Social Risk and Dialysis Facility Performance in the First Year of the ESRD Treatment Choices Model.

Importance: The End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices (ETC) model randomly selected 30% of US dialysis facilities to receive financial incentives based on their use of home dialysis, kidney transplant waitlisting, or transplant receipt. Facilities that disproportionately serve populations with high social risk have a lower use of home dialysis and kidney transplant raising concerns that these sites may fare poorly in the payment model. Objective: To examine first-year ETC model performance scores and financial penalties across dialysis facilities, stratified by their incident patients' social risk. Design, Setting, and Participants: A cross-sectional study of 2191 US dialysis facilities that participated in the ETC model from January 1 through December 31, 2021. Exposure: Composition of incident patient population, characterized by the proportion of patients who were non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, living in a highly disadvantaged neighborhood, uninsured, or covered by Medicaid at dialysis initiation. A facility-level composite social risk score assessed whether each facility was in the highest quintile of having 0, 1, or at least 2 of these characteristics. Main Outcomes and Measures: Use of home dialysis, waitlisting, or transplant; model performance score; and financial penalization. Results: Using data from 125 984 incident patients (median age, 65 years [IQR, 54-74]; 41.8% female; 28.6% Black; 11.7% Hispanic), 1071 dialysis facilities (48.9%) had no social risk features, and 491 (22.4%) had 2 or more. In the first year of the ETC model, compared with those with no social risk features, dialysis facilities with 2 or more had lower mean performance scores (3.4 vs 3.6, P = .002) and lower use of home dialysis (14.1% vs 16.0%, P < .001). These facilities had higher receipt of financial penalties (18.5% vs 11.5%, P < .001), more frequently had the highest payment cut of 5% (2.4% vs 0.7%; P = .003), and were less likely to achieve the highest bonus of 4% (0% vs 2.7%; P < .001). Compared with all other facilities, those in the highest quintile of treating uninsured patients or those covered by Medicaid experienced more financial penalties (17.4% vs 12.9%, P = .01) as did those in the highest quintile in the proportion of patients who were Black (18.5% vs 12.6%, P = .001). Conclusions: In the first year of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' ETC model, dialysis facilities serving higher proportions of patients with social risk features had lower performance scores and experienced markedly higher receipt of financial penalties.

The impact of removing financial incentives and/or audit and feedback on chlamydia testing in general practice: A cluster randomised controlled trial (ACCEPt-able).

BACKGROUND: Financial incentives and audit/feedback are widely used in primary care to influence clinician behaviour and increase quality of care. While observational data suggest a decline in quality when these interventions are stopped, their removal has not been evaluated in a randomised controlled trial (RCT), to our knowledge. This trial aimed to determine whether chlamydia testing in general practice is sustained when financial incentives and/or audit/feedback are removed. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We undertook a 2 × 2 factorial cluster RCT in 60 general practices in 4 Australian states targeting 49,525 patients aged 16-29 years for annual chlamydia testing. Clinics were recruited between July 2014 and September 2015 and were followed for up to 2 years or until 31 December 2016. Clinics were eligible if they were in the intervention group of a previous cluster RCT where general practitioners (GPs) received financial incentives (AU$5-AU$8) for each chlamydia test and quarterly audit/feedback reports of their chlamydia testing rates. Clinics were randomised into 1 of 4 groups: incentives removed but audit/feedback retained (group A), audit/feedback removed but incentives retained (group B), both removed (group C), or both retained (group D). The primary outcome was the annual chlamydia testing rate among 16- to 29-year-old patients, where the numerator was the number who had at least 1 chlamydia test within 12 months and the denominator was the number who had at least 1 consultation during the same 12 months. We undertook a factorial analysis in which we investigated the effects of removal versus retention of incentives (groups A + C versus groups B + D) and the effects of removal versus retention of audit/feedback (group B + C versus groups A + D) separately. Of 60 clinics, 59 were randomised and 55 (91.7%) provided data (group A: 15 clinics, 11,196 patients; group B: 14, 11,944; group C: 13, 11,566; group D: 13, 14,819). Annual testing decreased from 20.2% to 11.7% (difference -8.8%; 95% CI -10.5% to -7.0%) in clinics with incentives removed and decreased from 20.6% to 14.3% (difference -7.1%; 95% CI -9.6% to -4.7%) where incentives were retained. The adjusted absolute difference in treatment effect was -0.9% (95% CI -3.5% to 1.7%; p = 0.2267). Annual testing decreased from 21.0% to 11.6% (difference -9.5%; 95% CI -11.7% to -7.4%) in clinics where audit/feedback was removed and decreased from 19.9% to 14.5% (difference -6.4%; 95% CI -8.6% to -4.2%) where audit/feedback was retained. The adjusted absolute difference in treatment effect was -2.6% (95% CI -5.4% to -0.1%; p = 0.0336). Study limitations included an unexpected reduction in testing across all groups impacting statistical power, loss of 4 clinics after randomisation, and inclusion of rural clinics only. CONCLUSIONS: Audit/feedback is more effective than financial incentives of AU$5-AU$8 per chlamydia test at sustaining GP chlamydia testing practices over time in Australian general practice. TRIAL REGISTRATION: Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ACTRN12614000595617.

