Perceptual metrics for odorants: Learning from non-expert similarity feedback using machine learning.

Defining perceptual similarity metrics for odorant comparisons is crucial to understanding the mechanism of olfactory perception. Current methods in olfaction rely on molecular physicochemical features or discrete verbal descriptors (floral, burnt, etc.) to approximate perceptual (dis)similarity between odorants. However, structural or verbal descriptors alone are limited in modeling complex nuances of odor perception. While structural features inadequately characterize odor perception, language-based discrete descriptors lack the granularity needed to model a continuous perception space. We introduce data-driven approaches to perceptual metrics learning (PMeL) based on two key insights: a) by combining physicochemical features with the user's perceptual feedback, we can leverage both structural and perceptual attributes of odors to define dissimilarity, and b) instead of discrete labels, user's perceptual feedback can be gathered as relative similarity comparisons, such as "Does molecule-A smell more like molecule-B, or molecule-C?" These triplet comparisons are easier even for non-experts users and offer a more effective representation of the continuous perception space. Experimental results on several defined tasks show the effectiveness of our approach in evaluating perceptual dissimilarity between odorants. Finally, we investigate how closely our model, trained on non-expert feedback, aligns with the expert's similarity judgments. Our effort aims to reduce reliance on expert annotations.

A match does not make a sense: on the sufficiency of the comparator model for explaining the sense of agency.

The development of a sense of agency is indispensable for a cognitive entity (biological or artificial) to become a cognitive agent. In developmental psychology, researchers have taken inspiration from adult cognitive psychology and neuroscience literature and use the comparator model to assess the presence of a sense of agency in early infancy. Similarly, robotics researchers have taken components of the proposed mechanism in attempts to build a sense of agency into artificial systems. In this article, we identify an invalidating theoretical flaw in the reasoning underlying this conversion from adult studies to developmental science and cognitive systems research, rooted in an oversight in the conceptualization of the comparator model as currently used in experimental practice. In these experiments, the emphasis has been put solely on testing for a match between predicted and observed sensory consequences. We argue that the match by itself can exclusively generate a simple categorization or a representation of equality between predicted and observed sensory consequences, both of which are insufficient to generate the causal representations required for a sense of agency. Consequently, the comparator model, as it has been described in the context of the sense of agency and as it is commonly used in experimental designs, is insufficient to generate the sense of agency: infants and robots require more than developing the ability to match predicted and observed sensory consequences for a sense of agency. We conclude with outlining possible solutions and future directions for researchers in developmental science and artificial intelligence.