The human visual system differentially represents subjectively and objectively invisible stimuli.

The study of unconscious processing requires a measure of conscious awareness. Awareness measures can be either subjective (based on participant's report) or objective (based on perceptual performance). The preferred awareness measure depends on the theoretical position about consciousness and may influence conclusions about the extent of unconscious processing and about the neural correlates of consciousness. We obtained functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measurements from 43 subjects while they viewed masked faces and houses that were either subjectively or objectively invisible. Even for objectively invisible (perceptually indiscriminable) stimuli, we found significant category information in both early, lower-level visual areas and in higher-level visual cortex, although representations in anterior, category-selective ventrotemporal areas were less robust. For subjectively invisible stimuli, similar to visible stimuli, there was a clear posterior-to-anterior gradient in visual cortex, with stronger category information in ventrotemporal cortex than in early visual cortex. For objectively invisible stimuli, however, category information remained virtually unchanged from early visual cortex to object- and category-selective visual areas. These results demonstrate that although both objectively and subjectively invisible stimuli are represented in visual cortex, the extent of unconscious information processing is influenced by the measurement approach. Furthermore, our data show that subjective and objective approaches are associated with different neural correlates of consciousness and thus have implications for neural theories of consciousness.

How (not) to demonstrate unconscious priming: Overcoming issues with post-hoc data selection, low power, and frequentist statistics.

One widely used scientific approach to studying consciousness involves contrasting conscious operations with unconscious ones. However, challenges in establishing the absence of conscious awareness have led to debates about the extent and existence of unconscious processes. We collected experimental data on unconscious semantic priming, manipulating prime presentation duration to highlight the critical role of the analysis approach in attributing priming effects to unconscious processing. We demonstrate that common practices like post-hoc data selection, low statistical power, and frequentist statistical testing can erroneously support claims of unconscious priming. Conversely, adopting best practices like direct performance-awareness contrasts, Bayesian tests, and increased statistical power can prevent such erroneous conclusions. Many past experiments, including our own, fail to meet these standards, casting doubt on previous claims about unconscious processing. Implementing these robust practices will enhance our understanding of unconscious processing and shed light on the functions and neural mechanisms of consciousness.

Unconscious semantic priming from pictures under backward masking and continuous flash suppression.

It is debated whether the meaning of invisible pictures can be processed unconsciously. We tested whether pictures of animals or objects presented under backward masking or continuous flash suppression could prime the subsequent categorization of target words into animal or non-animal. In Experiment 1, the backward masking part failed to replicate the priming effect reported in two previous studies, despite sufficient statistical power (N = 59). Similarly, the continuous flash suppression part provided no evidence for a priming effect. In Experiment 2 (N = 65) we shortened the prime-target SOA from 290 ms to 90 ms, but again failed to obtain unconscious semantic priming under backward masking. Thus, our study did not provide evidence for unconscious semantic processing of pictures. These findings support the emerging view that unconscious processing is rather limited in scope.

Intact prioritisation of unconscious face processing in schizophrenia.

INTRODUCTION: Faces provide a rich source of social information, crucial for the successful navigation of daily social interactions. People with schizophrenia suffer a wide range of social-cognitive deficits, including abnormalities in face perception. However, to date, studies of face perception in schizophrenia have primarily employed tasks that require patients to make judgements about the faces. It is, thus, unclear whether the reported deficits reflect an impairment in encoding visual face information, or biased social-cognitive evaluative processes. METHODS: We assess the integrity of early unconscious face processing in 21 out-patients diagnosed with Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective Disorder (15M/6F) and 21 healthy controls (14M/7F). In order to control for any direct influence of higher order cognitive processes, we use a behavioural paradigm known as breaking continuous flash suppression (b-CFS), where participants simply respond to the presence and location of a face. In healthy adults, this method has previously been used to show that upright faces gain rapid and privileged access to conscious awareness over inverted faces and other inanimate objects. RESULTS: Here, we report similar effects in patients, suggesting that the early unconscious stages of face processing are intact in schizophrenia. CONCLUSION: Our data indicate that face processing deficits reported in the literature must manifest at a conscious stage of processing, where the influence of mentalizing or attribution biases might play a role.

