Changes in Cardiovascular Spending, Care Utilization, and Clinical Outcomes Associated With Participation in Bundled Payments for Care Improvement - Advanced.

BACKGROUND: Bundled Payments for Care Improvement - Advanced (BPCI-A) is a Medicare initiative that aims to incentivize reductions in spending for episodes of care that start with a hospitalization and end 90 days after discharge. Cardiovascular disease, an important driver of Medicare spending, is one of the areas of focus BPCI-A. It is unknown whether BPCI-A is associated with spending reductions or quality improvements for the 3 cardiovascular medical events or 5 cardiovascular procedures in the model. METHODS: In this retrospective cohort study, we conducted difference-in-differences analyses using Medicare claims for patients discharged between January 1, 2017, and September 30, 2019, to assess differences between BPCI-A hospitals and matched nonparticipating control hospitals. Our primary outcomes were the differential changes in spending, before versus after implementation of BPCI-A, for cardiac medical and procedural conditions at BPCI-A hospitals compared with controls. Secondary outcomes included changes in patient complexity, care utilization, healthy days at home, readmissions, and mortality. RESULTS: Baseline spending for cardiac medical episodes at BPCI-A hospitals was $25 606. The differential change in spending for cardiac medical episodes at BPCI-A versus control hospitals was $16 (95% CI, -$228 to $261; P=0.90). Baseline spending for cardiac procedural episodes at BPCI-A hospitals was $37 961. The differential change in spending for cardiac procedural episodes was $171 (95% CI, -$429 to $772; P=0.58). There were minimal differential changes in physicians' care patterns such as the complexity of treated patients or in their care utilization. At BPCI-A versus control hospitals, there were no significant differential changes in rates of 90-day readmissions (differential change, 0.27% [95% CI, -0.25% to 0.80%] for medical episodes; differential change, 0.31% [95% CI, -0.98% to 1.60%] for procedural episodes) or mortality (differential change, -0.14% [95% CI, -0.50% to 0.23%] for medical episodes; differential change, -0.36% [95% CI, -1.25% to 0.54%] for procedural episodes). CONCLUSIONS: Participation in BPCI-A was not associated with spending reductions, changes in care utilization, or quality improvements for the cardiovascular medical events or procedures offered in the model.

Year 1 of the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement-Advanced Model.

BACKGROUND: The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation launched the Medicare Bundled Payments for Care Improvement-Advanced (BPCI-A) program for hospitals in October 2018. Information is needed about the effects of the program on health care utilization and Medicare payments. METHODS: We conducted a modified segmented regression analysis using Medicare claims and including patients with discharge dates from January 2017 through September 2019 to assess differences between BPCI-A participants and two control groups: hospitals that never joined the BPCI-A program (nonjoining hospitals) and hospitals that joined the BPCI-A program in January 2020, after the conclusion of the intervention period (late-joining hospitals). The primary outcomes were the differences in changes in quarterly trends in 90-day per-episode Medicare payments and the percentage of patients with readmission within 90 days after discharge. Secondary outcomes were mortality, volume, and case mix. RESULTS: A total of 826 BPCI-A participant hospitals were compared with 2016 nonjoining hospitals and 334 late-joining hospitals. Among BPCI-A hospitals, the mean baseline 90-day per-episode Medicare payment was $27,315; the change in the quarterly trends in the intervention period as compared with baseline was -$78 per quarter. Among nonjoining hospitals, the mean baseline 90-day per-episode Medicare payment was $25,994; the change in quarterly trends as compared with baseline was -$26 per quarter (difference between nonjoining hospitals and BPCI-A hospitals, $52 [95% confidence interval {CI}, 34 to 70] per quarter; P<0.001; 0.2% of the baseline payment). Among late-joining hospitals, the mean baseline 90-day per-episode Medicare payment was $26,807; the change in the quarterly trends as compared with baseline was $4 per quarter (difference between late-joining hospitals and BPCI-A hospitals, $82 [95% CI, 41 to 122] per quarter; P<0.001; 0.3% of the baseline payment). There were no meaningful differences in the changes with regard to readmission, mortality, volume, or case mix. CONCLUSIONS: The BPCI-A program was associated with small reductions in Medicare payments among participating hospitals as compared with control hospitals. (Funded by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute.).

Care Disruption During COVID-19: a National Survey of Hospital Leaders.

