Competition and moral behavior: A meta-analysis of forty-five crowd-sourced experimental designs.

Does competition affect moral behavior? This fundamental question has been debated among leading scholars for centuries, and more recently, it has been tested in experimental studies yielding a body of rather inconclusive empirical evidence. A potential source of ambivalent empirical results on the same hypothesis is design heterogeneity-variation in true effect sizes across various reasonable experimental research protocols. To provide further evidence on whether competition affects moral behavior and to examine whether the generalizability of a single experimental study is jeopardized by design heterogeneity, we invited independent research teams to contribute experimental designs to a crowd-sourced project. In a large-scale online data collection, 18,123 experimental participants were randomly allocated to 45 randomly selected experimental designs out of 95 submitted designs. We find a small adverse effect of competition on moral behavior in a meta-analysis of the pooled data. The crowd-sourced design of our study allows for a clean identification and estimation of the variation in effect sizes above and beyond what could be expected due to sampling variance. We find substantial design heterogeneity-estimated to be about 1.6 times as large as the average standard error of effect size estimates of the 45 research designs-indicating that the informativeness and generalizability of results based on a single experimental design are limited. Drawing strong conclusions about the underlying hypotheses in the presence of substantive design heterogeneity requires moving toward much larger data collections on various experimental designs testing the same hypothesis.

Do people really prefer verbal probabilities?

When people communicate uncertainty, do they prefer to use words (e.g., "a chance", "possible") or numbers (e.g., "20%", "a 1 in 2 chance")? To answer this question, past research drew from a range of methodologies, yet failed to provide a clear-cut answer. Building on a review of existing methodologies, theoretical accounts and empirical findings, we tested the hypothesis that the preference for a particular format is driven by the variant of uncertainty that people experience. We expected that epistemic uncertainty would be more often communicated in words, whereas distributional uncertainty would be more often communicated in numbers; for the dispositional uncertainty, we expected that an individual's disposition would be more often communicated in words, whereas dispositions from the world would be more often communicated numerically. In three experiments (one oral, two written), participants communicated their uncertainty regarding two outcomes per variants of uncertainty: epistemic, dispositional and distributional. Overall, participants communicated their uncertainty more often in words, but this preference depended on the variants of uncertainty. Participants conveyed their epistemic and dispositional uncertainties more often in words and their distributional uncertainty in numbers (Experiments 1 and 2) but this effect was greatly reduced when the precision of uncertainty was held constant (Experiment 3), pointing out the key role of uncertainty vagueness. We have reviewed the implications of our findings for the existing accounts of format preferences.

Conceptual understanding and quantity inferences: a new framework for examining consumer understanding of food energy.

OBJECTIVE: The study examined two components of consumer understanding of food energy information: understanding the concept of energy and its quantity. Using this new framework, we investigated whether activity-equivalent labels facilitated interpretations of food energy compared with calorie labels and whether an image format would strengthen this facilitative effect compared with text. DESIGN: We assessed the effect of energy representation and format in a 2 (activity v. calories)×2 (image v. text) between-subjects design. Conceptual understanding of energy was measured in terms of level of understanding and personal engagement. Quantitative understanding was measured in terms of participants' estimations of a food's contribution to their recommended daily intake and perceptions of energy values as precise or single-bound interval estimates. SETTING: The experiment was conducted online through Qualtrics. SUBJECTS: Eight hundred and twelve participants (55 % female, age range 18-74 years) were recruited through a national survey panel in the UK. RESULTS: Participants were twice more likely to have a stronger conceptual understanding of energy and four times more likely to personally engage with activity labels v. calorie labels. Participants did not differ across labels in their estimations of energy quantities; however, they inferred quantities to mean exactly the stated number of calories, but at least the stated activity duration. There were no added benefits in presenting an image over the text format. CONCLUSIONS: Activity labels can facilitate conceptual understanding of energy, but may be subject to quantitative misinterpretations. Nutrition communication should consider what people infer from quantities represented on labels.

