Classified out of society? How educational classification induces political alienation through feelings of misrecognition.

Less educated citizens are both descriptively and substantively outnumbered by higher educated citizens in political and societal institutions. While social science has devoted much time to explain why such education effects exist, it has largely neglected the role of feelings of misrecognition in inducing political alienation among less educated citizens. We argue that education has become so central in processes of economic and social stratification that it is likely that less educated citizens feel misrecognized due to their marginal presence in societal and political institutions, which would then lead to their political alienation. This would in particular be the case in societies that are more 'schooled', that is, societies where schooling is a more dominant and steering institution. We analysed data from 49,261 individuals in 34 European countries and found that feelings of misrecognition were strongly related to political distrust, dissatisfaction with democracy, and vote abstention. These relations explained a significant part of the difference between higher and less educated citizens in political alienation. We also found that this mediation effect was larger in countries that are more schooled.

Social Influence and Group Identity.

This chapter reviews research on the group identity explanation of social influence, grounded in self-categorization theory, and contrasts it with other group-based explanations, including normative influence, interdependence, and social network approaches, as well as approaches to persuasion and influence that background group (identity) processes. Although the review primarily discusses recent research, its focus also invites reappraisal of some classic research in order to address basic questions about the scope and power of the group identity explanation. The self-categorization explanation of influence grounded in group norms, moderated by group identification, is compared and contrasted to other normative explanations of influence, notably the concept of injunctive norms and the relation to moral conviction. A range of moderating factors relating to individual variation, features of the intragroup and intergroup context, and important contextual variables (i.e., anonymity versus visibility, isolation versus copresence) that are particularly relevant to online influence in the new media are also reviewed.

When are intergroup attitudes judged as free speech and when as prejudice? A social identity analysis of attitudes towards immigrants.

Although anti-immigrant attitudes continue to be expressed around the world, identifying these attitudes as prejudice, truth or free speech remains contested. This contestation occurs, in part, because of the absence of consensually agreed-upon understandings of what prejudice is. In this context, the current study sought to answer the question, "what do people understand to be prejudice?" Participants read an intergroup attitude expressed by a member of their own group (an "in-group" member) or another group (an "out-group" member). This was followed by an interpretation of the attitude as either "prejudiced" or "free speech." This interpretation was also made by in-group or an out-group member. Subsequent prejudice judgements were influenced only by the group membership of the person expressing the initial attitude: the in-group member's attitude was judged to be less prejudiced than the identical attitude expressed by an out-group member. Participants' judgements of free speech, however, were more complex: in-group attitudes were seen more as free speech than out-group attitudes, except when an in-group member interpreted those attitudes as prejudice. These data are consistent with the Social Identity Approach to intergroup relations, and have implications for the processes by which intergroup attitudes become legitimised as free speech instead of prejudice.

"Fury, us": Anger as a basis for new group self-categories.

We tested the hypothesis that shared emotions, notably anger, influence the formation of new self-categories. We first measured participants' (N = 89) emotional reactions to a proposal to make university assessment tougher before providing feedback about the reactions of eight other co-present individuals. This feedback always contained information about the other individuals' attitudes to the proposals (four opposed and four not opposed) and in the experimental condition emotion information (of those opposed, two were angry, two were sad). Participants self-categorised more with, and preferred to work with, angry rather than sad targets, but only when participants' own anger was high. These findings support the idea that emotions are a potent determinant of self-categorisation, even in the absence of existing, available self-categories.

Disputing deindividuation: Why negative group behaviours derive from group norms, not group immersion.

Strong social identity does not lead to lack of accountability and "bad" behavior in groups and crowds but rather causes group behavior to be driven by group norms. The solution to problematic group behavior is therefore not to individualize the group but rather to change group norms, as underlined by the relational dynamics widely studied in the SIDE tradition.

You don't have to be well-educated to be an aversive racist, but it helps.

People with higher levels of formal education report less prejudice in survey research. Here we present novel evidence on the nature of educational differences in anti-Black attitudes among Whites. We replicate the education effect on explicit self-report measures of anti-Black attitudes, but we find that education is much less related to implicit measures of anti-Black attitudes. Implicit measures differ from explicit measures in that they do not allow respondents to control the measurement outcome; they therefore measure more spontaneous aspects of attitudes. These results shed new light on intergroup attitudes of the higher educated. Higher educated people are more likely to be aversive racists, that is, to score low on explicit, but not implicit measures of prejudice. Given the differential relation of explicit versus implicit measures to behavior, they have wide-ranging implications for the kind of intergroup behavior and discrimination we can expect from less and more highly educated people.

