RESUMEN
BACKGROUND: Pakistan and Afghanistan remain the only reservoirs of wild poliovirus transmission. Prior modeling suggested that before the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, plans to stop the transmission of serotype 1 wild poliovirus (WPV1) and persistent serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) did not appear on track to succeed. METHODS: We updated an existing poliovirus transmission and Sabin-strain oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) evolution model for Pakistan and Afghanistan to characterize the impacts of immunization disruptions and restrictions on human interactions (ie, population mixing) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. We also consider different options for responding to outbreaks and for preventive supplementary immunization activities (SIAs). RESULTS: The modeling suggests that with some resumption of activities in the fall of 2020 to respond to cVDPV2 outbreaks and full resumption on 1 January 2021 of all polio immunization activities to pre-COVID-19 levels, Pakistan and Afghanistan would remain off-track for stopping all transmission through 2023 without improvements in quality. CONCLUSIONS: Using trivalent OPV (tOPV) for SIAs instead of serotype 2 monovalent OPV offers substantial benefits for ending the transmission of both WPV1 and cVDPV2, because tOPV increases population immunity for both serotypes 1 and 2 while requiring fewer SIA rounds, when effectively delivered in transmission areas.
Asunto(s)
COVID-19 , Brotes de Enfermedades/prevención & control , Poliomielitis/transmisión , Vacuna Antipolio Oral , Poliovirus , Afganistán/epidemiología , Erradicación de la Enfermedad , Humanos , Pakistán/epidemiología , Pandemias , Poliomielitis/epidemiología , Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Poliovirus/inmunología , SARS-CoV-2RESUMEN
Nearly 20 years after the year 2000 target for global wild poliovirus (WPV) eradication, live polioviruses continue to circulate with all three serotypes posing challenges for the polio endgame. We updated a global differential equation-based poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to include programmatic and epidemiological experience through January 2020. We used the model to explore the likely dynamics of poliovirus transmission for 2019-2023, which coincides with a new Global Polio Eradication Initiative Strategic Plan. The model stratifies the global population into 72 blocks, each containing 10 subpopulations of approximately 10.7 million people. Exported viruses go into subpopulations within the same block and within groups of blocks that represent large preferentially mixing geographical areas (e.g., continents). We assign representative World Bank income levels to the blocks along with polio immunization and transmission assumptions, which capture some of the heterogeneity across countries while still focusing on global poliovirus transmission dynamics. We also updated estimates of reintroduction risks using available evidence. The updated model characterizes transmission dynamics and resulting polio cases consistent with the evidence through 2019. Based on recent epidemiological experience and prospective immunization assumptions for the 2019-2023 Strategic Plan, the updated model does not show successful eradication of serotype 1 WPV by 2023 or successful cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine serotype 2-related viruses.
Asunto(s)
Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Poliomielitis/transmisión , Vacuna Antipolio de Virus Inactivados , Vacuna Antipolio Oral , Poliovirus/inmunología , Medición de Riesgo/métodos , Erradicación de la Enfermedad , Brotes de Enfermedades/prevención & control , Salud Global , Humanos , Gestión de Riesgos , VacunaciónRESUMEN
After the globally coordinated cessation of any serotype of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), some risks remain from undetected, existing homotypic OPV-related transmission and/or restarting transmission due to several possible reintroduction risks. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of serotype 2-containing OPV (OPV2) in 2016. Following OPV2 cessation, the GPEI and countries implemented activities to withdraw all the remaining trivalent OPV, which contains all three poliovirus serotypes (i.e., 1, 2, and 3), from the supply chain and replace it with bivalent OPV (containing only serotypes 1 and 3). However, as of early 2020, monovalent OPV2 use for outbreak response continues in many countries. In addition, outbreaks observed in 2019 demonstrated evidence of different types of risks than previously modeled. We briefly review the 2019 epidemiological experience with serotype 2 live poliovirus outbreaks and propose a new risk for unexpected OPV introduction for inclusion in global modeling of OPV cessation. Using an updated model of global poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution with and without consideration of this new risk, we explore the implications of the current global situation with respect to the likely need to restart preventive use of OPV2 in OPV-using countries. Simulation results without this new risk suggest OPV2 restart will likely need to occur (81% of 100 iterations) to manage the polio endgame based on the GPEI performance to date with existing vaccine tools, and with the new risk of unexpected OPV introduction the expected OPV2 restart probability increases to 89%. Contingency planning requires new OPV2 bulk production, including genetically stabilized OPV2 strains.
