RESUMEN
Little is known about the response of physicians to changes in compensation: Do increases in compensation increase or decrease labour supply? In this paper, we estimate wage elasticities for physicians. We apply both a structural discrete choice approach and a reduced-form approach to examine how these different approaches affect wage elasticities at the intensive margin. Using uniquely rich data collected from a large sample of general practitioners (GPs) and specialists in Australia, we estimate 3 alternative utility specifications (quadratic, translog, and box-cox utility functions) in the structural approach, as well as a reduced-form specification, separately for men and women. Australian data is particularly suited for this analysis due to a lack of regulation of physicians' fees leading to variation in earnings. All models predict small negative wage elasticities for male and female GPs and specialists passing several sensitivity checks. For this high-income and long-working-hours population, the translog and box-cox utility functions outperform the quadratic utility function. Simulating the effects of 5% and 10% wage increases at the intensive margin slightly reduces the full-time equivalent supply of male GPs, and to a lesser extent of male specialists and female GPs.
Asunto(s)
Conducta de Elección , Médicos Generales , Renta/estadística & datos numéricos , Motivación , Especialización , Australia , Femenino , Médicos Generales/economía , Médicos Generales/provisión & distribución , Humanos , Masculino , Modelos Económicos , Factores Sexuales , Especialización/economía , Especialización/estadística & datos numéricos , Encuestas y CuestionariosRESUMEN
To date, there has been little data or empirical research on the determinants of doctors' earnings despite earnings having an important role in influencing the cost of health care, decisions on workforce participation and labour supply. This paper examines the determinants of annual earnings of general practitioners (GPs) and specialists using the first wave of the Medicine in Australia: Balancing Employment and Life, a new longitudinal survey of doctors. For both GPs and specialists, earnings are higher for men, for those who are self-employed and for those who do after-hours or on-call work. GPs have higher earnings if they work in larger practices, in outer regional or rural areas, and in areas with lower GP density, whereas specialists earn more if they have more working experience, spend more time in clinical work and have less complex patients. Decomposition analysis shows that the mean earnings of GPs are lower than that of specialists because GPs work fewer hours, are more likely to be female, are less likely to undertake after-hours or on-call work, and have lower returns to experience. Roughly 50% of the income gap between GPs and specialists is explained by differences in unobserved characteristics and returns to those characteristics.
Asunto(s)
Economía Médica , Medicina General/economía , Renta , Especialización/economía , Atención Posterior/economía , Australia , Recolección de Datos , Empleo/economía , Femenino , Humanos , Estudios Longitudinales , Masculino , Factores SexualesRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: Spending on new healthcare technologies increases net population health when the benefits of a new technology are greater than their opportunity costs-the benefits of the best alternative use of the additional resources required to fund a new technology. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study was to estimate the expected incremental cost per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) gained of increased government health expenditure as an empirical estimate of the average opportunity costs of decisions to fund new health technologies. The estimated incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) is proposed as a reference ICER to inform value-based decision making in Australia. METHODS: Empirical top-down approaches were used to estimate the QALY effects of government health expenditure with respect to reduced mortality and morbidity. Instrumental variable two-stage least-squares regression was used to estimate the elasticity of mortality-related QALY losses to a marginal change in government health expenditure. Regression analysis of longitudinal survey data representative of the general population was used to isolate the effects of increased government health expenditure on morbidity-related, QALY gains. Clinical judgement informed the duration of health-related quality-of-life improvement from the annual increase in government health expenditure. RESULTS: The base-case reference ICER was estimated at AUD28,033 per QALY gained. Parametric uncertainty associated with the estimation of mortality- and morbidity-related QALYs generated a 95% confidence interval AUD20,758-37,667. CONCLUSION: Recent public summary documents suggest new technologies with ICERs above AUD40,000 per QALY gained are recommended for public funding. The empirical reference ICER reported in this article suggests more QALYs could be gained if resources were allocated to other forms of health spending.
Asunto(s)
Tecnología Biomédica/economía , Atención a la Salud/economía , Años de Vida Ajustados por Calidad de Vida , Evaluación de la Tecnología Biomédica/métodos , Australia , Análisis Costo-Beneficio , Toma de Decisiones , Financiación Gubernamental/economía , Gastos en Salud/estadística & datos numéricos , Humanos , Análisis de los Mínimos Cuadrados , Calidad de Vida , Análisis de RegresiónRESUMEN
This paper investigates the effects of reducing subsidies for private health insurance on public sector expenditure for hospital care. An econometric framework using simultaneous equation models is developed to analyse the interrelated decisions on the intensity and type of health care use and private insurance. The framework is applied to the context of the mixed public-private system in Australia. The simulation projections show that reducing premium subsidies is expected to generate net cost savings. This arises because the cost savings achieved from reducing subsidies are larger than the potential increase in public expenditure on hospital care.