Kuhnian Lessons for the Study of Open-Ended Evolution.

Kuhnian philosophy of science implies that progress in the study of open-ended evolution (OEE) would be accelerated if the OEE science community were to agree on some examples of striking success in OEE science. This article recounts the important role of scientific paradigms and scientific exemplars in creating the productivity of what Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, calls "normal" science, and it describes how the study of OEE today would benefit from exhibiting more of the hallmarks of normal science. The article concludes by describing five proposed projects that would help create a consensus in the OEE community on some good examples of the scientific study of OEE.

Slowed canonical progress in large fields of science.

In many academic fields, the number of papers published each year has increased significantly over time. Policy measures aim to increase the quantity of scientists, research funding, and scientific output, which is measured by the number of papers produced. These quantitative metrics determine the career trajectories of scholars and evaluations of academic departments, institutions, and nations. Whether and how these increases in the numbers of scientists and papers translate into advances in knowledge is unclear, however. Here, we first lay out a theoretical argument for why too many papers published each year in a field can lead to stagnation rather than advance. The deluge of new papers may deprive reviewers and readers the cognitive slack required to fully recognize and understand novel ideas. Competition among many new ideas may prevent the gradual accumulation of focused attention on a promising new idea. Then, we show data supporting the predictions of this theory. When the number of papers published per year in a scientific field grows large, citations flow disproportionately to already well-cited papers; the list of most-cited papers ossifies; new papers are unlikely to ever become highly cited, and when they do, it is not through a gradual, cumulative process of attention gathering; and newly published papers become unlikely to disrupt existing work. These findings suggest that the progress of large scientific fields may be slowed, trapped in existing canon. Policy measures shifting how scientific work is produced, disseminated, consumed, and rewarded may be called for to push fields into new, more fertile areas of study.

Promoting Data Sharing: The Moral Obligations of Public Funding Agencies.

Sharing research data has great potential to benefit science and society. However, data sharing is still not common practice. Since public research funding agencies have a particular impact on research and researchers, the question arises: Are public funding agencies morally obligated to promote data sharing? We argue from a research ethics perspective that public funding agencies have several pro tanto obligations requiring them to promote data sharing. However, there are also pro tanto obligations that speak against promoting data sharing in general as well as with regard to particular instruments of such promotion. We examine and weigh these obligations and conclude that all things considered funders ought to promote the sharing of data. Even the instrument of mandatory data sharing policies can be justified under certain conditions.

On the concept of systematization in the Kemeny-Oppenheim approach to intertheoretical reduction.

In 1956, John G. Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim proposed an approach to intertheoretical reduction as an alternative to that of Ernest Nagel. However, they neglected to provide a clear definition of its basic concept of systematization. After decades of languishing in the shadows, new interest in the KO approach is emerging. Nevertheless, there are still misunderstandings regarding this basic concept. The present paper elucidates this concept by returning to Oppenheim's hitherto little-noticed publications from the 1920s and 1930s, which Kemeny and Oppenheim obviously used as guidance in 1956. Reappraising Oppenheim's early writings delivers two significant payoffs: new clarity in understanding the concept of systematization as well as a more solid grasp of the structure of this approach as a distinctive combination of explanation and systematization.

Theory vs. experiment: The rise of the dynamic view of proteins.

Over the past century, the scientific conception of the protein has evolved significantly. This paper focuses on the most recent stage of this evolution, namely, the origin of the dynamic view of proteins and the challenge it posed to the static view of classical molecular biology. Philosophers and scientists have offered two hypotheses to explain the origin of the dynamic view and its slow reception by structural biologists. Some have argued that the shift from the static to the dynamic view was a Kuhnian revolution, driven by the accumulation of dynamic anomalies, while others have argued that the shift was caused by new empirical findings made possible by technological advances. I analyze this scientific episode and ultimately reject both of these empiricist accounts. I argue that focusing primarily on technological advances and empirical discoveries overlooks the important role of theory in driving this scientific change. I show how the application of general thermodynamic principles to proteins gave rise to the dynamic view, and a commitment to these principles then led early adopters to seek out the empirical examples of protein dynamics, which would eventually convince their peers. My analysis of this historical case shows that empiricist accounts of modern scientific progress-at least those that aim to explain developments in the molecular life sciences-need to be tempered in order to capture the interplay between theory and experiment.

The Evolution of Flow Chemistry: An Opinion on Factors Driving Innovation.

This article seeks to provide an overview of the environmental factors within the pharmaceutical industry that have contributed to the emergence of flow chemistry over the past two decades. It highlights some of the challenges facing the industry and describes how they are being overcome by the exponential trajectory of scientific progress in the area. We identify current trends and offer a speculative glimpse into the future of drug development and manufacturing with some examples of progress being made at CARBOGEN AMCIS.

Scientific progress: By-whom or for-whom?

