most reported using tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) (n = 16; 80%) or nicotine-containing products (n = 14; 70%). All obtained THC-containing products from informal sources, such as family, friends, or dealers, as THC is illegal in North Carolina. Among 82 products tested, 74 (90%) contained THC, cannabidiol, or cannabinol; 54 (66%) contained vitamin E acetate.LIMITATIONS In North Carolina, EVALI is not reportable by law, and THC is illegal. Thus, cases and exposures are likely underreported.CONCLUSIONS THC-containing products, particularly those containing vitamin E acetate, are associated with EVALI. Persons should not use these products, particularly from informal sources. Continued communication of health risks to persons who use e-cigarette, or vaping, products is essential.

Not Just Endocarditis: Hospitalizations for Selected Invasive Infections Among Persons With Opioid and Stimulant Use Diagnoses-North Carolina, 2010-2018.

BACKGROUND: While increases in overdoses, viral hepatitis, and endocarditis associated with drug use have been well-documented in North Carolina, the full scope of invasive drug-related infections (IDRIs) has not. We characterized trends in IDRIs among hospitalized patients in North Carolina. METHODS: We compared invasive infections that were related or not related to drug use among hospitalized patients aged 18-55 years based on retrospective review of administrative records from 2010-2018. Hospitalizations for endocarditis, central nervous system/spine infections, osteomyelitis, and septic arthritis were labeled as IDRIs if discharge codes included opioid and/or amphetamine misuse. Trends, rates, and distributions were calculated. RESULTS: Among 44 851 hospitalizations for the specified infections, 2830 (6.3%) were IDRIs. The proportion of infections attributable to drug use increased from 1.5% (2010) to 13.1% (2018), and the rate grew from 1.2 to 15.1 per 100 000. Compared with those who had non-drug-related infections, patients with IDRIs were younger (median age, 35 vs 46 years), more likely to be non-Hispanic white (81% vs 56%), and had longer hospitalizations (median, 8 vs 6 days). 43% of hospitalizations for IDRIs involved infective endocarditis. CONCLUSIONS: The rate of IDRIs in North Carolina increased substantially during 2010-2018, indicating an urgent need for enhanced infection prevention, harm reduction, and addiction services aimed at community and inpatient settings.

Laboratory-Acquired Dengue Virus Infection, United States, 2018.

Investigation of a dengue case in a laboratory worker in North Carolina, USA, revealed that the case-patient prepared high-titer dengue virus stocks soon before illness onset. Improper doffing of gloves with an open finger wound likely resulted in cutaneous exposure. This case reinforces recommendations for enhanced precautions when working with high-titer dengue virus.

Multiple COVID-19 Clusters on a University Campus - North Carolina, August 2020.

Preventing transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), in institutes of higher education presents a unique set of challenges because of the presence of congregate living settings and difficulty limiting socialization and group gatherings. Before August 2020, minimal data were available regarding COVID-19 outbreaks in these settings. On August 3, 2020, university A in North Carolina broadly opened campus for the first time since transitioning to primarily remote learning in March. Consistent with CDC guidance at that time (1,2), steps were taken to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2 on campus. During August 3-25, 670 laboratory-confirmed cases of COVID-19 were identified; 96% were among patients aged <22 years. Eighteen clusters of five or more epidemiologically linked cases within 14 days of one another were reported; 30% of cases were linked to a cluster. Student gatherings and congregate living settings, both on and off campus, likely contributed to the rapid spread of COVID-19 within the university community. On August 19, all university A classes transitioned to online, and additional mitigation efforts were implemented. At this point, 334 university A-associated COVID-19 cases had been reported to the local health department. The rapid increase in cases within 2 weeks of opening campus suggests that robust measures are needed to reduce transmission at institutes of higher education, including efforts to increase consistent use of masks, reduce the density of on-campus housing, increase testing for SARS-CoV-2, and discourage student gatherings.

Trends in Number and Distribution of COVID-19 Hotspot Counties - United States, March 8-July 15, 2020.

The geographic areas in the United States most affected by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have changed over time. On May 7, 2020, CDC, with other federal agencies, began identifying counties with increasing COVID-19 incidence (hotspots) to better understand transmission dynamics and offer targeted support to health departments in affected communities. Data for January 22-July 15, 2020, were analyzed retrospectively (January 22-May 6) and prospectively (May 7-July 15) to detect hotspot counties. No counties met hotspot criteria during January 22-March 7, 2020. During March 8-July 15, 2020, 818 counties met hotspot criteria for ≥1 day; these counties included 80% of the U.S. population. The daily number of counties meeting hotspot criteria peaked in early April, decreased and stabilized during mid-April-early June, then increased again during late June-early July. The percentage of counties in the South and West Census regions* meeting hotspot criteria increased from 10% and 13%, respectively, during March-April to 28% and 22%, respectively, during June-July. Identification of community transmission as a contributing factor increased over time, whereas identification of outbreaks in long-term care facilities, food processing facilities, correctional facilities, or other workplaces as contributing factors decreased. Identification of hotspot counties and understanding how they change over time can help prioritize and target implementation of U.S. public health response activities.