BACKGROUND: The COVID-19 pandemic caused massive disruption in usual care delivery patterns in hospitals across the USA, and highlighted long-standing inequities in health care delivery and outcomes. Its effect on hospital operations, and whether the magnitude of the effect differed for hospitals serving historically marginalized populations, is unknown. OBJECTIVE: To investigate the perspectives of hospital leaders on the effects of COVID-19 on their facilities' operations and patient outcomes. METHODS: A survey was administered via print and electronic means to hospital leaders at 588 randomly sampled acute-care hospitals participating in Medicare's Inpatient Prospective Payment System, fielded from November 2020 to June 2021. Summary statistics were tabulated, and responses were adjusted for sampling strategy and non-response. RESULTS: There were 203 responses to the survey (41.6%), with 20.7% of respondents representing safety-net hospitals and 19.7% representing high-minority hospitals. Over three-quarters of hospitals reported COVID testing shortages, about two-thirds reported staffing shortages, and 78.8% repurposed hospital spaces to intensive care units, with a slightly higher proportion of high-minority hospitals reporting these effects. About half of respondents felt that non-COVID inpatients received worsened quality or outcomes during peak COVID surges, and almost two-thirds reported worsened quality or outcomes for outpatient non-COVID patients as well, with few differences by hospital safety-net or minority status. Over 80% of hospitals participated in alternative payment models prior to COVID, and a third of these reported decreasing these efforts due to the pandemic, with no differences between safety-net and high-minority hospitals. CONCLUSIONS: COVID-19 significantly disrupted the operations of hospitals across the USA, with hospitals serving patients in poverty and racial and ethnic minorities reporting relatively similar care disruption as non-safety-net and lower-minority hospitals.

Two-Year Evaluation of Mandatory Bundled Payments for Joint Replacement.

BACKGROUND: In 2016, Medicare implemented Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR), a national mandatory bundled-payment model for hip or knee replacement in randomly selected metropolitan statistical areas. Hospitals in such areas receive bonuses or pay penalties based on Medicare spending per hip- or knee-replacement episode (defined as the hospitalization plus 90 days after discharge). METHODS: We conducted difference-in-differences analyses using Medicare claims from 2015 through 2017, encompassing the first 2 years of bundled payments in the CJR program. We evaluated hip- or knee-replacement episodes in 75 metropolitan statistical areas randomly assigned to mandatory participation in the CJR program (bundled-payment metropolitan statistical areas, hereafter referred to as "treatment" areas) as compared with those in 121 control areas, before and after implementation of the CJR model. The primary outcomes were institutional spending per hip- or knee-replacement episode (i.e., Medicare payments to institutions, primarily to hospitals and post-acute care facilities), rates of postsurgical complications, and the percentage of "high-risk" patients (i.e., patients for whom there was an elevated risk of spending - a measure of patient selection). Analyses were adjusted for the hospital and characteristics of the patients and procedures. RESULTS: From 2015 through 2017, there were 280,161 hip- or knee-replacement procedures in 803 hospitals in treatment areas and 377,278 procedures in 962 hospitals in control areas. After the initiation of the CJR model, there were greater decreases in institutional spending per joint-replacement episode in treatment areas than in control areas (differential change [i.e., the between-group difference in the change from the period before the CJR model], -$812, or a -3.1% differential decrease relative to the treatment-group baseline; P<0.001). The differential reduction was driven largely by a 5.9% relative decrease in the percentage of episodes in which patients were discharged to post-acute care facilities. The CJR program did not have a significant differential effect on the composite rate of complications (P=0.67) or on the percentage of joint-replacement procedures performed in high-risk patients (P=0.81). CONCLUSIONS: In the first 2 years of the CJR program, there was a modest reduction in spending per hip- or knee-replacement episode, without an increase in rates of complications. (Funded by the Commonwealth Fund and the National Institute on Aging of the National Institutes of Health.).

Changes in Employment Status and Access to Care During COVID-19 Pandemic Among Low-Income Adults in 4 Southern States.

