Reasoning about Durations.

A set of assertions is consistent provided they can all be true at the same time. Naive individuals could prove consistency using the formal rules of a logical calculus, but it calls for them to fail to prove the negation of one assertion from the remainder in the set. An alternative procedure is for them to use an intuitive system (System 1) to construct a mental model of all the assertions. The task should be easy in this case. However, some sets of consistent assertions have no intuitive models and call for a deliberative system (System 2) to construct an alternative model. Formal rules and mental models therefore make different predictions. We report three experiments that tested their respective merits. The participants assessed the consistency of temporal descriptions based on statements using "during" and "before." They were more accurate for consistent problems with intuitive models than for those that called for deliberative models. There was no robust difference in accuracy between consistent and inconsistent problems. The results therefore corroborated the model theory.

Temporal explanations.

People can explain phenomena by appealing to temporal relations, for example, you might explain a colleague's absence at a meeting by inferring that their prior meeting ended late. Previous explanatory reasoning research shows that people construct causal explanations to resolve causal conflicts. Accordingly, temporal explanations may help reasoners resolve temporal conflicts, and we describe four experimental tests of the hypothesis (N = 240). Experiment 1 provided participants with conflicting or consistent temporal information and elicited natural responses about what followed. Participants spontaneously provided temporal explanations to resolve inconsistencies, and only a minority of them provided more conservative, direct refutations. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that participants preferred temporal explanations over simpler refutations to resolve conflicts, and Experiment 4 showed that participants judged temporal explanations more probable than refutations, and thereby yielded a novel class of conjunction fallacies. The research is the first to examine patterns in temporal explanatory reasoning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Iconicity bias and duration.

Descriptions of durational relations can be ambiguous, for example, the description "one meeting happened during another" could mean that one meeting started before the other ended, or it could mean that the meetings started and ended simultaneously. A recent theory posits that people mentally simulate descriptions of durational events by representing their starts and ends along a spatial axis, that is, an iconic representation of time. To draw conclusions from this iconic mental model, reasoners consciously scan it in the direction of earlier to later timepoints. The account predicts an iconicity bias: People should prefer descriptions that are congruent with an iconic scanning procedure-descriptions that mention the starts of events before the ends of events-over logically equivalent but incongruent descriptions. Six experiments corroborated the prediction; they show that iconicity biases in temporal reasoning manifest in cases when reasoners consciously evaluate the durations of events. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Recognition memory for hue: Prototypical bias and the role of labeling.

How does the concurrent use of language affect perception and memory for exemplars? Labels cue more general category information than a specific exemplar. Applying labels can affect the resulting memory for an exemplar. Here 3 alternative hypotheses are proposed for the role of labeling an exemplar at encoding: (a) labels distort memory toward the label prototype, (b) labels guide the level of specificity needed in the current context, and (c) labels direct attention to the label's referent among all possible features within a visual scene. University students were shown hues on object silhouettes that they either labeled with basic color categories, made preference judgments about, or indicated the animacy of its category. Experiments 1 and 2 established that there are response shifts toward the category prototype regardless of labeling, showing a pervasive influence of category knowledge on response bias. They also established an effect of labeling whereby labeling decreases the magnitude of shifts. Experiments 3 and 4 investigated the uniqueness and necessity of language in causing the decreased shift-neither of which proved to be the case. Overall, category-relative bias was pervasive and labeling appears to direct attention to the feature resulting in less biased memory. The results highlight that the context at encoding affects how memory is formed. (PsycINFO Database Record