Effect of response format on cognitive reflection: Validating a two- and four-option multiple choice question version of the Cognitive Reflection Test.

The Cognitive Reflection Test, measuring intuition inhibition and cognitive reflection, has become extremely popular because it reliably predicts reasoning performance, decision-making, and beliefs. Across studies, the response format of CRT items sometimes differs, based on the assumed construct equivalence of tests with open-ended versus multiple-choice items (the equivalence hypothesis). Evidence and theoretical reasons, however, suggest that the cognitive processes measured by these response formats and their associated performances might differ (the nonequivalence hypothesis). We tested the two hypotheses experimentally by assessing the performance in tests with different response formats and by comparing their predictive and construct validity. In a between-subjects experiment (n = 452), participants answered stem-equivalent CRT items in an open-ended, a two-option, or a four-option response format and then completed tasks on belief bias, denominator neglect, and paranormal beliefs (benchmark indicators of predictive validity), as well as on actively open-minded thinking and numeracy (benchmark indicators of construct validity). We found no significant differences between the three response formats in the numbers of correct responses, the numbers of intuitive responses (with the exception of the two-option version, which had a higher number than the other tests), and the correlational patterns of the indicators of predictive and construct validity. All three test versions were similarly reliable, but the multiple-choice formats were completed more quickly. We speculate that the specific nature of the CRT items helps build construct equivalence among the different response formats. We recommend using the validated multiple-choice version of the CRT presented here, particularly the four-option CRT, for practical and methodological reasons. Supplementary materials and data are available at https://osf.io/mzhyc/ .

When intuitive Bayesians need to be good readers: The problem-wording effect on Bayesian reasoning.

Are humans intuitive Bayesians? It depends. People seem to be Bayesians when updating probabilities from experience but not when acquiring probabilities from descriptions (i.e., Bayesian textbook problems). Decades of research on textbook problems have focused on how the format of the statistical information (e.g., the natural frequency effect) affects such reasoning. However, it pays much less attention to the wording of these problems. Mathematical problem-solving literature indicates that wording is critical for performance. Wording effects (the wording varied across the problems and manipulations) can also have far-reaching consequences. These may have confounded between-format comparisons and moderated within-format variability in prior research. Therefore, across seven experiments (N = 4909), we investigated the impact of the wording of medical screening problems and statistical formats on Bayesian reasoning in a general adult population. Participants generated more Bayesian answers with natural frequencies than with single-event probabilities, but only with the improved wording. The improved wording of the natural frequencies consistently led to more Bayesian answers than the natural frequencies with standard wording. The improved wording effect occurred mainly due to a more efficient description of the statistical information-cueing required mathematical operations, an unambiguous association of numbers with their reference class and verbal simplification. The wording effect extends the current theoretical explanations of Bayesian reasoning and bears methodological and practical implications. Ultimately, even intuitive Bayesians must be good readers when solving Bayesian textbook problems.

The social learning account of trypophobia.

Trypophobia is the condition in which individuals report a range of negative emotions when viewing clusters of small holes. Since the phenomenon was first described in the peer-reviewed literature a decade ago, 49 papers have appeared together with hundreds of news articles. There has also been much discussion on various Internet forums, including medical and health-related websites. In the present article, we examine the degree to which the phenomenon is caused by a form of social learning, specifically, its ubiquitous social media presence. We also examined its prevalence among the broad population. In Experiment 1 (n = 2,558), we assessed whether younger people and females (i.e., greater social media users) are more sensitive to trypophobic stimuli, as predicted by the social media hypothesis. In Experiment 2 (n = 283), we examined whether sensitivity to trypophobic stimuli and rates of trypophobia is greater in people who are aware of the condition's existence, as opposed to those who have never heard of the phenomenon. In line with the social media theory, results showed that younger people and females are indeed more susceptible to trypophobia. However, 24% of trypophobic individuals have never heard of the condition. Overall, these data suggest that both social learning and non-social learning contribute to trypophobia. We also find that the prevalence of trypophobia is approximately 10%.