When and Why People Prefer Higher Educated Politicians: Ingroup Bias, Deference, and Resistance.

When choosing between political candidates of different educational levels, do voters show ingroup bias or base their vote choice on candidates' perceived competence? We aim to investigate how (fictional) political candidates of different educational levels are evaluated and voted for, how this is affected by voters' educational level, and the role of perceived (Study 1) and manipulated competence (Study 2). Higher educated participants preferred higher to less educated candidates over and above their level of competence, particularly when they identified strongly with their educational level. This reflects ingroup bias among the higher educated. Less educated participants preferred higher educated candidates in Study 1, but did not prefer higher educated candidates when competence was manipulated independently from education in Study 2. The less educated, unlike the higher educated, therefore, seem to show deference to the assumed competence of the higher educated, because it disappears when more reliable competence information is available.

Further evidence that system justification amongst the disadvantaged is positively related to superordinate group identification.

Members of disadvantaged groups sometimes support societal systems that enable the very inequalities that disadvantaged them. Is it possible to explain this puzzling system-justifying orientation in terms of rational group-interested motives, without recourse to a separate system motive? The social identity model of system attitudes (SIMSA) claims that it is. SIMSA proposes that the system justification shown by a disadvantaged group (e.g., African American women) can sometimes support identity needs that are tied to a more inclusive (superordinate) in-group (e.g., Americans). There is already some supportive evidence for this proposition, but it is not yet clear whether: (1) such trends are visible in a wider range of disadvantaged contexts, and (2) this explanation also applies to those who are strongly invested in their subgroup (e.g., feminists). In two waves of a large nationally representative survey from 21 to 23 European states (Ntotal = 84,572) and two controlled experiments (Ntotal = 290 women), we found that: (a) system justification was positively associated with superordinate ingroup identification across multiple cases of disadvantage (Studies 1-3), (b) system justification increased when this inclusive identity was made more salient (Studies 2 & 3), and (c) system justification was visible even amongst feminists when they activated their superordinate (Italian) identity (Study 3).

"We're tolerant and they're prejudiced": Same-sex marriage supporters' and opponents' perceptions of supportive and oppositional claims.

The current research examined the proposition that debates over same-sex marriage are characterized, at least in part, by conflicting understandings about what is and is not prejudiced, normative and true. Toward this end, Australians' (N = 415) prejudice judgements of supportive and oppositional statements toward same-sex marriage were measured and analysed with analyses of variance. Unsurprisingly, same-sex marriage supporters perceived a supportive statement as unprejudiced, tolerant, truthful, in pursuit of individual liberty, and normative; oppositional statements were seen in precisely the opposite manner. Same-sex marriage opponents, however, disagreed, instead judging an oppositional statement as unprejudiced, tolerant, truthful, in pursuit of individual liberty, and normative; it was a supportive statement that was seen as relatively prejudiced. These effects remained even after controlling for independent expressions of in-group favouritism. The current data align with a collective naïve realism perspective, in which group members see their own views as veridical and those of disagreeing others as biased. We argue that prejudice-reduction efforts must be instantiated to facilitate a common in-group identity between supporters and opponents to enable consensus over facts and, ultimately, what is and is not prejudice. Without this consensus, each side of the political debate may simply hurl the pejorative label of "prejudice" against the other, with likely little opportunity for social influence and social change.

Gender-based in-group social influence can lead women to view a hostile sexist attitude as less prejudiced and more true.

Social influence processes by which women come to judge a hostile sexist attitude as relatively true and unprejudiced were examined. Based upon status characteristics theory, women's judgments were expected to be more strongly influenced by a man's than a woman's interpretation of the sexist attitude as true or prejudiced. Based upon self-categorization theory, women's judgments were expected to be more strongly influenced by a woman's than a man's interpretation. Support was primarily observed for the self-categorization theory prediction. This effect, however, was initially suppressed by participants' acceptance of the legitimacy of gender status differences. A post-hoc mediational analysis revealed two pathways by which in-group social influence affected women's acceptance the relative veracity of negative claims about their own group: a direct path from shared in-group membership with the influencing agent, and an indirect path through their acceptance of the legitimacy of gender status differences. The research highlights how women's endorsement of sexist views can have the capacity to minimize other women's challenges of these views as prejudice.

Protesters as "passionate economists": a dynamic dual pathway model of approach coping with collective disadvantage.

