Massively multiplexed nucleic acid detection with Cas13.

The great majority of globally circulating pathogens go undetected, undermining patient care and hindering outbreak preparedness and response. To enable routine surveillance and comprehensive diagnostic applications, there is a need for detection technologies that can scale to test many samples1-3 while simultaneously testing for many pathogens4-6. Here, we develop Combinatorial Arrayed Reactions for Multiplexed Evaluation of Nucleic acids (CARMEN), a platform for scalable, multiplexed pathogen detection. In the CARMEN platform, nanolitre droplets containing CRISPR-based nucleic acid detection reagents7 self-organize in a microwell array8 to pair with droplets of amplified samples, testing each sample against each CRISPR RNA (crRNA) in replicate. The combination of CARMEN and Cas13 detection (CARMEN-Cas13) enables robust testing of more than 4,500 crRNA-target pairs on a single array. Using CARMEN-Cas13, we developed a multiplexed assay that simultaneously differentiates all 169 human-associated viruses with at least 10 published genome sequences and rapidly incorporated an additional crRNA to detect the causative agent of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. CARMEN-Cas13 further enables comprehensive subtyping of influenza A strains and multiplexed identification of dozens of HIV drug-resistance mutations. The intrinsic multiplexing and throughput capabilities of CARMEN make it practical to scale, as miniaturization decreases reagent cost per test by more than 300-fold. Scalable, highly multiplexed CRISPR-based nucleic acid detection shifts diagnostic and surveillance efforts from targeted testing of high-priority samples to comprehensive testing of large sample sets, greatly benefiting patients and public health9-11.

Leveraging International Influenza Surveillance Systems and Programs during the COVID-19 Pandemic.

A network of global respiratory disease surveillance systems and partnerships has been built over decades as a direct response to the persistent threat of seasonal, zoonotic, and pandemic influenza. These efforts have been spearheaded by the World Health Organization, country ministries of health, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, nongovernmental organizations, academic groups, and others. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention worked closely with ministries of health in partner countries and the World Health Organization to leverage influenza surveillance systems and programs to respond to SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Countries used existing surveillance systems for severe acute respiratory infection and influenza-like illness, respiratory virus laboratory resources, pandemic influenza preparedness plans, and ongoing population-based influenza studies to track, study, and respond to SARS-CoV-2 infections. The incorporation of COVID-19 surveillance into existing influenza sentinel surveillance systems can support continued global surveillance for respiratory viruses with pandemic potential.

United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention support for influenza surveillance, 2013-2021.

Objective: To assess the stability of improvements in global respiratory virus surveillance in countries supported by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) after reductions in CDC funding and with the stress of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Methods: We assessed whether national influenza surveillance systems of CDC-funded countries: (i) continued to analyse as many specimens between 2013 and 2021; (ii) participated in activities of the World Health Organization's (WHO) Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System; (iii) tested enough specimens to detect rare events or signals of unusual activity; and (iv) demonstrated stability before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. We used CDC budget records and data from the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System. Findings: While CDC reduced per-country influenza funding by about 75% over 10 years, the number of specimens tested annually remained stable (mean 2261). Reporting varied substantially by country and transmission zone. Countries funded by CDC accounted for 71% (range 61-75%) of specimens included in WHO consultations on the composition of influenza virus vaccines. In 2019, only eight of the 17 transmission zones sent enough specimens to WHO collaborating centres before the vaccine composition meeting to reliably identify antigenic variants. Conclusion: Great progress has been made in the global understanding of influenza trends and seasonality. To optimize surveillance to identify atypical influenza viruses, and to integrate molecular testing, sequencing and reporting of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 into existing systems, funding must continue to support these efforts.

Influenza Activity and Composition of the 2022-23 Influenza Vaccine - United States, 2021-22 Season.

