ABSTRACT
Money has been portrayed by major theorists as an agent of individualism, an instrument of freedom, a currency that removes personal values attached to things, and a generator of avarice. Regardless, the impact of money varies greatly with the cultural turf of the recipient societies. For traditional subsistence economies based on gifting and sharing, surplus perishable resources foraged from the environment carry low costs to the giver compared with the benefits to the receiver. With cash, costs to the giver are usually the same as benefits to the receiver, making sharing expensive and introducing new choices. Using quantitative data on possessions and expenditures collected over a 44-y period from 1974 to 2018 among the Ju/'hoansi (!Kung) in southern Africa, former hunter-gatherers, we look at how individuals spend monetary income, how a partial monetary economy alters traditional norms and institutions (egalitarianism, gifting, and sharing), and how institutions from the past steer change. Results show that gifting declines as cash is spent to increase the well-being of individual families and that gifting and sharing decrease and networks narrow. The sharing of meals and casual gifting hold fast. Substantial material inequalities develop, even between neighbors, but social, gender, and political equalities persist. A strong tradition for individual autonomy combined with monetary income allows individuals to spend their money as they choose, adapt to modern conditions, and pursue new options. However, new challenges are emerging to develop greater community cooperation and build substantial and sustainable economies in the face of such centrifugal forces.
Subject(s)
Commerce , Individuality , Africa, Southern , Humans , Social ConditionsABSTRACT
Cultural norms are key to cooperation in human societies. How they are regulated, maintained, and adapted to the change remains a matter of debate. Humans have dispositions for both retributive and restorative justice; recent focus has been on third-party punishment, punitive sanctions by those not directly harmed, as key for norm enforcement. However, punishment does not engage the essential proficiencies and emotions critical to cooperation in small-scale societies with high dependence on collective action, sharing, and exchange. Third-party participation in norm enforcement is examined with data from a 10-y study among the Enga of Papua New Guinea. The Enga have a plural justice system with formal courts practicing retributive justice and customary courts applying restorative measures. Most cases are brought to customary courts. Drawing on observations from 333 village customary court cases concerning assault, marriage, land, and property violations, third-party engagement outside of and during customary court hearings is analyzed. Results show that all sides are heard, restoration is prioritized, and third-party punishment is rare; rather, third parties help with compensation to reintegrate wrongdoers and resolve conflicts. Repeated offenders and free riders receive ever less community support. Third parties contribute substantially both during and outside of customary court sessions to help kin, pursue economic agendas, or gain reputation. They also act generously to build a strong community. Emphasis is on amends to the victim for fairness, not punishment of the offender. Broad third-party participation is maintained throughout times of rapid change to adapt while supporting essential structures of society.
ABSTRACT
The cultural evolutionary approach to the dynamics of cumulative culture is insufficient for understanding how culture affects heritability estimates; it ignores the agency of individuals and internal complexity of social groups that drive cultural evolution. Both environmental and social selection need consideration. The WEIRD (western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) problem has never plagued anthropology: A wealth of ethnography is available for the problem at hand.
Subject(s)
Cultural Evolution , HumansABSTRACT
If recent exploratory traditions tap into evolved psychological dispositions to explore, wouldn't humans be expected to have drawn on such dispositions long before the written word? Trickster oral traditions fill this role in all levels of society, affluence, and on all continents, inverting the boundaries of social worlds and those between humans and animals, fostering cultural innovation.
Subject(s)
Creativity , Animals , HumansABSTRACT
Whitehouse's view that our ultrasocial species evolved in small, warring bands is questioned, and alternative social selection pressures for the evolution of identity fusion and self-sacrifice in small-scale societies are proposed. Short durations of states of fusion allow for re-evaluation of risks; the consolidation of episodic memories into collective oral traditions elicits cooperation. Dysmorphic memories may be more powerful in generating identity fusion when followed by euphoric ones, as in "rites of torture" in male initiations.
