2017 Outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease in Northern Democratic Republic of Congo.

BACKGROUND: In 2017, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) recorded its eighth Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak, approximately 3 years after the previous outbreak. METHODS: Suspect cases of EVD were identified on the basis of clinical and epidemiological information. Reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) analysis or serological testing was used to confirm Ebola virus infection in suspected cases. The causative virus was later sequenced from a RT-PCR-positive individual and assessed using phylogenetic analysis. RESULTS: Three probable and 5 laboratory-confirmed cases of EVD were recorded between 27 March and 1 July 2017 in the DRC. Fifty percent of cases died from the infection. EVD cases were detected in 4 separate areas, resulting in > 270 contacts monitored. The complete genome of the causative agent, a variant from the Zaireebolavirus species, denoted Ebola virus Muyembe, was obtained using next-generation sequencing. This variant is genetically closest, with 98.73% homology, to the Ebola virus Mayinga variant isolated from the first DRC outbreaks in 1976-1977. CONCLUSION: A single spillover event into the human population is responsible for this DRC outbreak. Human-to-human transmission resulted in limited dissemination of the causative agent, a novel Ebola virus variant closely related to the initial Mayinga variant isolated in 1976-1977 in the DRC.

Zika Virus Infection during Pregnancy and Effects on Early Childhood Development, French Polynesia, 2013-2016.

Congenital Zika virus syndrome consists of a large spectrum of neurologic abnormalities seen in infants infected with Zika virus in utero. However, little is known about the effects of Zika virus intrauterine infection on the neurocognitive development of children born without birth defects. Using a case-control study design, we investigated the temporal association of a cluster of congenital defects with Zika virus infection. In a nested study, we also assessed the early childhood development of children recruited in the initial study as controls who were born without known birth defects,. We found evidence for an association of congenital defects with both maternal Zika virus seropositivity (time of infection unknown) and symptomatic Zika virus infection during pregnancy. Although the early childhood development assessment found no excess burden of developmental delay associated with maternal Zika virus infection, larger, longer-term studies are needed.

Ebola virus disease in West Africa--the first 9 months of the epidemic and forward projections.

BACKGROUND: On March 23, 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) was notified of an outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in Guinea. On August 8, the WHO declared the epidemic to be a "public health emergency of international concern." METHODS: By September 14, 2014, a total of 4507 probable and confirmed cases, including 2296 deaths from EVD (Zaire species) had been reported from five countries in West Africa--Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. We analyzed a detailed subset of data on 3343 confirmed and 667 probable Ebola cases collected in Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone as of September 14. RESULTS: The majority of patients are 15 to 44 years of age (49.9% male), and we estimate that the case fatality rate is 70.8% (95% confidence interval [CI], 69 to 73) among persons with known clinical outcome of infection. The course of infection, including signs and symptoms, incubation period (11.4 days), and serial interval (15.3 days), is similar to that reported in previous outbreaks of EVD. On the basis of the initial periods of exponential growth, the estimated basic reproduction numbers (R0 ) are 1.71 (95% CI, 1.44 to 2.01) for Guinea, 1.83 (95% CI, 1.72 to 1.94) for Liberia, and 2.02 (95% CI, 1.79 to 2.26) for Sierra Leone. The estimated current reproduction numbers (R) are 1.81 (95% CI, 1.60 to 2.03) for Guinea, 1.51 (95% CI, 1.41 to 1.60) for Liberia, and 1.38 (95% CI, 1.27 to 1.51) for Sierra Leone; the corresponding doubling times are 15.7 days (95% CI, 12.9 to 20.3) for Guinea, 23.6 days (95% CI, 20.2 to 28.2) for Liberia, and 30.2 days (95% CI, 23.6 to 42.3) for Sierra Leone. Assuming no change in the control measures for this epidemic, by November 2, 2014, the cumulative reported numbers of confirmed and probable cases are predicted to be 5740 in Guinea, 9890 in Liberia, and 5000 in Sierra Leone, exceeding 20,000 in total. CONCLUSIONS: These data indicate that without drastic improvements in control measures, the numbers of cases of and deaths from EVD are expected to continue increasing from hundreds to thousands per week in the coming months.

[Risk of importation of tropical diseases in metropolitan France: dectection, alert, response]. / Risques d'importation des maladies infectieuses exotiques en France métropolitaine: détection, alerte et réponse.