Before the emergence of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, influenza activity in the United States typically began to increase in the fall and peaked in February. During the 2021-22 season, influenza activity began to increase in November and remained elevated until mid-June, featuring two distinct waves, with A(H3N2) viruses predominating for the entire season. This report summarizes influenza activity during October 3, 2021-June 11, 2022, in the United States and describes the composition of the Northern Hemisphere 2022-23 influenza vaccine. Although influenza activity is decreasing and circulation during summer is typically low, remaining vigilant for influenza infections, performing testing for seasonal influenza viruses, and monitoring for novel influenza A virus infections are important. An outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) is ongoing; health care providers and persons with exposure to sick or infected birds should remain vigilant for onset of symptoms consistent with influenza. Receiving a seasonal influenza vaccine each year remains the best way to protect against seasonal influenza and its potentially severe consequences.

Genomic Surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 Variants: Predominance of the Delta (B.1.617.2) and Omicron (B.1.1.529) Variants - United States, June 2021-January 2022.

Genomic surveillance is a critical tool for tracking emerging variants of SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID-19), which can exhibit characteristics that potentially affect public health and clinical interventions, including increased transmissibility, illness severity, and capacity for immune escape. During June 2021-January 2022, CDC expanded genomic surveillance data sources to incorporate sequence data from public repositories to produce weighted estimates of variant proportions at the jurisdiction level and refined analytic methods to enhance the timeliness and accuracy of national and regional variant proportion estimates. These changes also allowed for more comprehensive variant proportion estimation at the jurisdictional level (i.e., U.S. state, district, territory, and freely associated state). The data in this report are a summary of findings of recent proportions of circulating variants that are updated weekly on CDC's COVID Data Tracker website to enable timely public health action.† The SARS-CoV-2 Delta (B.1.617.2 and AY sublineages) variant rose from 1% to >50% of viral lineages circulating nationally during 8 weeks, from May 1-June 26, 2021. Delta-associated infections remained predominant until being rapidly overtaken by infections associated with the Omicron (B.1.1.529 and BA sublineages) variant in December 2021, when Omicron increased from 1% to >50% of circulating viral lineages during a 2-week period. As of the week ending January 22, 2022, Omicron was estimated to account for 99.2% (95% CI = 99.0%-99.5%) of SARS-CoV-2 infections nationwide, and Delta for 0.7% (95% CI = 0.5%-1.0%). The dynamic landscape of SARS-CoV-2 variants in 2021, including Delta- and Omicron-driven resurgences of SARS-CoV-2 transmission across the United States, underscores the importance of robust genomic surveillance efforts to inform public health planning and practice.

Emergence of SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 Lineage - United States, December 29, 2020-January 12, 2021.

On December 14, 2020, the United Kingdom reported a SARS-CoV-2 variant of concern (VOC), lineage B.1.1.7, also referred to as VOC 202012/01 or 20I/501Y.V1.* The B.1.1.7 variant is estimated to have emerged in September 2020 and has quickly become the dominant circulating SARS-CoV-2 variant in England (1). B.1.1.7 has been detected in over 30 countries, including the United States. As of January 13, 2021, approximately 76 cases of B.1.1.7 have been detected in 12 U.S. states.† Multiple lines of evidence indicate that B.1.1.7 is more efficiently transmitted than are other SARS-CoV-2 variants (1-3). The modeled trajectory of this variant in the U.S. exhibits rapid growth in early 2021, becoming the predominant variant in March. Increased SARS-CoV-2 transmission might threaten strained health care resources, require extended and more rigorous implementation of public health strategies (4), and increase the percentage of population immunity required for pandemic control. Taking measures to reduce transmission now can lessen the potential impact of B.1.1.7 and allow critical time to increase vaccination coverage. Collectively, enhanced genomic surveillance combined with continued compliance with effective public health measures, including vaccination, physical distancing, use of masks, hand hygiene, and isolation and quarantine, will be essential to limiting the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Strategic testing of persons without symptoms but at higher risk of infection, such as those exposed to SARS-CoV-2 or who have frequent unavoidable contact with the public, provides another opportunity to limit ongoing spread.