To explain the psychology behind individuals' motivation to participate in collective action against collective disadvantage (e.g., protest marches), the authors introduce a dynamic dual pathway model of approach coping that integrates many common explanations of collective action (i.e., group identity, unfairness, anger, social support, and efficacy). It conceptualizes collective action as the outcome of two distinct processes: emotion-focused and problem-focused approach coping. The former revolves around the experience of group-based anger (based in appraised external blame for unfair collective disadvantage). The latter revolves around beliefs in the group's efficacy (based in appraised instrumental coping potential for social change). The model is the first to make explicit the dynamic nature of collective action by explaining how undertaking collective action leads to the reappraisal of collective disadvantage, thus inspiring future collective action. The authors review empirical support for the model, discuss its theoretical and practical implications, and identify directions for future research and application.

Brexit and Trump: Which Theory of Social Stasis and Social Change Copes Best With the New Populism?

Why do voters seek to change the political landscape or to retain it? System justification theory (SJT) proposes that a separate system motive to preserve the existing order drives support for the status-quo, and that this motivation operates independently from personal and collective interests. But how does this explanation apply to recent populist shifts in the political order such as Brexit and the emergence of Donald Trump? While the system motive may seem useful in understanding why the usual progressives (Remain/Clinton voters) may want to stick with an established order, it seems insufficient to explain why the more conservative voters (Brexit/Trump voters) would want to upend the establishment. Thus, we compared SJT's system motive explanation for the system attitudes of voters on both sides of the political divide to an alternative explanation drawn from the newer social identity model of system attitudes (SIMSA). According to SIMSA, the difficulty in explaining the system attitudes of Brexit/Trump and Remain/Clinton voters from SJT's system motive standpoint can be resolved by focusing instead on the collective interests that both camps seek to satisfy with their votes. We examined these explanations in two studies conducted soon after Brexit (N = 313) and Trump's election (N = 289) in 2016, with results providing more support for SIMSA than for SJT.

Counteracting subliminal cues that threaten national identity.

In spite of their subtle nature, subliminal cues of group devaluation can have profound effects on members of targeted groups. Across three studies, we examine factors that allow people to counteract subliminal cues of group devaluation. We do this in the context of Spanish-German intergroup relations following the 2008 financial crisis. Throughout the crisis, narratives in politics and the media have drawn on national stereotypes to legitimize the economic situation in Spain. We argue that this represents a threat to our Spanish participants and that exposure to subliminal cues that reflect this threat will trigger responses that counteract this threat. Indeed, results showed that when subliminal associations legitimize the disadvantage faced by the group, our Spanish participants reversed the subliminal associations to which they were exposed. These findings show that Spanish participants are able to counteract the devaluation of their national in-group, even when that devaluation occurs outside of conscious awareness.

The Rocky Road from Experience to Expression of Emotions-Women's Anger About Sexism.

We investigated women's anger expression in response to sexism. In three studies (Ns = 103, 317, and 241), we tested the predictions that women express less anger about sexism than they experience-the anger gap-and that the anger expressed by women is associated with instrumental concerns, specifically perceived costs and benefits of confronting sexism. To estimate the specificity of the proposed gap, we compared women's anger reactions to men's anger reactions as well as anger reactions to sadness reactions. Across studies, we found support for the anger gap, that is, lower anger expression than experience, and the gap was more pronounced for women than for men (Study 3). Surprisingly, a gap also occurred in sadness reactions. Regarding instrumental concerns, there was converging evidence that expressed anger was negatively associated with individual costs. We also investigated whether anger expression can be encouraged through women's identification with feminists (Studies 1 and 2) and support by other women (Study 2); yet, we found no evidence. We conclude that, to understand women's-and men's-reactions to sexism, it is critical not to mistake their emotion expression for how they really feel, but instead to also consider strategic concerns. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42761-021-00081-7.

Group rationale, collective sense: beyond intergroup bias.

In this paper, I contest the view of the group as a source of bias and irrationality, especially prevalent within social psychology. I argue that this negative evaluation often arises by applying inappropriate standards, relating to the wrong level of analysis (often the individual level). Second, the image of the group as bad and biasing is often overstated. For example, the evidence suggests that intergroup discrimination, rather than being universal or generic, is often constrained, proportionate and reflects functional and rational strategies for managing threats and opportunities at the group level. Third, although the recent upsurge of interest in group emotions could be seen to reinforce the dualism between rationality and emotion, the contemporary functional approach argues for group emotions as augmenting rather than contradicting rationality. However, we should be wary (and weary) of narrow economic and individualist notions of rationality; group identity may offer the opportunity to redefine rationality in more collective and prosocial ways.

Is Martin Luther King or Malcolm X the more acceptable face of protest? High-status groups' reactions to low-status groups' collective action.

