Public support for social security in 66 countries: Prosperity, inequality, and household income as interactive causes.

It is widely accepted that support for government intervention is highest among people in lower socioeconomic positions, during economic recessions and in less prosperous countries. However, the relationship between income inequality and attitudes toward government intervention is less clear. We contribute new insights to both questions by exploring how subjective household income, economic prosperity, and income inequality interact to influence attitudes. Using mixed-effects and country fixed-effects models fitted to data from 66 countries, we demonstrate that income inequality has a strong positive impact on attitudes toward government intervention in rich countries but no discernable effect in poor countries. Concomitantly, the impact of economic prosperity differs by level of inequality. It has little effect when income inequality is relatively low, a weakening effect as inequality rises, and no apparent effect when inequality is high. Consistent with these findings, the effect of subjective household income on attitudes toward government intervention is strongest in countries that are simultaneously very prosperous and highly unequal. Taken together, these findings suggest that if inequality continues to rise, especially in rich countries, public demand for social spending will eventually increase as well.

Social media in the 2011 Egyptian uprising.

This paper uses Gallup poll data to assess two narratives that have crystallized around the 2011 Egyptian uprising: (1) New electronic communications media constituted an important and independent cause of the protests in so far as they enhanced the capacity of demonstrators to extend protest networks, express outrage, organize events, and warn comrades of real-time threats. (2) Net of other factors, new electronic communications media played a relatively minor role in the uprising because they are low-cost, low-risk means of involvement that attract many sympathetic onlookers who are not prepared to engage in high-risk activism. Examining the independent effects of a host of factors associated with high-risk movement activism, the paper concludes that using some new electronic communications media was associated with being a demonstrator. However, grievances, structural availability, and network connections were more important than was the use of new electronic communications media in distinguishing demonstrators from sympathetic onlookers. Thus, although both narratives have some validity, they must both be qualified.

Rational choice and the political bases of changing Israeli counterinsurgency strategy.

Israeli counterinsurgency doctrine holds that the persistent use of credible threat and disproportionate military force results in repeated victories that eventually teach the enemy the futility of aggression. The doctrine thus endorses classical rational choice theory's claim that narrow cost-benefit calculations shape fixed action rationales. This paper assesses whether Israel's strategic practice reflects its counterinsurgency doctrine by exploring the historical record and the association between Israeli and Palestinian deaths due to low-intensity warfare. In contrast to the expectations of classical rational choice theory, the evidence suggests that institutional, cultural and historical forces routinely override simple cost-benefit calculations. Changing domestic and international circumstances periodically cause revisions in counterinsurgency strategy. Credible threat and disproportionate military force lack the predicted long-term effect.

Family Welfare Effort, Total Fertility, and In Vitro Fertilization: Explaining the Israeli Anomaly.

The theory of family welfare effort is a leading macro-sociological explanation of variation in human fertility. It holds that states which provide universally available, inexpensive, high-quality day care, generous parental leave, and flexible work schedules lower the opportunity cost of motherhood. They thus enable women, especially those in lower socioeconomic strata, to have the number of babies they want. A considerable body of research supports this theory. However, it is based almost exclusively on analyses of Western European and North American countries. This paper examines the Israeli case because Israel's total fertility rate is anomalously high given its family welfare effort. Based on a review of the relevant literature and a reanalysis of data from various published sources, it explains the country's unusually high total fertility rate as the product of (1) religious and nationalistic sentiment that is heightened by the Jewish population's perception of a demographic threat in the form of a burgeoning Palestinian population and (2) the state's resulting support for pro-natal policies, including the world's most extensive in vitro fertilization (IVF) system. The paper also suggests that Israel's IVF policy may not be in harmony with the interests of many women insofar as even women with an extremely low likelihood of becoming pregnant are encouraged to undergo the often lengthy, emotionally and physically painful, and risky process of IVF.

La théorie de l'effort pour le bien-être familial est une explication macrosociologique majeure de la variation de la fécondité humaine. Cette théorie soutient l'idée que les États offrant des garderies universellement accessibles, peu coûteuses et de grande qualité, des congés parentaux généreux et des horaires variables réduisent le coût d'opportunité de la maternité. Ces États permettent ainsi aux femmes, en particulier celles appartenant à des strates socioéconomiques inférieures, d'avoir le nombre d'enfants qu'elles souhaitent. Un nombre considérable de recherches appuient cette théorie. Cependant, elle repose presque exclusivement sur des analyses des pays d'Europe occidentale et d'Amérique du Nord. Cet article examine le cas israélien parce que l'indice synthétique de fécondité d'Israël est anormalement élevé compte tenu de ses efforts en matière de bien-être familial. Reposant sur un examen de la littérature appropriée et d'une nouvelle analyse des données provenant de diverses sources publiées, il explique l'indice synthétique de fécondité anormalement élevé du pays comme le résultat: (1) d'un sentiment religieux et nationaliste renforcé par la perception par la population juive d'une menace démographique au vu d'une population palestinienne croissante et (2) du soutien que l'État apporte aux politiques natalistes, notamment grâce au système de fécondation in vitro le plus important au monde. Cet article suggère également que la politique israélienne de fécondation in vitro ne correspond peut-être pas aux intérêts de nombreuses femmes dans la mesure où l'on encourage même les femmes ayant une probabilité extrêmement faible de devenir enceintes à avoir recours au processus de la fécondation in vitro souvent long et douloureux sur les plans émotionnel et physique ainsi que risqué.

How Terrorism Affects Attitudes toward Democracy: Tunisia in 2015.

Tunisia is the only country that emerged from the Arab Spring as a democracy. However, Tunisian democracy is threatened by political divisions, economic problems, and the threat of terrorist attacks. We shed light on Tunisia's democratic prospects by examining (1) the degree to which major terrorist attacks in 2015 influenced Tunisian public opinion on democracy and (2) the extent to which preference for a democratic system affected opinions on the prospects for democracy in Tunisia. We use data from three waves of a nationwide survey conducted just before and just after Tunisia's first major terrorist attack, and just after the country's second major terrorist attack. We demonstrate that after the attacks the Tunisian public became less favourable toward democracy and less optimistic that Tunisia would soon be ready for it. Such scepticism was widespread, affecting people who preferred democracy as much as those who did not. We conclude that the prospects for Tunisian democracy are more precarious than is sometimes assumed.

Assessing variation in tolerance in 23 Muslim-majority and Western countries.

Scholars disagree over whether Islam hinders the development of liberal democracy in Muslim-majority countries. We contribute to this debate by assessing the influence of Islam at the individual and national levels on ethnic, racial, and religious tolerance in 23 countries. Our analyses are based on a set of multilevel models fitted to World Values Survey data and national-level contextual information from various sources. Our findings suggest that people living in Muslim-majority countries tend to be less tolerant than are those living in Western countries. Although a significant part of this difference is attributable to variation in level of economic development and income inequality, Muslim countries remain less tolerant even after controlling for these factors. On the other hand, controlling for other individual-level factors, nonpracticing Muslims in Western countries are more tolerant than are all others in both Muslim-majority and Western countries. This finding challenges common claims about the effects of Islam as a religion on tolerance, suggesting that it is Islamic political regimes--not Islam itself--that pose problems for social tolerance.