The 2018 Merit-based Incentive Payment System: Participation, Performance, and Payment Across Specialties.

BACKGROUND: The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) incorporates financial incentives and penalties intended to drive clinicians towards value-based purchasing, including alternative payment models (APMs). Newly available Medicare-approved qualified clinical data registries (QCDRs) offer specialty-specific quality measures for clinician reporting, yet their impact on clinician performance and payment adjustments remains unknown. OBJECTIVES: We sought to characterize clinician participation, performance, and payment adjustments in the MIPS program across specialties, with a focus on clinician use of QCDRs. RESEARCH DESIGN: We performed a cross-sectional analysis of the 2018 MIPS program. RESULTS: During the 2018 performance year, 558,296 clinicians participated in the MIPS program across the 35 specialties assessed. Clinicians reporting as individuals had lower overall MIPS performance scores (median [interquartile range (IQR)], 80.0 [39.4-98.4] points) than those reporting as groups (median [IQR], 96.3 [76.9-100.0] points), who in turn had lower adjustments than clinicians reporting within MIPS APMs (median [IQR], 100.0 [100.0-100.0] points) (P<0.001). Clinicians reporting as individuals had lower payment adjustments (median [IQR], +0.7% [0.1%-1.6%]) than those reporting as groups (median [IQR], +1.5% [0.6%-1.7%]), who in turn had lower adjustments than clinicians reporting within MIPS APMs (median [IQR], +1.7% [1.7%-1.7%]) (P<0.001). Within a subpopulation of 202,685 clinicians across 12 specialties commonly using QCDRs, clinicians had overall MIPS performance scores and payment adjustments that were significantly greater if reporting at least 1 QCDR measure compared with those not reporting any QCDR measures. CONCLUSIONS: Collectively, these findings highlight that performance score and payment adjustments varied by reporting affiliation and QCDR use in the 2018 MIPS.

Peer Learning in Radiology: Effect of a Pay-for-Performance Initiative on Clinical Impact and Usage.

