Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism.

This essay addresses Cartesian duality and how its implicit dialectic might be repaired using physics and information theory. Our agenda is to describe a key distinction in the physical sciences that may provide a foundation for the distinction between mind and matter, and between sentient and intentional systems. From this perspective, it becomes tenable to talk about the physics of sentience and 'forces' that underwrite our beliefs (in the sense of probability distributions represented by our internal states), which may ground our mental states and consciousness. We will refer to this view as Markovian monism, which entails two claims: (1) fundamentally, there is only one type of thing and only one type of irreducible property (hence monism). (2) All systems possessing a Markov blanket have properties that are relevant for understanding the mind and consciousness: if such systems have mental properties, then they have them partly by virtue of possessing a Markov blanket (hence Markovian). Markovian monism rests upon the information geometry of random dynamic systems. In brief, the information geometry induced in any system-whose internal states can be distinguished from external states-must acquire a dual aspect. This dual aspect concerns the (intrinsic) information geometry of the probabilistic evolution of internal states and a separate (extrinsic) information geometry of probabilistic beliefs about external states that are parameterised by internal states. We call these intrinsic (i.e., mechanical, or state-based) and extrinsic (i.e., Markovian, or belief-based) information geometries, respectively. Although these mathematical notions may sound complicated, they are fairly straightforward to handle, and may offer a means through which to frame the origins of consciousness.

Active Inference, Curiosity and Insight.

This article offers a formal account of curiosity and insight in terms of active (Bayesian) inference. It deals with the dual problem of inferring states of the world and learning its statistical structure. In contrast to current trends in machine learning (e.g., deep learning), we focus on how people attain insight and understanding using just a handful of observations, which are solicited through curious behavior. We use simulations of abstract rule learning and approximate Bayesian inference to show that minimizing (expected) variational free energy leads to active sampling of novel contingencies. This epistemic behavior closes explanatory gaps in generative models of the world, thereby reducing uncertainty and satisfying curiosity. We then move from epistemic learning to model selection or structure learning to show how abductive processes emerge when agents test plausible hypotheses about symmetries (i.e., invariances or rules) in their generative models. The ensuing Bayesian model reduction evinces mechanisms associated with sleep and has all the hallmarks of "aha" moments. This formulation moves toward a computational account of consciousness in the pre-Cartesian sense of sharable knowledge (i.e., con: "together"; scire: "to know").

Not only but also: REM sleep creates and NREM Stage 2 instantiates landmark junctions in cortical memory networks.

This article argues both rapid eye movement (REM) and non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep contribute to overnight episodic memory processes but their roles differ. Episodic memory may have evolved from memory for spatial navigation in animals and humans. Equally, mnemonic navigation in world and mental space may rely on fundamentally equivalent processes. Consequently, the basic spatial network characteristics of pathways which meet at omnidirectional nodes or junctions may be conserved in episodic brain networks. A pathway is formally identified with the unidirectional, sequential phases of an episodic memory. In contrast, the function of omnidirectional junctions is not well understood. In evolutionary terms, both animals and early humans undertook tours to a series of landmark junctions, to take advantage of resources (food, water and shelter), whilst trying to avoid predators. Such tours required memory for emotionally significant landmark resource-place-danger associations and the spatial relationships amongst these landmarks. In consequence, these tours may have driven the evolution of both spatial and episodic memory. The environment is dynamic. Resource-place associations are liable to shift and new resource-rich landmarks may be discovered, these changes may require re-wiring in neural networks. To realise these changes, REM may perform an associative, emotional encoding function between memory networks, engendering an omnidirectional landmark junction which is instantiated in the cortex during NREM Stage 2. In sum, REM may preplay associated elements of past episodes (rather than replay individual episodes), to engender an unconscious representation which can be used by the animal on approach to a landmark junction in wake.

REM sleep and dreaming: towards a theory of protoconsciousness.