Subject(s)
Cognition , Interpersonal Relations , Humans , Male , MemoryABSTRACT
Much attention has been focused on control of fire in human evolution and the impact of cooking on anatomy, social, and residential arrangements. However, little is known about what transpired when firelight extended the day, creating effective time for social activities that did not conflict with productive time for subsistence activities. Comparison of 174 day and nighttime conversations among the Ju/'hoan (!Kung) Bushmen of southern Africa, supplemented by 68 translated texts, suggests that day talk centers on economic matters and gossip to regulate social relations. Night activities steer away from tensions of the day to singing, dancing, religious ceremonies, and enthralling stories, often about known people. Such stories describe the workings of entire institutions in a small-scale society with little formal teaching. Night talk plays an important role in evoking higher orders of theory of mind via the imagination, conveying attributes of people in broad networks (virtual communities), and transmitting the "big picture" of cultural institutions that generate regularity of behavior, cooperation, and trust at the regional level. Findings from the Ju/'hoan are compared with other hunter-gatherer societies and related to the widespread human use of firelight for intimate conversation and our appetite for evening stories. The question is raised as to what happens when economically unproductive firelit time is turned to productive time by artificial lighting.
Subject(s)
Ethnicity/psychology , Fires , Social Behavior , Anthropology, Cultural , Black People/psychology , Botswana , Female , Humans , Interpersonal Relations , Male , NamibiaABSTRACT
Van Lange et al. add important life history perspectives to understanding violence. However, direct links between climate and violence are unlikely because cultural institutions modify human responses. Examples are given from the Bushmen of the Kalahari and Enga of Papua New Guinea. The correlations identified may occur because many countries closer to the equator are caught in the gap between the demise of traditional cultural institutions and the rise of modern forms of governance.
Subject(s)
Aggression , Self-Control , Botswana , Climate , Humans , Papua New Guinea , ViolenceABSTRACT
To add ethnographic perspective to Guala's arguments, I suggest reasons why experimental and ethnographic evidence do not concur and highlight some difficulties in measuring whether positive and negative reciprocity are indeed costly. I suggest that institutions to reduce the costs of maintaining cooperation are not limited to complex societies.
Subject(s)
Cooperative Behavior , Game Theory , Models, Psychological , Punishment/psychology , Social Behavior , HumansABSTRACT
Institutions to regulate marriage and sexual mores are nearly universal across human societies to assure production and reproduction and weave the fabric of society. The stakeholders are many. What happens when marital traditions break down in times of rapid change? Taking a long-term perspective, we will first look at developments in marital institutions that occurred after the arrival of the sweet potato (ca. 400 BP) among the Enga of Papua New Guinea. Next, we will document changes in recent marital practices of 402 Enga women collected in 2007. With data from 270 public forums in customary courts applying restorative justice between 2008 and 2019, we will consider (a) the impact of the breakdown of marital institutions and (b) responses to adapt norms to new practices. In the absence of regulation by 'traditional' institutions, individuals pursue their own interests and passions with negative outcomes for families and communities. Communities, non-governmental organisations, churches and government throughout Papua New Guinea are seeking to adapt norms to new conditions. We consider both norm change resulting from community action via customary courts and what communities strive to preserve. Cultural institutions and accompanying norms are important factors in assuring production and reproduction; however, they can instill attitudes that inhibit adaptation.
ABSTRACT
We report quantitative estimates of intergenerational transmission and population-wide inequality for wealth measures in a set of hunter-gatherer populations. Wealth is defined broadly as factors that contribute to individual or household well-being, ranging from embodied forms such as weight and hunting success to material forms such household goods, as well as relational wealth in exchange partners. Intergenerational wealth transmission is low to moderate in these populations, but is still expected to have measurable influence on an individual's life chances. Wealth inequality (measured with Gini coefficients) is moderate for most wealth types, matching what qualitative ethnographic research has generally indicated (if not the stereotype of hunter-gatherers as extreme egalitarians). We discuss some plausible mechanisms for these patterns, and suggest ways in which future research could resolve questions about the role of wealth in hunter-gatherer social and economic life.
ABSTRACT
Water sharing offers insight into the everyday and, at times, invisible ties that bind people and households with water and to one another. Water sharing can take many forms, including so-called "pure gifts," balanced exchanges, and negative reciprocity. In this paper, we examine water sharing between households as a culturally-embedded practice that may be both need-based and symbolically meaningful. Drawing on a wide-ranging review of diverse literatures, we describe how households practice water sharing cross-culturally in the context of four livelihood strategies (hunter-gatherer, pastoralist, agricultural, and urban). We then explore how cross-cutting material conditions (risks and costs/benefits, infrastructure and technologies), socio-economic processes (social and political power, water entitlements, ethnicity and gender, territorial sovereignty), and cultural norms (moral economies of water, water ontologies, and religious beliefs) shape water sharing practices. Finally, we identify five new directions for future research on water sharing: conceptualization of water sharing; exploitation and status accumulation through water sharing, biocultural approaches to the health risks and benefits of water sharing, cultural meanings and socio-economic values of waters shared; and water sharing as a way to enact resistance and build alternative economies.