Cortical suppression in human primary visual cortex predicts individual differences in illusory tilt perception.

Neural responses to visual stimuli are modulated by spatial and temporal context. For example, in primary visual cortex (V1), responses to an oriented target stimulus will be suppressed when embedded within an oriented surround stimulus. This suppression is orientation-specific, with the largest suppression observed when stimuli in the neuron's classical receptive field and surround are of similar orientation. In human psychological experiments, the tilt illusion and tilt aftereffect demonstrate an effect of context on perceived orientation of a target stimulus. Similar to the neurophysiological data, the strength of these effects is modulated by the orientation difference between the target stimulus and context. It has been hypothesized that the neural mechanism underlying both the tilt illusion and tilt aftereffect involves orientation-tuned inhibition in V1. However, to date there is no direct evidence linking human perception of these illusions with measurements of inhibition from human visual cortex. Here, we measured context-induced suppression of neural responses in human visual cortex using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In the same participants, we also measured magnitudes of their tilt illusion and tilt aftereffect. Our data revealed a significant relationship between the magnitude of neural suppression in V1 and size of the tilt illusion and tilt aftereffect. That is, participants who showed stronger blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) suppression in V1 also perceived stronger shifts in illusory tilt. This agreement between perception and neural responses in human V1 suggests a shared inhibitory mechanism that mediates both spatial and temporal effects of context in human perception.

The Two-Body Inversion Effect.

How does one perceive groups of people? It is known that functionally interacting objects (e.g., a glass and a pitcher tilted as if pouring water into it) are perceptually grouped. Here, we showed that processing of multiple human bodies is also influenced by their relative positioning. In a series of categorization experiments, bodies facing each other (seemingly interacting) were recognized more accurately than bodies facing away from each other (noninteracting). Moreover, recognition of facing body dyads (but not nonfacing body dyads) was strongly impaired when those stimuli were inverted, similar to what has been found for individual bodies. This inversion effect demonstrates sensitivity of the visual system to facing body dyads in their common upright configuration and might imply recruitment of configural processing (i.e., processing of the overall body configuration without prior part-by-part analysis). These findings suggest that facing dyads are represented as one structured unit, which may be the intermediate level of representation between multiple-object (body) perception and representation of social actions.

Object grouping based on real-world regularities facilitates perception by reducing competitive interactions in visual cortex.

In virtually every real-life situation humans are confronted with complex and cluttered visual environments that contain a multitude of objects. Because of the limited capacity of the visual system, objects compete for neural representation and cognitive processing resources. Previous work has shown that such attentional competition is partly object based, such that competition among elements is reduced when these elements perceptually group into an object based on low-level cues. Here, using functional MRI (fMRI) and behavioral measures, we show that the attentional benefit of grouping extends to higher-level grouping based on the relative position of objects as experienced in the real world. An fMRI study designed to measure competitive interactions among objects in human visual cortex revealed reduced neural competition between objects when these were presented in commonly experienced configurations, such as a lamp above a table, relative to the same objects presented in other configurations. In behavioral visual search studies, we then related this reduced neural competition to improved target detection when distracter objects were shown in regular configurations. Control studies showed that low-level grouping could not account for these results. We interpret these findings as reflecting the grouping of objects based on higher-level spatial-relational knowledge acquired through a lifetime of seeing objects in specific configurations. This interobject grouping effectively reduces the number of objects that compete for representation and thereby contributes to the efficiency of real-world perception.

Priming of object detection under continuous flash suppression depends on attention but not on part-whole configuration.