Dreaming has fascinated and mystified humankind for ages: the bizarre and evanescent qualities of dreams have invited boundless speculation about their origin, meaning and purpose. For most of the twentieth century, scientific dream theories were mainly psychological. Since the discovery of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, the neural underpinnings of dreaming have become increasingly well understood, and it is now possible to complement the details of these brain mechanisms with a theory of consciousness that is derived from the study of dreaming. The theory advanced here emphasizes data that suggest that REM sleep may constitute a protoconscious state, providing a virtual reality model of the world that is of functional use to the development and maintenance of waking consciousness.

Sleep is of the brain, by the brain and for the brain.

Sleep is a widespread biological phenomenon, and its scientific study is proceeding at multiple levels at the same time. Marked progress is being made in answering three fundamental questions: what is sleep, what are its mechanisms and what are its functions? The most salient answers to these questions have resulted from applying new techniques from basic and applied neuroscience research. The study of sleep is also shedding light on our understanding of consciousness, which undergoes alteration in parallel with sleep-induced changes in the brain.

Minds and Brains, Sleep and Psychiatry.

OBJECTIVE: This article offers a philosophical thesis for psychiatric disorders that rests upon some simple truths about the mind and brain. Specifically, it asks whether the dual aspect monism-that emerges from sleep research and theoretical neurobiology-can be applied to pathophysiology and psychopathology in psychiatry. METHODS: Our starting point is that the mind and brain are emergent aspects of the same (neuronal) dynamics; namely, the brain-mind. Our endpoint is that synaptic dysconnection syndromes inherit the same dual aspect; namely, aberrant inference or belief updating on the one hand, and a failure of neuromodulatory synaptic gain control on the other. We start with some basic considerations from sleep research that integrate the phenomenology of dreaming with the neurophysiology of sleep. RESULTS: We then leverage this treatment by treating the brain as an organ of inference. Our particular focus is on the role of precision (i.e., the representation of uncertainty) in belief updating and the accompanying synaptic mechanisms. CONCLUSIONS: Finally, we suggest a dual aspect approach-based upon belief updating (i.e., mind processes) and its neurophysiological implementation (i.e., brain processes)-has a wide explanatory compass for psychiatry and various movement disorders. This approach identifies the kind of pathophysiology that underwrites psychopathology-and points to certain psychotherapeutic and psychopharmacological targets, which may stand in mechanistic relation to each other.

Dissociable stages of human memory consolidation and reconsolidation.

Historically, the term 'memory consolidation' refers to a process whereby a memory becomes increasingly resistant to interference from competing or disrupting factors with the continued passage of time. Recent findings regarding the learning of skilled sensory and motor tasks ('procedural learning') have refined this definition, suggesting that consolidation can be more strictly determined by time spent in specific brain states such as wake, sleep or certain stages of sleep. There is also renewed interest in the possibility that recalling or 'reactivating' a previously consolidated memory renders it once again fragile and susceptible to interference, therefore requiring periods of reconsolidation. Using a motor skill finger-tapping task, here we provide evidence for at least three different stages of human motor memory processing after initial acquisition. We describe the unique contributions of wake and sleep in the development of different forms of consolidation, and show that waking reactivation can turn a previously consolidated memory back into a labile state requiring subsequent reconsolidation.

Lucid dreaming: a state of consciousness with features of both waking and non-lucid dreaming.