COVID-19 Contact Tracing in Two Counties - North Carolina, June-July 2020.

Contact tracing is a strategy implemented to minimize the spread of communicable diseases (1,2). Prompt contact tracing, testing, and self-quarantine can reduce the transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (3,4). Community engagement is important to encourage participation in and cooperation with SARS-CoV-2 contact tracing (5). Substantial investments have been made to scale up contact tracing for COVID-19 in the United States. During June 1-July 12, 2020, the incidence of COVID-19 cases in North Carolina increased 183%, from seven to 19 per 100,000 persons per day* (6). To assess local COVID-19 contact tracing implementation, data from two counties in North Carolina were analyzed during a period of high incidence. Health department staff members investigated 5,514 (77%) persons with COVID-19 in Mecklenburg County and 584 (99%) in Randolph Counties. No contacts were reported for 48% of cases in Mecklenburg and for 35% in Randolph. Among contacts provided, 25% in Mecklenburg and 48% in Randolph could not be reached by telephone and were classified as nonresponsive after at least one attempt on 3 consecutive days of failed attempts. The median interval from specimen collection from the index patient to notification of identified contacts was 6 days in both counties. Despite aggressive efforts by health department staff members to perform case investigations and contact tracing, many persons with COVID-19 did not report contacts, and many contacts were not reached. These findings indicate that improved timeliness of contact tracing, community engagement, and increased use of community-wide mitigation are needed to interrupt SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

Implementation of a Pooled Surveillance Testing Program for Asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 Infections on a College Campus - Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, August 2-October 11, 2020.

On university campuses and in similar congregate environments, surveillance testing of asymptomatic persons is a critical strategy (1,2) for preventing transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). All students at Duke University, a private research university in Durham, North Carolina, signed the Duke Compact (3), agreeing to observe mandatory masking, social distancing, and participation in entry and surveillance testing. The university implemented a five-to-one pooled testing program for SARS-CoV-2 using a quantitative, in-house, laboratory-developed, real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test (4,5). Pooling of specimens to enable large-scale testing while minimizing use of reagents was pioneered during the human immunodeficiency virus pandemic (6). A similar methodology was adapted for Duke University's asymptomatic testing program. The baseline SARS-CoV-2 testing plan was to distribute tests geospatially and temporally across on- and off-campus student populations. By September 20, 2020, asymptomatic testing was scaled up to testing targets, which include testing for residential undergraduates twice weekly, off-campus undergraduates one to two times per week, and graduate students approximately once weekly. In addition, in response to newly identified positive test results, testing was focused in locations or within cohorts where data suggested an increased risk for transmission. Scale-up over 4 weeks entailed redeploying staff members to prepare 15 campus testing sites for specimen collection, developing information management tools, and repurposing laboratory automation to establish an asymptomatic surveillance system. During August 2-October 11, 68,913 specimens from 10,265 graduate and undergraduate students were tested. Eighty-four specimens were positive for SARS-CoV-2, and 51% were among persons with no symptoms. Testing as a result of contact tracing identified 27.4% of infections. A combination of risk-reduction strategies and frequent surveillance testing likely contributed to a prolonged period of low transmission on campus. These findings highlight the importance of combined testing and contact tracing strategies beyond symptomatic testing, in association with other preventive measures. Pooled testing balances resource availability with supply-chain disruptions, high throughput with high sensitivity, and rapid turnaround with an acceptable workload.

COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing Facilities - 19 States, April 2020.