BACKGROUND: While the impact of the COVID-19 recession on the economy is clear, there is limited evidence on how the COVID-19 pandemic-related job losses among low-income people may have affected their access to health care. OBJECTIVE: To determine the association of job loss during the pandemic with insurance coverage and access to and affordability of health care among low-income adults. DESIGN: Using a random digit dialing telephone survey from October 2020 to December 2020 of low-income adults in 4 states-Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas-we conducted a series of multivariable logistic regression analyses, adjusting for demographics, chronic conditions, and state of residence. PARTICIPANTS: US citizens aged 19-64 with a family income less than 138% of the federal poverty line who became newly unemployed during pandemic, remained employed during pandemic, or were chronically unemployed before and during the pandemic. MAIN MEASURES: Rates of insurance, type of insurance coverage, measures of access to/affordability of care, and food/housing security KEY RESULTS: Of 1,794 respondents, 14.5% were newly unemployed, 49.6% were chronically unemployed, and 35.7% were employed. The newly unemployed were slightly younger and more likely Black or Latino. The newly unemployed were more likely to report uninsurance compared to the employed (+16.4 percentage points, 95% CI 6.0-26.9), and the chronically unemployed (+26.4 percentage points, 95% CI 16.2-36.6), mostly driven by Texas' populations. The newly unemployed also reported lower rates of access to care and higher rates of financial barriers to care. They were also more likely to report food and housing insecurity compared to others. CONCLUSIONS: In a survey of 4 Southern States during pandemic, the newly unemployed had higher rates of uninsurance and worse access to care-largely due to financial barriers-and reported more housing and food insecurity than other groups. Our study highlights the vulnerability of low-income populations who experienced a job loss, especially in Texas, which did not expand Medicaid.

Predictors of Success in the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Program.

BACKGROUND: Hospitals participating in Medicare's Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) program were incented to reduce Medicare payments for episodes of care. OBJECTIVE: To identify factors that influenced whether or not hospitals were able to save in the BPCI program, how the cost of different services changed to produce those savings, and if "savers" had lower or decreased quality of care. DESIGN: Retrospective cohort study. PARTICIPANTS: BPCI-participating hospitals. MAIN MEASURES: We designated hospitals that met the program goal of decreasing costs by at least 2% from baseline in average Medicare payments per 90-day episode as "savers." We used regression models to determine condition-level, patient-level, hospital-level, and market-level characteristics associated with savings. KEY RESULTS: In total, 421 hospitals participated in BPCI, resulting in 2974 hospital-condition combinations. Major joint replacement of the lower extremity had the highest proportion of savers (77.6%, average change in payments -$2235) and complex non-cervical spinal fusion had the lowest (22.2%, average change +$8106). Medical conditions had a higher proportion of savers than surgical conditions (11% more likely to save, P=0.001). Conditions that were mostly urgent/emergent had a higher proportion of savers than conditions that were mostly elective (6% more likely to save, P=0.007). Having higher than median costs at baseline was associated with saving (OR: 3.02, P<0.001). Hospitals with more complex patients were less likely to save (OR: 0.77, P=0.003). Savings occurred across both inpatient and post-acute care, and there were no decrements in clinical care associated with being a saver. CONCLUSIONS: Certain conditions may be more amenable than others to saving under bundled payments, and hospitals with high costs at baseline may perform well under programs which use hospitals' own baseline costs to set targets. Findings may have implications for the BPCI-Advanced program and for policymakers seeking to use payment models to drive improvements in care.

Changes in Health and Quality of Life in US Skilled Nursing Facilities by COVID-19 Exposure Status in 2020.