STUDY OBJECTIVES: The goal of the study was to seek physiological correlates of lucid dreaming. Lucid dreaming is a dissociated state with aspects of waking and dreaming combined in a way so as to suggest a specific alteration in brain physiology for which we now present preliminary but intriguing evidence. We show that the unusual combination of hallucinatory dream activity and wake-like reflective awareness and agentive control experienced in lucid dreams is paralleled by significant changes in electrophysiology. DESIGN: 19-channel EEG was recorded on up to 5 nights for each participant. Lucid episodes occurred as a result of pre-sleep autosuggestion. SETTING: Sleep laboratory of the Neurological Clinic, Frankfurt University. PARTICIPANTS: Six student volunteers who had been trained to become lucid and to signal lucidity through a pattern of horizontal eye movements. MEASUREMENTS AND RESULTS: Results show lucid dreaming to have REM-like power in frequency bands delta and theta, and higher-than-REM activity in the gamma band, the between-states-difference peaking around 40 Hz. Power in the 40 Hz band is strongest in the frontal and frontolateral region. Overall coherence levels are similar in waking and lucid dreaming and significantly higher than in REM sleep, throughout the entire frequency spectrum analyzed. Regarding specific frequency bands, waking is characterized by high coherence in alpha, and lucid dreaming by increased delta and theta band coherence. In lucid dreaming, coherence is largest in frontolateral and frontal areas. CONCLUSIONS: Our data show that lucid dreaming constitutes a hybrid state of consciousness with definable and measurable differences from waking and from REM sleep, particularly in frontal areas.

Failure to find executive function deficits following one night's total sleep deprivation in university students under naturalistic conditions.

Young adult male students participated in a naturalistic, group-design experiment to ascertain the effects of one night's total sleep deprivation (TSD) on performance of diverse executive function tasks presented as an extended, multitask battery. On the majority of component tasks in this battery, performance has been reported to be impaired following one night's TSD when tasks are administered in isolation. However, participants sleep deprived 35 to 39 hr showed few performance deficits among tests in this battery when compared with non-sleep-deprived controls. Sleep-deprived participants showed only poorer recognition memory and overconfidence in incorrect temporal judgments. Behavioral and physiological adaptation to chronically sleep-restricting lifestyles may confer resistance to the cognitive effects of sleep deprivation in high-functioning young adults.

Practice with sleep makes perfect: sleep-dependent motor skill learning.

Improvement in motor skill performance is known to continue for at least 24 hr following training, yet the relative contributions of time spent awake and asleep are unknown. Here we provide evidence that a night of sleep results in a 20% increase in motor speed without loss of accuracy, while an equivalent period of time during wake provides no significant benefit. Furthermore, a significant correlation exists between the improved performance overnight and the amount of stage 2 NREM sleep, particularly late in the night. This finding of sleep-dependent motor skill improvement may have important implications for the efficient learning of all skilled actions in humans.

The dream as a model for psychosis: an experimental approach using bizarreness as a cognitive marker.

Many previous observers have reported some qualitative similarities between the normal mental state of dreaming and the abnormal mental state of psychosis. Recent psychological, tomographic, electrophysiological, and neurochemical data appear to confirm the functional similarities between these 2 states. In this study, the hypothesis of the dreaming brain as a neurobiological model for psychosis was tested by focusing on cognitive bizarreness, a distinctive property of the dreaming mental state defined by discontinuities and incongruities in the dream plot, thoughts, and feelings. Cognitive bizarreness was measured in written reports of dreams and in verbal reports of waking fantasies in 30 schizophrenics and 30 normal controls. Seven pictures of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) were administered as a stimulus to elicit waking fantasies, and all participating subjects were asked to record their dreams upon awakening. A total of 420 waking fantasies plus 244 dream reports were collected to quantify the bizarreness features in the dream and waking state of both subject groups. Two-way analysis of covariance for repeated measures showed that cognitive bizarreness was significantly lower in the TAT stories of normal subjects than in those of schizophrenics and in the dream reports of both groups. The differences between the 2 groups indicated that, under experimental conditions, the waking cognition of schizophrenic subjects shares a common degree of formal cognitive bizarreness with the dream reports of both normal controls and schizophrenics. Though very preliminary, these results support the hypothesis that the dreaming brain could be a useful experimental model for psychosis.

Insight and Dissociation in Lucid Dreaming and Psychosis.

