Hepatitis C Virus Elimination Programs in Louisiana and Washington: Importance of Screening and Surveillance Systems.

The US government has established a national goal of hepatitis C virus (HCV) elimination by 2030. To date, most HCV elimination planning and activity have been at the state level. Fifteen states presently have publicly available HCV elimination plans. In 2019, Louisiana and Washington were the first states to initiate 5-year funded HCV elimination programs. These states differ on motivation for pursuing HCV elimination and ranking on several indicators. Simultaneously, however, they have emphasized several similar elimination components including HCV screening promotion through public awareness, screening expansion, surveillance enhancement (including electronic reporting and task force development), and harm reduction. The 13 other states with published elimination plans have proposed the majority of the elements identified by Louisiana and Washington, but several have notable gaps. Louisiana's and Washington's comprehensive plans, funding approaches, and programs provide a useful framework that can move states and the nation toward HCV elimination.

Other-Oriented Perfectionism in Children and Adolescents: Development and Validation of the Other-Oriented Perfectionism Subscale-Junior Form (OOPjr).

Research on adults indicates other-oriented perfectionism (requiring perfection from others) is associated with various consequential outcomes independent of self-oriented perfectionism (requiring perfection of the self) and socially prescribed perfectionism (believing others require perfection of the self). However, historically, the most widely used and researched measure of trait perfectionism in children, the Child-Adolescent Perfectionism Scale (CAPS), has omitted other-oriented perfectionism. In the present study, we address this by reporting on the multisource development and validation of the first self-report measure of other-oriented perfectionism specifically intended for youths: the Other-Oriented Perfectionism Subscale-Junior Form (OOPjr). Children (N = 107; Mage = 11.5, SD = 1.7) completed the OOPjr, CAPS, and measures of perfectionistic self-presentation, narcissism, social disconnection, depressive symptoms, and parental psychological control. Parents provided ratings of children's self-oriented, socially prescribed, and other-oriented perfectionism. Psychometric analyses indicated the OOPjr is a homogenous and internally reliable scale that, when factor analyzed alongside the CAPS, displays measurement invariance across gender and replicates the three-factor solution found in adults. Furthermore, parent ratings of other-oriented perfectionism showed unique positive relationships with OOPjr scores, but not CAPS scores. Likewise, other-oriented perfectionism had independent positive relationships with narcissistic superiority and achievement-oriented parental psychological control, after controlling for self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism. Overall, our findings provide preliminary support for the use of the OOPjr as a measure of other-oriented perfectionism in youths.

Only Familiar Information is a "Curse": Children's Ability to Predict What Their Peers Know.

The ability to make inferences about what one's peers know is critical for social interaction and communication. Three experiments (n = 309) examined the curse of knowledge, the tendency to be biased by one's knowledge when reasoning about others' knowledge, in children's estimates of their peers' knowledge. Four- to 7-year-olds were taught the answers to factual questions and estimated how many peers would know the answers. When children learned familiar answers, they showed a curse of knowledge in their peer estimates. But, when children learned unfamiliar answers to the same questions, they did not show a curse of knowledge. These data shed light on the mechanisms underlying perspective taking, supporting a fluency misattribution account of the curse of knowledge.

Value-Based Payment: What Does It Mean for Nurses?

Among the many lessons that have been reinforced by the SARS-COVID-19 pandemic is the failure of our current fee-for-service health care system to either adequately respond to patient needs or offer financial sustainability. This has enhanced bipartisan interest in moving forward with value-based payment reforms. Nurses have a rich history of innovative care models that speak to their potential centrality in delivery system reforms. However, deficits in terms of educational preparation, and in some cases resistance, to considering cost alongside quality, has hindered the profession's contribution to the conversation about value-based payments and their implications for system change. Addressing this deficit will allow nurses to more fully engage in redesigning health care to better serve the physical, emotional, and economic well-being of this nation. It also has the potential to unleash nurses from the tethers of a fee-for-service system where they have been relegated to a labor cost and firmly locate nurses in a value-generating role. Nurse administrators and educators bear the responsibility for preparing nurses for this next chapter of nursing.

Infants use relative numerical group size to infer social dominance.