Genomic Surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 Variants Circulating in the United States, December 2020-May 2021.

SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, is constantly mutating, leading to new variants (1). Variants have the potential to affect transmission, disease severity, diagnostics, therapeutics, and natural and vaccine-induced immunity. In November 2020, CDC established national surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 variants using genomic sequencing. As of May 6, 2021, sequences from 177,044 SARS-CoV-2-positive specimens collected during December 20, 2020-May 6, 2021, from 55 U.S. jurisdictions had been generated by or reported to CDC. These included 3,275 sequences for the 2-week period ending January 2, 2021, compared with 25,000 sequences for the 2-week period ending April 24, 2021 (0.1% and 3.1% of reported positive SARS-CoV-2 tests, respectively). Because sequences might be generated by multiple laboratories and sequence availability varies both geographically and over time, CDC developed statistical weighting and variance estimation methods to generate population-based estimates of the proportions of identified variants among SARS-CoV-2 infections circulating nationwide and in each of the 10 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) geographic regions.* During the 2-week period ending April 24, 2021, the B.1.1.7 and P.1 variants represented an estimated 66.0% and 5.0% of U.S. SARS-CoV-2 infections, respectively, demonstrating the rise to predominance of the B.1.1.7 variant of concern† (VOC) and emergence of the P.1 VOC in the United States. Using SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance methods to analyze surveillance data produces timely population-based estimates of the proportions of variants circulating nationally and regionally. Surveillance findings demonstrate the potential for new variants to emerge and become predominant, and the importance of robust genomic surveillance. Along with efforts to characterize the clinical and public health impact of SARS-CoV-2 variants, surveillance can help guide interventions to control the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States.

Replicative Fitness of Seasonal Influenza A Viruses With Decreased Susceptibility to Baloxavir.

Susceptibility of influenza A viruses to baloxavir can be affected by changes at amino acid residue 38 in the polymerase acidic (PA) protein. Information on replicative fitness of PA-I38-substituted viruses remains sparse. We demonstrated that substitutions I38L/M/S/T not only had a differential effect on baloxavir susceptibility (9- to 116-fold) but also on in vitro replicative fitness. Although I38L conferred undiminished growth, other substitutions led to mild attenuation. In a ferret model, control viruses outcompeted those carrying I38M or I38T substitutions, although their advantage was limited. These findings offer insights into the attributes of baloxavir-resistant viruses needed for informed risk assessment.

Update: Influenza Activity - United States, September 30, 2018-February 2, 2019.

CDC collects, compiles, and analyzes data on influenza activity and viruses in the United States. During September 30, 2018-February 2, 2019,* influenza activity† in the United States was low during October and November, increased in late December, and remained elevated through early February. As of February 2, 2019, this has been a low-severity influenza season (1), with a lower percentage of outpatient visits for influenza-like illness (ILI), lower rates of hospitalization, and fewer deaths attributed to pneumonia and influenza, compared with recent seasons. Influenza-associated hospitalization rates among children are similar to those observed in influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 predominant seasons; 28 influenza-associated pediatric deaths occurring during the 2018-19 season have been reported to CDC. Whereas influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses predominated in most areas of the country, influenza A(H3N2) viruses have predominated in the southeastern United States, and in recent weeks accounted for a growing proportion of influenza viruses detected in several other regions. Small numbers of influenza B viruses (<3% of all influenza-positive tests performed by public health laboratories) also were reported. The majority of the influenza viruses characterized antigenically are similar to the cell culture-propagated reference viruses representing the 2018-19 Northern Hemisphere influenza vaccine viruses. Health care providers should continue to offer and encourage vaccination to all unvaccinated persons aged ≥6 months as long as influenza viruses are circulating. Finally, regardless of vaccination status, it is important that persons with confirmed or suspected influenza who have severe, complicated, or progressive illness; who require hospitalization; or who are at high risk for influenza complications be treated with antiviral medications.