OBJECTIVE. The purpose of this article is to assess the effects of a pay-for-performance (PFP) initiative on clinical impact and usage of a radiology peer learning tool. MATERIALS AND METHODS. This retrospective study was performed at a large academic hospital. On May 1, 2017, a peer learning tool was implemented to facilitate radiologist peer feedback including clinical follow-up, positive feedback, and consultation. Subsequently, PFP target numbers for peer learning tool alerts by subspecialty divisions (October 1, 2017) and individual radiologists (October 1, 2018) were set. The primary outcome was report addendum rate (percent of clinical follow-up alerts with addenda), which was a proxy for peer learning tool clinical impact. Secondary outcomes were peer learning tool usage rate (number of peer learning tool alerts per 1000 radiology reports) and proportion of clinical follow-up alerts (percent of clinical follow-ups among all peer learning tool alerts). Outcomes were assessed biweekly using ANOVA and statistical process control analyses. RESULTS. Among 1,265,839 radiology reports from May 1, 2017, to September 29, 2019, a total of 20,902 peer learning tool alerts were generated. The clinical follow-up alert addendum rate was not significantly different between the period before the PFP initiative (9.9%) and the periods including division-wide (8.3%) and individual (7.9%) PFP initiatives (p = .55; ANOVA). Peer learning tool usage increased from 2.2 alerts per 1000 reports before the PFP initiative to 12.6 per 1000 during the division-wide PFP period (5.7-fold increase; 12.6/2.2), to 25.2 in the individual PFP period (11.5-fold increase vs before PFP; twofold increase vs division-wide) (p < .001). The clinical follow-up alert proportion decreased from 37.5% before the PFP initiative, to 34.4% in the division-wide period, to 31.3% in the individual PFP period. CONCLUSION. A PFP initiative improved radiologist engagement in peer learning by marked increase in peer learning tool usage rate without a change in report addendum rate as a proxy for clinical impact.

Payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings.

BACKGROUND: Changes to the method of payment for healthcare providers, including pay-for-performance schemes, are increasingly being used by governments, health insurers, and employers to help align financial incentives with health system goals. In this review we focused on changes to the method and level of payment for all types of healthcare providers in outpatient healthcare settings. Outpatient healthcare settings, broadly defined as 'out of hospital' care including primary care, are important for health systems in reducing the use of more expensive hospital services. OBJECTIVES: To assess the impact of different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings on the quantity and quality of health service provision, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, cost of service provision, and adverse effects. SEARCH METHODS: We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase (searched 5 March 2019), and several other databases. In addition, we searched clinical trials platforms, grey literature, screened reference lists of included studies, did a cited reference search for included studies, and contacted study authors to identify additional studies. We screened records from an updated search in August 2020, with any potentially relevant studies categorised as awaiting classification. SELECTION CRITERIA: Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient care settings. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the payment methods comparisons and outcomes, and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different outcome categories. Where feasible, we used meta-analysis to synthesise the effects of payment interventions under the same category. Where it was not possible to perform meta-analysis, we have reported means/medians and full ranges of the available point estimates. We have reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative difference (as per cent change or mean difference (MD)) for continuous outcomes. MAIN RESULTS: We included 27 studies in the review: 12 randomised trials, 13 controlled before-and-after studies, one interrupted time series, and one repeated measure study. Most healthcare providers were primary care physicians. Most of the payment methods were implemented by health insurance schemes in high-income countries, with only one study from a low- or middle-income country. The included studies were categorised into four groups based on comparisons of different payment methods. (1) Pay for performance (P4P) plus existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings P4P incentives probably improve child immunisation status (RR 1.27, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.19 to 1.36; 3760 patients; moderate-certainty evidence) and may slightly increase the number of patients who are asked more detailed questions on their disease by their pharmacist (MD 1.24, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.54; 454 patients; low-certainty evidence). P4P may slightly improve primary care physicians' prescribing of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medicines compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.07, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.12; 362 patients; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effects of extra P4P incentives on mean blood pressure reduction for patients and costs for providing services compared with an existing payment method (very low-certainty evidence). Outcomes related to workload or other health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial found that compared to the control group, the performance of incentivised professionals was not sustained after the P4P intervention had ended. (2) Fee for service (FFS) compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings We are uncertain about the effect of FFS on the quantity of health services delivered (outpatient visits and hospitalisations), patient health outcomes, and total drugs cost compared to an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. The quality of service provision and health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial reported that physicians paid via FFS may see more well patients than salaried physicians (low-certainty evidence), possibly implying that more unnecessary services were delivered through FFS. (3) FFS mixed with existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings FFS mixed payment method may increase the quantity of health services provided compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.37, 95% CI 1.07 to 1.76; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effect of FFS mixed payment on quality of services provided, patient health outcomes, and health professional outcomes compared with an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. Cost outcomes and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. (4) Enhanced FFS compared with FFS for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings Enhanced FFS (higher FFS payment) probably increases child immunisation rates (RR 1.25, 95% CI 1.06 to 1.48; moderate-certainty evidence). We are uncertain whether higher FFS payment results in more primary care visits and about the effect of enhanced FFS on the net expenditure per year on covered children with regular FFS (very low-certainty evidence). Quality of service provision, patient outcomes, health professional outcomes, and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: For healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings, P4P or an increase in FFS payment level probably increases the quantity of health service provision (moderate-certainty evidence), and P4P may slightly improve the quality of service provision for targeted conditions (low-certainty evidence). The effects of changes in payment methods on health outcomes is uncertain due to very low-certainty evidence. Information to explore the influence of specific payment method design features, such as the size of incentives and type of performance measures, was insufficient. Furthermore, due to limited and very low-certainty evidence, it is uncertain if changing payment models without including additional funding for professionals would have similar effects. There is a need for further well-conducted research on payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings in low- and middle-income countries; more studies comparing the impacts of different designs of the same payment method; and studies that consider the unintended consequences of payment interventions.

