"You need to be super smart to do well in math!" Young children's field-specific ability beliefs.

Success in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields is often believed to require intellectual talent ("brilliance"). Given that many cultures associate men more than women with brilliance, this belief poses an obstacle to women's STEM pursuits. Here, we investigated the developmental roots of this phenomenon, focusing specifically on young children's beliefs about math (N = 174 U.S. students in Grades 1-4; 93 girls, 81 boys; 52% White, 17% Asian, 13% Hispanic/Latinx). We found that field-specific ability beliefs (FABs) that associate success in math (vs. reading/writing) with brilliance are already present in early elementary school. We also found that brilliance-oriented FABs about math are negatively associated with elementary school students' (and particularly girls') math motivation-specifically, their math self-efficacy and interest. The early emergence of brilliance-oriented FABs about math and the negative relation between FABs and math motivation underscore the need to understand the sources and long-term effects of these beliefs. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Field-specific ability beliefs (FABs) are beliefs about the extent to which intellectual talent (or "brilliance") is required for success in a particular field or context. Among adults, brilliance-oriented FABs are an obstacle to diversity in science and technology, but the childhood antecedents of these beliefs are not well understood. The present study (N = 174) found that FABs that associate success in math (vs. reading/writing) with brilliance were already present in Grades 1-4. Brilliance-oriented FABs about math were negatively associated with elementary school students' (and particularly girls') math motivation-specifically, their math self-efficacy and interest.

What makes a role model motivating for young girls? The effects of the role model's growth versus fixed mindsets about ability and interest.

Successful women role models can be-but are not always-effective in increasing pursuit of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) careers among girls. What makes a woman role model motivating for young girls? An experimental study (N = 205 girls aged 5-8 years; 42.0% girls of color) investigated the effects of a role model's messages about her own ability and interest. The model portrayed her ability and interest as quantities that developed over time (a growth mindset) or that had always been present (a fixed mindset). The role model's growth (vs. fixed) mindset messages about ability-but not interest-increased girls' interest and self-efficacy in the scientist's field, but these effects were observed only among girls of color (ds = 0.56 and 0.65 for interest and self-efficacy, respectively). The findings contribute to theory on role models and growth mindsets, and they also have implications for the design of effective role model interventions.

Mindset × Context: Schools, Classrooms, and the Unequal Translation of Expectations into Math Achievement.