Congregate work and residential locations are at increased risk for infectious disease transmission including respiratory illness outbreaks. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), is primarily spread person to person through respiratory droplets. Nationwide, the meat and poultry processing industry, an essential component of the U.S. food infrastructure, employs approximately 500,000 persons, many of whom work in proximity to other workers (1). Because of reports of initial cases of COVID-19, in some meat processing facilities, states were asked to provide aggregated data concerning the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19 and the number of workers with COVID-19 in these facilities, including COVID-19-related deaths. Qualitative data gathered by CDC during on-site and remote assessments were analyzed and summarized. During April 9-27, aggregate data on COVID-19 cases among 115 meat or poultry processing facilities in 19 states were reported to CDC. Among these facilities, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,913 (approximately 3%) workers, and 20 COVID-19-related deaths were reported. Facility barriers to effective prevention and control of COVID-19 included difficulty distancing workers at least 6 feet (2 meters) from one another (2) and in implementing COVID-19-specific disinfection guidelines.* Among workers, socioeconomic challenges might contribute to working while feeling ill, particularly if there are management practices such as bonuses that incentivize attendance. Methods to decrease transmission within the facility include worker symptom screening programs, policies to discourage working while experiencing symptoms compatible with COVID-19, and social distancing by workers. Source control measures (e.g., the use of cloth face covers) as well as increased disinfection of high-touch surfaces are also important means of preventing SARS-CoV-2 exposure. Mitigation efforts to reduce transmission in the community should also be considered. Many of these measures might also reduce asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission (3). Implementation of these public health strategies will help protect workers from COVID-19 in this industry and assist in preserving the critical meat and poultry production infrastructure (4).

Redefining the Team in Team-Based Care: Role of Public Health.

In North Carolina, our public health infrastructure consists of a state health department and 85 local health departments representing all 100 counties. The state health department, local health departments, health systems, and clinical providers work literally and figuratively as a team to improve the health of our citizens. In this article, we provide examples of the critical role of public health practitioners as part of the broader team addressing health, specifically in the areas of chronic disease, communicable disease, oral health, environmental health, and maternal and child health.

Hepatitis B Reverse Seroconversion and Transmission in a Hemodialysis Center: A Public Health Investigation and Case Report.

In March 2013, public health authorities were notified of a new hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection in a patient receiving hemodialysis. We investigated to identify the source and prevent additional infections. We reviewed medical records, interviewed the index patient regarding hepatitis B risk factors, performed HBV molecular analysis, and observed infection control practices at the outpatient hemodialysis facility where she received care. The index patient's only identified hepatitis B risk factor was hemodialysis treatment. The facility had no other patients with known active HBV infection. One patient had evidence of a resolved HBV infection. Investigation of this individual, who was identified as the source patient, indicated that HBV reverse seroconversion and reactivation had occurred in the setting of HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) infection and a failed kidney transplant. HBV whole genome sequences analysis from the index and source patients indicated 99.9% genetic homology. Facility observations revealed multiple infection control breaches. Inadequate dilution of the source patient's sample during HBV testing might have led to a false-negative result, delaying initiation of hemodialysis in isolation. In conclusion, HBV transmission occurred after an HIV-positive hemodialysis patient with transplant-related immunosuppression experienced HBV reverse seroconversion and reactivation. Providers should be aware of this possibility, especially among severely immunosuppressed patients, and maintain stringent infection control.

Preventing Health Care-Associated Infections: Connecting North Carolina's Patients to National Efforts.

With increased federal and state attention to prevention and control of health care-associated infections (HAIs), broad multifacility collaboratives have emerged to guide providers' work at the bedside. This commentary reviews how HAI prevention flows from federal-level guidance through state leadership and into hospitals, connecting governance to its impact on North Carolina's patients.

Previously undiagnosed HIV infections identified through cluster investigation, North Carolina, 2002-2007.

During cluster investigation, index patients name social contacts that are not sex or drug-sharing partners. The likelihood of identifying new HIV infections among social contacts is unknown. We hypothesized greater odds of identifying new infections among social contacts identified by men who report sex with men (MSM). We reviewed North Carolina HIV diagnoses during 2002-2005 and used logistic regression to compare testing results among social contacts of MSM, men who report sex with women only (MSW) and women. HIV was newly diagnosed among 54/601 (9.0 %) social contacts tested named by MSM, 16/522 (3.1 %) named by MSW, and 23/639 (3.6 %) named by women. Compared with those named by MSW, odds of new HIV diagnosis were greater among MSM social contacts (adjusted odds ratio: 2.5; 95 % confidence interval: 1.3-4.7). Testing social contacts identified previously undiagnosed HIV infections and could provide an opportunity to interrupt transmission.

Notes from the field: atypical pneumonia in three members of an extended family - South Carolina and north Carolina, july-august 2013.

On August 5, 2013, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified of a case of acute respiratory failure in a previously healthy woman. A family interview revealed the patient's uncle and cousin had also been hospitalized with similar symptoms in North Carolina. The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control and the North Carolina Division of Public Health collaborated to identify the cause of the respiratory illness cluster and to prevent additional illnesses.