Vaccination invitations sent by warm and competent medical professionals disclosing risks and benefits increase trust and booking intention and reduce inequalities between ethnic groups.

OBJECTIVE: We aim to identify vaccination invitations that foster trust and improve vaccination uptake overall, especially among ethnic minority groups who are more at risk from coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and less likely to be vaccinated. METHOD: In a preregistered 4 × 4 mixed-design experiment, we manipulated how much risk-benefit information the message included within-subjects and the message source between-subjects (N = 4,038 U.K. and U.S. participants, 50% ethnic minority). Participants read four vaccine invitations that varied in vaccination risk-benefit information (randomized order): control (no information), benefits only, risk and benefit, and risk and benefit that mentions vulnerable groups. The messages were sent by one of four sources (random allocation): control (health institution), medical professional (unnamed), warm and competent medical professional (unnamed), and named warm and competent medical professional (Sanjay/Lamar). Participants assessed how much they trusted the message and how likely they would be to book their vaccination appointment. RESULTS: Information about vaccination benefits and risks increased trust, especially among ethnic minority groups-for whom the effect replicated within each group. Trust also increased when the message was sent by a warm and competent medical professional relative to a health institution, but the importance of the source mattered less when more information was shared. CONCLUSIONS: Our research demonstrates the positive impact of outlining the benefits and disclosing the risks of COVID vaccines in vaccination invitation messages. Having a warm and competent medical professional source can also increase trust, especially where the message is limited in scope. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Too old to be a diversity hire: Choice bundling shown to increase gender-diverse hiring decisions fails to increase age diversity.

Past research has shown that people are more likely to make the decision to hire candidates whose gender would increase group diversity when making multiple hiring choices in a bundle (i.e., when selecting multiple team members simultaneously) compared to making choices in isolation (i.e., when selecting a single team member). However, it is unclear if this bundling effect extends to age diversity and the selection of older candidates, as older workers are often the target of socially acceptable negative stereotypes and bias in recruitment, leaving them unemployed for longer than their younger counterparts. Across five preregistered experiments (total N = 4,096), we tested if the positive effect of bundling on diversity of selections extends to older candidates in hiring decisions. We found evidence of bias against older job candidates in hiring decisions but found inconsistent effects of choice bundling on the selection of older candidates across experiments. An effect of bundling was found in two of five experiments, with no meta-analytic effect found across the five studies. Making older candidates more competitive and introducing a diversity statement aimed at increasing their selection both significantly increased older candidate selections, but failed to activate the bundling effect. We discuss the theoretical implications for choice bundling interventions and for age as a diversity characteristic to support the design of interventions that meet the challenges of an aging workforce. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

People prefer to predict middle, most likely quantitative outcomes (not extreme ones), but they still over-estimate their likelihood.

Past work showed a tendency to associate verbal probabilities (e.g., possible, unlikely) with extreme quantitative outcomes, and to over-estimate the outcomes' probability of occurrence. In the first four experiments (Experiment 1, Experiments 2a-c), we tested whether this "extremity effect" reflects a general preference for extreme (vs central or less extreme) values of a distribution. Participants made predictions based on a frequency distribution in two scenarios. We did not find a preference for extreme outcomes. Instead, most of the participants made a prediction about the middle, most frequent outcome of the distribution (i.e., the modal outcome), but still over-estimated the outcomes' probabilities. In Experiment 3, we tested whether the over-estimation could be better explained by an "at least"/"at most" reading of the predictions. We found that only a minority of participants interpreted predictions as the lower/upper bounds of an open interval and that these interpretations were not associated with heightened probability estimates. In the final three experiments (Experiments 4a-c), we tested whether participants perceived extreme outcome predictions as more correct, useful and interesting than modal outcome predictions. We found that extreme and modal predictions were considered equally correct, but modal predictions were judged most useful, whereas extreme predictions were judged to be more interesting. Overall, our results indicate that the preference for extreme outcomes is limited to specific verbal probability expressions, whereas the over-estimation of the probability of quantitative outcomes may be more general than anticipated and applies to non-extreme values as well.

