RESUMEN
We review the context of the environment of care in the intensive care unit setting in relation to patient safety and quality, specifically addressing healthcare-associated infection issues and solutions involving interdisciplinary teams. Issues addressed include current and future architectural design and layout trends, construction trends affecting intensive care units, and prevention of construction-associated healthcare-associated infections related to airborne and waterborne risks and design solutions. Specific elements include single-occupancy, acuity-scalable intensive care unit rooms; environmental aspects of hand hygiene, such as water risks, sink design/location, human waste management, surface selection (floor covering, countertops, furniture, and equipment) and cleaning, antimicrobial-treated or similar materials, ultraviolet germicidal irradiation, specialized rooms (airborne infection isolation and protective environments), and water system design and strategies for safe use of potable water and mitigation of water intrusion. Effective design and operational use of the intensive care unit environment of care must engage critical care personnel from initial planning and design through occupancy of the new/renovated intensive care unit as part of the infection control risk assessment team. The interdisciplinary infection control risk assessment team can address key environment of care design features to enhance the safety of intensive care unit patients, personnel, and visitors. This perspective will ensure the environment of care supports human factors and behavioral aspects of the interaction between the environment of care and its occupants.
Asunto(s)
Arquitectura y Construcción de Instituciones de Salud , Control de Infecciones , Unidades de Cuidados Intensivos , Seguridad , Antiinfecciosos/administración & dosificación , Infección Hospitalaria/prevención & control , Predicción , Desinfección de las Manos , Humanos , Aislamiento de Pacientes , Atención Dirigida al Paciente , Habitaciones de Pacientes , Eliminación de Residuos , Diálisis Renal , Propiedades de Superficie , Cuartos de BañoRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: Airborne infection isolation rooms (AIIRs) help prevent the spread of infectious agents in hospitals. The performance of 678 AIIRs was evaluated and compared with construction design guidelines. METHODS: The pressure differentials (DeltaP) between the isolation rooms and adjacent areas were measured, and ventilation and construction details were recorded for each room. Ultrafine particle concentrations were evaluated in the rooms, surrounding areas, and ventilation systems serving the rooms. Measurements were analyzed as a function of room parameters. RESULTS: Only 32% of the isolation rooms achieved the recommended DeltaP of -2.5 Pascals (Pa) relative to surrounding areas. AIIRs with solid ceilings had an average DeltaP of -4.4 Pa, which was significantly higher than the average DeltaP of -2.0 Pa for rooms with dropped ceilings (P = .0002). Isolation room ultrafine particle concentrations were more highly correlated with particle levels in surrounding areas (R(2) = 0.817) than in the ventilation systems serving the rooms (R(2) = 0.441). Almost all ventilation filters serving AIIRs collected fewer particles than anticipated. CONCLUSION: The results indicate that hospitals are not all maintaining AIIRs to correspond with current guidelines. The findings also support the contention that having tightly sealed rooms helps maintain appropriate pressure differentials.
Asunto(s)
Microbiología del Aire/normas , Infección Hospitalaria/prevención & control , Ambiente Controlado , Adhesión a Directriz/normas , Control de Infecciones/métodos , Aislamiento de Pacientes , Arquitectura y Construcción de Instituciones de Salud , Filtración , Humanos , Minnesota , Material Particulado/análisis , Gestión de Riesgos , Encuestas y Cuestionarios , VentilaciónRESUMEN
The prospect of biological attacks is a growing strategic threat. Covert aerosol attacks inside a building are of particular concern. In the summer of 2005, the Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center convened a Working Group to determine what steps could be taken to reduce the risk of exposure of building occupants after an aerosol release of a biological weapon. The Working Group was composed of subject matter experts in air filtration, building ventilation and pressurization, air conditioning and air distribution, biosecurity, building design and operation, building decontamination and restoration, economics, medicine, public health, and public policy. The group focused on functions of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems in commercial or public buildings that could reduce the risk of exposure to deleterious aerosols following biological attacks. The Working Group's recommendations for building owners are based on the use of currently available, off-the-shelf technologies. These recommendations are modest in expense and could be implemented immediately. It is also the Working Group's judgment that the commitment and stewardship of a lead government agency is essential to secure the necessary financial and human resources and to plan and build a comprehensive, effective program to reduce exposure to aerosolized infectious agents in buildings.
Asunto(s)
Microbiología del Aire , Contaminación del Aire Interior/prevención & control , Bioterrorismo/prevención & control , Control de Enfermedades Transmisibles/métodos , Planificación en Desastres , Ambiente Controlado , Gestión de Riesgos/métodos , Comités Consultivos , Aerosoles/toxicidad , Aire Acondicionado/instrumentación , Comercio/normas , Filtración/instrumentación , Calefacción/instrumentación , Humanos , Liderazgo , Pennsylvania , Instalaciones Públicas/normas , Ventilación/instrumentaciónRESUMEN
In spite of great advances in medicine, serious communicable diseases are a significant threat. Hospitals must be prepared to deal with patients who are infected with pathogens introduced by a bioterrorist act (e.g., smallpox), by a global emerging infectious disease (e.g., avian influenza, viral hemorrhagic fevers), or by a laboratory accident. One approach to hazardous infectious diseases in the hospital setting is a biocontainment patient care unit (BPCU). This article represents the consensus recommendations from a conference of civilian and military professionals involved in the various aspects of BPCUs. The role of these units in overall U.S. preparedness efforts is discussed. Technical issues, including medical care issues (e.g., diagnostic services, unit access); infection control issues (e.g., disinfection, personal protective equipment); facility design, structure, and construction features; and psychosocial and ethical issues, are summarized and addressed in detail in an appendix. The consensus recommendations are presented to standardize the planning, design, construction, and operation of BPCUs as one element of the U.S. preparedness effort.