When science makes cognitive progress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents by whom scientific progress is made, that improve during progressive episodes. This paper argues against this assumption and explores a different approach. Scientific progress should be defined in terms of potential improvements to the cognitive attitudes of those for whom progress is made, i.e. the receivers rather than the producers of scientific information. This includes not only scientists themselves, but also various other individuals who utilize scientific information in different ways for the benefit of society as a whole.

Understanding and scientific progress: lessons from epistemology.

Contemporary debate surrounding the nature of scientific progress has focused upon the precise role played by justification, with two realist accounts having dominated proceedings. Recently, however, a third realist account has been put forward, one which offers no role for justification at all. According to Finnur Dellsén's (Stud Hist Philos Sci Part A 56:72-83, 2016) noetic account, science progresses when understanding increases, that is, when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world that they could before. In this paper, we argue that the noetic account is severely undermotivated. Dellsén provides three examples intended to show that understanding can increase absent the justification required for true belief to constitute knowledge. However, we demonstrate that a lack of clarity in each case allows for two contrasting interpretations, neither of which serves its intended purpose. On the first, the agent involved lacks both knowledge and understanding; and, on the second, the agent involved successfully gains both knowledge and understanding. While neither interpretation supports Dellsén's claim that understanding can be prised apart from knowledge, we argue that, in general, agents in such cases ought to be attributed neither knowledge nor understanding. Given that the separability of knowledge and understanding is a necessary component of the noetic account, we conclude that there is little support for the idea that science progresses through increasing understanding rather than the accumulation of knowledge.

[Historical (cultural) view of the heart and cardiovascular system]. / Herz und Herz-Kreislauf-System in der (kultur-)historischen Betrachtung.

Who discovered the cardiovascular and capillary systems? When students in advanced semesters are asked about historical matters that have decisively influenced the path to present day medicine, as a rule no answer or a false answer is forthcoming. Whoever wants to understand scientific thinking and action, cannot do better than to grapple with the historical and cultural developments in medicine; however, more than any other science the natural sciences and medicine provide evidence that new ways and knowledge must be consistently sought for the benefit of patients. The aim of this article is to make a contribution to remembering how the cardiovascular system was discovered and the cultural and historical importance of the heart. Last but not least, however, the article aims to convey the impression of the huge personal sacrifice, including one's own life, and the stony path which led to the acquisition of this knowledge.

Scientific progress despite irreproducibility: A seeming paradox.

It appears paradoxical that science is producing outstanding new results and theories at a rapid rate at the same time that researchers are identifying serious problems in the practice of science that cause many reports to be irreproducible and invalid. Certainly, the practice of science needs to be improved, and scientists are now pursuing this goal. However, in this perspective, we argue that this seeming paradox is not new, has always been part of the way science works, and likely will remain so. We first introduce the paradox. We then review a wide range of challenges that appear to make scientific success difficult. Next, we describe the factors that make science work-in the past, present, and presumably also in the future. We then suggest that remedies for the present practice of science need to be applied selectively so as not to slow progress and illustrate with a few examples. We conclude with arguments that communication of science needs to emphasize not just problems but the enormous successes and benefits that science has brought and is now bringing to all elements of modern society.

Persistence of false paradigms in low-power sciences.

We develop a model describing how false paradigms may persist, hindering scientific progress. The model features two paradigms, one describing reality better than the other. Tenured scientists display homophily: They favor tenure candidates who adhere to their paradigm. As in statistics, power is the probability (absent any bias) of denying tenure to scientists adhering to the false paradigm. The model shows that because of homophily, when power is low, the false paradigm may prevail. Then, only an increase in power can ignite convergence to the true paradigm. Historical case studies suggest that low power comes either from lack of empirical evidence or from reluctance to base tenure decisions on available evidence.

Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account.

What is scientific progress? This paper advances an interpretation of this question, and an account that serves to answer it (thus interpreted). Roughly, the question is here understood to concern what type of cognitive change with respect to a topic X constitutes a scientific improvement (to a greater or lesser extent) with respect to X. The answer explored in the paper is that the requisite type of cognitive change occurs when scientific results are made publicly available so as to make it possible for anyone to increase their understanding of X. This account is briefly compared to two rival accounts of scientific progress, based respectively on increasing truthlikeness and accumulating knowledge, and is argued to be preferable to both.

The algorithmic turn in conservation biology: Characterizing progress in ethically-driven sciences.

As a discipline distinct from ecology, conservation biology emerged in the 1980s as a rigorous science focused on protecting biodiversity. Two algorithmic breakthroughs in information processing made this possible: place-prioritization algorithms and geographical information systems. They provided defensible, data-driven methods for designing reserves to conserve biodiversity that obviated the need for largely intuitive and highly problematic appeals to ecological theory at the time. But the scientific basis of these achievements and whether they constitute genuine scientific progress has been criticized. We counter by pointing out important inaccuracies about the science and rejecting the apparent theory-first focus. More broadly, the case study reveals significant limitations of the predominant epistemic-semantic conceptions of scientific progress and the considerable merits of pragmatic, practically-oriented accounts.

The history of science as the progress of the human spirit: The historiography of astronomy in the eighteenth century.