Detecting dominance relationships, within and across species, provides a clear fitness advantage because this ability helps individuals assess their potential risk of injury before engaging in a competition. Previous research has demonstrated that 10- to 13-mo-old infants can represent the dominance relationship between two agents in terms of their physical size (larger agent = more dominant), whereas younger infants fail to do so. It is unclear whether infants younger than 10 mo fail to represent dominance relationships in general, or whether they lack sensitivity to physical size as a cue to dominance. Two studies explored whether infants, like many species across the animal kingdom, use numerical group size to assess dominance relationships and whether this capacity emerges before their sensitivity to physical size. A third study ruled out an alternative explanation for our findings. Across these studies, we report that infants 6-12 mo of age use numerical group size to infer dominance relationships. Specifically, preverbal infants expect an agent from a numerically larger group to win in a right-of-way competition against an agent from a numerically smaller group. In addition, this is, to our knowledge, the first study to demonstrate that infants 6-9 mo of age are capable of understanding social dominance relations. These results demonstrate that infants' understanding of social dominance relations may be based on evolutionarily relevant cues and reveal infants' early sensitivity to an important adaptive function of social groups.

Unselective Overimitators: The Evolutionary Implications of Children's Indiscriminate Copying of Successful and Prestigious Models.

Children are both shrewd about whom to copy-they selectively learn from certain adults-and overimitators-they copy adults' obviously superfluous actions. Is overimitation also selective? Does selectivity change with age? In two experiments, 161 two- to seven-year-old children saw videos of one adult receiving better payoffs or more bystander attention than another. Children then watched the adults perform unnecessary actions on novel transparent devices. Children preferred the adult who received greater payoffs or bystander attention when asked questions like "Who do you think is smarter?" but overimitated both adults' unnecessary actions equally. Although older children overimitated more, unselectivity was consistent across ages. This pattern hints at a plausible adaptive function of overimitation: acquiring rarely demonstrated behaviors by practising them immediately.

Infants infer third-party social dominance relationships based on visual access to intergroup conflict.

During a conflict, having a greater number of allies than the opposition can improve one's success in a conflict. However, allies must be aware that has a conflict has occurred, and this is often influenced by what they are able to see. Here, we explored whether infants' assessment of social dominance is influenced by whether or not social allies have visual access to an episode of intergroup conflict. In Experiment 1, 9-12-month-olds only expected an agent to be socially dominant if their allies were able to witness the conflict. Experiment 2 provided further support for this finding, as infants did not expect an agent from a numerically larger group to be socially dominant when allies were unable to witness the conflict. Together, these results suggest that infants do not simply use a heuristic in which "numerically larger groups are always more dominant". Importantly, infants are able to incorporate social allies' ability to witness a conflict when predicting social dominance between groups.

Epistemic states and traits: preschoolers appreciate the differential informativeness of situation-specific and person-specific cues to knowledge.

Previous research has demonstrated that preschoolers can use situation-specific (e.g., visual access) and person-specific (e.g., prior accuracy) cues to infer what others know. The present studies investigated whether 4- and 5-year-olds appreciate the differential informativeness of these types of cues. In Experiment 1 (N = 50), children used others' prior labeling accuracy as a cue when learning labels for, but not the visual identity of, hidden objects. In Experiment 2 (N = 64), with both cues present, children attended more to visual access than prior accuracy when learning the visual identity of, but not labels for, hidden objects. These findings demonstrate that children appreciate the difference between situation- and person-specific cues and flexibly evaluate these cues depending on what information they are seeking.

Machiavellian strategist or cultural learner? Mentalizing and learning over development in a resource-sharing game.

Theorists have sought to identify the key selection pressures that drove the evolution of our species' cognitive abilities, life histories and cooperative inclinations. Focusing on two leading theories, each capable of accounting for many of the rapid changes in our lineage, we present a simple experiment designed to assess the explanatory power of both the Machiavellian Intelligence and the Cultural Brain/Intelligence Hypotheses. Children (aged 3-7 years) observed a novel social interaction that provided them with behavioural information that could either be used to outmanoeuvre a partner in subsequent interactions or for cultural learning. The results show that, even after four rounds of repeated interaction and sometimes lower pay-offs, children continued to rely on copying the observed behaviour instead of harnessing the available social information to strategically extract pay-offs (stickers) from their partners. Analyses further reveal that superior mentalizing abilities are associated with more targeted cultural learning - the selective copying of fewer irrelevant actions - while superior generalized cognitive abilities are associated with greater imitation of irrelevant actions. Neither mentalizing capacities nor more general measures of cognition explain children's ability to strategically use social information to maximize pay-offs. These results provide developmental evidence favouring the Cultural Brain/Intelligence Hypothesis over the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis.

Are the classic false belief tasks cursed? Young children are just as likely as older children to pass a false belief task when they are not required to overcome the curse of knowledge.