Pay for Performance and Treatment Outcome in Agonist Treatment for Opioid Use Disorder.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Pay for performance (P4P) models have become more popular in reimbursement for medical services, including treatment for substance use disorders. However, studies have not examined whether P4P has an impact on treatment outcome in the individual in opioid agonist treatment (OAT). Thus, the present study was conducted at the individual level, rather than the programmatic level, to determine whether meeting the P4P early engagement criteria (four services in the initial 14 days of treatment and/or eight services within the initial 30 days of treatment) resulted in reduced opioid, benzodiazepine, and cocaine use. METHODS: We performed a retrospective study of 63 patients enrolled in OAT for opioid use disorder. χ2 analyses were conducted crossing P4P early engagement criteria status and urine drug screen (UDS) results for opioid, cocaine, and/or benzodiazepine use at 6 and 12 months postadmission. Methadone dosage and treatment retention were also considered. The odds ratio was used to determine the directionality of significant results. RESULTS: Significant relationships were revealed between patients meeting 30-day P4P early engagement criteria and opioid negative UDS, and with retention in treatment at 6 and 12 months. Methadone dosage was significant at a 6-month follow-up. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: Since significant associations between opioid use and P4P as well as opioid use and methadone dose were revealed, findings partially supported hypothesis. SCIENTIFIC SIGNIFICANCE: P4P and methadone dosage may have some benefit to individuals in OAT in attaining short-term abstinence from opioids. P4P may be less useful in helping individuals achieve abstinence from other substances of abuse. (Am J Addict 2020;00:00-00).

Detection-Based Monetary Incentives to Improve Syphilis Screening Uptake: Results of a Pilot Intervention in a High Transmission Setting in Southern China.

BACKGROUND: Underscreening of syphilis in clinical settings is a pervasive problem in resource-constrained settings where heavy patient loads and competing health priorities inhibit health providers' ability to meet screening coverage targets. A "detection-based" pay-for-performance (P4P) strategy can incentivize more targeted testing by rewarding providers with a monetary bonus for every confirmed case. METHODS: Five clinics in a high transmission setting of China participated in the 6-month pilot intervention. Seropositive proportions during the P4P intervention were compared with those during the preintervention phase using multilevel logistic regression models adjusted for age and sex of clinic attendees. RESULTS: There were 8423 patients that sought care at 1 of the 6 clinics over the course of the study. Adjusted odds of a positive syphilis screen were greater during the intervention period compared to the preintervention interval (odds ratio, 1.33; 95% confidence interval, 1.14-1.56). Variability in clinic-level effects was substantial given the small number of sites of this pilot study. CONCLUSIONS: Results of this detection-based P4P pilot study demonstrate the feasibility and preliminary effectiveness of this approach for improving syphilis case detection in resource-constrained clinical settings. A fully powered randomized trial is needed to inform the full utility of this approach for improving sexually transmitted disease detection globally.

Proxy indicators to estimate appropriateness of antibiotic prescriptions by general practitioners: a proof-of-concept cross-sectional study based on reimbursement data, north-eastern France 2017.

