Availability of synchronous information in an additional sensory modality does not enhance the full body illusion.

The Full body illusion (FBI) is an illusion in which participants experience a change in self-location to a body that is perceived from a third-person perspective. The FBI is usually induced through experimenter generated stroking but can also be induced through self-generated stroking. In four experiments (three preregistered) we compared a self-generated stroking induction condition to a self-generated movement condition, where the only difference between conditions was the presence or absence of touch. We investigated whether the illusion reflects an all-or-nothing phenomenon or whether the illusion is influenced by the availability of synchronous information in an additional sensory modality. As a prerequisite, we investigated whether the FBI can also be induced using just self-generated movement in the absence of synchronous touch. Illusion strength was measured through illusion statements. Participants reported an equally strong illusion for both induction methods in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. In the third experiment, we additionally measured the time of illusion onset. Like the illusion strength measures, the illusion onset times did not differ between the two induction methods. In the fourth experiment participants only completed the self-generated movement condition. Again, they reported the FBI, demonstrating that the findings of Experiments 1, 2 and 3 were not dependent on the presence of a condition that used synchronous touch. Together, these findings confirm the hypothesis that the FBI is an all-or-nothing phenomenon and that adding additional multisensory synchronicity does not help to enhance the strength, onset time or onset probability of the illusion.

Do impulsive individuals benefit more from food go/no-go training? Testing the role of inhibition capacity in the no-go devaluation effect.

Not responding to food items in a go/no-go task can lead to devaluation of these food items, which may help people regulate their eating behavior. The Behavior Stimulus Interaction (BSI) theory explains this devaluation effect by assuming that inhibiting impulses triggered by appetitive foods elicits negative affect, which in turn devalues the food items. BSI theory further predicts that the devaluation effect will be stronger when food items are more appetitive and when individuals have low inhibition capacity. To test these hypotheses, we manipulated the appetitiveness of food items and measured individual inhibition capacity with the stop-signal task. Food items were consistently paired with either go or no-go cues, so that participants responded to go items and not to no-go items. Evaluations of these items were measured before and after go/no-go training. Across two preregistered experiments, we consistently found no-go foods were liked less after the training compared to both go foods and foods not used in the training. Unexpectedly, this devaluation effect occurred for both appetitive and less appetitive food items. Exploratory signal detection analyses suggest this latter finding might be explained by increased learning of stimulus-response contingencies for the less appetitive items when they are presented among appetitive items. Furthermore, the strength of devaluation did not consistently correlate with individual inhibition capacity, and Bayesian analyses combining data from both experiments provided moderate support for the null hypothesis. The current project demonstrated the devaluation effect induced by the go/no-go training, but failed to obtain further evidence for BSI theory. Since the devaluation effect was reliably obtained across experiments, the results do reinforce the notion that the go/no-go training is a promising tool to help people regulate their eating behavior.

Temporal focus, temporal distance, and mind-wandering valence: Results from an experience sampling and an experimental study.

When mind-wandering, people may think about events that happened in the past, or events that may happen in the future. Using experience sampling, we first aimed to replicate the finding that future-oriented thoughts show a greater positivity bias than past-oriented thoughts. Furthermore, we investigated whether there is a relation between the temporal distance of past- and future-oriented thoughts and the frequency of positive thoughts, a factor that has received little attention in previous work. Second, we experimentally investigated the relation between temporal focus, temporal distance, and thought valence. Both studies showed that future-oriented thoughts were more positive compared to past-oriented thoughts. Regarding temporal distance, thoughts about the distant past and future were more positive than thoughts about the near past and future in the experiment. However, the experience sampling study did not provide clear insight into this relation. Potential theoretical and methodological explanations for these findings are discussed.

Thinking in Black and White: Conscious thought increases racially biased judgments through biased face memory.

It is a common research finding that conscious thought helps people to avoid racial discrimination. These three experiments, however, illustrate that conscious thought may increase biased face memory, which leads to increased judgment bias (i.e., preferring White to Black individuals). In Experiments 1 and 2, university students formed impressions of Black and White housemate candidates. They judged the candidates either immediately (immediate decision condition), thought about their judgments for a few minutes (conscious thought condition), or performed an unrelated task for a few minutes (unconscious thought condition). Conscious thinkers and immediate decision-makers showed a stronger face memory bias than unconscious thinkers, and this mediated increased judgment bias, although not all results were significant. Experiment 3 used a new, different paradigm and showed that a Black male was remembered as darker after a period of conscious thought than after a period of unconscious thought. Implications for racial prejudice are discussed.