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Poliomielitis/inmunología , Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Vacuna Antipolio Oral , Poliovirus , Simulación por Computador , Erradicación de la Enfermedad/métodos , Brotes de Enfermedades/prevención & control , Salud Global , Conductas Relacionadas con la Salud , Humanos , Vacuna Antipolio de Virus Inactivados , Probabilidad , Riesgo , Gestión de Riesgos , Serogrupo , Vacunación/métodosRESUMEN
Due to security, access, and programmatic challenges in areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, both countries continue to sustain indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission and threaten the success of global polio eradication and oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation. We fitted an existing differential-equation-based poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to Pakistan and Afghanistan using four subpopulations to characterize the well-vaccinated and undervaccinated subpopulations in each country. We explored retrospective and prospective scenarios for using inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in routine immunization or supplemental immunization activities (SIAs). The undervaccinated subpopulations sustain the circulation of serotype 1 WPV and serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus. We find a moderate impact of past IPV use on polio incidence and population immunity to transmission mainly due to (1) the boosting effect of IPV for individuals with preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection and (2) the effect of IPV-only on oropharyngeal transmission for individuals without preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection. Future IPV use may similarly yield moderate benefits, particularly if access to undervaccinated subpopulations dramatically improves. However, OPV provides a much greater impact on transmission and the incremental benefit of IPV in addition to OPV remains limited. This study suggests that despite the moderate effect of using IPV in SIAs, using OPV in SIAs remains the most effective means to stop transmission, while limited IPV resources should prioritize IPV use in routine immunization.
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Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Poliomielitis/transmisión , Afganistán , Erradicación de la Enfermedad , Humanos , Modelos Biológicos , Pakistán , Poliomielitis/inmunología , Poliovirus/clasificación , Poliovirus/inmunología , Vacuna Antipolio de Virus Inactivados/administración & dosificación , Vacuna Antipolio Oral/administración & dosificación , Estudios Prospectivos , Estudios Retrospectivos , Medición de Riesgo , Gestión de Riesgos , Serotipificación , Vacunación/métodosRESUMEN
The Global Commission for the Certification of the Eradication of Poliomyelitis certified the eradication of type 2 poliovirus in September 2015, making type 2 poliovirus the first human pathogen to be eradicated since smallpox. The eradication of type 2 poliovirus, the absence of detection of type 3 poliovirus worldwide since November 2012, and cornering type 1 poliovirus to only a few geographic areas of 3 countries has enabled implementation of the endgame of polio eradication which calls for a phased withdrawal of oral polio vaccine beginning with the type 2 component, introduction of inactivated poliovirus vaccine, strengthening of routine immunization in countries with extensive polio resources, and initiating activities to transition polio resources, program experience, and lessons learned to other global health initiatives. This supplement focuses on efforts by global partners to successfully launch polio endgame activities to permanently secure and sustain the enormous gains of polio eradication forever.