Update: Influenza Activity in the United States During the 2018-19 Season and Composition of the 2019-20 Influenza Vaccine.

Influenza activity* in the United States during the 2018-19 season (September 30, 2018-May 18, 2019) was of moderate severity (1). Nationally, influenza-like illness (ILI)† activity began increasing in November, peaked during mid-February, and returned to below baseline in mid-April; the season lasted 21 weeks,§ making it the longest season in 10 years. Illness attributed to influenza A viruses predominated, with very little influenza B activity. Two waves of influenza A were notable during this extended season: influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses from October 2018 to mid-February 2019 and influenza A(H3N2) viruses from February through May 2019. Compared with the 2017-18 influenza season, rates of hospitalization this season were lower for adults, but were similar for children. Although influenza activity is currently below surveillance baselines, testing for seasonal influenza viruses and monitoring for novel influenza A virus infections should continue year-round. Receiving a seasonal influenza vaccine each year remains the best way to protect against seasonal influenza and its potentially severe consequences.

Update: Influenza Activity - United States and Worldwide, May 19-September 28, 2019, and Composition of the 2020 Southern Hemisphere Influenza Vaccine.

During May 19-September 28, 2019,* low levels of influenza activity were reported in the United States, with cocirculation of influenza A and influenza B viruses. In the Southern Hemisphere seasonal influenza viruses circulated widely, with influenza A(H3) predominating in many regions; however, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and influenza B viruses were predominant in some countries. In late September, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended components for the 2020 Southern Hemisphere influenza vaccine and included an update to the A(H3N2) and B/Victoria-lineage components. Annual influenza vaccination is the best means for preventing influenza illness and its complications, and vaccination before influenza activity increases is optimal. Health care providers should recommend vaccination for all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications to vaccination (1).

Influenza Activity - United States, September 30-December 1, 2018.

Influenza activity in the United States was low during October 2018, and, although it increased slowly during November, activity remains low across most of the country.* During the week ending December 1, 2018, the percentage of outpatient visits for influenza-like illness† (ILI) was equal to the national baseline§ (Figure) and was at or slightly above the region-specific baseline in four of the 10 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services regions¶ (Regions 4 and 7-9). The majority of jurisdictions experienced minimal or low ILI activity since September 30; however, two experienced moderate ILI activity, and two experienced high ILI activity** during the week ending December 1. The percentage of deaths attributed to pneumonia and influenza remains below the epidemic threshold,†† and the rate of influenza-associated hospitalizations remains low. Five laboratory-confirmed, influenza-associated pediatric deaths occurring since September 30 have been reported to CDC. During the week ending December 1, the majority of jurisdictions (40 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands) reported sporadic or local geographic spread of influenza activity, nine states reported regional activity, and one state reported widespread activity.§§.

Update: Influenza Activity - United States and Worldwide, May 20-October 13, 2018.

During May 20-October 13, 2018,* low levels of influenza activity were reported in the United States, with a mix of influenza A and B viruses circulating. Seasonal influenza activity in the Southern Hemisphere was low overall, with influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 predominating in many regions. Antigenic testing of available influenza A and B viruses indicated that no significant antigenic drift in circulating viruses had emerged. In late September, the components for the 2019 Southern Hemisphere influenza vaccine were selected and included an incremental update to the A(H3N2) vaccine virus used in egg-based vaccine manufacturing; no change was recommended for the A(H3N2) component of cell-manufactured or recombinant influenza vaccines. Annual influenza vaccination is the best method for preventing influenza illness and its complications, and all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications should receive influenza vaccine, preferably before the onset of influenza circulation in their community, which often begins in October and peaks during December-February. Health care providers should offer vaccination by the end of October and should continue to recommend and administer influenza vaccine to previously unvaccinated patients throughout the 2018-19 influenza season (1). In addition, during May 20-October 13, a small number of nonhuman influenza "variant" virus infections† were reported in the United States; most were associated with exposure to swine. Although limited human-to-human transmission might have occurred in one instance, no ongoing community transmission was identified. Vulnerable populations, especially young children and other persons at high risk for serious influenza complications, should avoid swine barns at agricultural fairs, or close contact with swine.§.