Authority defied: need for cognitive closure influences regulatory control when resisting authority.

The present studies examined whether differences in need for cognitive closure (NCC) were related to differences in regulatory control when confronted with authority. In two studies, levels of regulatory control were measured when participants resisted (Study 1; N = 46) or prepared to resist the influence attempt of an authority figure (Study 2; N = 50). Results showed that resisting the influence attempt from a high-authority figure was more depleting for participants higher in NCC compared to individuals lower in NCC. However, when they were given instructions and time to prepare the act of resistance, individuals high in NCC actually showed an increase in regulatory control. Authority is usually viewed as a general principle of influence; however, the present studies suggest that there are individual differences that influence how people may experience interactions with authorities.

Newell and Shanks' approach to psychology is a dead end.

Newell & Shanks (N&S) criticize theories on decision making that include unconscious processes. To the extent that their own perspective becomes apparent, however, it is dated, implausible, and at odds with the major developments of the past decades. Their conclusions are, at least for research areas we feel entitled to evaluate, based on a biased sampling of the literature.

Assessment of implicit sexual associations in non-incarcerated pedophiles.

Offences committed by pedophiles are crimes that evoke serious public concern and outrage. Although recent research using implicit measures has shown promise in detecting deviant sexual associations, the discriminatory and predictive quality of implicit tasks has not yet surpassed traditional assessment methods such as questionnaires and phallometry. The current research extended previous findings by examining whether a combination of two implicit tasks, the Implicit Association Task (IAT) and the Picture Association Task (PAT), was capable of differentiating pedophiles from non-pedophiles, and whether the PAT, which allows separate analysis for male, female, boy and girl stimulus categories, was more sensitive to specific sexual associations in pedophiles than the IAT. A total of 20 male self-reported pedophiles (10 offender and 10 non-offenders) and 20 male self-reported heterosexual controls completed the two implicit measures. Results indicated that the combination of both tasks produced the strongest results to date in detecting implicit pedophilic preferences (AUC = .97). Additionally, the PAT showed promise in decomposing the sexual associations in pedophiles. Interestingly, as there was an equal distribution of offenders and non-offenders in the pedophile group, it was possible to test for implicit association differences between these groups. This comparison showed no clear link between having these implicit sexual associations and actual offending.

Empathy is a beautiful thing: empathy predicts imitation only for attractive others.

Research shows that we spontaneously imitate people. Moreover, empathy predicts the degree of this non-conscious imitation. Little is known, however, if or how this expression of empathy is influenced by stable physical characteristics of our interaction-partners. In two studies, we tested whether attractiveness of others moderated the relation between empathy and imitation. While seeing a woman performing joystick movements, participants either imitated, or non-imitated these movements. Results showed that the higher participants empathy score, the faster they imitated an attractive person. The level of empathy did not predict the degree of imitation of unattractive targets. The findings demonstrate that the expression of empathy through imitation can be moderated by attractiveness, thereby introducing a new dimension to the conditionality of empathy.

Good morning creativity: task reactivation during sleep enhances beneficial effect of sleep on creative performance.

Both scientists and artists have suggested that sleep facilitates creativity, and this idea has received substantial empirical support. In the current study, we investigate whether one can actively enhance the beneficial effect of sleep on creativity by covertly reactivating the creativity task during sleep. Individuals' creative performance was compared after three different conditions: sleep-with-conditioned-odor; sleep-with-control-odor; or sleep-with-no-odor. In the evening prior to sleep, all participants were presented with a problem that required a creative solution. In the two odor conditions, a hidden scent-diffuser spread an odor while the problem was presented. In the sleep-with-conditioned-odor condition, task reactivation during sleep was induced by means of the odor that was also presented while participants were informed about the problem. In the sleep-with-control-odor condition, participants were exposed to a different odor during sleep than the one diffused during problem presentation. In the no odor condition, no odor was presented. After a night of sleep with the conditioned odor, participants were found to be: (i) more creative; and (ii) better able to select their most creative idea than participants who had been exposed to a control odor or no odor while sleeping. These findings suggest that we do not have to passively wait until we are hit by our creative muse while sleeping. Task reactivation during sleep can actively trigger creativity-related processes during sleep and thereby boost the beneficial effect of sleep on creativity.