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Erradicación de la Enfermedad , Salud Global , Programas de Inmunización , Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Humanos , Vacuna Antipolio de Virus Inactivados , Vacuna Antipolio OralRESUMEN
Background: The Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan (PEESP) established a target that at least 50% of the time of personnel receiving funding from the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) for polio eradication activities (hereafter, "GPEI-funded personnel") should be dedicated to the strengthening of immunization systems. This article describes the self-reported profile of how GPEI-funded personnel allocate their time toward immunization goals and activities beyond those associated with polio, the training they have received to conduct tasks to strengthen routine immunization systems, and the type of tasks they have conducted. Methods: A survey of approximately 1000 field managers of frontline GPEI-funded personnel was conducted by Boston Consulting Group in the 10 focus countries of the PEESP during 2 phases, in 2013 and 2014, to determine time allocation among frontline staff. Country-specific reports on the training of GPEI-funded personnel were reviewed, and an analysis of the types of tasks that were reported was conducted. Results: A total of 467 managers responded to the survey. Forty-seven percent of the time (range, 23%-61%) of GPEI-funded personnel was dedicated to tasks related to strengthening immunization programs, other than polio eradication. Less time was spent on polio-associated activities in countries that had already interrupted wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission, compared with findings for WPV-endemic countries. All countries conducted periodic trainings of the GPEI-funded personnel. The types of non-polio-related tasks performed by GPEI-funded personnel varied among countries and included surveillance, microplanning, newborn registration and defaulter tracing, monitoring of routine immunization activities, and support of district immunization task teams, as well as promotion of health behaviors, such as clean-water use and good hygiene and sanitation practices. Conclusion: In all countries, GPEI-funded personnel perform critical tasks in the strengthening of routine immunization programs and the control of measles and rubella. In certain countries with very weak immunization systems, GPEI-funded personnel provide critical support for the immunization programs, and sudden discontinuation of their employment would potentially disrupt the immunization programs in their countries and create a setback in capacity and effectiveness that would put children at higher risk for vaccine-preventable diseases.
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Erradicación de la Enfermedad/organización & administración , Erradicación de la Enfermedad/estadística & datos numéricos , Programas de Inmunización/organización & administración , Programas de Inmunización/estadística & datos numéricos , Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Humanos , Entrevistas como Asunto , Vacunación Masiva , Vigilancia en Salud Pública , Encuestas y CuestionariosRESUMEN
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) has been in operation since 1988, now spends $1 billion annually, and operates through thousands of staff and millions of volunteers in dozens of countries. It has brought polio to the brink of eradication. After eradication is achieved, what should happen to the substantial assets, capabilities, and lessons of the GPEI? To answer this question, an extensive process of transition planning is underway. There is an absolute need to maintain and mainstream some of the functions, to keep the world polio-free. There is also considerable risk-and, if seized, substantial opportunity-for other health programs and priorities. And critical lessons have been learned that can be used to address other health priorities. Planning has started in the 16 countries where GPEI's footprint is the greatest and in the program's 5 core agencies. Even though poliovirus transmission has not yet been stopped globally, this planning process is gaining momentum, and some plans are taking early shape. This is a complex area of work-with difficult technical, financial, and political elements. There is no significant precedent. There is forward motion and a willingness on many sides to understand and address the risks and to explore the opportunities. Very substantial investments have been made, over 30 years, to eradicate a human pathogen from the world for the second time ever. Transition planning represents a serious intent to responsibly bring the world's largest global health effort to a close and to protect and build upon the investment in this effort, where appropriate, to benefit other national and global priorities. Further detailed technical work is now needed, supported by broad and engaged debate, for this undertaking to achieve its full potential.
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Erradicación de la Enfermedad/métodos , Erradicación de la Enfermedad/organización & administración , Salud Global , Programas de Inmunización/métodos , Programas de Inmunización/organización & administración , Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Prioridades en Salud , HumanosRESUMEN
From 2012 to date, Nigeria has been the focus of intensified polio eradication efforts. Large investments made by multiple partner organizations and the federal Ministry of Health to support strategies and resources, including personnel, for increasing vaccination coverage and improved performance monitoring paid off, as the number of wild poliovirus (WPV) cases detected in Nigeria were reduced significantly, from 122 in 2012 to 6 in 2014. No WPV cases were detected in Nigeria in 2015 and as at March 2017, only 4 WPV cases had been detected. Given the momentum gained toward polio eradication, these resources seem well positioned to help advance other priority health agendas in Nigeria, particularly the control of vaccine-preventable diseases, such as measles. Despite implementation of mass measles vaccination campaigns, measles outbreaks continue to occur regularly in Nigeria, leading to high morbidity and mortality rates for children <5 years of age. The National Stop Transmission of Polio (NSTOP) program was collaboratively established in 2012 to create a network of staff working at national, state, and district levels in areas deemed high risk for vaccine-preventable disease outbreaks. As an example of how the polio legacy can create long-lasting improvements to public health beyond polio, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention will transition >180 NSTOP officers to provide technical experience to improve measles surveillance, routine vaccination coverage, and outbreak investigation and response in high-risk areas.