Promoting COVID-19 vaccine confidence through public responses to misinformation: The joint influence of message source and message content.

OBJECTIVE: During the pandemic healthcare professionals and political leaders routinely used traditional and new media outlets to publicly respond to COVID-19 myths and inaccuracies. We examine how variations in the sources and messaging strategies of these public statements affect respondents' beliefs about the safety of COVID-19 vaccines. METHODS: We analyzed the results of an experiment embedded within a multi-wave survey deployed to US and UK respondents in January-February 2022 to examine these effects. We employ a test-retest between-subjects experimental protocol with a control group. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions reflecting discrete pairings of message source (political authorities vs. healthcare professionals) and messaging strategy (debunking misinformation vs. discrediting mis-informants) or a control condition. We use linear regression to compare the effects of exposure to treatment conditions on changes in respondent beliefs about the potential risks associated with COVID-19 vaccination. RESULTS: In the UK sample, we observe a statistically significant decrease in beliefs about the risks of COVID-19 vaccines among respondents exposed to debunking messages by healthcare professionals. We observe a similar relationship in the US sample, but the effect was weaker and not significant. Identical messages from political authorities had no effect on respondents' beliefs about vaccine risks in either sample. Discrediting messages critical of mis-informants likewise had no influence on respondent beliefs, regardless of the actor to which they were attributed. Political ideology moderated the influence of debunking statements by healthcare professionals on respondent vaccine attitudes in the US sample, such that the treatment was more effective among liberals and moderates than among conservatives. CONCLUSIONS: Brief exposure to public statements refuting anti-vaccine misinformation can help promote vaccine confidence among some populations. The results underscore the joint importance of message source and messaging strategy in determining the effectiveness of responses to misinformation.

Rationally irrational: When people do not correct their reasoning errors even if they could.

Why is it that sometimes people do not correct their reasoning errors? The dominating dual-process theories of reasoning detail how people (fail to) detect their reasoning errors but underspecify how people decide to correct these errors once they are detected. We have unpacked the motivational aspects of the correction process here, leveraging the research on cognitive control. Specifically, we argue that when people detect an error, they decide whether or not to correct it based on the overall expected value associated with the correction-combining perceived efficacy and the reward associated with the correction while considering the cost of effort. Using a modified two-response paradigm, participants solved cognitive reflection problems twice while we manipulated the factors defining the expected value associated with correction at the second stage. In five experiments (N = 5,908), we found that answer feedback and reward increased the probability of correction while cost decreased it, relative to the control groups. These cognitive control critical factors affected the decisions to correct reasoning errors (Experiments 2 and 3) and the corrective reasoning itself (Experiments 1, 4 and 5) across a range of problems, feedbacks, types of errors (reflective or intuitive), and cost and reward manipulations pre-tested and checked in five separate studies (N = 951). Thus, some people did not correct their epistemically irrational reasoning errors because they followed the instrumentally rational principle of the expected value maximization: They were rationally irrational. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

How Should Doctors Frame the Risk of a Vaccine's Adverse Side Effects? It Depends on How Trustworthy They Are.