Importance: During the COVID-19 pandemic, the US federal government required that skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) close to visitors and eliminate communal activities. Although these policies were intended to protect residents, they may have had unintended negative effects. Objective: To assess health outcomes among SNFs with and without known COVID-19 cases. Design, Setting, and Participants: This retrospective observational study used US Medicare claims and Minimum Data Set 3.0 for January through November in each year beginning in 2018 and ending in 2020 including 15 477 US SNFs with 2 985 864 resident-years. Exposures: January through November of calendar years 2018, 2019, and 2020. COVID-19 diagnoses were used to assign SNFs into 2 mutually exclusive groups with varying membership by month in 2020: active COVID-19 (≥1 COVID-19 diagnosis in the current or past month) or no-known COVID-19 (no observed diagnosis by that month). Main Outcomes and Measures: Monthly rates of mortality, hospitalization, emergency department (ED) visits, and monthly changes in activities of daily living (ADLs), body weight, and depressive symptoms. Each SNF in 2018 and 2019 served as its own control for 2020. Results: In 2018-2019, mean monthly mortality was 2.2%, hospitalization 3.0%, and ED visit rate 2.9% overall. In 2020, among active COVID-19 SNFs compared with their own 2018-2019 baseline, mortality increased by 1.60% (95% CI, 1.58% to 1.62%), hospitalizations decreased by 0.10% (95% CI, -0.12% to -0.09%), and ED visit rates decreased by 0.57% (95% CI, -0.59% to -0.55%). Among no-known COVID-19 SNFs, mortality decreased by 0.15% (95% CI, -0.16% to -0.13%), hospitalizations by 0.83% (95% CI, -0.85% to -0.81%), and ED visits by 0.79% (95% CI, -0.81% to -0.77%). All changes were statistically significant. In 2018-2019, across all SNFs, residents required assistance with an additional 0.89 ADLs between January and November, and lost 1.9 lb; 27.1% had worsened depressive symptoms. In 2020, residents in active COVID-19 SNFs required assistance with an additional 0.36 ADLs (95% CI, 0.34 to 0.38), lost 3.1 lb (95% CI, -3.2 to -3.0 lb) more weight, and were 4.4% (95% CI, 4.1% to 4.7%) more likely to have worsened depressive symptoms, all statistically significant changes. In 2020, residents in no-known COVID-19 SNFs had no significant change in ADLs (-0.06 [95% CI, -0.12 to 0.01]), but lost 1.8 lb (95% CI, -2.1 to -1.5 lb) more weight and were 3.2% more likely (95% CI, 2.3% to 4.1%) to have worsened depressive symptoms, both statistically significant changes. Conclusions and Relevance: Among skilled nursing facilities in the US during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic and prior to the availability of COVID-19 vaccination, mortality and functional decline significantly increased at facilities with active COVID-19 cases compared with the prepandemic period, while a modest statistically significant decrease in mortality was observed at facilities that had never had a known COVID-19 case. Weight loss and depressive symptoms significantly increased in skilled nursing facilities in the first year of the pandemic, regardless of COVID-19 status.

Evaluation of Medicare's Bundled Payments Initiative for Medical Conditions.

BACKGROUND: The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) launched the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative in 2013. A subsequent study showed that the initiative was associated with reductions in Medicare payments for total joint replacement, but little is known about the effect of BPCI on medical conditions. METHODS: We used Medicare claims from 2013 through 2015 to identify admissions for the five most commonly selected medical conditions in BPCI: congestive heart failure (CHF), pneumonia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), sepsis, and acute myocardial infarction (AMI). We used difference-in-differences analyses to assess changes in standardized Medicare payments per episode of care (defined as the hospitalization plus 90 days after discharge) for these conditions at BPCI hospitals and matched control hospitals. RESULTS: A total of 125 hospitals participated in BPCI for CHF, 105 hospitals for pneumonia, 101 hospitals for COPD, 88 hospitals for sepsis, and 73 hospitals for AMI. At baseline, the average Medicare payment per episode of care across the five conditions at BPCI hospitals was $24,280, which decreased to $23,993 during the intervention period (difference, -$286; P=0.41). Control hospitals had an average payment for all episodes of $23,901, which decreased to $23,503 during the intervention period (difference, -$398; P=0.08; difference in differences, $112; P=0.79). Changes from baseline to the intervention period in clinical complexity, length of stay, emergency department use or readmission within 30 or 90 days after hospital discharge, or death within 30 or 90 days after admission did not differ significantly between the intervention and control hospitals. CONCLUSIONS: Hospital participation in five common medical bundles under BPCI was not associated with significant changes in Medicare payments, clinical complexity, length of stay, emergency department use, hospital readmission, or mortality. (Funded by the Commonwealth Fund.).

Effect of a Hospital-wide Measure on the Readmissions Reduction Program.

