Oversimplifications and Misrepresentations in the Repressed Memory Debate: A Reply to Ross.

Ross argued that false memory researchers misunderstand the concepts of repression and dissociation, as well as the writings of Freud. In this commentary, we show that Ross is wrong. He oversimplifies and misrepresents the literature on repressed and false memory. We rebut Ross by showing the fallacies underlying his arguments. For example, we adduce evidence showing that the notions of dissociation or repression are unnecessary to explain how people may forget and then remember childhood sexual abuse, stressing that abuse survivors may reinterpret childhood events later in life. Also, Ross overlooks previous critiques concerning dissociation. Finally, we will demonstrate that Ross misrepresents work by Freud and Loftus in the area of repressed and false memory. His article confuses, not clarifies, an already heated debate on the existence of repressed memory.

What science tells us about false and repressed memories.

What does science tell us about memory phenomena such as false and repressed memories? This issue is highly pressing as incorrect knowledge about these memory phenomena might contribute to egregious effects in the courtroom such as false accusations of abuse. In the current article, we provide a succinct review of the scientific nature of false and repressed memories. We demonstrate that research has shown that about 30% of tested subjects formed false memories of autobiographical experiences. Furthermore, this empirical work has also revealed that such false memories can even be implanted for negative events and events that allegedly occurred repeatedly. Concerning the controversial topic of repressed memories, we show that plausible alternative explanations exist for why people claim to have forgotten traumatic experiences; explanations that do not require special memory mechanisms such as the unconscious blockage of traumatic memories. Finally, we demonstrate that people continue to believe that unconscious repression of traumatic incidents can exist. Disseminating scientifically articulated knowledge on the functioning of memory to contexts such as the courtroom is necessary as to prevent the occurrence of false accusations and miscarriages of justice.

Memory construction: a brief and selective history.

In this short article, we provide a brief introduction to the idea that memory involves constructive processes. The importance of constructive processes in memory has a rich history, one that stretches back more than 125 years. This historical context provides a backdrop for the articles appearing in this special issue of Memory, articles that outline the current thinking about the constructive nature of memory. We argue that memory construction, either implicitly or explicitly, represents the current framework in which modern memory research is embedded.

Generative processing and emotional false memories: a generation "cost" for negative false memory formation but only after delay.

Previous research shows that manipulations (e.g. levels-of-processing) that facilitate true memory often increase susceptibility to false memory. An exception is the generation effect. Using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, Soraci et al. found that generating rather than reading list items led to an increase in true but not false memories. They argued that generation led to enhanced item-distinctiveness that drove down false memory production. In the current study, we investigated the effects of generative processing on valenced stimuli and after a delayed retention interval to examine factors that may lead to a generation effect that increases false memories. At the immediate test, false recognition rates for both negative and neutral valanced critical lures were similar across read and generate conditions. However, after a one-week delay, we saw a valence differentiation, with a generation effect for false recognition but only for negative stimuli. The roles of item-specific and relational processing during encoding and their interaction with long-term retention are discussed.

Reconsolidation or interference? Aging effects and the reactivation of novel and familiar episodic memories.

We examined aging effects in reconsolidation and interference in episodic memory by reactivating memories for well-learned items in young and healthy older adults while controlling memory strength and the degree semantic processes contributed to memory. In Experiment 1, young and old adults learned pairs of real words and images to a strict criterion. After 24-hours, half of the images were reactivated and new words were paired with the images and learned to criterion. Following a 1-week delay, recognition and source monitoring were measured for both sets of pairings. Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1, but using previously unknown novel words and unusual images. As predicted, older adults needed more trials to learn both the A-B and A-C pairings. Older adults required more trials to learn the new associations for reactivated than the not reactivated pairs, although there was no main effect of reactivation and no Age x Reactivation interaction for measures of recognition one-week later. These results are inconsistent with previous findings concerning age differences in reactivation effects in episodic memory. Instead, they suggest that once memory strength and input from semantic memory are better controlled, young and old adults perform similarly on tests of long-term recognition memory.