Update: Influenza Activity - United States, October 1, 2017-February 3, 2018.

Influenza activity in the United States began to increase in early November 2017 and rose sharply from December through February 3, 2018; elevated influenza activity is expected to continue for several more weeks. Influenza A viruses have been most commonly identified, with influenza A(H3N2) viruses predominating, but influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and influenza B viruses were also reported. This report summarizes U.S. influenza activity* during October 1, 2017-February 3, 2018,† and updates the previous summary (1).

Update: Influenza Activity in the United States During the 2017-18 Season and Composition of the 2018-19 Influenza Vaccine.

The United States 2017-18 influenza season (October 1, 2017-May 19, 2018) was a high severity season with high levels of outpatient clinic and emergency department visits for influenza-like illness (ILI), high influenza-related hospitalization rates, and elevated and geographically widespread influenza activity across the country for an extended period. Nationally, ILI activity began increasing in November, reaching an extended period of high activity during January-February, and remaining elevated through March. Influenza A(H3N2) viruses predominated through February and were predominant overall for the season; influenza B viruses predominated from March onward. This report summarizes U.S. influenza activity* during October 1, 2017-May 19, 2018.†.

Introduction, Evolution, and Dissemination of Influenza A Viruses in Exhibition Swine in the United States during 2009 to 2013.

The swine-human interface created at agricultural fairs, along with the generation of and maintenance of influenza A virus diversity in exhibition swine, presents an ongoing threat to public health. Nucleotide sequences of influenza A virus isolates collected from exhibition swine in Ohio (n = 262) and Indiana (n = 103) during 2009 to 2013 were used to investigate viral evolution and movement within this niche sector of the swine industry. Phylogenetic and Bayesian analyses were employed to identify introductions of influenza A virus to exhibition swine and study viral population dynamics. In 2013 alone, we identified 10 independent introductions of influenza A virus into Ohio and/or Indiana exhibition swine. Frequently, viruses from the same introduction were identified at multiple fairs within the region, providing evidence of rapid and widespread viral movement within the exhibition swine populations of the two states. While pigs moving from fair to fair to fair is possible in some locations, the concurrent detection of nearly identical strains at several fairs indicates that a common viral source was more likely. Importantly, we detected an association between the high number of human variant H3N2 (H3N2v) virus infections in 2012 and the widespread circulation of influenza A viruses of the same genotype in exhibition swine in Ohio fairs sampled that year. The extent of viral diversity observed in exhibition swine and the rapidity with which it disseminated across long distances indicate that novel strains of influenza A virus will continue to emerge and spread within exhibition swine populations, presenting an ongoing threat to humans. IMPORTANCE: Understanding the underlying population dynamics of influenza A viruses in commercial and exhibition swine is central to assessing the risk for human infections with variant viruses, including H3N2v. We used viral genomic sequences from isolates collected from exhibition swine during 2009 to 2013 to understand how the peak of H3N2v cases in 2012 relates to long-term trends in the population dynamics of pandemic viruses recently introduced into commercial and exhibition swine in the United States. The results of our spatial analysis underscore the key role of rapid viral dispersal in spreading multiple genetic lineages throughout a multistate network of agricultural fairs, providing opportunities for divergent lineages to coinfect, reassort, and generate new viral genotypes. The higher genetic diversity of genotypes cocirculating in exhibition swine since 2013 could facilitate the evolution of new reassortants, potentially with even greater ability to cause severe infections in humans or cause human-to-human transmission, highlighting the need for continued vigilance.

Update: Influenza Activity in the United States During the 2016-17 Season and Composition of the 2017-18 Influenza Vaccine.

