Semantic weight and verb retrieval in aphasia.

Individuals with agrammatic aphasia may have difficulty with verb production in comparison to nouns. Additionally, they may have greater difficulty producing verbs that have fewer semantic components (i.e., are semantically "light") compared to verbs that have greater semantic weight. A connectionist verb-production model proposed by Gordon and Dell (2003) learns through error correction to "divide the labor" between syntax and semantics. Verbs that are semantically heavier come to depend less on syntax and more on semantics. For lighter verbs, the reverse is true. We performed this study to clarify the role of semantic weight in aphasic verb production and to test the prediction from Gordon and Dell that a brain lesion that impairs the syntactic input to verb retrieval will impair lighter verbs more than heavier ones. Consistent with this prediction, we found that the decrement for lighter verbs was present in a group with agrammatic aphasia but not in a matched group without agrammatism.

Distinctions between manipulation and function knowledge of objects: evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging.

A prominent account of conceptual knowledge proposes that information is distributed over visual, tactile, auditory, motor and verbal-declarative attribute domains to the degree to which these features were activated when the knowledge was acquired [D.A. Allport, Distributed memory, modular subsystems and dysphagia, In: S.K. Newman, R. Epstein (Eds.), Current perspectives in dysphagia, Churchill Livingstone, Edinburgh, 1985, pp. 32-60]. A corollary is that when drawing upon this knowledge (e.g., to answer questions), particular aspects of this distributed information is re-activated as a function of the requirements of the task at hand [L.J. Buxbaum, E.M. Saffran, Knowledge of object manipulation and object function: dissociations in apraxic and non-apraxic subjects. Brain and Language, 82 (2002) 179-199; L.J. Buxbaum, T. Veramonti, M.F. Schwartz, Function and manipulation tool knowledge in apraxia: knowing 'what for' but not 'how', Neurocase, 6 (2000) 83-97; W. Simmons, L. Barsalou, The similarity-in-topography principle: Reconciling theories of conceptual deficits, Cognitive Neuropsychology, 20 (2003) 451-486]. This account predicts that answering questions about object manipulation should activate brain regions previously identified as components of the distributed sensory-motor system involved in object use, whereas answering questions about object function (that is, the purpose that it serves) should activate regions identified as components of the systems supporting verbal-declarative features. These predictions were tested in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study in which 15 participants viewed picture or word pairs denoting manipulable objects and determined whether the objects are manipulated similarly (M condition) or serve the same function (F condition). Significantly greater and more extensive activations in the left inferior parietal lobe bordering the intraparietal sulcus were seen in the M condition with pictures and, to a lesser degree, words. These findings are consistent with the known role of this region in skilled object use [K.M. Heilman, L.J. Gonzalez Rothi, Apraxia, In: K.M. Heilman, E. Valenstein (Eds.), Clinical Neuropsychology, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, pp. 141-150] as well as previous fMRI results [M. Kellenbach, M. Brett, K. Patterson, Actions speak louder than functions: the importance of manipulability and action in tool representation, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 15 (2003) 30-46] and behavioral findings in brain-lesion patients [L.J. Buxbaum, E.M. Saffran, Knowledge of object manipulation and object function: dissociations in apraxic and non-apraxic subjects, Brain and Language, 82 (2002) 179-199]. No brain regions were significantly more activated in the F than M condition. These data suggest that brain regions specialized for sensory-motor function are a critical component of distributed representations of manipulable objects.

The man who executed "imagined" movements: evidence for dissociable components of the body schema.

We examined the nature of representations underlying motor imagery and execution in a patient (CW) with bilateral parietal lesions. When imagining hand movements, CW executed the imagined motor act but was unaware of the movements. These movements were significantly more accurate than volitional movements for the left but not right hand. CW also exhibited preserved motor imagery for the left but not right hand. Consistent with previous accounts, these findings suggest that motor imagery may normally involve the inhibition of movements. CW's unawareness of movements during motor imagery may reflect inattention or misattribution of the unexpected sensory feedback. Furthermore, in line with current models of motor control, motor imagery may depend on the integrity of a "forward model" derived from motor outflow information to generate a prediction of the consequences of a motor command. Such predictions appear to be preserved for imagery of left but not right hand movements in CW. Action may additionally depend on precise updating of effector position derived from the comparison of predicted and actual sensory information. We propose that CW's impaired volitional movements may be attributable to the degradation of such an updating mechanism.