Manipulating memory associations changes decision-making preferences in a preconditioning task.

Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making. We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants' memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money. Participants' memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants' decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined. Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by false feedback on memories. The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories.

A self-reference false memory effect in the DRM paradigm: Evidence from Eastern and Western samples.

It is well established that processing information in relation to oneself (i.e., self-referencing) leads to better memory for that information than processing that same information in relation to others (i.e., other-referencing). However, it is unknown whether self-referencing also leads to more false memories than other-referencing does. In the current two experiments with European and East Asian samples, we presented participants the Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists together with their own name or other people's name (i.e., "Trump" in Experiment 1 and "Li Ming" in Experiment 2). We found consistent results across the two experiments; that is, in the self-reference condition, participants had higher true and false memory rates compared with those in the other-reference condition. Moreover, we found that self-referencing did not exhibit superior mnemonic advantage in terms of net accuracy compared with other-referencing and neutral conditions. These findings are discussed in terms of theoretical frameworks such as spreading activation theories and the fuzzy-trace theory. We propose that our results reflect the adaptive nature of memory in the sense that cognitive processes that increase mnemonic efficiency may also increase susceptibility to associative false memories.

Unravelling the nature of early (autobiographical) memory.

In this article, I provide an overview of the problems associated with understanding the nature of early autobiographical memory and discuss issues concerning the forgetting of these memories (infantile/childhood amnesia). Specifically, I provide a brief exegesis as to whether such memories are stored in a fragile manner to begin with, become difficult to retrieve over time, or both. In order to answer this and other related questions, I review the contribution of the articles in this special issue to understanding the enigma that is infantile/childhood amnesia. I then outline some of the issues that remain and suggest a functional approach to understanding why the forgetting of early experiences may be more adaptive than remembering them. I conclude by suggesting that infantile amnesia may actually begin during infancy itself.

Memory development: implications for adults recalling childhood experiences in the courtroom.

Adults frequently provide compelling, detailed accounts of early childhood experiences in the courtroom. Judges and jurors are asked to decide guilt or innocence based solely on these decades-old memories using 'common sense' notions about memory. However, these notions are not in agreement with findings from neuroscientific and behavioural studies of memory development. Without expert guidance, judges and jurors may have difficulty in properly adjudicating the weight of memory evidence in cases involving adult recollections of childhood experiences.

Forgetting having denied: The "amnesic" consequences of denial.

The concept of denial has its roots in psychoanalysis. Denial has been assumed to be effective in blocking unwanted memories. In two experiments, we report that denial has unique consequences for remembering. In our two experiments, participants viewed a video of a theft, and half of the participants had to deny seeing certain details in the video, whereas the other half had to tell the truth. One day later, all participants were given either a source-monitoring recognition or a recall task. In these tasks, they were instructed to indicate (1) whether they could remember talking about certain details and (2) whether they could recollect seeing those details in the video. In both experiments, we found that denial made participants forget that they had talked about these details, while leaving memory for the video itself unaffected. This denial-induced forgetting was evident for both the source-monitoring recognition and recall tests. Furthermore, when we asked participants after the experiment whether they could still not remember talking about these details, those who had to deny were most likely to report that they had forgotten talking about the details. In contrast to a widely held belief, we show that denial does not impair memory for the experienced stimuli, but that it has a unique ability to undermine memory for what has been talked about.

Can false memories prime alternative solutions to ambiguous problems?

Research has demonstrated that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating insight-based problem-solving tasks by increasing solution rates and decreasing solution times. The present research extended this finding by investigating whether false memories could be used to bias ambiguous insight-based problem-solving tasks in a similar manner. Compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems with two possible correct answers, a dominant and a non-dominant solution, were created and normed (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, participants were asked to solve these CRAT problems after they were given Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists whose critical lures were also the non-dominant solution to half of the corresponding CRATs. As predicted, when false memories served as primes, solution rates were higher and solution times were faster for non-dominant than dominant CRAT solutions. This biasing effect was only found when participants falsely recalled the critical lure, and was not found when participants did not falsely recall the critical lure, or when they were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to spreading activation models of solution competition in problem-solving tasks and current theories of false memory priming effects.