The question of when children understand that others have minds that can represent or misrepresent reality (i.e., possess a 'Theory of Mind') is hotly debated. This understanding plays a fundamental role in social interaction (e.g., interpreting human behavior, communicating, empathizing). Most research on this topic has relied on false belief tasks such as the 'Sally-Anne Task', because researchers have argued that it is the strongest litmus test examining one's understanding that the mind can misrepresent reality. Unfortunately, in addition to a variety of other cognitive demands this widely used measure also unnecessarily involves overcoming a bias that is especially pronounced in young children-the 'curse of knowledge' (the tendency to be biased by one's knowledge when considering less-informed perspectives). Three- to 6-year-old's (n = 230) false belief reasoning was examined across tasks that either did, or did not, require overcoming the curse of knowledge, revealing that when the curse of knowledge was removed three-year-olds were significantly better at inferring false beliefs, and as accurate as five- and six-year-olds. These findings reveal that the classic task is not specifically measuring false belief understanding. Instead, previously observed developmental changes in children's performance could be attributed to the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge. Similarly, previously observed relationships between individual differences in false belief reasoning and a variety of social outcomes could instead be the result of individual differences in the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge, highlighting the need to re-evaluate how best to interpret large bodies of research on false belief reasoning and social-emotional functioning.

The power of allies: Infants' expectations of social obligations during intergroup conflict.

Many species of animals form social allegiances to enhance survival. Across disciplines, researchers have suggested that allegiances form to facilitate within group cooperation and defend each other against rival groups. Here, we explore humans' reasoning about social allegiances and obligations beginning in infancy, long before they have experience with intergroup conflict. In Experiments 1 and 2, we demonstrate that infants (17-19 months, and 9-13 months, respectively) expect a social ally to intervene and provide aid during an episode of intergroup conflict. Experiment 3 conceptually replicated the results of Experiments 1 and 2. Together, this set of experiments reveals that humans' understanding of social obligation and loyalty may be innate, and supported by infants' naïve sociology.

'I bet you know more and are nicer too!': what children infer from others' accuracy.

Research has shown that preschoolers monitor others' prior accuracy and prefer to learn from individuals who have the best track record. We investigated the scope of preschoolers' attributions based on an individual's prior accuracy. Experiment 1 revealed that 5-year-olds (but not 4-year-olds) used an individual's prior accuracy at labelling to predict her knowledge of words and broader facts; they also showed a 'halo effect' predicting she would be more prosocial. Experiment 2 confirmed that, overall, 4-year-olds did not make explicit generalizations of knowledge. These findings suggest that an individual's prior accuracy influences older preschoolers' expectations of that individual's broader knowledge as well as their impressions of how she will behave in social interactions.

Two-year-olds are vigilant of others' non-verbal cues to credibility.

Data from three experiments provide the first evidence that children, at least as young as age two, are vigilant of others' non-verbal cues to credibility, and flexibly use these cues to facilitate learning. Experiment 1 revealed that 2- and 3-year-olds prefer to learn about objects from someone who appears, through non-verbal cues, to be confident in performing actions on those objects than from someone who appears uncertain when performing actions on those objects. Experiment 2 revealed that when 2-year-olds observe only one model perform a single action, either confidently or unconfidently, they do not use the model's level of confidence in this single instance to influence their learning. Experiment 3 revealed that 2-year-olds will use a single model's level of confidence to guide their learning if they have observed that the model has a history of being either consistently confident or consistently uncertain. These findings reveal that young children selectively alter their learning based on others' non-verbal cues of credibility, and underscore the importance of an early sensitivity to socio-cognitive cues for human learning and development.

Children's understanding of when a person's confidence and hesitancy is a cue to their credibility.

The most readily-observable and influential cue to one's credibility is their confidence. Although one's confidence correlates with knowledge, one should not always trust confident sources or disregard hesitant ones. Three experiments (N = 662; 3- to 12-year-olds) examined the developmental trajectory of children's understanding of 'calibration': whether a person's confidence or hesitancy correlates with their knowledge. Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that children use a person's history of calibration to guide their learning. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed a developmental progression in calibration understanding: Children preferred a well-calibrated over a miscalibrated confident person by around 4 years, whereas even 7- to 8-year-olds were insensitive to calibration in hesitant people. The widespread implications for social learning, impression formation, and social cognition are discussed.

Three- and four-year-olds spontaneously use others' past performance to guide their learning.

