Creating resistance to avian influenza infection through genome editing of the ANP32 gene family.

Chickens genetically resistant to avian influenza could prevent future outbreaks. In chickens, influenza A virus (IAV) relies on host protein ANP32A. Here we use CRISPR/Cas9 to generate homozygous gene edited (GE) chickens containing two ANP32A amino acid substitutions that prevent viral polymerase interaction. After IAV challenge, 9/10 edited chickens remain uninfected. Challenge with a higher dose, however, led to breakthrough infections. Breakthrough IAV virus contained IAV polymerase gene mutations that conferred adaptation to the edited chicken ANP32A. Unexpectedly, this virus also replicated in chicken embryos edited to remove the entire ANP32A gene and instead co-opted alternative ANP32 protein family members, chicken ANP32B and ANP32E. Additional genome editing for removal of ANP32B and ANP32E eliminated all viral growth in chicken cells. Our data illustrate a first proof of concept step to generate IAV-resistant chickens and show that multiple genetic modifications will be required to curtail viral escape.

Genomic screening of 16 UK native bat species through conservationist networks uncovers coronaviruses with zoonotic potential.

There has been limited characterisation of bat-borne coronaviruses in Europe. Here, we screened for coronaviruses in 48 faecal samples from 16 of the 17 bat species breeding in the UK, collected through a bat rehabilitation and conservationist network. We recovered nine complete genomes, including two novel coronavirus species, across six bat species: four alphacoronaviruses, a MERS-related betacoronavirus, and four closely related sarbecoviruses. We demonstrate that at least one of these sarbecoviruses can bind and use the human ACE2 receptor for infecting human cells, albeit suboptimally. Additionally, the spike proteins of these sarbecoviruses possess an R-A-K-Q motif, which lies only one nucleotide mutation away from a furin cleavage site (FCS) that enhances infectivity in other coronaviruses, including SARS-CoV-2. However, mutating this motif to an FCS does not enable spike cleavage. Overall, while UK sarbecoviruses would require further molecular adaptations to infect humans, their zoonotic risk warrants closer surveillance.

Mutations that adapt SARS-CoV-2 to mink or ferret do not increase fitness in the human airway.

SARS-CoV-2 has a broad mammalian species tropism infecting humans, cats, dogs, and farmed mink. Since the start of the 2019 pandemic, several reverse zoonotic outbreaks of SARS-CoV-2 have occurred in mink, one of which reinfected humans and caused a cluster of infections in Denmark. Here we investigate the molecular basis of mink and ferret adaptation and demonstrate the spike mutations Y453F, F486L, and N501T all specifically adapt SARS-CoV-2 to use mustelid ACE2. Furthermore, we risk assess these mutations and conclude mink-adapted viruses are unlikely to pose an increased threat to humans, as Y453F attenuates the virus replication in human cells and all three mink adaptations have minimal antigenic impact. Finally, we show that certain SARS-CoV-2 variants emerging from circulation in humans may naturally have a greater propensity to infect mustelid hosts and therefore these species should continue to be surveyed for reverse zoonotic infections.