Exploring the consequences of nonbelieved memories in the DRM paradigm.

In the current experiments, we attempted to elicit nonbelieved memories (NBMs) using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm. Furthermore, by using this approach, we explored the consequences of nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants received several DRM wordlists and were presented with a recognition task. After the recognition task, participants' statements were contradicted by giving them feedback about true and false items. In this way, we succeeded in eliciting nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiment 2, participants were also involved in a modified perceptual closure task after receiving belief-relevant feedback. In this task, participants received degraded visual representations of words (e.g., false and true) that became clearer over time. Participants had to identify them as fast as possible. We also measured dissociation, compliance, and social desirability. We found that undermining belief had contrasting consequences for true and false memories. That is, nonbelieved true memories were identified more slowly whereas nonbelieved false memories were identified more quickly. We did not find any relation between our individual differences measures and the formation of NBMs.

Undermining belief in false memories leads to less efficient problem-solving behaviour.

Memories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events is undermined, but recollection is retained, are called nonbelieved memories (NBMs). The present experiments examined the effects of NBMs on subsequent problem-solving behaviour. In Experiment 1, we challenged participants' beliefs in their memories and examined whether NBMs affected subsequent solution rates on insight-based problems. True and false memories were elicited using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Then participants' belief in true and false memories was challenged by telling them the item had not been presented. We found that when the challenge led to undermining belief in false memories, fewer problems were solved than when belief was not challenged. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used except that some participants solved the problems one week rather than immediately after the feedback. Again, our results showed that undermining belief in false memories resulted in lower problem solution rates. These findings suggest that for false memories, belief is an important agent in whether memories serve as effective primes for immediate and delayed problem-solving.

A Case Concerning Children's False Memories of Abuse: Recommendations Regarding Expert Witness Work.

Expert witnesses can play a major role in legal cases concerning the reliability of statements. Abuse cases frequently contain only the memories of eyewitnesses/victims without the presence of physical evidence. Here, it is of the utmost importance that expert witnesses use scientific evidence for their expert opinion. In this case report, a case is described in which 20 children reported being sexually abused by the same teachers at their elementary school. The investigative steps that were taken by the police and school authorities are reviewed, including how they probably affected memory. In order to provide a sound expert opinion regarding the reliability of these statements, three recommendations are proposed. To reduce the effect of confirmation bias and increase objectivity, it is argued that expert witnesses' reports should contain alternative scenarios, be checked by another expert, and focus on the origin and context of the first statement.

Maltreated and non-maltreated children's true and false memories of neutral and emotional word lists in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott task.

Maltreated (n=26) and non-maltreated (n=31) 7- to 12-year-old children were tested on the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory task using emotional and neutral word lists. True recall was significantly better for non-maltreated than maltreated children regardless of list valence. The proportion of false recall for neutral lists was comparable regardless of maltreatment status. However, maltreated children showed a significantly higher false recall rate for the emotional lists than non-maltreated children. Together, these results provide new evidence that maltreated children could be more prone to false memory illusions for negatively valenced information than their non-maltreated counterparts.

On the adaptive function of children's and adults' false memories.

Recent research has shown that memory illusions can successfully prime both children's and adults' performance on complex, insight-based problems (compound remote associates tasks or CRATs). The current research aimed to clarify the locus of these priming effects. Like before, Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists were selected to prime subsequent CRATs such that the critical lures were also the solution words to a subset of the CRATs participants attempted to solve. Unique to the present research, recognition memory tests were used and participants were either primed during the list study phase, during the memory test phase, or both. Across two experiments, primed problems were solved more frequently and significantly faster than unprimed problems. Moreover, when participants were primed during the list study phase, subsequent solution times and rates were considerably superior to those produced by those participants who were simply primed at test. Together, these are the first results to show that false-memory priming during encoding facilitates problem-solving in both children and adults.