Previous research has shown that the identification of visual objects can rely on both view-dependent, holistic as well as view-independent, analytic representation, depending on visual attention. Here, we asked whether the initial conscious detection of objects reveals similar dependencies and may therefore share similar perceptual mechanisms. We used continuous flash suppression to render objects presented in familiar views invisible at the beginning of a trial and recorded the time these target objects needed to break into awareness. Target objects were preceded by spatially attended or unattended primes that were either shown in the same familiar view as the targets or horizontally split (i.e., with their halves swapping positions) in order to disrupt holistic processing. Relative to an unprimed baseline, suppression times were shorter for all priming conditions. Although spatial attention enhanced this priming effect on access to awareness, even unattended primes facilitated awareness of a related target, indicating that object detection does not fully concur with the idea of attention-demanding analytic object representations. Moreover, priming effects were of similar strength for primes shown in the same familiar view as the targets and for horizontally split primes, indicating that holistic (template-like) representations do not play an integral role in object detection. These results suggest that the initial detection of an object relies on representations of object features rather than holistic representations used for recognition. The perceptual mechanisms mediating conscious object detection are therefore markedly different from those underlying object identification.

Interobject grouping facilitates visual awareness.

In organizing perception, the human visual system takes advantage of regularities in the visual input to perceptually group related image elements. Simple stimuli that can be perceptually grouped based on physical regularities, for example by forming an illusory contour, have a competitive advantage in entering visual awareness. Here, we show that regularities that arise from the relative positioning of complex, meaningful objects in the visual environment also modulate visual awareness. Using continuous flash suppression, we found that pairs of objects that were positioned according to real-world spatial regularities (e.g., a lamp above a table) accessed awareness more quickly than the same object pairs shown in irregular configurations (e.g., a table above a lamp). This advantage was specific to upright stimuli and abolished by stimulus inversion, meaning that it did not reflect physical stimulus confounds or the grouping of simple image elements. Thus, knowledge of the spatial configuration of objects in the environment shapes the contents of conscious perception.

Rapid fear detection relies on high spatial frequencies.

Signals of threat--such as fearful faces--are processed with priority and have privileged access to awareness. This fear advantage is commonly believed to engage a specialized subcortical pathway to the amygdala that bypasses visual cortex and processes predominantly low-spatial-frequency information but is largely insensitive to high spatial frequencies. We tested visual detection of low- and high-pass-filtered fearful and neutral faces under continuous flash suppression and sandwich masking, and we found consistently that the fear advantage was specific to high spatial frequencies. This demonstrates that rapid fear detection relies not on low- but on high-spatial-frequency information--indicative of an involvement of cortical visual areas. These findings challenge the traditional notion that a subcortical pathway to the amygdala is essential for the initial processing of fear signals and support the emerging view that the cerebral cortex is crucial for the processing of ecologically relevant signals.

Guns Are Not Faster to Enter Awareness After Seeing a Black Face: Absence of Race-Priming in a Gun/Tool Task During Continuous Flash Suppression.

In the Weapon Identification Task (WIT), Black faces prime the identification of guns compared with tools. We measured race-induced changes in visual awareness of guns and tools using continuous flash suppression (CFS). Eighty-four participants, primed with Black or Asian faces, indicated the location of a gun or tool target that was temporarily rendered invisible through CFS, which provides a sensitive measure of effects on early visual processing. The same participants also completed a standard (non-CFS) WIT. We replicated the standard race-priming effect in the WIT. In the CFS task, Black and Asian primes did not affect the time guns and tools needed to enter awareness. Thus, race priming does not alter early visual processing but does change the identification of guns and tools. This confirms that race-priming originates from later post-perceptual memory- or response-related processing.

The Scientific Study of Consciousness Cannot and Should Not Be Morally Neutral.

A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, such as the ability to feel pain and pleasure or reflect on one's own experience, vary in different states and animal species. Considering the tight link between consciousness and moral status, answers to these questions have implications for law and ethics. Here we point out that given this link, the scientific community studying consciousness may face implicit pressure to carry out certain research programs or interpret results in ways that justify current norms rather than challenge them. We show that because consciousness largely determines moral status, the use of nonhuman animals in the scientific study of consciousness introduces a direct conflict between scientific relevance and ethics-the more scientifically valuable an animal model is for studying consciousness, the more difficult it becomes to ethically justify compromises to its well-being for consciousness research. Finally, in light of these considerations, we call for a discussion of the immediate ethical corollaries of the body of knowledge that has accumulated and for a more explicit consideration of the role of ideology and ethics in the scientific study of consciousness.