Dreams and psychosis share several important features regarding symptoms and underlying neurobiology, which is helpful in constructing a testable model of, for example, schizophrenia and delirium. The purpose of the present communication is to discuss two major concepts in dreaming and psychosis that have received much attention in the recent literature: insight and dissociation. Both phenomena are considered functions of higher order consciousness because they involve metacognition in the form of reflective thought and attempted control of negative emotional impact. Insight in dreams is a core criterion for lucid dreams. Lucid dreams are usually accompanied by attempts to control the dream plot and dissociative elements akin to depersonalization and derealization. These concepts are also relevant in psychotic illness. Whereas insightfulness can be considered innocuous in lucid dreaming and even advantageous in psychosis, the concept of dissociation is still unresolved. The present review compares correlates and functions of insight and dissociation in lucid dreaming and psychosis. This is helpful in understanding the two concepts with regard to psychological function as well as neurophysiology.

Towards a Functional Understanding of PGO Waves.

Ponto-Geniculo-Occipital (PGO) waves are biphasic field potentials identified in a range of mammalian species that are ubiquitous with sleep, but can also be identified in waking perception and eye movement. Their role in REM sleep and visual perception more broadly may constitute a promising avenue for further research, however what was once an active field of study has recently fallen into stasis. With the reality that invasive recordings performed on animals cannot be replicated in humans; while animals themselves cannot convey experience to the extent required to elucidate how PGO waves factor into awareness and behavior, innovative solutions are required if significant research outcomes are to ever be realized. Advances in non-invasive imaging technologies and sophistication in imaging methods now offer substantial scope to renew the study of the electrophysiological substrates of waking and dreaming perception. Among these, Magnetoencephalogram (MEG) stands out through its capacity to measure deep brain activations with high temporal resolution. With the current trend in sleep and dream research to produce translational findings of psychopathological and medical significance, in addition to the clear links that PGO wave generation sites share, pharmacologically, with receptors involved in expression of mental illness; there is a strong case to support scientific research into PGO waves and develop a functional understanding of their broader role in human perception.

From synapse to gene product: prolonged expression of c-fos induced by a single microinjection of carbachol in the pontomesencephalic tegmentum.

It is not known how the brain modifies its regulatory systems in response to the application of a drug, especially over the long term of weeks and months. We have developed a model system approach to this question by manipulating cholinergic cell groups of the laterodorsal and pedunculopontine tegmental (LDT/PPT) nuclei in the pontomesencephalic tegmentum (PMT), which are known to be actively involved in the timing and quantity of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. In a freely moving feline model, a single microinjection of the cholinergic agonist carbachol conjugated to a latex nanosphere delivery system into the caudolateral PMT elicits a long-term enhancement of one distinguishing phasic event of REM sleep, ponto-geniculo-occipital (PGO) waves, lasting 5 days but without any significant change in REM sleep or other behavioral state. Here, we test the hypothesis that cholinergic activation within the caudolateral PMT alters the postsynaptic excitability of the PGO network, stimulating the prolonged expression of c-fos that underlies this long-term PGO enhancement (LTPE) effect. Using quantitative Fos immunohistochemistry, we found that the number of Fos-immunoreactive (Fos-IR) neurons surrounding the caudolateral PMT injection site decreased sharply by postcarbachol day 03, while the number of Fos-IR neurons in the more rostral LDT/PPT increased >30-fold and remained at a high level following the course of LTPE. These results demonstrate a sustained c-fos expression in response to pharmacological stimulation of the brain and suggest that carbachol's acute effects induce LTPE via cholinergic receptors, with subsequent transsynaptic activation of the LDT/PPT maintaining the LTPE effect.

Sleep quality deteriorates over a binge--abstinence cycle in chronic smoked cocaine users.