When do adolescents' dreams of promising journeys through high school translate into academic success? This monograph reports the results of a collaborative effort among sociologists and psychologists to systematically examine the role of schools and classrooms in disrupting or facilitating the link between adolescents' expectations for success in math and their subsequent progress in the early high school math curriculum. Our primary focus was on gendered patterns of socioeconomic inequality in math and how they are tethered to the school's peer culture and to students' perceptions of gender stereotyping in the classroom. To do this, this monograph advances Mindset × Context Theory. This orients research on educational equity to the reciprocal influence between students' psychological motivations and their school-based opportunities to enact those motivations. Mindset × Context Theory predicts that a student's mindset will be more strongly linked to developmental outcomes among groups of students who are at risk for poor outcomes, but only in a school or classroom context where there is sufficient need and support for the mindset. Our application of this theory centers on expectations for success in high school math as a foundational belief for students' math progress early in high school. We examine how this mindset varies across interpersonal and cultural dynamics in schools and classrooms. Following this perspective, we ask: 1. Which gender and socioeconomic identity groups showed the weakest or strongest links between expectations for success in math and progress through the math curriculum? 2. How did the school's peer culture shape the links between student expectations for success in math and math progress across gender and socioeconomic identity groups? 3. How did perceptions of classroom gender stereotyping shape the links between student expectations for success in math and math progress across gender and socioeconomic identity groups? We used nationally representative data from about 10,000 U.S. public school 9th graders in the National Study of Learning Mindsets (NSLM) collected in 2015-2016-the most recent, national, longitudinal study of adolescents' mindsets in U.S. public schools. The sample was representative with respect to a large number of observable characteristics, such as gender, race, ethnicity, English Language Learners (ELLs), free or reduced price lunch, poverty, food stamps, neighborhood income and labor market participation, and school curricular opportunities. This allowed for generalization to the U.S. public school population and for the systematic investigation of school- and classroom-level contextual factors. The NSLM's complete sampling of students within schools also allowed for a comparison of students from different gender and socioeconomic groups with the same expectations in the same educational contexts. To analyze these data, we used the Bayesian Causal Forest (BCF) algorithm, a best-in-class machine-learning method for discovering complex, replicable interaction effects. Chapter IV examined the interplay of expectations, gender, and socioeconomic status (SES; operationalized with maternal educational attainment). Adolescents' expectations for success in math were meaningful predictors of their early math progress, even when controlling for other psychological factors, prior achievement in math, and racial and ethnic identities. Boys from low-SES families were the most vulnerable identity group. They were over three times more likely to not make adequate progress in math from 9th to 10th grade relative to girls from high-SES families. Boys from low-SES families also benefited the most from their expectations for success in math. Overall, these results were consistent with Mindset × Context Theory's predictions. Chapters V and VI examined the moderating role of school-level and classroom-level factors in the patterns reported in Chapter IV. Expectations were least predictive of math progress in the highest-achieving schools and schools with the most academically oriented peer norms, that is, schools with the most formal and informal resources. School resources appeared to compensate for lower levels of expectations. Conversely, expectations most strongly predicted math progress in the low/medium-achieving schools with less academically oriented peers, especially for boys from low-SES families. This chapter aligns with aspects of Mindset × Context Theory. A context that was not already optimally supporting student success was where outcomes for vulnerable students depended the most on student expectations. Finally, perceptions of classroom stereotyping mattered. Perceptions of gender stereotyping predicted less progress in math, but expectations for success in math more strongly predicted progress in classrooms with high perceived stereotyping. Gender stereotyping interactions emerged for all sociodemographic groups except for boys from high-SES families. The findings across these three analytical chapters demonstrate the value of integrating psychological and sociological perspectives to capture multiple levels of schooling. It also drew on the contextual variability afforded by representative sampling and explored the interplay of lab-tested psychological processes (expectations) with field-developed levers of policy intervention (school contexts). This monograph also leverages developmental and ecological insights to identify which groups of students might profit from different efforts to improve educational equity, such as interventions to increase expectations for success in math, or school programs that improve the school or classroom cultures.

An Emphasis on Brilliance Fosters Masculinity-Contest Cultures.

Women are underrepresented in fields in which success is believed to require brilliance, but the reasons for this pattern are poorly understood. We investigated perceptions of a "masculinity-contest culture," an organizational environment of ruthless competition, as a key mechanism whereby a perceived emphasis on brilliance discourages female participation. Across three preregistered correlational and experimental studies involving adult lay participants online (N = 870) and academics from more than 30 disciplines (N = 1,347), we found a positive association between the perception that a field or an organization values brilliance and the perception that this field or organization is characterized by a masculinity-contest culture. This association was particularly strong among women. In turn, perceiving a masculinity-contest culture predicted lower interest and sense of belonging as well as stronger impostor feelings. Experimentally reducing the perception of a masculinity-contest culture eliminated gender gaps in interest and belonging in a brilliance-oriented organization, suggesting possible avenues for intervention.

Growth-Mindset Intervention Delivered by Teachers Boosts Achievement in Early Adolescence.

School underachievement is a persistent problem in the United States. Direct-to-student, computer-delivered growth-mindset interventions have shown promise as a way to improve achievement for students at risk of failing in school; however, these interventions benefit only students who happen to be in classrooms that support growth-mindset beliefs. Here, we tested a teacher-delivered growth-mindset intervention for U.S. adolescents in Grades 6 and 7 that was designed to both impart growth-mindset beliefs and create a supportive classroom environment where those beliefs could flourish (N = 1,996 students, N = 50 teachers). The intervention improved the grades of struggling students in the target class by 0.27 standard deviations, or 2.81 grade percentage points. The effects were largest for students whose teachers endorsed fixed mindsets before the intervention. This large-scale, randomized controlled trial demonstrates that growth-mindset interventions can produce gains when delivered by teachers.

Teacher Mindsets Help Explain Where a Growth-Mindset Intervention Does and Doesn't Work.