Eye gaze adaptation under interocular suppression.

The perception of eye gaze is central to social interaction in that it provides information about another person's goals, intentions, and focus of attention. Direction of gaze has been found to reflexively shift the observer's attention in the corresponding direction, and prolonged exposure to averted eye gaze adapts the visual system, biasing perception of subsequent gaze in the direction opposite to the adapting face. Here, we tested the role of conscious awareness in coding eye gaze directions. To this end, we measured aftereffects induced by adapting faces with different eye gaze directions that were presented during continuous flash suppression, a potent interocular suppression technique. In some trials the adapting face was rendered fully invisible, whereas in others it became partially visible. In Experiment 1, the adapting and test faces were presented in identical sizes and to the same eye. Even fully invisible faces were capable of inducing significant eye gaze aftereffects, although these were smaller than aftereffects from partially visible faces. When the adapting and test faces were shown to different eyes in Experiment 2, significant eye gaze aftereffects were still observed for the fully invisible faces, thus showing interocular transfer. Experiment 3 disrupted the spatial correspondence between adapting and test faces by introducing a size change. Under these conditions, aftereffects were restricted to partially visible adapting faces. These results were replicated in Experiment 4 using a blocked adaptation design. Together, these findings indicate that size-dependent low-level components of eye gaze can be represented without awareness, whereas object-centered higher-level representations of eye gaze directions depend on visual awareness.

Gaze direction and face orientation modulate perceptual sensitivity to faces under interocular suppression.

Faces convey information essential for social interaction. Their importance has prompted suggestions that some facial features may be processed unconsciously. Although some studies have provided empirical support for this idea, it remains unclear whether these findings were due to perceptual processing or to post-perceptual decisional factors. Evidence for unconscious processing of facial features has predominantly come from the Breaking Continuous Flash Suppression (b-CFS) paradigm, which measures the time it takes different stimuli to overcome interocular suppression. For example, previous studies have found that upright faces are reported faster than inverted faces, and direct-gaze faces are reported faster than averted-gaze faces. However, this procedure suffers from important problems: observers can decide how much information they receive before committing to a report, so their detection responses may be influenced by differences in decision criteria and by stimulus identification. Here, we developed a new procedure that uses predefined exposure durations, enabling independent measurement of perceptual sensitivity and decision criteria. We found higher detection sensitivity to both upright and direct-gaze (compared to inverted and averted-gaze) faces, with no effects on decisional factors. For identification, we found both greater sensitivity and more liberal criteria for upright faces. Our findings demonstrate that face orientation and gaze direction influence perceptual sensitivity, indicating that these facial features may be processed unconsciously.

Intact prioritization of fearful faces during continuous flash suppression in psychopathy.

Affective state recognition and in particular the identification of fear is known to be impaired in psychopathy. It is unclear, however, whether this reflects a deficit in basic perception ('fear blindness') or a deficit in later cognitive processing. To test for a perceptual deficit, 63 male incarcerated offenders, assessed with the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), detected fearful, neutral, and happy facial expressions rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression (CFS). Fearful faces were detected faster than neutral and happy faces. There was no reduction of the fear advantage in the 20 offenders diagnosed with psychopathy according to the PCL-R, and there was no correlation between the fear advantage and PCL-R scores. Deficits in the processing of fearful facial expressions in psychopathy may thus not reflect fear blindness, but impairments at later postperceptual processing stages. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

High-level face shape adaptation depends on visual awareness: evidence from continuous flash suppression.

When incompatible images are presented to the two eyes, one image dominates awareness while the other is rendered invisible by interocular suppression. It has remained unclear whether complex visual information can reach high-level processing stages in the ventral visual pathway during such interocular suppression. Here, we asked whether basic face shape, which is thought to be encoded in areas of the ventral stream, can be processed without visual awareness. We measured aftereffects induced by prolonged exposure to distorted faces during continuous flash suppression. Despite constant physical stimulation, in some trials the adaptor face was fully suppressed from awareness, while in other trials it overcame suppression and became partially visible. Aftereffects were induced even by entirely invisible adaptors, albeit reduced compared to partially visible adaptors, and only when adaptor and test stimuli were presented in the same size to the same eye. However, when adaptor and test stimuli were presented to different eyes or to the same eye but in different sizes, aftereffects were restricted to partially visible adaptors. These results suggest that a monocular, low-level component of face shape adaptation escapes interocular suppression and can proceed without visual awareness. By contrast, high-level components of basic face shape encoding involving ventral stream processing are eliminated by interocular suppression and require visual awareness.