ABSTRACT
Recent claims of culture in great apes have provoked fervent argument about the 'true' definition of culture, most of which has been unhelpful. Instead, a range of definitions should be used to explore different aspects of the cognitive processes that together result in human culture, many of which can be productively studied in non-humans. A richer cognitive account of the contents of culture needs to be developed and used to compare animal and human cultures, instead of sterile searching for a cognitive Rubicon between them. Exploring six views of culture, this article highlights the fundamental contrast of whether culture evolves as a by-product of cumulative change in cognitive mechanisms, or whether it is actively selected for its advantages.
Subject(s)
Brain/physiology , Cognition/physiology , Culture , Social Behavior , Adaptation, Psychological , Animals , Humans , LearningABSTRACT
The concept of cooperative communities that enforce norm conformity through reward, as well as shaming, ridicule, and ostracism, has been central to anthropology since the work of Durkheim. Prevailing approaches from evolutionary theory explain the willingness to exert sanctions to enforce norms as self-interested behavior, while recent experimental studies suggest that altruistic rewarding and punishing-"strong reciprocity"-play an important role in promoting cooperation. This paper will use data from 308 conversations among the Ju/'hoansi (!Kung) Bushmen (a) to examine the dynamics of norm enforcement, (b) to evaluate the costs of punishment in a forager society and understand how they are reduced, and
ABSTRACT
In 1990, shotguns and M-16s were adopted into Enga warfare, setting off some 15 years of devastation as youths (~17 to 28) took charge of interclan warfare. In response, people called on elder leaders to adapt customary institutions to restore peace; subsequently, war deaths and the frequency of war declined radically. Data from precolonial warfare, 501 recent wars, and 129 customary court sessions allow us to consider (i) the principles and values behind customary institutions for peace, (ii) their effectiveness, (iii) how they interact with and compare to state institutions of today, and (iv) how such institutions might have shaped our human behavioral repertoire to make life in state societies possible.
Subject(s)
Behavior , Firearms/statistics & numerical data , Mortality/trends , Violence , Warfare , Adolescent , Adult , Humans , Papua New Guinea , Young AdultABSTRACT
Contemporary humans exhibit spectacular biological success derived from cumulative culture and cooperation. The origins of these traits may be related to our ancestral group structure. Because humans lived as foragers for 95% of our species' history, we analyzed co-residence patterns among 32 present-day foraging societies (total n = 5067 individuals, mean experienced band size = 28.2 adults). We found that hunter-gatherers display a unique social structure where (i) either sex may disperse or remain in their natal group, (ii) adult brothers and sisters often co-reside, and (iii) most individuals in residential groups are genetically unrelated. These patterns produce large interaction networks of unrelated adults and suggest that inclusive fitness cannot explain extensive cooperation in hunter-gatherer bands. However, large social networks may help to explain why humans evolved capacities for social learning that resulted in cumulative culture.
Subject(s)
Cultural Evolution , Family , Population Groups , Residence Characteristics , Social Behavior , Adult , Cooperative Behavior , Cross-Cultural Comparison , Female , Humans , MaleABSTRACT
Small-scale human societies range from foraging bands with a strong egalitarian ethos to more economically stratified agrarian and pastoral societies. We explain this variation in inequality using a dynamic model in which a population's long-run steady-state level of inequality depends on the extent to which its most important forms of wealth are transmitted within families across generations. We estimate the degree of intergenerational transmission of three different types of wealth (material, embodied, and relational), as well as the extent of wealth inequality in 21 historical and contemporary populations. We show that intergenerational transmission of wealth and wealth inequality are substantial among pastoral and small-scale agricultural societies (on a par with or even exceeding the most unequal modern industrial economies) but are limited among horticultural and foraging peoples (equivalent to the most egalitarian of modern industrial populations). Differences in the technology by which a people derive their livelihood and in the institutions and norms making up the economic system jointly contribute to this pattern.