RATIONALE: In cocaine dependent individuals, changes in subjective and objective sleep quality accompany their characteristic binge-abstinence cycle. Preliminary studies suggest that sleep quality may decline with prolonged abstinence. Reported here are results of the most extensive study to date on sleep abnormalities during cocaine binge and confirmed abstinence under controlled conditions. OBJECTIVES: The purpose of the current study was to use an experimental, inpatient model of the cocaine binge and abstinence cycle to examine the course and magnitude of sleep disturbances during cocaine use and abstinence. METHODS: Five inpatient non-treatment seeking cocaine users completed 3 baseline days of drug abstinence followed by 3 days of medically monitored "binge" cocaine use, and then 15 days of drug abstinence. Physiological sleep was recorded with polysomnography and the Nightcap ambulatory monitor, while subjective sleep was assessed by questionnaire. RESULTS: Across 3 days of binge cocaine use and 15 subsequent days of confirmed drug abstinence, mean sleep duration, efficiency and latency changed in the direction of poorer sleep quality. In contrast, subjective reports of sleep quality remained unchanged across the same period. CONCLUSIONS: Physiological sleep quality deteriorated from days when cocaine was used across the first 2 weeks of confirmed drug abstinence. In contrast, subjective reports of sleep quality remained unchanged across the same period. We postulate that this dissociation between objective and subjective sleep quality results from a cocaine-use related disruption of the sleep homeostat. Worsening sleep quality during cocaine abstinence may contribute to the risk of relapse and its treatment may offer novel therapeutic strategies for cocaine dependence.

Neural correlates of insight in dreaming and psychosis.

The idea that dreaming can serve as a model for psychosis has a long and honourable tradition, however it is notoriously speculative. Here we demonstrate that recent research on the phenomenon of lucid dreaming sheds new light on the debate. Lucid dreaming is a rare state of sleep in which the dreamer gains insight into his state of mind during dreaming. Recent electroencephalogram (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data for the first time allow very specific hypotheses about the dream-psychosis relationship: if dreaming is a reasonable model for psychosis, then insight into the dreaming state and insight into the psychotic state should share similar neural correlates. This indeed seems to be the case: cortical areas activated during lucid dreaming show striking overlap with brain regions that are impaired in psychotic patients who lack insight into their pathological state. This parallel allows for new therapeutic approaches and ways to test antipsychotic medication.

Emotional experience during rapid-eye-movement sleep in narcolepsy.

STUDY OBJECTIVES: To describe emotional experience during sleep-onset rapid-eye-movement [(REM) SOREM] sleep and nighttime REM in narcoleptic patients and to relate any differences in REM emotion to the more general abnormalities of this disorder. DESIGN: Awakenings were performed from SOREM (REM at the onset of daytime naps and nighttime sleep) and nighttime emergent (ascending) REM in 15 patients with narcolepsy and from nighttime REM in 9 normal healthy participants. Subjects rated the occurrence and intensity of discrete emotion types for each line in their REM-mentation reports. Fragmentation of REM was measured and related to emoton. SETTING: Subjects were studied in their own homes over 2 consecutive days and nights (3 nights for normals) and were monitored by ambulatory polysomnography. PARTICIPANTS: Fifteen patients with narcolepsy, aged 17 to 70 years (mean = 45.3) and 9 normal healthy subjects, aged 31 to 60 years (mean = 43.0). RESULTS: Emotions were found more often and were more intense in narcoleptic SOREM than in nighttime REM of either narcoleptic or normal subjects, with anxiety/fear exhibiting the strongest increase, followed by joy/elation. Comparing nighttime REM in narcoleptic and normal subjects, narcoleptics were found to have more intense feelings of anxiety/fear and of joy/elation but to have a less frequent experience of surprise and anger. Positive and negative emotions occurred in a balanced fashion in SOREM and nighttime REM in narcoleptic subjects. In the SOREM of narcoleptic patients, high levels of positive emotions, in particular of joy/elation, were associated with a less fragmented (more stable) REM sleep. CONCLUSION: The REM sleep of patients with narcolepsy affords a unique opportunity to study emotion and to analyze its psychophysiology. Narcolepsy intensifies REM-dream emotion, especially anxiety/fear and joy/elation, and this is most clearly seen during SOREM sleep. The changes in REM emotion of narcoleptic patients could reflect the effect of the fundamental pathology of this disorder upon neurobiologic systems that support cognitive-emotional functions.