A growth-mindset intervention teaches the belief that intellectual abilities can be developed. Where does the intervention work best? Prior research examined school-level moderators using data from the National Study of Learning Mindsets (NSLM), which delivered a short growth-mindset intervention during the first year of high school. In the present research, we used data from the NSLM to examine moderation by teachers' mindsets and answer a new question: Can students independently implement their growth mindsets in virtually any classroom culture, or must students' growth mindsets be supported by their teacher's own growth mindsets (i.e., the mindset-plus-supportive-context hypothesis)? The present analysis (9,167 student records matched with 223 math teachers) supported the latter hypothesis. This result stood up to potentially confounding teacher factors and to a conservative Bayesian analysis. Thus, sustaining growth-mindset effects may require contextual supports that allow the proffered beliefs to take root and flourish.

The acquisition of the gender-brilliance stereotype: Age trajectory, relation to parents' stereotypes, and intersections with race/ethnicity.

Past research has explored children's gender stereotypes about specific intellectual domains, such as mathematics and science, but less is known about the acquisition of domain-general stereotypes about the intellectual abilities of women and men. During 2017 and 2018, the authors administered Implicit Association Tests to Chinese Singaporean adults and 8- to 12-year-olds (N = 731; 58% female) to examine the gender stereotype that portrays exceptional intellectual ability (e.g., genius, brilliance) as a male attribute. This gender-brilliance stereotype was present among adults and children and for both Chinese and White stereotype targets. It also was stronger among older children and among children whose parents also showed it. This early-emerging stereotype may be an obstacle to gender equity in many prestigious employment sectors.

Parents' responses to children's math performance in early elementary school: Links with parents' math beliefs and children's math adjustment.

A new parent-report measure was used to examine parents' person and process responses to children's math performance. Twice over a year from 2017 to 2020, American parents (N = 546; 80% mothers, 20% other caregivers; 62% white, 21% Black, 17% other) reported their responses and math beliefs; their children's (Mage  = 7.48 years; 50% girls, 50% boys) math adjustment was also assessed. Factor analyses indicated parents' person and process responses to children's math success and failure represent four distinct, albeit related, responses. Person (vs. process) responses were less common and less likely to accompany views of math ability as malleable and failure as constructive (|r|s = .16-.23). The more parents used person responses, the poorer children's later math adjustment (|ß|s = .06-.16).

Children's Intuitive Theories of Academic Performance.

How do children reason about academic performance across development? A classic view suggests children's intuitive theories in this domain undergo qualitative changes. According to this view, older children and adults consider both effort and skill as sources of performance (i.e., a "performance = effort + skill" theory), but younger children can only consider effort (i.e., a "performance = effort" theory). Results from two studies (N = 240 children aged 4-9) contradict the claim of theory change, suggesting instead that children as young as 4 operate with an intuitive theory of academic performance that incorporates both effort and skill as explanatory concepts. This work reveals that children's understanding of academic performance is more continuous across development than previously assumed.

Asking Children to "Be Helpers" Can Backfire After Setbacks.

Describing behaviors as reflecting categories (e.g., asking children to "be helpers") has been found to increase pro-social behavior. The present studies (N = 139, ages 4-5) tested whether such effects backfire if children experience setbacks while performing category-relevant actions. In Study 1, children were asked either to "be helpers" or "to help," and then pretended to complete a series of successful scenarios (e.g., pouring milk) and unsuccessful scenarios (e.g., spilling milk while trying to pour). After the unsuccessful trials, children asked to "be helpers" had more negative attitudes. In Study 2, asking children to "be helpers" impeded children's helping behavior after they experienced difficulties while trying to help. Implications for how category labels shape beliefs and behavior are discussed.

Developmental evidence for a link between the inherence bias in explanation and psychological essentialism.

The assumption that natural and social categories have deeper "essences" is a fundamental feature of the conceptual system, with wide-ranging consequences for behavior. What are the developmental origins of this assumption? We propose that essentialism emerges in part from a bias in the process of generating explanations that leads reasoners to overuse inherent or intrinsic features. Consistent with this proposal, the inherence bias in 4-year-olds' explanations predicted the strength of their essentialist beliefs (Study 1; N = 64), and manipulations of the inherence bias in 4- to 7-year-olds (Studies 2 and 3; N = 112 each) led to subsequent changes in the essentialist beliefs of children who attended to the manipulation. These findings contribute to our understanding of the origins of essentialism.

How deep do we dig? Formal explanations as placeholders for inherent explanations.

