Believability of evidence matters for correcting social impressions.

To what extent are we beholden to the information we encounter about others? Are there aspects of cognition that are unduly influenced by gossip or outright disinformation, even when we deem it unlikely to be true? Research has shown that implicit impressions of others are often insensitive to the truth value of the evidence. We examined whether the believability of new, contradictory information about others influenced whether people corrected their implicit and explicit impressions. Contrary to previous work, we found that across seven studies, the perceived believability of new evidence predicted whether people corrected their implicit impressions. Subjective assessments of truth value also uniquely predicted correction beyond other properties of information such as diagnosticity/extremity. This evidence shows that the degree to which someone thinks new information is true influences whether it impacts implicit impressions.

The Long-Term Effects of New Evidence on Implicit Impressions of Other People.

Implicit impressions are often assumed to be difficult to update in light of new information. Even when an intervention appears to successfully change implicit evaluations, the effects have been found to be fleeting, reverting to baseline just hours or days later. Recent findings, however, show that two properties of new evidence-diagnosticity and believability-can result in very rapid implicit updating. In the current studies, we assessed the long-term effects of evidence possessing these two properties on implicit updating over periods of days, weeks, and months. Three studies assessed the malleability of implicit evaluations after memory consolidation (Study 1; N = 396) as well as the longer-term trajectories of implicit responses after exposure to new evidence about novel targets (Study 2; N = 375) and familiar ones (Study 3; N = 341). In contrast with recent work, our findings suggest that implicit impressions can exhibit both flexibility after consolidation and durability weeks or months later.

The impact of valenced verbal information on implicit and explicit evaluation: the role of information diagnosticity, primacy, and memory cueing.

Previous research has shown that the presentation of valenced information about a target stimulus sometimes has different effects on implicit and explicit stimulus evaluations. Importantly, however, research examining the moderators of implicit-explicit dissociations has often failed to account for differences in the properties of the instruments used to measure implicit and explicit evaluations, preventing a clear interpretation of the results. In an effort to overcome these limitations, we conducted a study that probed the impact of valenced information on implicit and explicit evaluations as measured with procedures that were matched on methodological factors. Participants first read positive and negative information about a person named Bob and then completed measures of implicit and explicit evaluations of Bob. We examined the moderating effect of three characteristics: information diagnosticity, primacy, and whether information retrieval was cued during evaluation. Results of two high-powered experiments showed an effect of diagnosticity on implicit and explicit evaluations, replicating previous work, and extending it to new evaluation measures. We observed primacy effects on explicit evaluations in Experiment 1 and on implicit evaluations in Experiment 2. However, we did not observe memory cueing effects or any interactions. We discuss practical implications as well as implications for cognitive evaluation theories.

Social-psychological evidence for the effective updating of implicit attitudes.

Recent findings in social psychology show how implicit affective responses can be changed, leading to strong, fast, and durable updating. This work demonstrates that new information viewed as diagnostic or which prompts reinterpretations of previous learning produces fast revision, suggesting two factors that might be leveraged in clinical settings. Reconsolidation provides a plausible route for making such reasoning possible.

Powerful Effects of Diagnostic Information on Automatic and Self-Reported Evaluation: The Moderating Role of Memory Recall.

We sometimes learn about certain behaviors of others that we consider diagnostic of their character (e.g., that they did immoral things). Recent research has shown that such information trumps the impact of other (less diagnostic) information both on self-reported evaluations and on more automatic evaluations as probed with indirect measures such as the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP). We examined whether facilitating memory recall of alternative information moderates the impact of diagnostic information on evaluation. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants learned one diagnostic positive and one diagnostic negative behavior of two unfamiliar people. Presenting a cue semantically related to this information during evaluation influenced AMP scores but not self-reported liking scores. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that elaborative rehearsal of low diagnostic information eliminated diagnosticity effects on AMP scores and reduced them on self-reported liking scores. These findings help elucidate the role of memory recall and diagnosticity in evaluation.

A Process Dissociation Model of Implicit Rapid Revision in Response to Diagnostic Revelations.

Previous research has demonstrated that implicit evaluations can be reversed with exposure to a single impression-inconsistent behavior. But what exactly is changing when perceivers encounter diagnostic revelations about someone? One possibility is that rapid changes are occurring in the extent to which perceivers view the person positively or negatively. Another possibility is that they override the expression of initial evaluations through control-oriented processes. We conducted three studies (one preregistered) that used multinomial process trees to distinguish between these possibilities. We find consistent support across two different implicit measures that diagnostic behaviors result in rapid changes in evaluative processes. We obtained only inconsistent evidence for effects on more control-oriented processes. These findings thus help to reveal the cognitive processes underlying rapid implicit revision. Implications for theoretical perspectives on implicit attitudes are discussed.

