Impact of cardiac intraoperative precursor events on adverse outcomes.

BACKGROUND: Although extensive study has been directed at the influence of patient factors and comorbidities on cardiac surgical outcomes, less attention has been focused on process. We sought to examine the relationship between intraoperative precursor events (those events that precede and are requisite for the occurrence of an adverse event) and adverse outcomes themselves. METHODS: Anonymous, prospectively collected intraoperative data was merged with database outcomes for 450 patients undergoing major adult cardiac operations. Precursor events were categorized by type, person most affected, severity, and compensation. Number and categories of precursor events were analyzed as predictors of a composite outcome combining death or near miss complications (DNM), using logistic regression. RESULTS: Precursor events occurred more frequently in cases with a DNM outcome than in those with no adverse event (2.7 +/- 2.4 vs 2.0 +/- 2.3/procedure, P = .005). After adjustment for other patient characteristics, the number of precursor events remained an independent predictor of DNM (RR, 1.14 per event [1.04 to 1.24]). Of 990 events, 35.6% related to management, 28.8% were technical, and 22.8% were environment-related. The surgeon was most affected in 40.8%, and 16.5% were of major severity. When categories of precursor events were analyzed, major severity events and those most affecting the surgeon were independent predictors of DNM. CONCLUSIONS: More detailed study of process in complex operations may lead to improved quality of care and patient safety. Special attention must be paid particularly to high risk patients and high risk precursor events.

Prospective assessment of intraoperative precursor events during cardiac surgery.

OBJECTIVE: Increasing attention has been afforded to the ubiquity of medical error and associated adverse events in medicine. There remains little data on the frequency and nature of precursor events in cardiac surgery, and we sought to characterize this. METHODS: Detailed, anonymous information regarding intraoperative precursor events (which may result in adverse events) was collected prospectively from six key members of the operating team during 464 major adult cardiac surgical cases at three hospitals and were analyzed with univariable statistical methods. RESULTS: During 464 cardiac surgical procedures, 1627 reports of problematic precursor events were collected for an average of 3.5 and maximum of 26 per procedure. 73.3% of cases had at least one recorded event. One-third (33.3%) of events occurred prior to the first incision, and 31.2% of events occurred while on bypass. While 68.0% of events were regarded as minor in severity (e.g., delays and missing equipment), a substantial proportion (32.0%) was considered major and included anastomotic problems, pump failure, and drug errors. Most problems (90.4%) were reported as being compensated for, although many (30.9%) were never discussed among the team. Major events were more likely to be discussed (p<0.0001) and less likely to have been previously encountered (p=0.0005). Perceptions of the severity and compensation of events varied across the team, as did temporal patterns of reporting (p<0.0001). CONCLUSIONS: A wide range of problematic precursor events occurs during the majority of cardiac surgery procedures. Attention to causes and ways of preventing these precursor events could have an impact on the rate of significant errors and improve the safety of cardiac surgery.

Facing ambiguous threats.

On February 1, 2003, the world watched in horror as the Columbia space shuttle broke apart while reentering the earth's atmosphere, killing all seven astronauts. Some have argued that NASA's failure to respond with appropriate intensity to the so-called foam strike that led to the accident was evidence of irresponsible or incompetent management. The authors' research, however, suggests that NASA was exhibiting a natural, albeit unfortunate, pattern of behavior common in many organizations. The foam strike is a prime example of what the authors call an ambiguous threat-a signal that may or may not portend future harm. Ambiguous threats differ from threats with obvious causes-say, a fire in the building-for which the response is clear. They also differ from unmistakable threats that may lack straightforward response paths (such as the frightening oxygen-tank explosion aboard Apollo 13). However, when the warning sign is ambiguous and the threat's potential effect is unclear, managers may choose to ignore or discount the risk. Such an approach can be catastrophic. Firms that do a good job of dealing with ambiguous threats do not improvise during a crisis; rather, they apply a rigorous set of detection and response capabilities that they have developed and practiced beforehand. In this article, the authors outline how to put such capabilities in place long before a crisis strikes. First, companies need to hone their teamwork and rapid problem-solving skills through practice. Second, they must learn to recognize weak signals, amplify the threat, and encourage employees to ask disconcerting "what if" questions in a safe environment. Finally, they should explore possible responses to threats through quick, low-cost experimentation.

National assessment of business-of-medicine training and its implications for the development of a business-of-medicine curriculum.