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Erradicación de la Enfermedad/métodos , Erradicación de la Enfermedad/organización & administración , Programas de Inmunización/métodos , Programas de Inmunización/organización & administración , Sarampión/prevención & control , Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Preescolar , Humanos , Lactante , Recién Nacido , Sarampión/epidemiología , NigeriaRESUMEN
PROBLEM: Many countries have weak disease surveillance and immunization systems. The elimination of polio creates an opportunity to use staff and assets from the polio eradication programme to control other vaccine-preventable diseases and improve disease surveillance and immunization systems. APPROACH: In 2003, the active surveillance system of Nepal's polio eradication programme began to report on measles and neonatal tetanus cases. Japanese encephalitis and rubella cases were added to the surveillance system in 2004. Staff from the programme aided the development and implementation of government immunization policies, helped launch vaccination campaigns, and trained government staff in reporting practices and vaccine management. LOCAL SETTING: Nepal eliminated indigenous polio in 2000, and controlled outbreaks caused by polio importations between 2005 and 2010. RELEVANT CHANGES: In 2014, the surveillance activities had expanded to 299 sites, with active surveillance for measles, rubella and neonatal tetanus, including weekly visits from 15 surveillance medical officers. Sentinel surveillance for Japanese encephalitis consisted of 132 sites. Since 2002, staff from the eradication programme have helped to introduce six new vaccines and helped to secure funding from Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. Staff have also assisted in responding to other health events in the country. LESSON LEARNT: By expanding the activities of its polio eradication programme, Nepal has improved its surveillance and immunization systems and increased vaccination coverage of other vaccine-preventable diseases. Continued donor support, a close collaboration with the Expanded Programme on Immunization, and the retention of the polio eradication programme's skilled workforce were important for this expansion.
Asunto(s)
Atención a la Salud/organización & administración , Erradicación de la Enfermedad/organización & administración , Poliomielitis/epidemiología , Vigilancia en Salud Pública/métodos , Creación de Capacidad/organización & administración , Humanos , Programas de Inmunización/organización & administración , Sarampión/epidemiología , Nepal , Rubéola (Sarampión Alemán)/epidemiologíaRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: Following successful eradication of wild polioviruses and planned globally-coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), national and global health leaders may need to respond to outbreaks from reintroduced live polioviruses, particularly vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). Preparing outbreak response plans and assessing potential vaccine needs from an emergency stockpile require consideration of the different national risks and conditions as they change with time after OPV cessation. METHODS: We used an integrated global model to consider several key issues related to managing poliovirus risks and outbreak response, including the time interval during which monovalent OPV (mOPV) can be safely used following homotypic OPV cessation; the timing, quality, and quantity of rounds required to stop transmission; vaccine stockpile needs; and the impacts of vaccine choices and surveillance quality. We compare the base case scenario that assumes aggressive outbreak response and sufficient mOPV available from the stockpile for all outbreaks that occur in the model, with various scenarios that change the outbreak response strategies. RESULTS: Outbreak response after OPV cessation will require careful management, with some circumstances expected to require more and/or higher quality rounds to stop transmission than others. For outbreaks involving serotype 2, using trivalent OPV instead of mOPV2 following cessation of OPV serotype 2 but before cessation of OPV serotypes 1 and 3 would represent a good option if logistically feasible. Using mOPV for outbreak response can start new outbreaks if exported outside the outbreak population into populations with decreasing population immunity to transmission after OPV cessation, but failure to contain outbreaks resulting in exportation of the outbreak poliovirus may represent a greater risk. The possibility of mOPV use generating new long-term poliovirus excretors represents a real concern. Using the base case outbreak response assumptions, we expect over 25% probability of a shortage of stockpiled filled mOPV vaccine, which could jeopardize the achievement of global polio eradication. For the long term, responding to any poliovirus reintroductions may require a global IPV stockpile. Despite the risks, our model suggests that good risk management and response strategies can successfully control most potential outbreaks after OPV cessation. CONCLUSIONS: Health leaders should carefully consider the numerous outbreak response choices that affect the probability of successfully managing poliovirus risks after OPV cessation.