BackgroundIn most countries, including France, data on clinical indications for outpatient antibiotic prescriptions are not available, making it impossible to assess appropriateness of antibiotic use at prescription level.AimOur objectives were to: (i) propose proxy indicators (PIs) to estimate appropriateness of antibiotic use at general practitioner (GP) level based on routine reimbursement data; and (ii) assess PIs' performance scores and their clinimetric properties using a large regional reimbursement database.MethodsA recent systematic literature review on quality indicators was the starting point for defining a set of PIs, taking French national guidelines into account. We performed a cross-sectional study analysing National Health Insurance data (available at prescriber and patient levels) on antibiotics prescribed by GPs in 2017 for individuals living in north-eastern France. We measured performance scores of the PIs and their case-mix stability, and tested their measurability, applicability, and room for improvement (clinimetric properties).ResultsThe 3,087 GPs included in this study prescribed a total of 2,077,249 antibiotic treatments. We defined 10 PIs with specific numerators, denominators and targets. Performance was low for almost all indicators ranging from 9% to 75%, with values < 30% for eight of 10 indicators. For all PIs, we found large variation between GPs and patient populations (case-mix stability). Regarding clinimetric properties, all PIs were measurable, applicable, and showed high improvement potential.ConclusionsThe set of 10 PIs showed satisfactory clinimetric properties and might be used to estimate appropriateness of antibiotic prescribing in primary care, in an automated way within antibiotic stewardship programmes.

Changes in Hospital Referral Patterns to Skilled Nursing Facilities Under the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program.

BACKGROUND: The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) penalizes hospitals for higher-than-expected readmission rates. Almost 20% of Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) patients receive postacute care in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) after hospitalization. SNF patients have high readmission rates. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study was to investigate the association between changes in hospital referral patterns to SNFs and HRRP penalty pressure. DESIGN: We examined changes in the relationship between penalty pressure and outcomes before versus after HRRP announcement among 2698 hospitals serving 6,936,393 Medicare FFS patients admitted for target conditions: acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, or pneumonia. Hospital-level penalty pressure was the expected penalty rate in the first year of the HRRP multiplied by Medicare discharge share. OUTCOMES: Informal integration measured by the percentage of referrals to hospitals' most referred SNF; formal integration measured by SNF acquisition; readmission-based quality index of the SNFs to which a hospital referred discharged patients; referral rate to any SNF. RESULTS: Hospitals facing the median level of penalty pressure had modest differential increases of 0.3 percentage points in the proportion of referrals to the most referred SNF and a 0.006 SD increase in the average quality index of SNFs referred to. There were no statistically significant differential increases in formal acquisition of SNFs or referral rate to SNF. CONCLUSIONS: HRRP did not prompt substantial changes in hospital referral patterns to SNFs, although readmissions for patients referred to SNF differentially decreased more than for other patients, warranting investigation of other mechanisms underlying readmissions reduction.

Association between Freestanding Dialysis Facility Size and Medicare Quality Incentive Program Performance Scores.

BACKGROUND: Medicare uses a quality incentive program (QIP) criteria to evaluate care in dialysis facilities and apply monetary penalties on underperforming facilities. Smaller dialysis facilities are likely to be rural and operate on lower profit margin; therefore, such facilities are likely to underperform and face Medicare penalties. The variation in QIP scores by facility size is not yet known. We investigated the association between freestanding dialysis facility size and QIP scores. METHODS: Our cross-sectional analysis compared QIP scores across levels of facility size for 5,193 freestanding dialysis facilities that received QIP scores in 2015. We used Medicare facility data including Dialysis Facility Compare, Performance Scores, Facility-Level Impact, and Area Health Resource and United States Renal Data System files for the payment year 2015. We measured the facility size using the number of dialysis stations per dialysis facility. QIP scores were used to determine the quality of care. A generalized linear model was estimated at an alpha level of 0.05. RESULTS: Facilities operating more than 10 dialysis stations scored higher than those operating fewer. Further, facilities in the South and Northeast, not offering peritoneal dialysis, affiliated with chains (except chain 3) and spending more hours per dialysis achieved higher QIP scores. Facilities reporting a higher proportion of Hispanic patients and of patients with access to pre-end-stage renal disease (ESRD) nephrologist care achieved higher QIP scores. Conversely, facilities with a higher Black patient population and higher patient travel distances scored lower. CONCLUSIONS: The current study provides important finding about the performance of the dialysis facilities with ≤10 dialysis stations. Quality improvement strategies are needed, especially for the dialysis facilities with ≤10 stations, to prevent penalties and eventual closure of such facilities due to financial insolvency. Failure to address these issues will increase further disparities in ESRD care.