BACKGROUND: How health workers frame their communication about vaccines' probability of adverse side effects could play an important role in people's intentions to be vaccinated (e.g., positive frame: side effects are unlikely v. negative frame: there is a chance of side effects). Based on the pragmatic account of framing as implicit advice, we expected that participants would report greater vaccination intentions when a trustworthy physician framed the risks positively (v. negatively), but we expected this effect would be reduced or reversed when the physician was untrustworthy. DESIGN: In 4 online experiments (n = 191, snowball sampling and n = 453, 451, and 464 UK residents via Prolific; Mage≈ 34 y, 70% women, 84% White British), we manipulated the trustworthiness of a physician and how they framed the risk of adverse side effects in a scenario (i.e., a chance v. unlikely adverse side effects). Participants reported their vaccination intention, their level of distrust in health care systems, and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. RESULTS: Physicians who were trustworthy (v. untrustworthy) consistently led to an increase in vaccination intention, but the way they described adverse side effects mattered too. A positive framing of the risks given by a trustworthy physician consistently led to increased vaccination intention relative to a negative framing, but framing had no effect or the opposite effect when given by an untrustworthy physician. The exception to this trend occurred in unvaccinated individuals in experiment 3, following serious concerns about one of the COVID vaccines. In that study, unvaccinated participants responded more favorably to the negative framing of the trustworthy physician. CONCLUSIONS: Trusted sources should use positive framing to foster vaccination acceptance. However, in a situation of heightened fears, a negative framing-attracting more attention to the risks-might be more effective. HIGHLIGHTS: How health workers frame their communication about a vaccine's probability of adverse side effects plays an important role in people's intentions to be vaccinated.In 4 experiments, we manipulated the trustworthiness of a physician and how the physician framed the risk of adverse side effects of a COVID vaccine.Positive framing given by a trustworthy physician promoted vaccination intention but had null effect or did backfire when given by an untrustworthy physician.The effect occurred over and above participants' attitude toward the health care system, risk perceptions, and beliefs in COVID misinformation.

Ambiguity and unintended inferences about risk messages for COVID-19.

The World Health Organization established that the risk of suffering severe symptoms from coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is higher for some groups, but this does not mean their chances of infection are higher. However, public health messages often highlight the "increased risk" for these groups such that the risk could be interpreted as being about contracting an infection rather than suffering severe symptoms from the illness (as intended). Stressing the risk for vulnerable groups may also prompt inferences that individuals not highlighted in the message have lower risk than previously believed. In five studies, we investigated how U.K. residents interpreted such risk messages about COVID-19 (n = 396, n = 399, n = 432, n = 474) and a hypothetical new virus (n = 454). Participants recognized that the risk was about experiencing severe symptoms, but over half also believed that the risk was about infection, and had a corresponding heightened perception that vulnerable people were more likely to be infected. Risk messages that clarified the risk event reduced misinterpretations for a hypothetical new virus, but existing misinterpretations of coronavirus risks were resistant to correction. We discuss the need for greater clarity in public health messaging by distinguishing between the two risk events. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

A pre-registered, multi-lab non-replication of the action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE).

The Action-sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE) is a well-known demonstration of the role of motor activity in the comprehension of language. Participants are asked to make sensibility judgments on sentences by producing movements toward the body or away from the body. The ACE is the finding that movements are faster when the direction of the movement (e.g., toward) matches the direction of the action in the to-be-judged sentence (e.g., Art gave you the pen describes action toward you). We report on a pre-registered, multi-lab replication of one version of the ACE. The results show that none of the 18 labs involved in the study observed a reliable ACE, and that the meta-analytic estimate of the size of the ACE was essentially zero.

Effect of information on reducing inappropriate expectations and requests for antibiotics.

People often expect antibiotics when they are clinically inappropriate (e.g., for viral infections). This contributes significantly to physicians' decisions to prescribe antibiotics when they are clinically inappropriate, causing harm to the individual and to society. In two pre-registered studies employing UK general population samples (n1  = 402; n2  = 190), we evaluated the relationship between knowledge and beliefs with antibiotic expectations, and the effects of information provision on such expectations. We conducted a correlational study (study 1), in which we examined the role of antibiotic knowledge and beliefs and an experiment (study 2) in which we assessed the causal effect of information provision on antibiotic expectations. In study 1, we found that both knowledge and beliefs about antibiotics predicted antibiotic expectations. In study 2, a 2 (viral information: present vs. absent) × 2 (antibiotic information: present vs. absent) experimental between-subjects design, information about antibiotic efficacy significantly reduced expectations for antibiotics, but viral aetiology information did not. Providing antibiotic information substantially diminishes inappropriate expectations of antibiotics. Health campaigns might also aim to change social attitudes and normative beliefs, since more complex sociocognitive processes underpin inappropriate expectations for antibiotics.