During the 2016-17 influenza season (October 2, 2016-May 20, 2017) in the United States, influenza activity* was moderate. Activity remained low through November, increased during December, and peaked in February nationally, although there were regional differences in the timing of influenza activity. Influenza A(H3N2) viruses predominated through mid-March and were predominant overall for the season, but influenza B viruses were most commonly reported from late March through May. This report summarizes influenza activity in the United States during October 2, 2016-May 20, 2017† and updates the previous summary (1).

Update: Influenza Activity - United States and Worldwide, May 21-September 23, 2017.

During May 21-September 23, 2017,* the United States experienced low-level seasonal influenza virus activity; however, beginning in early September, CDC received reports of a small number of localized influenza outbreaks caused by influenza A(H3N2) viruses. In addition to influenza A(H3N2) viruses, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and influenza B viruses were detected during May-September worldwide and in the United States. Influenza B viruses predominated in the United States from late May through late June, and influenza A viruses predominated beginning in early July. The majority of the influenza viruses collected and received from the United States and other countries during that time have been characterized genetically or antigenically as being similar to the 2017 Southern Hemisphere and 2017-18 Northern Hemisphere cell-grown vaccine reference viruses; however, a smaller proportion of the circulating A(H3N2) viruses showed similarity to the egg-grown A(H3N2) vaccine reference virus which represents the A(H3N2) viruses used for the majority of vaccine production in the United States. Also, during May 21-September 23, 2017, CDC confirmed a total of 33 influenza variant virus† infections; two were influenza A(H1N2) variant (H1N2v) viruses (Ohio) and 31 were influenza A(H3N2) variant (H3N2v) viruses (Delaware [1], Maryland [13], North Dakota [1], Pennsylvania [1], and Ohio [15]). An additional 18 specimens from Maryland have tested presumptive positive for H3v and further analysis is being conducted at CDC.

Update: Increase in Human Infections with Novel Asian Lineage Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Viruses During the Fifth Epidemic - China, October 1, 2016-August 7, 2017.

Among all influenza viruses assessed using CDC's Influenza Risk Assessment Tool (IRAT), the Asian lineage avian influenza A(H7N9) virus (Asian H7N9), first reported in China in March 2013,* is ranked as the influenza virus with the highest potential pandemic risk (1). During October 1, 2016-August 7, 2017, the National Health and Family Planning Commission of China; CDC, Taiwan; the Hong Kong Centre for Health Protection; and the Macao CDC reported 759 human infections with Asian H7N9 viruses, including 281 deaths, to the World Health Organization (WHO), making this the largest of the five epidemics of Asian H7N9 infections that have occurred since 2013 (Figure 1). This report summarizes new viral and epidemiologic features identified during the fifth epidemic of Asian H7N9 in China and summarizes ongoing measures to enhance pandemic preparedness. Infections in humans and poultry were reported from most areas of China, including provinces bordering other countries, indicating extensive, ongoing geographic spread. The risk to the general public is very low and most human infections were, and continue to be, associated with poultry exposure, especially at live bird markets in mainland China. Throughout the first four epidemics of Asian H7N9 infections, only low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses were detected among human, poultry, and environmental specimens and samples. During the fifth epidemic, mutations were detected among some Asian H7N9 viruses, identifying the emergence of high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses as well as viruses with reduced susceptibility to influenza antiviral medications recommended for treatment. Furthermore, the fifth-epidemic viruses diverged genetically into two separate lineages (Pearl River Delta lineage and Yangtze River Delta lineage), with Yangtze River Delta lineage viruses emerging as antigenically different compared with those from earlier epidemics. Because of its pandemic potential, candidate vaccine viruses (CVV) were produced in 2013 that have been used to make vaccines against Asian H7N9 viruses circulating at that time. CDC is working with partners to enhance surveillance for Asian H7N9 viruses in humans and poultry, to improve laboratory capability to detect and characterize H7N9 viruses, and to develop, test and distribute new CVV that could be used for vaccine production if a vaccine is needed.