BACKGROUND: The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program penalizes hospitals that have high 30-day readmission rates across specific conditions. There is support for changing to a hospital-wide readmission measure to broaden hospital eligibility and provide incentives for improvement across more conditions. METHODS: We used Medicare claims from 2011 through 2013 to evaluate the number of hospitals that were eligible for penalties, in that they met a volume threshold of 25 admissions over a 3-year period for a specific condition or 25 admissions over a 1-year period for the cohorts included in the hospital-wide measure. We estimated the expected effects that changing from the condition-specific readmission measures to a hospital-wide measure would have on average penalties for safety-net hospitals (i.e., hospitals that treat a large proportion of low-income patients) and other hospitals. RESULTS: Our sample included 6,807,899 admissions for the hospital-wide measure and 4,392,658 admissions for the condition-specific measures. Of 3443 hospitals, 688 were considered to be safety-net hospitals. Changing to the hospital-wide measure would result in 76 more hospitals being eligible to receive penalties. The hospital-wide measure would increase penalties (mean [±SE] Medicare payment reductions across all hospitals) from 0.42±0.01% to 0.89±0.01% of Medicare base diagnosis-related-group payments. It would also increase the disparity in penalties between safety-net hospitals and other hospitals from -0.03±0.02 to 0.41±0.06 percentage points. CONCLUSIONS: A transition to a hospital-wide readmission measure would only modestly increase the number of hospitals eligible for penalties and would substantially increase the penalties for safety-net hospitals.

Learning and the "Early Joiner" Effect for Medical Conditions in Medicare's Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Program: Retrospective Cohort Study.

BACKGROUND: Studies of medical conditions in the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative did not show reductions in Medicare payments for the majority of conditions, but this could mask heterogeneity. OBJECTIVE: To determine whether earlier enrollment and/or longer participation in BPCI were associated with performance. DESIGN: We divided BPCI hospitals into wave 1 (joined 10/1/13, 1/1/14, or 4/1/14), wave 2 (joined 7/1/14, 10/1/14, 1/1/15, or 4/1/15), and wave 3 (joined 7/1/15, 10/1/15, or 1/1/16) and compared changes in Medicare payments for acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, pneumonia, sepsis, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease between BPCI and matched controls in 6-month increments. SUBJECTS: US hospitals. MEASURES: Medicare payments. RESULTS: There were 120 hospital-condition pairs in wave 1, 264 in wave 2, and 300 in wave 3. Wave 1 hospitals had similar savings to controls early in the program (0-6 mo difference in differences -$10, P=0.976; 6-12 mo +$295, P=0.441; 12-18 mo -$540, P=0.218; 18-24 mo -$485, P=0.259) but had greater savings than controls at 24-30 months (difference in differences -$663, P=0.035). Wave 2 (0-6 mo +$193, P=0.524; 6-12 mo -$183, P=0.489; 12-18 mo -$162, P=0.618) and wave 3 hospitals (0-6 mo +$79, P=0.753; 6-12 mo -$32, P=0.876) did not achieve significant savings at any time interval. There were no differential changes in patient outcomes over time. CONCLUSIONS: Hospitals that joined BPCI earliest began to achieve savings at roughly 2 years of participation. These findings have implications for this and other alternative payment models.

Association of Skilled Nursing Facility Participation in a Bundled Payment Model With Institutional Spending for Joint Replacement Surgery.

Importance: Medicare recently concluded a national voluntary payment demonstration, Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) model 3, in which skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) assumed accountability for patients' Medicare spending for 90 days from initial SNF admission. There is little evidence on outcomes associated with this novel payment model. Objective: To evaluate the association of BPCI model 3 with spending, health care utilization, and patient outcomes for Medicare beneficiaries undergoing lower extremity joint replacement (LEJR). Design, Setting, and Participants: Observational difference-in-difference analysis using Medicare claims from 2013-2017 to evaluate the association of BPCI model 3 with outcomes for 80 648 patients undergoing LEJR. The preintervention period was from January 2013 through September 2013, which was 9 months prior to enrollment of the first BPCI cohort. The postintervention period extended from 3 months post-BPCI enrollment for each SNF through December 2017. BPCI SNFs were matched with control SNFs using propensity score matching on 2013 SNF characteristics. Exposures: Admission to a BPCI model 3-participating SNF. Main Outcomes and Measures: The primary outcome was institutional spending, a combination of postacute care and hospital Medicare-allowed payments. Additional outcomes included other categories of spending, changes in case mix, admission volume, home health use, length of stay, and hospital use within 90 days of SNF admission. Results: There were 448 BPCI SNFs with 18 870 LEJR episodes among 16 837 patients (mean [SD] age, 77.5 [9.4] years; 12 173 [72.3%] women) matched with 1958 control SNFs with 72 005 LEJR episodes among 63 811 patients (mean [SD] age, 77.6 [9.4] years; 46 072 [72.2%] women) in the preintervention and postintervention periods. Seventy-nine percent of matched BPCI SNFs were for-profit facilities, 85% were located in an urban area, and 85% were part of a larger corporate chain. There were no systematic changes in patient case mix or episode volume between BPCI-participating SNFs and controls during the program. Institutional spending decreased from $17 956 to $15 746 in BPCI SNFs and from $17 765 to $16 563 in matched controls, a differential decrease of 5.6% (-$1008 [95% CI, -$1603 to -$414]; P < .001). This decrease was related to a decline in SNF days per beneficiary (from 26.2 to 21.3 days in BPCI SNFs and from 26.3 to 23.4 days in matched controls; differential change, -2.0 days [95% CI, -2.9 to -1.1]). There was no significant change in mortality or 90-day readmissions. Conclusions and Relevance: Among Medicare patients undergoing lower extremity joint replacement from 2013-2017, the BPCI model 3 was significantly associated with a decrease in mean institutional spending on episodes initiated by admission to SNFs. Further research is needed to assess bundled payments in other clinical contexts.