The French public health institute is responsible for promoting and coordinating threats the detection and assessment of health risks, and for suggesting possible responses. Transmissible diseases affecting both human and animal health are the focus of surveillance networks. Early detection of potential infectious threats is based on the screening of "alert signals" identified through routine surveillance networks and other systems. The quality and accuracy of these signals is first verified, before assessing, through a multidisciplinary approach, the risk of introduction and dissemination. This article examines specific cases illustrating the process of detection, risk analysis and response, with respect to infectious threats that are endemic in tropical regions and have the potential to be imported into metropolitan France. For both novel pathogens and exotic diseases--which, not being endemic in France, are less well known--the analysis and response process must regularly be adapted to the latest epidemiological, clinical and biological findings, taking interactions between the pathogen, host, and environment into consideration. The need to improve reaction times and risk assessment is also discussed.

International epidemic intelligence at the Institut de Veille Sanitaire, France.

The French Institute for Public Health Surveillance monitors health events of potential international importance occurring worldwide to provide timely warning to French health authorities. We reviewed the nature and place of occurrence of the last 200 events. From an individual country's perspective, the need for multiple sources is emphasized.

[Globalization, emergence and importation of infectious diseases]. / Mondialisation, emergence et importation de maladies infectieuses.

Epidemiology of infectious diseases has considerably changed over the past decades. The current epidemiological risk is global and thus requires a global response. International institutions have developed mechanisms in order to cope with this challenge. France is not only confronted to global risk affecting the world population but also to specific risks in relation to the regional context and the existence of French overseas territories. The unprecedented outbreak of Chikungunya viral infection that affected the French island of La Réunion in 2005-2006 has clearly emphasized the vulnerability of French overseas territories' population to tropical diseases. It also illustrates the risk of importation of such diseases in Metropolitan France (mainland France and Corsica). In disease free areas, the surveillance of potentially imported diseases cannot rely exclusively on data available from endemic countries. Routine surveillance should also include tools tailored to detect potentially emerging pathogens. The role of health professional especially clinicians and biologists in metropolitan France and overseas territories is crucial. For that matter, they are the first line for detection and notification of emerging events.

Contact tracing performance during the Ebola virus disease outbreak in Kenema district, Sierra Leone.

Contact tracing in an Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak is the process of identifying individuals who may have been exposed to infected persons with the virus, followed by monitoring for 21 days (the maximum incubation period) from the date of the most recent exposure. The goal is to achieve early detection and isolation of any new cases in order to prevent further transmission. We performed a retrospective data analysis of 261 probable and confirmed EVD cases in the national EVD database and 2525 contacts in the Contact Line Lists in Kenema district, Sierra Leone between 27 April and 4 September 2014 to assess the performance of contact tracing during the initial stage of the outbreak. The completion rate of the 21-day monitoring period was 89% among the 2525 contacts. However, only 44% of the EVD cases had contacts registered in the Contact Line List and 6% of probable or confirmed cases had previously been identified as contacts. Touching the body fluids of the case and having direct physical contact with the body of the case conferred a 9- and 20-fold increased risk of EVD status, respectively. Our findings indicate that incompleteness of contact tracing led to considerable unmonitored transmission in the early months of the epidemic. To improve the performance of early outbreak contact tracing in resource poor settings, our results suggest the need for prioritized contact tracing after careful risk assessment and better alignment of Contact Line Listing with case ascertainment and investigation.This article is part of the themed issue 'The 2013-2016 West African Ebola epidemic: data, decision-making and disease control'.

Factors influencing performance of internet-based biosurveillance systems used in epidemic intelligence for early detection of infectious diseases outbreaks.

BACKGROUND: Internet-based biosurveillance systems have been developed to detect health threats using information available on the Internet, but system performance has not been assessed relative to end-user needs and perspectives. METHOD AND FINDINGS: Infectious disease events from the French Institute for Public Health Surveillance (InVS) weekly international epidemiological bulletin published in 2010 were used to construct the gold-standard official dataset. Data from six biosurveillance systems were used to detect raw signals (infectious disease events from informal Internet sources): Argus, BioCaster, GPHIN, HealthMap, MedISys and ProMED-mail. Crude detection rates (C-DR), crude sensitivity rates (C-Se) and intrinsic sensitivity rates (I-Se) were calculated from multivariable regressions to evaluate the systems' performance (events detected compared to the gold-standard) 472 raw signals (Internet disease reports) related to the 86 events included in the gold-standard data set were retrieved from the six systems. 84 events were detected before their publication in the gold-standard. The type of sources utilised by the systems varied significantly (p<0001). I-Se varied significantly from 43% to 71% (p=0001) whereas other indicators were similar (C-DR: p=020; C-Se, p=013). I-Se was significantly associated with individual systems, types of system, languages, regions of occurrence, and types of infectious disease. Conversely, no statistical difference of C-DR was observed after adjustment for other variables. CONCLUSION: Although differences could result from a biosurveillance system's conceptual design, findings suggest that the combined expertise amongst systems enhances early detection performance for detection of infectious diseases. While all systems showed similar early detection performance, systems including human moderation were found to have a 53% higher I-Se (p=00001) after adjustment for other variables. Overall, the use of moderation, sources, languages, regions of occurrence, and types of cases were found to influence system performance.