Asunto(s)
Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Vacuna Antipolio Oral/provisión & distribución , Planificación en Desastres , Brotes de Enfermedades/prevención & control , Humanos , Cooperación Internacional , Gestión de Riesgos , Vacunación/métodosRESUMEN
Over the past 50 years, the use of vaccines led to significant decreases in the global burdens of measles and rubella, motivated at least in part by the successive development of global control and elimination targets. The Global Vaccine Action Plan (GVAP) includes specific targets for regional elimination of measles and rubella in five of six regions of the World Health Organization by 2020. Achieving the GVAP measles and rubella goals will require significant immunization efforts and associated financial investments and political commitments. Planning and budgeting for these efforts can benefit from learning some important lessons from the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). Following an overview of the global context of measles and rubella risks and discussion of lessons learned from the GPEI, we introduce the contents of the special issue on modeling and managing the risks of measles and rubella. This introduction describes the synthesis of the literature available to support evidence-based model inputs to support the development of an integrated economic and dynamic disease transmission model to support global efforts to optimally manage these diseases globally using vaccines.
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Sarampión/prevención & control , Modelos Teóricos , Gestión de Riesgos , Rubéola (Sarampión Alemán)/prevención & control , Erradicación de la Enfermedad , Salud Global , Humanos , Organización Mundial de la SaludRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) after interrupting all wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission, but many questions remain related to long-term poliovirus risk management policies. METHODS: We used an integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to simulate possible futures and estimate the health and economic outcomes of maintaining the 2013 status quo of continued OPV use in most developing countries compared with OPV cessation policies with various assumptions about global inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) adoption. RESULTS: Continued OPV use after global WPV eradication leads to continued high costs and/or high cases. Global OPV cessation comes with a high probability of at least one outbreak, which aggressive outbreak response can successfully control in most instances. A low but non-zero probability exists of uncontrolled outbreaks following a poliovirus reintroduction long after OPV cessation in a population in which IPV-alone cannot prevent poliovirus transmission. We estimate global incremental net benefits during 2013-2052 of approximately $16 billion (US$2013) for OPV cessation with at least one IPV routine immunization dose in all countries until 2024 compared to continued OPV use, although significant uncertainty remains associated with the frequency of exportations between populations and the implementation of long term risk management policies. CONCLUSIONS: Global OPV cessation offers the possibility of large future health and economic benefits compared to continued OPV use. Long-term poliovirus risk management interventions matter (e.g., IPV use duration, outbreak response, containment, continued surveillance, stockpile size and contents, vaccine production site requirements, potential antiviral drugs, and potential safer vaccines) and require careful consideration. Risk management activities can help to ensure a low risk of uncontrolled outbreaks and preserve or further increase the positive net benefits of OPV cessation. Important uncertainties will require more research, including characterizing immunodeficient long-term poliovirus excretor risks, containment risks, and the kinetics of outbreaks and response in an unprecedented world without widespread live poliovirus exposure.