In the eighteenth century, the historiography of astronomy was part of a wider discussion concerning the history of the human spirit. The concept of the human spirit was very popular among Enlightenment authors because it gave the history of human knowledge continuity, unity and meaning. Using this concept, scientists and historians of science such as Montucla, Lalande, Bailly and Laplace could present the history of astronomy in terms of a progress towards contemporary science that was slow and could be interrupted at times, but was still constant, regular, and necessary. In my paper I intend to explain how the originally philosophical concept of the human spirit was transferred to the history of astronomy. I also introduce the basic principles to which the development of the spirit is subject in astronomy, according to historians of astronomy. The third part of the paper describes how historians of astronomy took into account the effect of social and natural factors on the history of astronomy.

Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding.

What is scientific progress? On Alexander Bird's epistemic account of scientific progress, an episode in science is progressive precisely when there is more scientific knowledge at the end of the episode than at the beginning. Using Bird's epistemic account as a foil, this paper develops an alternative understanding-based account on which an episode in science is progressive precisely when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world at the end of the episode than at the beginning. This account is shown to be superior to the epistemic account by examining cases in which knowledge and understanding come apart. In these cases, it is argued that scientific progress matches increases in scientific understanding rather than accumulations of knowledge. In addition, considerations having to do with minimalist idealizations, pragmatic virtues, and epistemic value all favor this understanding-based account over its epistemic counterpart.

Taming theory with thought experiments: Understanding and scientific progress.

I claim that one way thought experiments contribute to scientific progress is by increasing scientific understanding. Understanding does not have a currently accepted characterization in the philosophical literature, but I argue that we already have ways to test for it. For instance, current pedagogical practice often requires that students demonstrate being in either or both of the following two states: 1) Having grasped the meaning of some relevant theory, concept, law or model, 2) Being able to apply that theory, concept, law or model fruitfully to new instances. Three thought experiments are presented which have been important historically in helping us pass these tests, and two others that cause us to fail. Then I use this operationalization of understanding to clarify the relationships between scientific thought experiments, the understanding they produce, and the progress they enable. I conclude that while no specific instance of understanding (thus conceived) is necessary for scientific progress, understanding in general is.

Scientific progress without increasing verisimilitude: In response to Niiniluoto.

First, I argue that scientific progress is possible in the absence of increasing verisimilitude in science's theories. Second, I argue that increasing theoretical verisimilitude is not the central, or primary, dimension of scientific progress. Third, I defend my previous argument that unjustified changes in scientific belief may be progressive. Fourth, I illustrate how false beliefs can promote scientific progress in ways that cannot be explicated by appeal to verisimilitude.

A tale of three theories: Feyerabend and Popper on progress and the aim of science.

In this paper, three theories of progress and the aim of science are discussed: (i) the theory of progress as increasing explanatory power, advocated by Popper in The logic of scientific discovery (1935/1959); (ii) the theory of progress as approximation to the truth, introduced by Popper in Conjectures and refutations (1963); (iii) the theory of progress as a steady increase of competing alternatives, which Feyerabend put forward in the essay "Reply to criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam" (1965) and defended as late as the last edition of Against method (1993). It is argued that, contrary to what Feyerabend scholars have predominantly assumed, Feyerabend's changing attitude towards falsificationism-which he often advocated at the beginning of his career, and vociferously attacked in the 1970s and 1980s-must be explained by taking into account not only Feyerabend's very peculiar view of the aim of science, but also Popper's changing account of progress.

Redefining the scientific method: as the use of sophisticated scientific methods that extend our mind.

Scientific, medical, and technological knowledge has transformed our world, but we still poorly understand the nature of scientific methodology. Science textbooks, science dictionaries, and science institutions often state that scientists follow, and should follow, the universal scientific method of testing hypotheses using observation and experimentation. Yet, scientific methodology has not been systematically analyzed using large-scale data and scientific methods themselves as it is viewed as not easily amenable to scientific study. Using data on all major discoveries across science including all Nobel Prize and major non-Nobel Prize discoveries, we can address the question of the extent to which "the scientific method" is actually applied in making science's groundbreaking research and whether we need to expand this central concept of science. This study reveals that 25% of all discoveries since 1900 did not apply the common scientific method (all three features)-with 6% of discoveries using no observation, 23% using no experimentation, and 17% not testing a hypothesis. Empirical evidence thus challenges the common view of the scientific method. Adhering to it as a guiding principle would constrain us in developing many new scientific ideas and breakthroughs. Instead, assessing all major discoveries, we identify here a general, common feature that the method of science can be reduced to: making all major discoveries has required using sophisticated methods and instruments of science. These include statistical methods, particle accelerators, and X-ray methods. Such methods extend our mind and generally make observing, experimenting, and testing hypotheses in science possible, doing so in new ways and ensure their replicability. This provides a new perspective to the scientific method-embedded in our sophisticated methods and instruments-and suggests that we need to reform and extend the way we view the scientific method and discovery process.