A wealth of human knowledge is acquired by attending to information provided by other people--but some people are more credible sources than others. In two experiments, we explored whether young children spontaneously keep track of an individual's history of being accurate or inaccurate and use this information to facilitate subsequent learning. We found that 3- and 4-year-olds favor a previously accurate individual when learning new words and learning new object functions and applied the principle of mutual exclusivity to the newly learned words but not the newly learned functions. These findings expand upon previous research in a number of ways, most importantly by showing that (a) children spontaneously keep track of an individual's history and use it to guide subsequent learning without any prompting, and (b) children's sensitivity to others' prior accuracy is not specific to the domain of language.

A 'curse of knowledge' in the absence of knowledge? People misattribute fluency when judging how common knowledge is among their peers.

Knowledge can be a curse: Once we have acquired a particular item of knowledge it tends to bias, or contaminate, our ability to reason about a less informed perspective (referred to as the 'curse of knowledge' or 'hindsight bias'). The mechanisms underlying the curse of knowledge bias are a matter of great import and debate. We highlight two mechanisms that have been proposed to underlie this bias-inhibition and fluency misattribution. Explanations that involve inhibition argue that people have difficulty fully inhibiting or suppressing the content of their knowledge when trying to reason about a less informed perspective. Explanations that involve fluency misattribution focus on the feelings of fluency with which the information comes to mind and the tendency to misattribute the subjective feelings of fluency associated with familiar items to the objective ease or foreseeability of that information. Three experiments with a total of 359 undergraduate students provide the first evidence that fluency misattribution processes are sufficient to induce the curse of knowledge bias. These results add to the literature on the many manifestations of the curse of knowledge bias and the many types of source misattributions, by revealing their role in people's judgements of how common, or widespread, one's knowledge is. The implications of these results for cognitive science and social cognition are discussed.

Outcome Knowledge and False Belief.

Virtually every social interaction involves reasoning about the perspectives of others, or 'theory of mind (ToM).' Previous research suggests that it is difficult to ignore our current knowledge when reasoning about a more naïve perspective (i.e., the curse of knowledge). In this Mini Review, we discuss the implications of the curse of knowledge for certain aspects of ToM. Particularly, we examine how the curse of knowledge influences key measurements of false belief reasoning. In closing, we touch on the need to develop new measurement tools to discern the mechanisms involved in the curse of knowledge and false belief reasoning, and how they develop across the lifespan.

Children Can Learn New Facts Equally Well From Interactive Media Versus Face to Face Instruction.

Today's children have more opportunities than ever before to learn from interactive technology, yet experimental research assessing the efficacy of children's learning from interactive media in comparison to traditional learning approaches is still quite scarce. Moreover, little work has examined the efficacy of using touch-screen devices for research purposes. The current study compared children's rate of learning factual information about animals during a face-to-face instruction from an adult female researcher versus an analogous instruction from an interactive device. Eighty-six children ages 4 through 8 years (64% male) completed the learning task in either the Face-to-Face condition (n = 43) or the Interactive Media condition (n = 43). In the Learning Phase of the experiment, which was presented as a game, children were taught novel facts about animals without being told that their memory of the facts would be tested. The facts were taught to the children either by an adult female researcher (Face-to-Face condition) or from a pre-recorded female voice represented by a cartoon Llama (Interactive Media condition). In the Testing Phase of the experiment that immediately followed, children's memory for the taught facts was tested using a 4-option forced-choice paradigm. Children's rate of learning was significantly above chance in both conditions and a comparison of the rates of learning across the two conditions revealed no significant differences. Learning significantly improved from age 4 to age 8, however, even the preschool-aged children performed significantly above chance, and their performance did not differ between conditions. These results suggest that, interactive media can be equally as effective as one-on-one instruction, at least under certain conditions. Moreover, these results offer support for the validity of using interactive technology to collect data for research purposes. We discuss the implications of these results for children's learning from interactive media, parental attitudes about interactive technology, and research methods.

Understanding children's and adults' limitations in mental state reasoning.

Young children exhibit several deficits in reasoning about their own and other people's mental states. We propose that these deficits, along with more subtle limitations in adults' social-cognitive reasoning, are all manifestations of the same cognitive bias. This is the 'curse of knowledge' - a tendency to be biased by one's own knowledge when attempting to appreciate a more naïve or uninformed perspective. We suggest the developmental differences in mental state reasoning exist because the strength of this bias diminishes with age, not because of a conceptual change in how young children understand mental states. By pointing out the common denominator in children's and adults' limitations in mental state reasoning we hope to provide a unified framework for understanding the nature and development of social cognition.