Nationality dominates gender in decision-making in the Dictator and Prisoner's Dilemma Games.

Across a variety of contexts, adults tend to cooperate more with ingroup members than outgroup members. However, humans belong to multiple social groups simultaneously and we know little about how this cross-categorization affects cooperative decision-making. Nationality and gender are two social categories that are ripe for exploration in this regard: They regularly intersect in the real world and we know that each affects cooperation in isolation. Here we explore two hypotheses concerning the effects of cross-categorization on cooperative decision-making. First, the additivity hypothesis (H1), which proposes that the effects of social categories are additive, suggesting that people will be most likely to cooperate with partners who are nationality and gender ingroup members. Second, the category dominance hypothesis (H2), which proposes that one category will outcompete the other in driving decision-making, suggesting that either nationality or gender information will be privileged in cooperative contexts. Secondarily, we test whether identification with-and implicit bias toward-nationality and gender categories predict decision-making. Indian and US Americans (N = 479), made decisions in two cooperative contexts-the Dictator and Prisoner's Dilemma Games-when paired with partners of all four social categories: Indian women and men, and US American women and men. Nationality exerted a stronger influence than gender: people shared and cooperated more with own-nationality partners and believed that own-nationality partners would be more cooperative. Both identification with-and implicit preferences for-own-nationality, led to more sharing in the Dictator Game. Our findings are most consistent with H2, suggesting that when presented simultaneously, nationality, but not gender, exerts an important influence on cooperative decision-making. Our study highlights the importance of testing cooperation in more realistic intergroup contexts, ones in which multiple social categories are in play.

Perceptual salience influences food choices independently of health and taste preferences.

BACKGROUND: Making decisions about food is a critical part of everyday life and a principal concern for a number of public health issues. Yet, the mechanisms involved in how people decide what to eat are not yet fully understood. Here, we examined the role of visual attention in healthy eating intentions and choices. We conducted two-alternative forced choice tests of competing food stimuli that paired healthy and unhealthy foods that varied in taste preference. We manipulated their perceptual salience such that, in some cases, one food item was more perceptually salient than the other. In addition, we manipulated the cognitive load and time pressure to test the generalizability of the salience effect. RESULTS: Manipulating salience had a powerful effect on choice in all situations; even when an unhealthy but tastier food was presented as an alternative, healthy food options were selected more often when they were perceptually salient. Moreover, in a second experiment, food choices on one trial impacted food choices on subsequent trials; when a participant chose the healthy option, they were more likely to choose a healthy option again on the next trial. Furthermore, robust effects of salience on food choice were observed across situations of high cognitive load and time pressure. CONCLUSIONS: These results have implications both for understanding the mechanisms of food-related decision-making and for implementing interventions that might make it easier for people to make healthy eating choices.

Opposing contributions of psychologically distinct components of empathy to empathic accuracy.

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported online in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General on Jul 23 2020 (see record 2020-54558-001). In the original article, significance levels indicated by the asterisks in Table 2 are incorrect. The corrected Table 2 is given in erratum. All versions of this article have been corrected.] What is it that provides us an accurate window into the thoughts and feelings of others? Although, intuitively, it might seem as though trait empathy would enhance this ability, research has produced decidedly mixed results, ultimately failing to uncover robust, systematic relationships between the two. Recent research has suggested, however, that different facets of empathy-emotional contagion, on the one hand, and empathic concern, on the other-are psychologically distinct and result in different behavioral tendencies (Jordan, Amir, & Bloom, 2016). In 5 preregistered studies involving nearly 2,600 participants, we assessed the opposing contributions of these distinct facets of empathy to empathic accuracy. We found that whereas trait concern is beneficial to empathic accuracy, trait contagion is, paradoxically, detrimental. These patterns emerged across 4 different measures of empathic accuracy that involve emotional and mental states communicated through the eyes (Study 1), paralinguistic cues in the voice (Study 2), facial expressions (Studies 2 and 4), and cues presented during a mock interview (Study 3). Moreover, in Study 4, we identified rational thinking style as a mechanism for these opposing effects. Whereas those who exhibit contagion tend to be less rational, those who exhibit concern tend to be more rational. These differences in cognitive style mediate the opposing relationships of contagion and concern with interpersonal accuracy. Our studies thus highlight the value of empirically separating psychologically distinct facets of empathy to more accurately characterize their independent contributions to interpersonal processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Updating implicit impressions: New evidence on intentionality and the affect misattribution procedure.