Interfacing a biosurveillance portal and an international network of institutional analysts to detect biological threats.

The Early Alerting and Reporting (EAR) project, launched in 2008, is aimed at improving global early alerting and risk assessment and evaluating the feasibility and opportunity of integrating the analysis of biological, chemical, radionuclear (CBRN), and pandemic influenza threats. At a time when no international collaborations existed in the field of event-based surveillance, EAR's innovative approach involved both epidemic intelligence experts and internet-based biosurveillance system providers in the framework of an international collaboration called the Global Health Security Initiative, which involved the ministries of health of the G7 countries and Mexico, the World Health Organization, and the European Commission. The EAR project pooled data from 7 major internet-based biosurveillance systems onto a common portal that was progressively optimized for biological threat detection under the guidance of epidemic intelligence experts from public health institutions in Canada, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The group became the first end users of the EAR portal, constituting a network of analysts working with a common standard operating procedure and risk assessment tools on a rotation basis to constantly screen and assess public information on the web for events that could suggest an intentional release of biological agents. Following the first 2-year pilot phase, the EAR project was tested in its capacity to monitor biological threats, proving that its working model was feasible and demonstrating the high commitment of the countries and international institutions involved. During the testing period, analysts using the EAR platform did not miss intentional events of a biological nature and did not issue false alarms. Through the findings of this initial assessment, this article provides insights into how the field of epidemic intelligence can advance through an international network and, more specifically, how it was further developed in the EAR project.

Evaluation of epidemic intelligence systems integrated in the early alerting and reporting project for the detection of A/H5N1 influenza events.

The objective of Web-based expert epidemic intelligence systems is to detect health threats. The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) Early Alerting and Reporting (EAR) project was launched to assess the feasibility and opportunity for pooling epidemic intelligence data from seven expert systems. EAR participants completed a qualitative survey to document epidemic intelligence strategies and to assess perceptions regarding the systems performance. Timeliness and sensitivity were rated highly illustrating the value of the systems for epidemic intelligence. Weaknesses identified included representativeness, completeness and flexibility. These findings were corroborated by the quantitative analysis performed on signals potentially related to influenza A/H5N1 events occurring in March 2010. For the six systems for which this information was available, the detection rate ranged from 31% to 38%, and increased to 72% when considering the virtual combined system. The effective positive predictive values ranged from 3% to 24% and F1-scores ranged from 6% to 27%. System sensitivity ranged from 38% to 72%. An average difference of 23% was observed between the sensitivities calculated for human cases and epizootics, underlining the difficulties in developing an efficient algorithm for a single pathology. However, the sensitivity increased to 93% when the virtual combined system was considered, clearly illustrating complementarities between individual systems. The average delay between the detection of A/H5N1 events by the systems and their official reporting by WHO or OIE was 10.2 days (95% CI: 6.7-13.8). This work illustrates the diversity in implemented epidemic intelligence activities, differences in system's designs, and the potential added values and opportunities for synergy between systems, between users and between systems and users.

Influenza A(H1N1)2009 in the French Pacific territories: assessment of the epidemic wave during the austral winter.

The three French territories in the Pacific (New Caledonia [NC], French Polynesia [FP] and Wallis and Futuna [WF]) have been affected by an outbreak of influenza A(H1N1)2009 during the austral winter of 2009. This wave of influenza-like illness was characterized by a short duration (approximately 8 weeks) and high attack rates: 16-18% in NC and FP, 28% in Wallis and 38% in Futuna. The number of infected patients requiring hospitalization in critical care services and the number of deaths were, respectively, 21 and 10 in NC and 13 and 7 in FP (none in WF). Diabetes, cardiac and pulmonary diseases, obesity in adults, neuromuscular diseases in children, and Oceanic origin were frequently observed among severe cases and deaths. A significant proportion of the population remains susceptible to A(H1N1)2009, making the occurrence of a second wave likely. A state of preparedness and control efforts must be implemented, based on preventive measures (immunization), as well as combined clinical and virological surveillance and health organization.