OBJECTIVES/HYPOTHESIS: The objectives were, first, to determine the current state of business training in otolaryngology residency programs in the United States and, second, to lay the groundwork for development of a business-of-medicine (BOM) curriculum. STUDY DESIGN: Cross-sectional survey. METHODS: A survey concerning methodology and topics for management training of residents was mailed to the chairpersons or program directors of the 102 otolaryngology residency programs. A similar survey was sent to 576 otolaryngology graduates (classes of 2000, 2001, and 2002). An interactive BOM curriculum on CD-ROM was developed based on the results. RESULTS: The response rate among program directors was 74.5% (76 of 102), and among the otolaryngology graduates, 38.2% (220 of 575). Seventy-five percent of graduates rated their BOM training as poor or fair. Only 8% rated their BOM training as excellent. Twenty percent of the graduates responded to having a BOM course during residency. Recent graduates reported that a BOM course can best be taught through lectures and apprenticeship/mentoring, whereas program directors reported that a BOM course can best be taught through lectures and outside consultants. Graduates reported that coding compliance was the topic most neglected in residency, whereas program directors reported that coding compliance was the main topic covered in the business training. Both groups agreed that department attending physicians have the most impact on a resident's business training. Program directors reported that correct coding, planning one's entry into medical practice, risk management, and reimbursement issues are the most important topics for residents to learn, whereas recent graduates stated that the most important topics should be correct coding, office management, risk management, and reimbursement. CONCLUSION: The present study reflects a perceived necessity for improvement of BOM training in otolaryngology residency programs. Based on this finding, the outcome measures from the survey, and the authors' own experience from business courses given in the first author's department, a BOM curriculum was developed that is general enough to target all otolaryngology residents and intended to provide business skills which result in improved use of resources and, ultimately, higher quality of care.

The effect of decreasing length of stay on discharge destination and readmission after coronary bypass operation.

BACKGROUND: Over the decade of the 1990s, hospital stay after operation declined in response to prospective payment and managed care. As a result, complications previously detected and treated in the hospital may have begun to occur after discharge. In addition, discharge to nursing homes and rehabilitation hospitals may have increased. To address these questions, we used a statewide database to look at the use of postacute care and the 30-day readmission and mortality after coronary bypass operation. METHODS: A modification of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy discharge data to include a unique patient identifier allowed us to retrospectively track patient destination at discharge and study 30-day readmission to all hospitals in the state. RESULTS: Over the 3-year period after the institution of the unique patient identifier (1993 to 1996), postoperative length of stay after coronary bypass operation decreased from 7.4 to 6 days (19%, P <.0005), but the 30-day readmission rate (17.7%) did not increase. Discharge to rehabilitation hospitals and skilled nursing facilities rose significantly (11.7% to 23.8%), especially in the Medicare population (17.2% to 38.5%). Mortality in the 30 days after discharge remained constant at 0.3%. CONCLUSIONS: A shorter postoperative length of stay did not appear to disadvantage coronary artery bypass patients by increasing their likelihood of readmission or death. Cost savings from reduced length of stay were offset by increased use of postacute services.

Hospital disclosure practices: results of a national survey.

New patient safety standards from JCAHO that require hospitals to disclose to patients all unexpected outcomes of care took effect 1 July 2001. In an early 2002 survey of risk managers at a nationally representative sample of hospitals, the vast majority reported that their hospital's practice was to disclose harm at least some of the time, although only one-third of hospitals actually had board-approved policies in place. More than half of respondents reported that they would always disclose a death or serious injury, but when presented with actual clinical scenarios, respondents were much less likely to disclose preventable harms than to disclose nonpreventable harms of comparable severity. Reluctance to disclose preventable harms was twice as likely to occur at hospitals having major concerns about the malpractice implications of disclosure.

Lessons from England's health care workforce redesign: no quick fixes.

In 2000 the English National Health Service (NHS) began a series of workforce redesign initiatives that increased the number of doctors and nurses serving patients, expanded existing staff roles and developed new ones, redistributed health care work, and invested in teamwork. The English workforce redesign experience offers important lessons for US policy makers. Redesigning the health care workforce is not a quick fix to control costs or improve the quality of care. A poorly planned redesign can even result in increased costs and decreased quality. Changes in skill mix and role definitions should be preceded by a detailed analysis and redesign of the work performed by health care professionals. New roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined in advance, and teamwork models that include factors common in successful redesigns such as leadership, shared objectives, and training should be promoted. The focus should be on retraining current staff instead of hiring new workers. Finally, any workforce redesign must overcome opposition from professional bodies, individual practitioners, and regulators. England's experience suggests that progress is possible if workforce redesigns are planned carefully and implemented with skill.