Formal explanations (e.g., "Mittens has whiskers because she's a cat") pose an intriguing puzzle in human cognition: they seem like little more than tautologies, yet they are surprisingly commonplace and natural-sounding. To resolve this puzzle, we hypothesized that formal explanations constitute an implicit appeal to a category's inherent features rather than simply to the category itself (as their explicit content would suggest); the latter is just a placeholder. We conducted a series of eight experiments with 951 participants that supported four predictions that followed from this hypothesis: First, formal explanations-though natural-sounding-were not particularly satisfying. Second, for natural kinds, formal explanations were less satisfying than inherent explanations (specifically, ones that appealed to a natural kind's causally powerful "essence"). Third, participants viewed essence-related inherent explanations as more specific versions of the ideas expressed by formal explanations, which were viewed as more general placeholders. Fourth, and finally, formal explanations tended to serve as placeholders for explanations that appealed to inherent features more so than for other types of explanations, such as ones that appealed to external, environmental factors. In addition to supporting our novel claim about the meaning of formal explanations, these data suggest a new way in which explanations do their psychological work: not via their literal content (as assumed by prior work on explanation), but rather via the additional inferences they encourage. We end by discussing the potential heuristic value of formal explanations for causal learning in childhood.

Investigating the origins of political views: biases in explanation predict conservative attitudes in children and adults.

We tested the hypothesis that political attitudes are influenced by an information-processing factor - namely, a bias in the content of everyday explanations. Because many societal phenomena are enormously complex, people's understanding of them often relies on heuristic shortcuts. For instance, when generating explanations for such phenomena (e.g., why does this group have low status?), people often rely on facts that they can retrieve easily from memory - facts that are skewed toward inherent or intrinsic features (e.g., this group is unintelligent). We hypothesized that this bias in the content of heuristic explanations leads to a tendency to (1) view socioeconomic stratification as acceptable and (2) prefer current societal arrangements to alternative ones, two hallmarks of conservative ideology. Moreover, since the inherence bias in explanation is present across development, we expected it to shape children's proto-political judgments as well. Three studies with adults and 4- to 8-year-old children (N = 784) provided support for these predictions: Not only did individual differences in reliance on inherent explanations uniquely predict endorsement of conservative views (particularly the stratification-supporting component; Study 1), but manipulations of this explanatory bias also had downstream consequences for political attitudes in both children and adults (Studies 2 and 3). This work contributes to our understanding of the origins of political attitudes.

How does social essentialism affect the development of inter-group relations?

Psychological essentialism is a pervasive conceptual bias to view categories as reflecting something deep, stable, and informative about their members. Scholars from diverse disciplines have long theorized that psychological essentialism has negative ramifications for inter-group relations, yet little previous empirical work has experimentally tested the social implications of essentialist beliefs. Three studies (N = 127, ages 4.5-6) found that experimentally inducing essentialist beliefs about a novel social category led children to share fewer resources with category members, but did not lead to the out-group dislike that defines social prejudice. These findings indicate that essentialism negatively influences some key components of inter-group relations, but does not lead directly to the development of prejudice.

Memory accessibility shapes explanation: Testing key claims of the inherence heuristic account.

People understand the world by constructing explanations for what they observe. It is thus important to identify the cognitive processes underlying these judgments. According to a recent proposal, everyday explanations are often constructed heuristically: Because people need to generate explanations on a moment-by-moment basis, they cannot perform an exhaustive search through the space of possible reasons, but may instead use the information that is most easily accessible in memory (Cimpian & Salomon 2014a, b). In the present research, we tested two key claims of this proposal that have so far not been investigated. First, we tested whether-as previously hypothesized-the information about an entity that is most accessible in memory tends to consist of inherent or intrinsic facts about that entity, rather than extrinsic (contextual, historical, etc.) facts about it (Studies 1 and 2). Second, we tested the implications of this difference in the memory accessibility of inherent versus extrinsic facts for the process of generating explanations: Does the fact that inherent facts are more accessible than relevant extrinsic facts give rise to an inherence bias in the content of the explanations generated (Studies 3 and 4)? The findings supported the proposal that everyday explanations are generated in part via a heuristic process that relies on easily accessible-and often inherent-information from memory.

Young Children's Self-Concepts Include Representations of Abstract Traits and the Global Self.