Readmissions, Observation, and the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program.

BACKGROUND: The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, which is included in the Affordable Care Act (ACA), applies financial penalties to hospitals that have higher-than-expected readmission rates for targeted conditions. Some policy analysts worry that reductions in readmissions are being achieved by keeping returning patients in observation units instead of formally readmitting them to the hospital. We examined the changes in readmission rates and stays in observation units over time for targeted and nontargeted conditions and assessed whether hospitals that had greater increases in observation-service use had greater reductions in readmissions. METHODS: We compared monthly, hospital-level rates of readmission and observation-service use within 30 days after hospital discharge among Medicare elderly beneficiaries from October 2007 through May 2015. We used an interrupted time-series model to determine when trends changed and whether changes differed between targeted and nontargeted conditions. We assessed the correlation between changes in readmission rates and use of observation services after adoption of the ACA in March 2010. RESULTS: We analyzed data from 3387 hospitals. From 2007 to 2015, readmission rates for targeted conditions declined from 21.5% to 17.8%, and rates for nontargeted conditions declined from 15.3% to 13.1%. Shortly after passage of the ACA, the readmission rate declined quickly, especially for targeted conditions, and then continued to fall at a slower rate after October 2012 for both targeted and nontargeted conditions. Stays in observation units for targeted conditions increased from 2.6% in 2007 to 4.7% in 2015, and rates for nontargeted conditions increased from 2.5% to 4.2%. Within hospitals, there was no significant association between changes in observation-unit stays and readmissions after implementation of the ACA. CONCLUSIONS: Readmission trends are consistent with hospitals' responding to incentives to reduce readmissions, including the financial penalties for readmissions under the ACA. We did not find evidence that changes in observation-unit stays accounted for the decrease in readmissions.

Performance in the Medicare Shared Savings Program by Accountable Care Organizations Disproportionately Serving Dual and Disabled Populations.

BACKGROUND: The growth of accountable care organizations (ACOs) and other alternative payment models has prompted concern about whether these models will disadvantage providers who serve vulnerable populations, particularly those living in poverty or with a disability. OBJECTIVE: To examine performance by ACOs in the top quintile of their proportion of beneficiaries dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid (high-dual) and the top quintile of disabled beneficiaries (high-disabled). RESEARCH DESIGN: This is a retrospective cohort study. SUBJECTS: The 333 ACOs in the Medicare Shared Savings Program in 2014, followed through 2016. MEASURES: Quality scores, savings per beneficiary, whether or not the ACO shared savings, and amount of shared savings. RESULTS: High-dual and high-disabled ACOs had slightly lower quality and similar or higher baseline spending than other ACOs, but achieved greater savings per beneficiary than other ACOs ($212 vs. $51 for high-dual ACOs, P=0.04; $241 vs. $44 for high-disabled ACOs, P=0.012). Further, these ACOs were equally or more likely to earn shared savings; just over 30% of high-dual ACOs earned shared savings compared with 25% of non-high-dual ACOs (P=0.35) and 38% of high-disabled ACOs earned shared savings compared with 23% of non-high-disabled ACOs (P=0.013). In longitudinal analyses, we found a decrease in the differences in quality between high-social risk and other ACOs over time. Savings remained higher for high-dual and high-disabled ACOs relative to other ACOs over 2014-2016 though the gap narrowed over time. CONCLUSIONS: High-dual and high-disabled ACOs had similar or higher spending than other ACOs at baseline, but achieved greater savings and were equally or more likely to earn shared savings, suggesting that alternative payment models can have positive financial outcomes for providers who serve vulnerable populations.