Do financial incentives influence the hospitalization rate of nursing home residents? Evidence from Germany.

Efficient health-care provision for nursing home residents is a concern in many OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. This paper analyzes whether nursing homes respond to financial incentives when deciding whether to hospitalize their residents. In Germany, reimbursements for nursing homes are reduced after a defined number of days when a resident stays in a hospital instead of a nursing home. As a result of a federal law introduced in 2008, some German states had to change the point at which reimbursements to nursing homes are reduced so that reductions are made from Day 4 instead of Day 1 of a resident's absence. This exogenously raised an incentive for the nursing homes affected to hospitalize residents especially for an expected short-term stay. This analysis exploits the introduction of the law in a difference-in-difference approach, using market-wide German-DRG files covering all hospital patients discharged from hospitals to nursing homes from 2007 to 2011. The results suggest an increase of approximately 11% in short-term hospital stays as a consequence of the longer reimbursement period introduced by the law.

Factors contributing to rapidly increasing rates of cesarean section in Armenia: a partially mixed concurrent quantitative-qualitative equal status study.

BACKGROUND: Armenia has an upward trend in cesarean sections (CS); the CS rate increased from 7.2% in 2000 to 31.0% in 2017. The purpose of this study was to investigate potential factors contributing to the rapidly increasing rates of CS in Armenia and identify the actual costs of CS and vaginal birth (VB), which are different from the reimbursement rates by the Obstetric Care State Certificate Program of the Ministry of Health. METHODS: This was a partially mixed concurrent quantitative-qualitative equal status study. The research team collected qualitative data via in-depth interviews (IDI) with obstetrician-gynecologists (OBGYN) and policymakers and focus group discussions (FGD) with women. The quantitative phase of the study utilized the bottom-up cost accounting (considering only direct variable costs) from the perspective of providers, and it included self-administered provider surveys and retrospective review of mother and child hospital records. The survey questionnaire was developed based on IDIs with providers of different medical services. RESULTS: The mean estimated direct variable cost per case was 35,219 AMD (94.72 USD) for VB and 80,385 AMD (216.19 USD) for CS. The ratio of mean direct variable costs for CS vs. VB was 2.28, which is higher than the government's reimbursement ratio of 1.64. The amount of bonus payments to OBGYNs was 11 fold higher for CS than for VB indicating that OBGYNs may have significant financial motivation to perform CS without a medical necessity. The qualitative study analysis revealed that financial incentives, maternal request and lack of regulations could be contributing to increasing the CS rates. While OBGYNs did not report that higher reimbursement for CS could lead to increasing CS rates, the policymakers suggested a relationship between the high CS rate and the reimbursement mechanism. The quantitative phase of the study confirmed the policymakers' concern. CONCLUSION: The study suggested an important relationship between the increasing CS rates and the current health care reimbursement system.

Health policy analysis of the non-implementation of HPV vaccination coverage in the pay for performance scheme in France.