Zen meditation and access to information in the unconscious.

In two experiments and two different research paradigms, we tested the hypothesis that Zen meditation increases access to accessible but unconscious information. Zen practitioners who meditated in the lab performed better on the Remote Associate Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962) than Zen practitioners who did not meditate. In a new, second task, it was observed that Zen practitioners who meditated used subliminally primed words more than Zen practitioners who did not meditate. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.

Perspective taking eliminates differences in co-representation of out-group members' actions.

Coordinated action relies on shared representations between interaction partners: people co-represent actions of others in order to respond appropriately. However, little is known about the social factors that influence shared representations. We investigated whether actions performed by in-group and out-group members are represented differently, and if so, what role perspective-taking plays in this process. White participants performed a joint Simon task with an animated image of a hand with either white or black skin tone. Results of study I demonstrated that actions performed by in-group members were co-represented while actions of out-group members were not. In study II, it was found that participants co-represented actions of out-group members when they had read about an out-group member and to take his perspective prior to the actual experiment. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed.

Goals, attention, and (un)consciousness.

In this article, literature from neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and social cognition is integrated to discuss the relation between goals, attention, and consciousness. Goals are the tools with which people engage in volitional behavior. Whereas goal pursuit was traditionally assumed to be strongly related to consciousness, recent research and theorizing suggest that goals guide behavior through attention, and this guidance can occur outside of a person's awareness. The crucial explanatory role of goals and attention in behavior, as well as the relative unimportance of consciousness, is examined in the context of social cognition research on goal priming. Furthermore, three research domains are discussed that are relevant for the understanding of the implementation of volitional behavior: implicit learning, evaluative conditioning, and unconscious thought. It is concluded that these processes are goal dependent and that they need attention, but that they can generally proceed without awareness. Finally, when people are consciously aware of their behavior or their goals, the effects can be beneficial as well as detrimental.

Unconscious-thought effects take place off-line, not on-line.

The unconscious-thought effect refers to an improvement in decision making following distraction from the decision context for a period of time. The dominant explanation for this effect is that unconscious processes continue to deal with the problem during the distraction period. Recently, however, some researchers have proposed that unconscious thinkers may be merely recalling a judgment that was formed on-line (i.e., during information acquisition). We present two experiments that rule out the latter interpretation. In the unconscious-thought condition of the first experiment, participants who reported making their decision after unconscious thought made better decisions than those who reported making their decision on-line. In the second experiment, all participants judged the choice alternatives both on-line and off-line. On-line judgments were predictive of off-line judgments only in the immediate-decision condition, but not in the conscious- and unconscious-thought conditions. These results demonstrate that a period of unconscious thought does improve judgments that were formed earlier on-line.

Time for Action: Verbal Action Cues Influence Temporal Binding.

Prior research has shown that our perception of time is compressed when we volitionally perform actions, a phenomenon referred to as temporal binding. In three studies, we investigated the degree to which contextual cues that signaled other agents and related to actions would influence binding, given that those cues may affect individual's feelings of independent action performance. Participants heard action verbalizations that did or did not match actions that participants had already begun performing. Participants' time estimates of the intervals between action initiations and action effects were higher on trials in which they heard verbalizations that matched their ongoing actions, and lower on trials in which the verbalizations and actions did not match. Such effects did not occur when participants passively observed actions and effects being caused by the computer. These results show that the compatibility of action cues with ongoing actions influences temporal binding effects, suggesting that they influence our feelings of having been an independent agent.

The self-generated full body illusion is accompanied by impaired detection of somatosensory stimuli.