Are COVID-19 conspiracies a threat to public health? Psychological characteristics and health protective behaviours of believers.

We tested the link between COVID-19 conspiracy theories and health protective behaviours in three studies: one at the onset of the pandemic in the United Kingdom (UK), a second just before the first national lockdown, and a third during that lockdown (N = 302, 404 and 399). We focused on conspiracy theories that did not deny the existence of COVID-19 and evaluated the extent to which they predicted a range of health protective behaviours, before and after controlling for psychological and sociodemographic characteristics associated with conspiracy theory belief. COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs were positively correlated with beliefs in other unrelated conspiracies and a general conspiracy mind-set, and negatively correlated with trust in government and a tendency towards analytical thinking (vs. intuitive thinking). Unexpectedly, COVID-19 conspiracy believers adhered to basic health guidelines and advanced health protective measures as strictly as non-believers. Conspiracy believers were, however, less willing to install the contact-tracing app, get tested for and vaccinated against COVID-19, and were more likely to share COVID-19 misinformation-all of which might undermine public health initiatives. Study 3 showed conspiracy theory believers were less willing to undertake health protective behaviours that were outside of their personal control, perceiving these as having a negative balance of risks and benefits. We discuss models explaining conspiracy beliefs and health protective behaviours, and suggest practical recommendations for public health initiatives.

'Always take your doctor's advice': Does trust moderate the effect of information on inappropriate antibiotic prescribing expectations?

Objectives To reduce overprescribing, health campaigns urge physicians to provide people with information regarding appropriate antibiotic use and encourage the public to trust their physicians' prescribing decisions. We test (1) whether providing individuals with complete information about the viral aetiology of an illness and the ineffectiveness of antibiotics will reduce inappropriate antibiotic expectations, (2) whether individuals with greater trust in their physician will have lower expectations, and (3) whether individuals with greater trust in their physician will benefit more from the complete information provision and have lower expectations. Design Experiment 1 features a between-subjects design (information provision: baseline vs. complete information) with a general measure of participants' trust in their physician. Experiment 2 features a 2 (physician trustworthiness: low vs. high) × 2 (information provision: baseline vs. complete information) between-subjects design. Methods In Experiment 1, participants (n = 366) reported their trust in their physician, read a vignette describing a hypothetical consultation with a physician for a viral cold and then expressed their expectations for antibiotics. In Experiment 2, participants (n = 380) read a vignette of a consultation with a physician for a viral ear infection then expressed their expectations for antibiotics. Results In both experiments, the provision of complete information significantly reduced inappropriate expectations for antibiotics. Greater trust in physicians was associated with higher antibiotic expectations in Experiment 1, but lower expectations in Experiment 2. In both experiments, trust in physicians appeared to facilitate the effect of information provision, but this effect was weak and inconsistent. Conclusion Providing information about viral aetiology and the ineffectiveness and side effects of antibiotics reduces inappropriate antibiotic expectations. Further research into the effect of trust in physicians as a moderator of the effect information provision is required, particularly given the recent increase in trust-based antibiotic campaigns. Statement of contribution What is already known Inappropriate expectations for antibiotics encourage overprescribing in primary care. To reduce inappropriate expectations, interventions often aim to educate people about antibiotics and encourage them to trust their physician. What does this study add Causal evidence that clinical information provision reduces but does not eliminate inappropriate antibiotic expectations. We find that increased trust in physicians is not always associated with lower expectations for antibiotics. Although increased trust seemed to boost the effect of information provision, this effect was weak and inconsistent.