Background: The French National Cancer Control Plan (NCCP) launched in 2014 set the objective to improve human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination coverage (VC). The NCCP included a measure to integrate a VC indicator in the pay for performance (P4P) scheme for general practitioners (GPs), which was not implemented. The objective of the study was to analyse the reasons for non-implementation of this measure, using the health policy analysis framework. Methods: The policy from proposal to non-implementation of the HPV VC indicator into the P4P scheme was analysed through the actors involved, the content of the measure, the contextual factors and the processes of policy-making. Results: The actors were the Ministry of Health (MOH) and National Cancer Institute as policy-makers, the public health insurance as an indirect target, and GPs as direct targets. The content of the policy was not evidence-informed and was not included into the NCCP preparation report. The context included vaccine hesitancy and ethical concerns from GPs in opposition with MOH. The process involved a diversity of stakeholders with a complex governance and no strict monitoring of the measure. Conclusions: Complex vaccination policy governance associated with a non-evidence-informed policy content and an unfavourable context may have been the reasons for the policy failure.

Pay-for-performance for shared care of diabetes in Taiwan.

BACKGROUND/PURPOSE: Comprehensive and continuous care is crucial for patients with diabetes. The diabetes pay-for-performance (P4P) program launched by the National Health Insurance (NHI) administration in Taiwan provides a financial incentive to facilitate this goal. In this study, we explored the characteristics of patients in the P4P program between 2005 and 2014. METHODS: Data of patients with diabetes enrolled in the NHI program between 2005 and 2014 were extracted from the NHI research database. Patients were classed as having diabetes if they had three or more outpatient visits within 365 calendar days with an International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification diagnostic code of 250 or hospitalization one or more times with such a diagnosis. The trends of participating in the P4P program were analyzed. RESULTS: Participation rate of the P4P program increased from 12.1% to 19% between 2005 and 2014. Participants were younger and more likely to be female than those not participating in the program. Lower risks of cancer-related mortality, annual mortality and heart failure were seen in patients participating in the P4P program than in those not participating. CONCLUSION: Older, male patients with a high disease severity may be less likely to enroll in the P4P program. Although participation rate is increasing, a broad enrollment is expected.

2019 Diabetes Atlas: Achievements and challenges in diabetes care in Taiwan.

The 2019 Diabetes Atlas delineated both accomplishments and challenges in diabetes care in Taiwan between 2005 and 2014. The series reported that Taiwan had significantly improved aspects of care quality for patients with diabetes. For example, the mortality rate decreased, the difference between the life expectancies of patients with diabetes and those of the general population decreased, and the rates of hospitalization because of heart diseases, cerebrovascular diseases, chronic kidney diseases, and unsatisfactory glycemic control decreased. However, despite these achievements, the 2019 Diabetes Atlas also reported some substantial challenges that have not been overcome. For example, the incidence of diabetes among women aged <19 years and 20-39 years increased by 27% and 33%, respectively. Furthermore, a high prevalence of macrovascular complications, a continuous increase in the dialysis prevalence rates among men with diabetes of all ages, and a low participation rate (<20%) of patients with diabetes in the pay-for-performance program were observed. The publication of the 2019 Diabetes Atlas is a milestone that demonstrates a strong will in medical societies to improve the quality of diabetes care. We expect this initiative can be reorganized every 5 years to report the results of continuous monitoring and surveillance and update the epidemiological features of diabetes in Taiwan.

Investigating the impact of primary care payments on underdiagnosis in dementia: A difference-in-differences analysis.

OBJECTIVE: In England, two primary care incentive schemes were introduced to increase dementia diagnosis rates to two-thirds of expected levels. This study assesses the effectiveness of these schemes. METHODS: We used a difference-in-differences framework to analyse the individual and collective impacts of the incentive schemes: (1) Directed Enhanced Service 18 (DES18: facilitating timely diagnosis of and support for dementia) and (2) the Dementia Identification Scheme (DIS). The dataset included 7529 English general practices, of which 7142 were active throughout the 10-year study period (April 2006 to March 2016). We controlled for a range of factors, including a contemporaneous hospital incentive scheme for dementia. Our dependent variable was the percentage of expected cases that was recorded on practice dementia registers (the "rate"). RESULTS: From March 2013 to March 2016, the mean rate rose from 51.8% to 68.6%. Both DES18 and DIS had positive and significant effects. In practices participating in the DES18 scheme, the rate increased by 1.44 percentage points more than the rate for non-participants; DIS had a larger effect, with an increase of 3.59 percentage points. These combined effects increased dementia registers nationally by an estimated 40 767 individuals. Had all practices fully participated in both schemes, the corresponding number would have been 48 685. CONCLUSION: The primary care incentive schemes appear to have been effective in closing the gap between recorded and expected prevalence of dementia, but the hospital scheme had no additional discernible effect. This study contributes additional evidence that financial incentives can motivate improved performance in primary care.