Research has found that body illusions may be accompanied by consequences for the real body whereby various somatosensory and homeostatic bodily functions may be impaired. These findings stem from research where an experimenter induced the body illusions. In line with advances in the domains of videogames and virtual reality where the real body is used as a controller we investigate if these consequences also accompany self-generated body illusions. In two preregistered experiments we made use of a head-mounted display set-up to induce the full body illusion (FBI) whereby touch is felt to originate from a 3PP body, and examined effects in the simple detection of supra-threshold vibrotactile stimuli presented to the participants' back and head. Results of both experiments indicate that it is possible to induce a FBI through self-stroking of the neck and that the FBI is accompanied by reduced accuracy and delayed reaction times in detection of somatosensory stimuli. In an additional preregistered control experiment the alternative explanation that a difference in motion presented in the conditions was responsible for these findings was ruled out. Our findings corroborate previous studies that have found body illusions to be accompanied by bodily consequences and further extend these findings to the domain of self-induced body illusions. These results are relevant for video games and VR setups that are geared towards virtual embodiment as they advance our understanding of the conditions and mechanisms in which bodily consequences may express themselves.

Predicting soccer matches after unconscious and conscious thought as a function of expertise.

In two experiments, we investigated the effects of expertise and mode of thought on the accuracy of people's predictions. Both experts and nonexperts predicted the results of soccer matches after conscious thought, after unconscious thought, or immediately. In Experiment 1, experts who thought unconsciously outperformed participants in all other conditions. Whereas unconscious thinkers showed a correlation between expertise and accuracy of prediction, no such relation was observed for conscious thinkers or for immediate decision makers. In Experiment 2, this general pattern was replicated. In addition, experts who thought unconsciously were better at applying diagnostic information than experts who thought consciously or who decided immediately. The results are consistent with unconscious-thought theory.

When mere action versus inaction leads to robust preference change.

Understanding the formation and modification of preferences is important for explaining human behavior across many domains. Here we examined when and how preferences for food items can be changed by linking mere action versus inaction to these items. In 7 preregistered experiments, participants were trained to consistently respond to certain food items (go items) and not respond to other items (no-go items) in a go/no-go training. Next, to assess preferences, they repeatedly chose between go and no-go items for consumption. Decision time during the choice task was manipulated and measured. Immediately after training, participants chose go items more often for consumption when choosing under time pressure, for both high-value and low-value choice pairs. Preferences were reliably changed in favor of go items for choices between unhealthy foods, between healthy foods, and between healthy and unhealthy foods. Furthermore, preference change was still observed one week after training, although the effect size largely decreased. Interestingly, when participants made choices without time pressure, the effect became weaker and statistically nonsignificant. These results suggest that preference change induced by mere responding versus not responding is constrained to situations where people take little time to make decisions, and the effect is relatively short-lived. By showing the reliability, generalizability and boundary conditions of the effect, these findings advance our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of go/no-go training, provide more insights into how the training can be effectively applied, and raise new theoretical questions on how mere action versus inaction impacts preferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The merits of unconscious thought in creativity.

Research has yielded weak empirical support for the idea that creative solutions may be discovered through unconscious thought, despite anecdotes to this effect. To understand this gap, we examined the effect of unconscious thought on two outcomes of a remote-association test (RAT): implicit accessibility and conscious reporting of answers. In Experiment 1, which used very difficult RAT items, a short period of unconscious thought (i.e., participants were distracted while holding the goal of solving the RAT items) increased the accessibility of RAT answers, but did not increase the number of correct answers compared with an equal duration of conscious thought or mere distraction. In Experiment 2, which used moderately difficult RAT items, unconscious thought led to a similar level of accessibility, but fewer correct answers, compared with conscious thought. These findings confirm and extend unconscious-thought theory by demonstrating that processes that increase the mental activation of correct solutions do not necessarily lead them into consciousness.

On the (mis)categorization of unattractive brides and attractive prostitutes: extending evaluative congruency effects to social category activation.

Numerous studies have shown that social categorization is a flexible process that partly depends on contextual variables. However, little is known about the role of affect in people's access to categorical dimensions. We investigated the hypothesis that social category activation is facilitated on evaluatively congruent dimensions. Two studies provide support for this evaluative-matching hypothesis, in which social categorization was found to be faster and more accurate for evaluatively congruent categories (i.e., unattractive foreigners, unattractive prostitutes, attractive fellow-citizens and attractive brides) than for evaluatively incongruent categories (i.e., attractive foreigners, attractive prostitutes, unattractive fellow-citizens and unattractive brides). We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.