Different pre-scanning instructions induce distinct psychological and resting brain states during functional magnetic resonance imaging.

Resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fMRI) is widely used to investigate functional brain network connectivity during rest or when the subject is not performing an explicit task. In the standard procedure, subjects are instructed to 'let your mind wander' or 'think of nothing'. While these instructions appear appropriate to induce a 'resting-state', they could induce distinct psychological and physiological states during the scan. In this study, we investigated whether different instructions affect mental state and functional connectivity (FC) (i.e. induce distinct 'resting states') during rs-fMRI scanning. Thirty healthy subjects were subjected to two rs-fMRI scans differing only in pre-scan instructions: think of nothing (TN) and mind-wandering (MW) conditions. Self-reports confirmed that subjects spent the majority of the scanning time in the appropriate mental state. Independent component analysis extracted 19 independent components (ICs) of interest and functional network connectivity analyses indicated several conditional differences in FCs among those ICs, especially characterised by stronger FC in the MW condition than in the TN condition, between default mode network and salience/visual/frontal network. Complementary correlation analysis indicated that some of the network FCs were significantly correlated with their self-reported data on how often they had the TN condition during the scans. The present results provide evidence that the pre-scan instruction has a significant influence on resting-state FC and its relationship with mental activities.

Top-down attentional factors modulate action priming in reach-to-grasp action.

Previous studies report that viewing exaggerated, high-lifting reaches (versus direct reaches) primes higher vertical deviation in wrist trajectory in the observer's subsequent reaches (trajectory priming), but it is unclear to what extent this effect depends upon task instructions relevant to top-down attention. In two experiments, participants were instructed to gaze at a dot presented on a large monitor for a colour-change go signal that cued them to execute a direct reach to a target. In the background, the monitor also displayed life-sized films of a human model. The films were of the model either remaining still or reaching to grasp a target with either a direct trajectory or an exaggerated, high-lifting trajectory. When the dot traced the human model's wrist throughout her movement, a robust trajectory priming effect emerged. When the dot remained stationary in a central location but the human model reached in the background, the human model's trajectory did not alter the participants' trajectories. Finally, when the dot traced exaggerated and direct trajectories and the human model remained stationary, the dot's movement produced an attenuated, non-significant trajectory priming effect. These findings show that top-down attentional factors modulate trajectory priming. In addition, a moving non-human stimulus does not produce the same degree of action priming when contextual factors make salient its independence of human agency and/or intention.

Communicated beliefs about action-outcomes: The role of initial confirmation in the adoption and maintenance of unsupported beliefs.

As agents seeking to learn how to successfully navigate their environments, humans can both obtain knowledge through direct experience, and second-hand through communicated beliefs. Questions remain concerning how communicated belief (or instruction) interacts with first-hand evidence integration, and how the former can bias the latter. Previous research has revealed that people are more inclined to seek out confirming evidence when they are motivated to uphold the belief, resulting in confirmation bias. The current research explores whether merely communicated beliefs affect evidence integration over time when it is not of interest to uphold the belief, and all evidence is readily available. In a novel series of on-line experiments, participants chose on each trial which of two options to play for money, being exposed to outcomes of both. Prior to this, they were exposed to favourable communicated beliefs regarding one of two options. Beliefs were either initially supported or undermined by subsequent probabilistic evidence (probabilities reversed halfway through the task, rendering the options equally profitable overall). Results showed that while communicated beliefs predicted initial choices, they only biased subsequent choices when supported by initial evidence in the first phase of the experiment. Findings were replicated across contexts, evidence sequence lengths, and probabilistic distributions. This suggests that merely communicated beliefs can prevail even when not supported by long run evidence, and in the absence of a motivation to uphold them. The implications of the interaction between communicated beliefs and initial evidence for areas including instruction effects, impression formation, and placebo effects are discussed.