Optimal compensation rule under provider adverse selection and moral hazard.

Although healthcare provider payments have been studied extensively in the literature, little is known about the optimal compensation rule when, in addition to unobservable provider effort (moral hazard), the provider's ability type is also private information (adverse selection). We find that when only provider effort is unobservable, to induce the first-best outcome the optimal compensation rule requires zero fee-for-service. When both provider moral hazard and adverse selection exist, the first-best outcome will be infeasible. The second-best compensation rule entails combined use of capitation, fee-for-service, and pay-for-performance.

Going beyond incentivizing formal health providers: Evidence from the Rwanda Community Performance-Based Financing program.

Pay-for-performance programs are introduced in an increasing number of low- and middle-income countries with the goal of reducing maternal and child mortality and morbidity through increased health service utilization and quality. Although most programs incentivize formal health providers, some constraints to utilization might be better alleviated by incentivizing other actors in the health care system. This paper presents results from a randomized controlled trial set to evaluate the effects of two incentive schemes that were introduced on top of Rwanda's national Performance-Based Financing program at the health facility level. One scheme rewarded community health worker cooperatives for the utilization of five services by their communities. The second scheme provided in-kind transfers to users of three services. The analysis finds no impact of the cooperative performance payments on coverage of the targeted services, behaviors of community health workers, or outcomes at the cooperative level. Although health centers experienced frequent stock outs of the gifts, the demand-side intervention significantly increased timely antenatal care by 9.3 percentage points and timely postnatal care by 8.6 percentage points. This study shows that demand-side incentives can increase service utilization also when provided in addition to a supply-side pay-for-performance scheme.

Reducing costs at the end of life through provider incentives for hospice care: A retrospective cohort study.

BACKGROUND: Costs of medical care have been found to be highest at the end of life. AIM: To evaluate the effect of provider reimbursement for hospice care on end-of-life costs. DESIGN: The policy expanded access to hospice care for end-stage renal disease patients, a policy previously limited to cancer patients only. This study employed a difference-in-differences analysis using a generalized linear model. The main outcome is inpatient expenditures in the last 30 days of life. SETTING/PARTICIPANTS: A cohort of 151,509 patients with chronic kidney disease or cancer, aged 65 years or older, who died between 2005 and 2012 in the National Health Insurance Research Database, which contains all enrollment and inpatient claims data for Taiwan. RESULTS: Even as end-of-life costs for cancer are declining over time, expanding hospice care benefits to end-stage renal disease patients is associated with an additional reduction of 7.3% in end-of-life costs per decedent, holding constant patient and provider characteristics. On average, end-of-life costs are also high for end-stage renal disease (1.88 times higher than those for cancer). The cost savings were larger among older patients-among those who died at 80 years of age or higher, the cost reduction was 9.8%. CONCLUSION: By expanding hospice care benefits through a provider reimbursement policy, significant costs at the end of life were saved.

The rise of reimbursement-based medicine: the case of bone metastasis radiation treatment.

It has been hypothesised that the reimbursement system pertaining to radiotherapy is influencing prescription practices for patients with cancer with bone metastases. In this paper, we present and discuss the results of an empirical study that was undertaken on patient records, referred to radiotherapy for the treatment of bone metastases, in a medium-size city, in southern Brazil, during the period of March 2006 to March 2014. Our findings seem to confirm this hypothesis: after a change in the reimbursement method, radiation prescriptions were adapted accordingly, in order to maximise profits. Once such patients become highly vulnerable due to their diagnoses, they also become susceptible to a subtle form of exploitation; physicians let patients believe that more radiation will be better for their health, and they do so despite knowing otherwise, and as it seems, out of pecuniary interests.