Nightcap: a reliable system for determining sleep onset latency.

Previous studies have demonstrated that the Nightcap home-based sleep-monitoring system can differentiate waking, NREM and REM sleep based on eyelid movements (ELMs) and head movement behavior. The present study aims at determining the reliability of the Nightcap in determining the human sleep onset latency (SOL) as revealed by standard polysomnography (PSG). Four naps were recorded in each of ten normal subjects using both PSG and the Nightcap simultaneously. The Nightcap algorithm scored sleep onset as the first of 4 consecutive 30-sec epochs with less than 5 ELMs. The mean percentage of agreement between the Nightcap and PSG was 93% (k = 0.79), and the average absolute difference was 45 sec (13.3% of SOL(PSG)). SOL(NC) differed by less than 1 min in 85% of onsets. Recordings of EEG activity from 90 sec before and after PSG-identified sleep onsets were subjected to spectral analysis. Changes in spectral power in the theta (4-7 Hz) and alpha (8-12 Hz) frequency bands during the transition into light sleep correlated well with eyelid behavior. However, changes in ELM density predicted sleep onset better than did changes in theta and alpha spectral power. These results suggest that the Nightcap may be a potential alternative to the PSG technique in the assessment of SOL in normal subjects.

Cognitive flexibility across the sleep-wake cycle: REM-sleep enhancement of anagram problem solving.

Flexible or 'fluid' cognitive processes are regarded as fundamental to problem solving and creative ability, requiring a specific neurophysiological milieu. REM-sleep dreaming is associated with creative processes and abstract reasoning with increased strength of weak associations in cognitive networks. REM sleep is also mediated by a distinctive neurophysiological profile, different to that of wake and NREM sleep. This study compared the performance of 16 subjects on a test of cognitive flexibility using anagram word puzzles following REM and NREM awakenings across the night, and waking performances during the day. REM awakenings provided a significant 32% advantage in the number of anagrams solved compared with NREM awakenings and was equal to that of wake time trials. Correlations of individual performance profiles suggest that REM sleep may offer a different mode of problem solving compared with wake and NREM. When early and late REM and NREM awakening data were separated, a dissociation was evident, with NREM task performance becoming more REM-like later in the night, while REM performance remained constant. These data suggest that the neurophysiology of REM sleep represents a brain state more amenable to flexible cognitive processing than NREM and different from that in wake, and may offer insights into the neurocognitive properties of REM-sleep dreaming.

Virtual reality and consciousness inference in dreaming.

This article explores the notion that the brain is genetically endowed with an innate virtual reality generator that - through experience-dependent plasticity - becomes a generative or predictive model of the world. This model, which is most clearly revealed in rapid eye movement (REM) sleep dreaming, may provide the theater for conscious experience. Functional neuroimaging evidence for brain activations that are time-locked to rapid eye movements (REMs) endorses the view that waking consciousness emerges from REM sleep - and dreaming lays the foundations for waking perception. In this view, the brain is equipped with a virtual model of the world that generates predictions of its sensations. This model is continually updated and entrained by sensory prediction errors in wakefulness to ensure veridical perception, but not in dreaming. In contrast, dreaming plays an essential role in maintaining and enhancing the capacity to model the world by minimizing model complexity and thereby maximizing both statistical and thermodynamic efficiency. This perspective suggests that consciousness corresponds to the embodied process of inference, realized through the generation of virtual realities (in both sleep and wakefulness). In short, our premise or hypothesis is that the waking brain engages with the world to predict the causes of sensations, while in sleep the brain's generative model is actively refined so that it generates more efficient predictions during waking. We review the evidence in support of this hypothesis - evidence that grounds consciousness in biophysical computations whose neuronal and neurochemical infrastructure has been disclosed by sleep research.