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported online in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology on Jul 8 2019 (see record 2019-40588-001). In the article, Malcolm X was misspelled in the article title, in the second epigraph below the abstract, and in the second paragraph of the first paragraph and the first sentence of the fifth paragraph of the Implications for the Effectiveness of Low-Status Collective Action section. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Work on collective action focuses mainly on the perspective of disadvantaged groups. However, the dynamics of social change cannot be fully understood without taking into account the reactions of the members of advantaged groups to collective action by low-status groups. In 10 experiments conducted in 4 different intergroup contexts (N = 1349), we examine advantaged groups support for normative versus non-normative collective action by disadvantaged groups. Experiments 1a to 1e show that normative collective action is perceived as more likely to improve the disadvantaged group's position and that non-normative collective action is perceived as more damaging to the advantaged group's social image. Also, these differences are due to differences in perceptions of actions violating norms of protest and perceptions of protesters as blaming the advantaged group for the inequality. Experiments 2a to 3 show that high compared with low identified members of advantaged groups distinguish more between types of collective action, showing a greater preference for the normative type. Both a mediational design and an experimental-causal-chain design (Experiments 3 and 4) show that support among high identifiers depends more on whether collective action damages the high-status group's social image than on whether it actually reduces inequality. Findings suggest that high-status groups' support for collective action is not only shaped by the perceived likelihood of change but also by its potential damage to the image of the high-status ingroup. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Frustration-affirmation? Thwarted goals motivate compliance with social norms for violence and nonviolence.

When thwarted goals increase endorsement of violence, it may not always reflect antisocial tendencies or some breakdown of self-regulation per se; such responses can also reflect an active process of self-regulation, whose purpose is to comply with the norms of one's social environment. In the present experiments (total N = 2,145), the causal link between thwarted goals and endorsement of violent means (guns and war) was found to be contingent on perceptions that violence is normatively valued. Experiments 1-3 establish that thwarted goals increase endorsement of violence primarily among U.S. adults of a lower educational background and/or men who endorse a masculine honor culture. Experiment 4 manipulates the perceived normative consensus of college educated Americans, and demonstrates that thwarted goals increase college educated Americans' endorsement of whatever norm is salient: prowar or antiwar. Generalizing the model beyond violent means, Experiment 5 demonstrates that goal-thwarted Europeans report increased willingness to volunteer for refugee support activities if they perceive strong social norms to volunteer. Altogether, these findings support a frustration-affirmation model rather than frustration-aggression, whereby thwarted goals increase compliance with perceived norms for behavior, which can increase endorsement of violent means such as guns and war, but also nonviolent charitable actions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Subjective status and perceived legitimacy across countries.

The relationships between subjective status and perceived legitimacy are important for understanding the extent to which people with low status are complicit in their oppression. We use novel data from 66 samples and 30 countries (N = 12,788) and find that people with higher status see the social system as more legitimate than those with lower status, but there is variation across people and countries. The association between subjective status and perceived legitimacy was never negative at any levels of eight moderator variables, although the positive association was sometimes reduced. Although not always consistent with hypotheses, group identification, self-esteem, and beliefs in social mobility were all associated with perceived legitimacy among people who have low subjective status. These findings enrich our understanding of the relationship between social status and legitimacy.

Strength in numbers or less is more? A matter of opinion and a question of taste.

Theory and research on attitudes and opinions assume that people generally prefer a state where their preferences are shared by the majority of relevant others. Other research points to the value that distinctiveness, or being in a minority, can have for both groups and individuals. The authors propose that a relatively neglected factor here concerns the nature of the preference, namely, whether the preference is a matter of opinion or a question of taste. The authors argue that different processes play a role in each of these cases, with the result that people like a majority to share their opinion but prefer to be part of a minority in matters of taste. Results of three experiments support this prediction and show that shared opinions reflect the perceived power of others' support, whereas shared tastes reflect distinctiveness from others.

The influence of discrimination and fairness on collective self-esteem.

This article examines the influence of discrimination and fairness on collective self-esteem. Whereas social identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis emphasizes that discrimination can enhance self-esteem, the authors contend that this self-esteem advantage will actually reverse when groups are primed with the idea of engaging in a fair intergroup competition. They measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2) discrimination and fairness in real (Study 1) and minimal (Study 2) groups, after which they manipulated the presence of an intergroup competition in both studies. Collective self-esteem served as the main dependent measure. Results indicated that when an intergroup competition was present or impending, previously expressed fairness (or less discrimination) was positively related to self-esteem, whereas discrimination was positively related to collective self-esteem in the absence of an intergroup competition. Results are discussed in terms of social identity theory and the importance of the broader social context for examining the relationship between discrimination and self-esteem.