Action bias in the public's clinically inappropriate expectations for antibiotics.

Clinical guidelines recommend that physicians educate patients about illnesses and antibiotics to eliminate inappropriate preferences for antibiotics. We expected that information provision about illnesses and antibiotics would reduce but not eliminate inappropriate preferences for antibiotics and that cognitive biases could explain why some people resist the effect of information provision. In 2 experiments, participants (n1 = 424; n2 = 434) either received incomplete information (about the viral etiology of their infection) or complete information (about viral etiology and the ineffectiveness and harms of taking antibiotics), before deciding to rest or take antibiotics. Those in the complete information conditions responded to items on 4 biases: action bias, social norm, source discrediting, and information neglect. In 2 follow-up experiments (n1 = 150; n2 = 732), we aimed to counteract the action bias by reframing the perception of the resting option as an action. Complete information provision reduced but did not eliminate inappropriate preferences for antibiotics. Around 10% of people wanted antibiotics even when informed they are harmful and offer no benefit and even when the alternative option (i.e., rest) was framed as an active treatment option. Results suggest an action bias underpins this preference but appears challenging to counteract. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Focus to an attribute with verbal or numerical quantifiers affects the attribute framing effect.

People find positive attribute frames (e.g., 75% lean) more persuasive than negative ones (e.g., 25% fat). In three pre-registered experiments, we tested whether this effect would be magnified by using verbal quantifiers instead of numerical ones (e.g., 'high % lean' vs. '75% lean'). This moderating effect of quantifier format was predicted based on previous empirical work and two non-exclusive accounts of framing effects. First, verbal quantifiers are presumed to be a more intuitive format than numerical quantifiers, so might predispose people more to judgement biases such as the framing effect. Second, verbal quantifiers draw a greater focus to the attributes they describe. This could provide a linguistic signal that the positive frame is better than the negative one. In three experiments, we manipulated the attribute frame (positive or negative) and the quantifier format (verbal or numerical) between-subjects, and quantity pairs (e.g., 5% fat and 95% lean or 25% fat and 75% lean) within-subjects. We also tested if participants focused more on the attributes in the frame, by measuring whether participants selected causal sentence completions about the beef that focused on why it had fat meat or lean meat. Results showed a robust framing effect, which was partially mediated by the focus of the sentence completions. However, the verbal format did not increase the magnitude of the framing effect. These results suggest that a focus on the attribute contributes to the framing effect, but contrary to past work, this focus is not different between verbal and numerical quantifiers.

The intuitive use of contextual information in decisions made with verbal and numerical quantifiers.

Verbal and numerical formats (e.g., verbal: "low fat," or numerical: "20% fat") are used interchangeably to communicate nutritional information. However, prior research implies that verbal quantifiers are processed more intuitively than numerical ones. We tested this hypothesis in two pre-registered experiments measuring four indicators of processing style: (a) response time, (b) decision performance, (c) reliance on irrelevant contextual information, which we inferred from participants' decision patterns, and (d) the level of interference from a concurrent memory task. Participants imagined they had consumed a given amount of a nutrient (represented in a pie chart) and decided whether a new quantity (either verbal or numerical) could be eaten within their guideline daily amount (GDA). The experiments used a mixed design varying format (verbal or numerical), concurrent memory load (no load, easy, and hard load in Experiment 1; no load and hard load in Experiment 2), nutrient (fat and minerals), quantity (low, medium, and high in Experiment 1; low and high in Experiment 2), and the assigned correct response for a trial (within and exceeding limits). Participants were faster and made fewer correct decisions with verbal quantifiers, and they relied more on contextual information (i.e., the identity of the nutrient involved). However, memory load did not impair decisions with verbal or numerical quantifiers. Altogether, these results suggest that verbal quantifiers are processed intuitively, slightly more so than numerical quantifiers, but that numerical quantifiers do not require much analytical processing to reach simple decisions.