Elements of Program Design in Medicare's Value-based and Alternative Payment Models: a Narrative Review.

Increasing emphasis on value in health care has spurred the development of value-based and alternative payment models. Inherent in these models are choices around program scope (broad vs. narrow); selecting absolute or relative performance targets; rewarding improvement, achievement, or both; and offering penalties, rewards, or both. We examined and classified current Medicare payment models-the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (HVBP), Hospital-Acquired Conditions Reduction Program (HACRP), Medicare Advantage Quality Star Rating program, Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier (VM) and its successor, the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), and the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) on these elements of program design and reviewed the literature to place findings in context. We found that current Medicare payment models vary significantly across each parameter of program design examined. For example, in terms of scope, the HRRP focuses exclusively on risk-standardized excess readmissions and the HACRP on patient safety. In contrast, HVBP includes 21 measures in five domains, including both quality and cost measures. Choices regarding penalties versus bonuses are similarly variable: HRRP and HACRP are penalty-only; HVBP, VM, and MIPS are penalty-or-bonus; and the MSSP and MA quality star rating programs are largely bonus-only. Each choice has distinct pros and cons that impact program efficacy. Unfortunately, there are scant data to inform which program design choice is best. While no one approach is clearly superior to another, the variability contained within these programs provides an important opportunity for Medicare and others to learn from these undertakings and to use that knowledge to inform future policymaking.

Association of Practice-Level Social and Medical Risk With Performance in the Medicare Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier Program.

Importance: Medicare recently launched the Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier (PVBM) Program, a mandatory pay-for-performance program for physician practices. Little is known about performance by practices that serve socially or medically high-risk patients. Objective: To compare performance in the PVBM Program by practice characteristics. Design, Setting, and Participants: Cross-sectional observational study using PVBM Program data for payments made in 2015 based on performance of large US physician practices caring for fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries in 2013. Exposures: High social risk (defined as practices in the top quartile of proportion of patients dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid) and high medical risk (defined as practices in the top quartile of mean Hierarchical Condition Category risk score among fee-for-service beneficiaries). Main Outcomes and Measures: Quality and cost z scores based on a composite of individual measures. Higher z scores reflect better performance on quality; lower scores, better performance on costs. Results: Among 899 physician practices with 5 189 880 beneficiaries, 547 practices were categorized as low risk (neither high social nor high medical risk) (mean, 7909 beneficiaries; mean, 320 clinicians), 128 were high medical risk only (mean, 3675 beneficiaries; mean, 370 clinicians), 102 were high social risk only (mean, 1635 beneficiaries; mean, 284 clinicians), and 122 were high medical and social risk (mean, 1858 beneficiaries; mean, 269 clinicians). Practices categorized as low risk performed the best on the composite quality score (z score, 0.18 [95% CI, 0.09 to 0.28]) compared with each of the practices categorized as high risk (high medical risk only: z score, -0.55 [95% CI, -0.77 to -0.32]; high social risk only: z score, -0.86 [95% CI, -1.17 to -0.54]; and high medical and social risk: -0.78 [95% CI, -1.04 to -0.51]) (P < .001 across groups). Practices categorized as high social risk only performed the best on the composite cost score (z score, -0.52 [95% CI, -0.71 to -0.33]), low risk had the next best cost score (z score, -0.18 [95% CI, -0.25 to -0.10]), then high medical and social risk (z score, 0.40 [95% CI, 0.23 to 0.57]), and then high medical risk only (z score, 0.82 [95% CI, 0.65 to 0.99]) (P < .001 across groups). Total per capita costs were $9506 for practices categorized as low risk, $13 683 for high medical risk only, $8214 for high social risk only, and $11 692 for high medical and social risk. These patterns were associated with fewer bonuses and more penalties for high-risk practices. Conclusions and Relevance: During the first year of the Medicare Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier Program, physician practices that served more socially high-risk patients had lower quality and lower costs, and practices that served more medically high-risk patients had lower quality and higher costs.