Managing the new primary care: the new skills that will be needed.

Developing new models of primary care will demand a level of managerial expertise that few of today's primary care physicians possess. Yet medical schools continue to focus on the basic sciences, to the exclusion of such managerial topics as running effective teams. The approach to executing reform appears to assume that practice managers and entrepreneurs can undertake the managerial work of transforming primary care, while physicians stick with practicing medicine. This essay argues that physicians currently in practice could be equipped over time with the management skills necessary to develop and implement new models of primary care.

Restructuring within an academic health center to support quality and safety: the development of the Center for Quality and Safety at the Massachusetts General Hospital.

Recent focus on the need to improve the quality and safety of health care has created new challenges for academic health centers (AHCs). Whereas previously quality was largely assumed, today it is increasingly quantifiable and requires organized systems for improvement. Traditional structures and cultures within AHCs, although well suited to the tripartite missions of teaching, research, and clinical care, are not easily adaptable to the tasks of measuring, reporting, and improving quality. Here, the authors use a case study of Massachusetts General Hospital's efforts to restructure quality and safety to illustrate the value of beginning with a focus on organizational culture, using a systematic process of engaging clinical leadership, developing an organizational framework dependent on proven business principles, leveraging focus events, and maintaining executive dedication to execution of the initiative. The case provides a generalizable example for AHCs of how applying explicit management design can foster robust organizational change with relatively modest incremental financial resources.

Learning in a new cardiac surgical center: an analysis of precursor events.

BACKGROUND: Few studies of learning in the health care sector have analyzed measures of process, as opposed to outcomes. We assessed the learning curve for a new cardiac surgical center using precursor events (incidents or circumstances required for the occurrence of adverse outcomes). METHODS: Intraoperative precursor events were recorded prospectively during major adult cardiac operations, categorized by blinded adjudicators, and counted for each case (overall and according to these categories). Trends in the number of precursor events were analyzed by hospital and by defining 10 equal-sized groups across time, as were trends in outcomes obtained from institutional databases. Results from the first 101 cases performed at a new cardiac surgical site (hospital A) were compared with 2 established centers. RESULTS: A steep reduction in the total number of precursor events over time was observed in the early experience of hospital A (9.2 +/- 4.9 to 2.0 +/- 1.2 events per case, from first to last decile of time, P(trend) < .0001) compared with qualitatively stable levels in the other hospitals; this reduction was driven largely by decreases in the minor severity (P(trend) < .0001), compensated (P(trend) < .0001), and environment (P(trend) < .0001) categories of precursor events. No detectable changes over time were observed in postoperative mortality and complications. No significant improvement was observed in patient comorbid conditions or medical status over time to explain the trend in hospital A. CONCLUSION: Analyzing and targeting specific kinds of process-related failures (precursor events) may provide a novel and sensitive means of tracking, deconstructing, and optimizing organizational learning in medicine.

Care platforms: a basic building block for care delivery.

Without significant operational reform within the nation's health care delivery organizations, new financing models, payment systems, or structures are unlikely to realize their promise. Adapting insights from high-performing companies in other high-risk, high-cost, science- and technology-based industries, we propose the "care platform" as an organizing framework for internal operations in diversified provider organizations to increase the quality, reliability, and efficiency of care delivery. A care platform organizes "care production" around similar work, rather than organs or specialties; integrates standard and custom care processes; and surrounds them with specifically configured information and business systems. Such organizational designs imply new roles for physicians.

Medicine's service challenge: blending custom and standard care.

Health care, once resolutely customized, is now a process comprising an uncomfortable mix of custom and standard elements. Although the operations management literature often advocates the separation of custom and standard processes, health care managers must usually provide both simultaneously, attempting to combine the two types of service process within a single organization dynamically. If this is not done effectively, quality of care can suffer. Using examples drawn from health care delivery, this paper introduces three operational strategies for effectively combining custom and standard clinical processes. The choice of operating strategy depends on the nature of the patient's needs and the state of medical knowledge.