There is debate about the abstractness of young children's self-concepts-specifically, whether they include representations of (a) general traits and abilities and (b) the global self. Four studies (N = 176 children aged 4-7) suggested these representations are indeed part of early self-concepts. Studies 1 and 2 reexamined prior evidence that young children cannot represent traits and abilities. The results suggested that children's seemingly immature judgments in previous studies were due to peculiarities of the task context not the inadequacy of children's self-concepts. Similarly, Studies 3 and 4 revealed that, contrary to claims of immaturity in reasoning about the global self, young children update their global self-evaluations in flexible, context-sensitive ways. This evidence suggests continuity in the structure of self-concepts across childhood.

Are stereotypes accurate? A perspective from the cognitive science of concepts.

In his 2012 book, Jussim suggests that people's beliefs about various groups (i.e., their stereotypes) are largely accurate. We unpack this claim using the distinction between generic and statistical beliefs - a distinction supported by extensive evidence in cognitive psychology, linguistics, and philosophy. Regardless of whether one understands stereotypes as generic or statistical beliefs about groups, skepticism remains about the rationality of social judgments.

Why Do People Tend to Infer "Ought" From "Is"? The Role of Biases in Explanation.

People tend to judge what is typical as also good and appropriate-as what ought to be. What accounts for the prevalence of these judgments, given that their validity is at best uncertain? We hypothesized that the tendency to reason from "is" to "ought" is due in part to a systematic bias in people's (nonmoral) explanations, whereby regularities (e.g., giving roses on Valentine's Day) are explained predominantly via inherent or intrinsic facts (e.g., roses are beautiful). In turn, these inherence-biased explanations lead to value-laden downstream conclusions (e.g., it is good to give roses). Consistent with this proposal, results from five studies (N = 629 children and adults) suggested that, from an early age, the bias toward inherence in explanations fosters inferences that imbue observed reality with value. Given that explanations fundamentally determine how people understand the world, the bias toward inherence in these judgments is likely to exert substantial influence over sociomoral understanding.

Conceptions of Adolescence: Implications for Differences in Engagement in School Over Early Adolescence in the United States and China.

American youth are more prone to storm and stress during adolescence than are Chinese youth (e.g., American youth's engagement in school declines more). However, it is unclear why. This research examined differences in conceptions of adolescence in the United States and China. Using both open- and closed-ended measures, youth (N = 397; 50 % female; mean age = 13.19 years) reported on their views of teens. American (vs. Chinese) youth were more likely to see adolescence as a time of decreased family responsibility along with increased individuation from parents, school disengagement, and peer orientation. Conceptions of adolescence as a time of dampened family responsibility and heightened school disengagement contributed to American (vs. Chinese) youth being less engaged in school over the seventh and eighth grades. The findings suggest that culture shapes ideas about adolescence, which contribute to differences in American and Chinese youth's engagement in school over this phase.

The inherence heuristic across development: systematic differences between children's and adults' explanations for everyday facts.

The inherence heuristic is a basic cognitive process that supplies quick-and-easy answers to what are, in reality, incredibly complex questions about why the broad patterns of the world are as they are (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014-a, 2014-b). This explanatory heuristic satisfies the human need to understand, but it is also a source of bias because the heuristic relies too often on the (easily accessible) inherent features of the entities in the patterns being explained. Here, we investigated the developmental trajectory of this heuristic. Given that the cognitive resources that help override the typical output of the inherence heuristic are scarce in childhood, we hypothesized that the heuristic's output would be more broadly endorsed by children than by adults. Five experiments involving young children and adults (N=480) provided consistent support for this hypothesis. The first three experiments (Part I) investigated participants' explanations for broad patterns (e.g., fire trucks are red) and suggested that, consistent with our predictions, children were particularly likely to endorse inherence-based explanations. The last two experiments (Part II) investigated two intuitions that accompany the output of the inherence heuristic: namely, that the patterns being explained cannot be changed and are temporally stable. As predicted, participants' judgments on these dimensions showed the same developmental differences as the explanations investigated in Part I, with children being particularly likely to see patterns as inalterable and temporally stable. The developmental differences found across these five experiments suggest that children start out with a broad reliance on the explanatory output of the inherence heuristic, a reliance that narrows in scope to some extent as children develop.