Dissociating conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects.

The scope of unconscious processing is highly debated, with recent studies showing that even high-level functions such as perceptual integration and category-based attention occur unconsciously. For example, upright faces that are suppressed from awareness through interocular suppression break into awareness more quickly than inverted faces. Similarly, verbal object cues boost otherwise invisible objects into awareness. Here, we replicate these findings, but find that they reflect a general difference in detectability not specific to interocular suppression. To dissociate conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects, we use an additional discrimination task to rule out conscious processes as a cause for these differences. Results from this detection-discrimination dissociation paradigm reveal that, while face orientation is processed unconsciously, category-based attention requires awareness. These findings provide insights into the function of conscious perception and offer an experimental approach for mapping out the scope and limits of unconscious processing.

No effect of value learning on awareness and attention for faces: Evidence from continuous flash suppression and the attentional blink.

It is widely believed that the emotional and movtivational value of social signals, such as faces, influences perception and attention. However, effects reported for stimuli with intrinsic affective value, such as emotional facial expressions, can often be explained by differences in low-level stimulus properties. To rule out such low-level effects, here we used a value-learning procedure, in which faces were associated with different probabilities of monetary gain and loss in a choice game. In three experiments involving 149 participants, we tested the influence of affective valence (win- vs. loss-associated faces) and motivational salience (probability of monetary gain or loss) on visual awareness, attention, and memory. Using continuous flash suppression and rapid serial visual presentation, we found no effects of affective valence or motivational salience on visual awareness of faces. Furthermore, in two experiments, there was no evidence for a modulation of the attentional blink, indicating that acquired emotional and motivational value does not influence attentional priority of faces. However, we found that motivational salience boosted recognition memory, and this effect was particularly pronounced for win-associated faces. These results indicate that acquired affective valence and motivational salience affect only later processing of faces related to memory but do not directly affect visual awareness and attention. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The hard problem makes the easy problems hard - a reply to Doerig et al.

In their paper Doerig et al. argue that we should put the hard problem aside and focus on empirical data to solve the 'easy' problems of consciousness - finding the neural and functional correlates of consciousness. In other words 'shut up and measure'. This has worked well with other thorny issues, such as explaining life, so why not adopt this approach here? We argue that despite the popularity of this view it is not feasible. In order to collect any consciousness data one needs to take an implicit or explicit stance on the hard problem.

Sorry, baby: Infant faces reach awareness more slowly than adult faces.

Past research has found an attentional bias for positive relative to neutral stimuli, with a greater attentional bias for stimuli that are more motivationally relevant. Baby faces are an example of a motivationally relevant stimulus because they elicit caretaking behaviors. Building on previous work demonstrating that baby faces capture attention, the current study used breaking continuous flash suppression (bCFS) to investigate whether infant faces are prioritized for access to awareness. On each trial of the task, a face was shown to one eye and a rapidly changing Mondrian pattern to the other. Participants were asked to report the location of the face as soon as it emerged from suppression. The faces were either infant or adult faces, presented in upright or inverted orientation. Despite evidence suggesting that infant faces might reach awareness more quickly than adult faces, the opposite was found: Adult faces reached awareness more quickly than infant faces. Moreover, a stronger face inversion effect was observed for adult versus infant faces, indicating that the shorter suppression times for adult faces were due to increased expertise with adult faces. A past bCFS study demonstrated an own-age face effect for young adults, but it left open the possibility that this effect was due to the youthful appearance of the young versus old faces. The current results rule out this possibility and provide further support for the idea that experience with faces of one's own social group facilitates the access of those faces to awareness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).