Recent work has shown that implicit first impressions of other people can be rapidly updated when new information about them is highly diagnostic or provides a reinterpretation of the basis of prior belief. The Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) is one prominent implicit measure that has been widely used in this and other work. However, the status of the AMP as a measure of unintentional responding has been a matter of debate, which necessarily also raises questions about the "implicitness" of the updated responses within recent person impression research. In re-analyses of published work, we identify multimodal distributions of AMP responses that raise concerns about potential intentional influences on this task. Drawing on 8 new studies, however, we find that such patterns are not likely attributable to intentional responding (Studies 1, 2A-2B), and that methodological modifications to the AMP procedure eliminate bimodality but do not eliminate effects of rapid revision (Studies 3A-6). Furthermore, these modifications provide evidence that the rapid-revision effects reported in earlier work can be produced under suboptimal conditions such as distraction and increased vigilance against prime influence. We advocate for the continued use of judgmental misattribution as a valuable tool in the arsenal of implicit social cognition researchers, but also encourage researchers to continue to examine the distributional patterns of measures like the AMP, and what those patterns might reflect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

He did what? The role of diagnosticity in revising implicit evaluations.

Research suggests that implicit evaluations are relatively insensitive to single instances of new, countervailing information that contradicts prior learning. In 6 experiments, however, we identify the critical role of the perceived diagnosticity of that new information: Counterattitudinal information that is deemed highly diagnostic of the target's true nature leads to a complete reversal of the previous implicit evaluation. Experiments 1a and 1b establish this effect by showing that newly formed implicit evaluations are reversed minutes later with exposure to a single piece of highly diagnostic information. Experiment 2 demonstrates a valence asymmetry in participants' likelihood of exhibiting rapid reversals of newly formed positive versus negative implicit evaluations. Experiment 3 provides evidence that a target must be personally responsible for the counterattitudinal behavior and not merely incidentally associated with a negative act. Experiment 4 shows that participants exhibit revision only when they judge the target's counterattitudinal behavior as offensive and thus diagnostic of his character. Experiment 5 demonstrates the behavioral implications of newly revised implicit evaluations. These studies show that newly formed implicit evaluations can be completely overturned through deliberative considerations about a single piece of counterattitudinal information.

Time pressure increases cooperation in competitively framed social dilemmas.

What makes people willing to pay costs to benefit others? Does such cooperation require effortful self-control, or do automatic, intuitive processes favor cooperation? Time pressure has been shown to increase cooperative behavior in Public Goods Games, implying a predisposition towards cooperation. Consistent with the hypothesis that this predisposition results from the fact that cooperation is typically advantageous outside the lab, it has further been shown that the time pressure effect is undermined by prior experience playing lab games (where selfishness is the more advantageous strategy). Furthermore, a recent study found that time pressure increases cooperation even in a game framed as a competition, suggesting that the time pressure effect is not the result of social norm compliance. Here, we successfully replicate these findings, again observing a positive effect of time pressure on cooperation in a competitively framed game, but not when using the standard cooperative framing. These results suggest that participants' intuitions favor cooperation rather than norm compliance, and also that simply changing the framing of the Public Goods Game is enough to make it appear novel to participants and thus to restore the time pressure effect.

The dark side of intuition: aging and increases in nonoptimal intuitive decisions.

When making decisions, people typically draw on two general modes of thought: intuition and reason. Age-related changes in cognition and emotion may impact these decision processes: Although older individuals experience declines in deliberative processes, they experience stability or improvement in their emotional processes. Recent research has shown that when older adults rely more on their intact emotional abilities versus their declining deliberative faculties, the quality of their decisions is significantly improved. But how would older adults fare under circumstances in which intuitive/affective processes lead to nonoptimal decisions? The ratio bias paradigm embodies just such a circumstance, offering individuals a chance to win money by drawing, say, a red jellybean from one of two dishes containing red and white jellybeans. People will often choose to draw from a dish with a greater absolute number of winners (nine red beans and 91 white beans; 9%) than a dish with a greater probability of winning (one red bean and nine white beans; 10%) due to a strong emotional pull toward the greater number. We examined whether older adults (N = 30) would make more nonoptimal decisions on the ratio bias task than young adults (N = 30). We found that older adults did make more nonoptimal choices than their younger counterparts and that positive affect was associated with nonoptimal choices.

People's intuitions about intuitive insight and intuitive choice.

How do people balance intuition and reason when making decisions? We report 6 studies that indicate that people are cued by the features of the decision problem to follow intuition or reason when making their choice. That is, when features of the choice resemble features commonly associated with rational processing, people tend to decide on the basis of reason; when features of the choice match those associated with intuitive processing, people tend to decide on the basis of intuition. Choices that are seen as objectively evaluable (Study 1A), sequential (Studies 1B and 3), complex (Study 2), or precise (Study 4) elicit a preference for choosing rationally. This framework accurately predicts people's choices in variants of both the ratio-bias (Study 3) and ambiguity-aversion paradigms (Study 4). Discussion focuses on the relationship between the task cuing account, other decision-making models, and dual-process accounts of cognition.