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Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Gestión de Riesgos/economía , Antivirales/economía , Antivirales/uso terapéutico , Brotes de Enfermedades , Humanos , Síndromes de Inmunodeficiencia/patología , Poliomielitis/economía , Poliomielitis/transmisión , Poliovirus/inmunología , Vacuna Antipolio de Virus Inactivados/economía , Vacuna Antipolio de Virus Inactivados/uso terapéutico , Vacuna Antipolio Oral/administración & dosificación , Vacuna Antipolio Oral/economía , Estudios Prospectivos , Salud Pública/economía , Serogrupo , Vacunación/economíaRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: Most poliovirus infections occur with no symptoms and this leads to the possibility of silent circulation, which complicates the confirmation of global goals to permanently end poliovirus transmission. Previous simple models based on hypothetical populations assumed perfect detection of symptomatic cases and suggested the need to observe no paralytic cases from wild polioviruses (WPVs) for approximately 3-4 years to achieve 95% confidence about eradication, but the complexities in real populations and the imperfect nature of surveillance require consideration. METHODS: We revisit the probability of undetected poliovirus circulation using a more comprehensive model that reflects the conditions in a number of places with different characteristics related to WPV transmission, and we model the actual environmental WPV detection that occurred in Israel in 2013. We consider the analogous potential for undetected transmission of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses. The model explicitly accounts for the impact of different vaccination activities before and after the last detected case of paralytic polio, different levels of surveillance, variability in transmissibility and neurovirulence among serotypes, and the possibility of asymptomatic participation in transmission by previously-vaccinated or infected individuals. RESULTS: We find that prolonged circulation in the absence of cases and thus undetectable by case-based surveillance may occur if vaccination keeps population immunity close to but not over the threshold required for the interruption of transmission, as may occur in northwestern Nigeria for serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus in the event of insufficient tOPV use. Participation of IPV-vaccinated individuals in asymptomatic fecal-oral transmission may also contribute to extended transmission undetectable by case-based surveillance, as occurred in Israel. We also find that gaps or quality issues in surveillance could significantly reduce confidence about actual disruption. Maintaining high population immunity and high-quality surveillance for several years after the last detected polio cases will remain critical elements of the polio end game. CONCLUSIONS: Countries will need to maintain vigilance in their surveillance for polioviruses and recognize that their risks of undetected circulation may differ as a function of their efforts to manage population immunity and to identify cases or circulating live polioviruses.
Asunto(s)
Infecciones Asintomáticas , Modelos Biológicos , Poliomielitis/transmisión , Vigilancia en Salud Pública/métodos , Adolescente , Adulto , Anciano , Anciano de 80 o más Años , Infecciones Asintomáticas/epidemiología , Niño , Preescolar , Femenino , Humanos , Lactante , Recién Nacido , Israel/epidemiología , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Nigeria/epidemiología , Poliomielitis/diagnóstico , Poliomielitis/epidemiología , Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Vacunas contra Poliovirus , Adulto JovenRESUMEN
The world is on the verge of achieving global polio eradication. During >25 years of operations, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) has mobilized and trained millions of volunteers, social mobilizers, and health workers; accessed households untouched by other health initiatives; mapped and brought health interventions to chronically neglected and underserved communities; and established a standardized, real-time global surveillance and response capacity. It is important to document the lessons learned from polio eradication, especially because it is one of the largest ever global health initiatives. The health community has an obligation to ensure that these lessons and the knowledge generated are shared and contribute to real, sustained changes in our approach to global health. We have summarized what we believe are 10 leading lessons learned from the polio eradication initiative. We have the opportunity and obligation to build a better future by applying the lessons learned from GPEI and its infrastructure and unique functions to other global health priorities and initiatives. In so doing, we can extend the global public good gained by ending for all time one of the world's most devastating diseases by also ensuring that these investments provide public health dividends and benefits for years to come.
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Erradicación de la Enfermedad/organización & administración , Poliomielitis/epidemiología , Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Erradicación de la Enfermedad/tendencias , Salud Global , HumanosRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: Pockets of undervaccinated individuals continue to raise concerns about their potential to sustain epidemic transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases. Prior importations of live polioviruses (LPVs) into Amish communities in North America led to their recognition as a potential and identifiable linked network of undervaccinated individuals. METHODS: We developed an individual-based model to explore the potential transmission of a LPV throughout the North American Amish population. RESULTS: Our model demonstrates the expected limited impact associated with the historical importations, which occurred in isolated communities during the low season for poliovirus transmission. We show that some conditions could potentially lead to wider circulation of LPVs and cases of paralytic polio in Amish communities if an importation occurred during or after 2013. The impact will depend on the uncertain historical immunity to poliovirus infection among members of the community. CONCLUSIONS: Heterogeneity in immunization coverage represents a risk factor for potential outbreaks of polio if introduction of a LPV occurs, although overall high population immunity in North America suggests that transmission would remain relatively limited. Efforts to prevent spread between Amish church districts with any feasible measures may offer the best opportunity to contain an outbreak and limit its size.
