Statistical Learning and Inference Is Impaired in the Nonclinical Continuum of Psychosis.

Our perceptions result from the brain's ability to make inferences, or predictive models, of sensory information. Recently, it has been proposed that psychotic traits may be linked to impaired predictive processes. Here, we examine the brain dynamics underlying statistical learning and inference in stable and volatile environments, in a population of healthy human individuals (N = 75; 36 males, 39 females) with a range of psychotic-like experiences. We measured prediction error responses to sound sequences with electroencephalography, gauged sensory inference explicitly by behaviorally recording sensory statistical learning errors, and used dynamic causal modeling to tap into the underlying neural circuitry. We discuss the findings that were robust to replication across the two experiments (Discovery dataset, N = 31; Validation dataset, N = 44). First, we found that during stable conditions, participants demonstrated greater precision in their predictive model, reflected in a larger prediction error response to unexpected sounds, and decreased statistical learning errors. Moreover, individuals with attenuated prediction errors in stable conditions were found to make greater incorrect predictions about sensory information. Critically, we show that greater errors in statistical learning and inference are related to increased psychotic-like experiences. These findings link neurophysiology to behavior during statistical learning and prediction formation, as well as providing further evidence for the idea of a continuum of psychosis in the healthy, nonclinical population.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT While perceiving the world, we make inferences by learning the statistics present in the sensory environment. It has been argued that psychosis may emerge because of a failure to learn sensory statistics, resulting in an impaired representation of the world. Recently, it has been proposed that psychosis exists on a continuum; however, there is conflicting evidence on whether sensory learning deficits align on the nonclinical end of the psychosis continuum. We found that statistical learning of sensory events is associated with the magnitude of mismatch negativity and, critically, is impaired in healthy people who report more psychotic-like experiences. We replicated these findings in an independent sample, demonstrating strengthened credibility to support the continuum of psychosis that extends into the nonclinical population.

Uncertainty Promotes Neuroreductionism: A Behavioral Online Study on Folk Psychological Causal Inference from Neuroimaging Data.

INTRODUCTION: Increased efforts in neuroscience try to understand mental disorders as brain disorders. In the present study, we investigate how common a neuroreductionist inclination is among highly educated people. In particular, we shed light on implicit presuppositions of mental disorders little is known about in the public, exemplified here by the case of body integrity dysphoria (BID) that is considered a mental disorder for the first time in ICD-11. METHODS: Identically graphed, simulated data of mind-brain correlations were shown in 3 contexts with presumably different presumptions about causality. 738 highly educated lay people rated plausibility of causality attribution from the brain to mind and from mind to the brain for correlations between brain structural properties and mental phenomena. We contrasted participants' plausibility ratings of causality in the contexts of commonly perceived brain lesion-induced behavior (aphasia), behavior-induced training effects (piano playing), and a newly described mental disorder (BID). RESULTS: The findings reveal the expected context-dependent modulation of causality attributions in the contexts of aphasia and piano playing. Furthermore, we observed a significant tendency to more readily attribute causal inference from the brain to mind than vice versa with respect to BID. CONCLUSION: In some contexts, exemplified here by aphasia and piano playing, unidirectional causality attributions may be justified. However, with respect to BID, we critically discuss presumably unjustified neuroreductionist inclinations under causal uncertainty. Finally, we emphasize the need for a presupposition-free approach in psychiatry.