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Amish , Poliomielitis/epidemiología , Poliomielitis/transmisión , Vacunas contra Poliovirus/administración & dosificación , Poliovirus/aislamiento & purificación , Características de la Residencia , Vacunación/estadística & datos numéricos , Adolescente , Adulto , Anciano , Anciano de 80 o más Años , Niño , Preescolar , Femenino , Humanos , Lactante , Recién Nacido , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Modelos Estadísticos , América del Norte/epidemiología , Poliomielitis/prevención & control , Medición de Riesgo , Adulto JovenRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: In 2009, enhanced poliovirus surveillance was established in polio-endemic areas of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, India, to assess poliovirus infection in older individuals. METHODS: In Uttar Pradesh, stool specimens from asymptomatic household and neighborhood contacts of patients with laboratory-confirmed polio were tested for polioviruses. In Bihar, in community-based surveillance, children and adults from 250 randomly selected households in the Kosi River area provided stool and pharyngeal swab samples that were tested for polioviruses. A descriptive analysis of surveillance data was performed. RESULTS: In Uttar Pradesh, 89 of 1842 healthy contacts of case patients with polio (4.8%) were shedding wild poliovirus (WPV); 54 of 85 (63.5%) were ≥5 years of age. Shedding was significantly higher in index households than in neighborhood households (P<.05). In Bihar, 11 of 451 healthy persons (2.4%) were shedding WPV in their stool; 6 of 11 (54.5%) were ≥5 years of age. Mean viral titer was similar in older and younger children. CONCLUSIONS: A high proportion of persons≥5 years of age were asymptomatically shedding polioviruses. These findings provide indirect evidence that older individuals could have contributed to community transmission of WPV in India. Polio vaccination campaigns generally target children<5 years of age. Expanding this target age group in polio-endemic areas could accelerate polio eradication.
Asunto(s)
Enfermedades Asintomáticas/epidemiología , Poliomielitis/epidemiología , Poliovirus/aislamiento & purificación , Adolescente , Adulto , Factores de Edad , Anciano , Niño , Preescolar , Monitoreo Epidemiológico , Heces/virología , Femenino , Humanos , India/epidemiología , Lactante , Recién Nacido , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Faringe/virología , Poliomielitis/transmisión , Poliomielitis/virología , Prevalencia , Esparcimiento de Virus , Adulto JovenRESUMEN
In 1988, the World Health Assembly resolved to eradicate polio worldwide. Since then, four of the six World Health Organization (WHO) regions have been certified as polio-free: the Americas in 1994, the Western Pacific Region in 2000, the European Region in 2002, and the South-East Asia Region in 2014. Currently, nearly 80% of the world's population lives in areas certified as polio-free. Certification may be considered when ≥3 years have passed since the last isolation of wild poliovirus (WPV) in the presence of sensitive, certification-standard surveillance. Although regional eradication has been validated in the European Region and the Western Pacific Region, outbreaks resulting from WPV type 1 (WPV1) imported from known endemic areas were detected and controlled in these regions in 2010 and 2011, respectively. The last reported case associated with WPV type 2 (WPV2) was in India in 1999, marking global interruption of WPV2 transmission. The completion of polio eradication was declared a programmatic emergency for public health in 2012, and the international spread of WPV1 was declared a public health emergency of international concern in May 2014. The efforts needed to interrupt all indigenous WPV1 transmission are now being focused on the remaining endemic countries: Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. WPV type 3 (WPV3) has not been detected in circulation since November 11, 2012. This report summarizes the evidence of possible global interruption of transmission of WPV3, based on surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) and environmental surveillance.