Three ways to make replication mainstream.

Zwaan et al. argue convincingly that replication needs to be more mainstream. Here, I suggest three practices for achieving that goal: Incremental Replications, which are built into each experiment in a series of experiments; Reciprocal Replications, which are reciprocal arrangements of co-replications across labs; and Didactic Replications, which are replications used for training.

Editorial Perspective: The use of person-first language in scholarly writing may accentuate stigma.

Numerous style guides, including those issued by the American Psychological and the American Psychiatric Associations, prescribe that writers use only person-first language so that nouns referring to persons (e.g. children) always precede phrases referring to characteristics (e.g. children with typical development). Person-first language is based on the premise that everyone, regardless of whether they have a disability, is a person-first, and therefore everyone should be referred to with person-first language. However, my analysis of scholarly writing suggests that person-first language is used more frequently to refer to children with disabilities than to refer to children without disabilities; person-first language is more frequently used to refer to children with disabilities than adults with disabilities; and person-first language is most frequently used to refer to children with the most stigmatized disabilities. Therefore, the use of person-first language in scholarly writing may actually accentuate stigma rather than attenuate it. Recommendations are forwarded for language use that may reduce stigma.

A guide for social science journal editors on easing into open science.

Journal editors have a large amount of power to advance open science in their respective fields by incentivising and mandating open policies and practices at their journals. The Data PASS Journal Editors Discussion Interface (JEDI, an online community for social science journal editors: www.dpjedi.org ) has collated several resources on embedding open science in journal editing ( www.dpjedi.org/resources ). However, it can be overwhelming as an editor new to open science practices to know where to start. For this reason, we created a guide for journal editors on how to get started with open science. The guide outlines steps that editors can take to implement open policies and practices within their journal, and goes through the what, why, how, and worries of each policy and practice. This manuscript introduces and summarizes the guide (full guide: https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/hstcx ).

Anti-ableism and scientific accuracy in autism research: a false dichotomy.

It was recently argued that autism researchers committed to rejecting ableist frameworks in their research may sacrifice "scientifically accurate" conceptualizations of autism. In this perspective piece, we argue that: (a) anti-ableism vs. scientific accuracy is a false dichotomy, (b) there is no ideology-free science that has claim to scientific accuracy, and (c) autism science has a history of false leads in part because of unexamined ableist ideologies that undergird researcher framings and interpretations of evidence. To illustrate our claims, we discuss several avenues of autism research that were promoted as scientific advances, but were eventually debunked or shown to have much less explanatory value than initially proposed. These research programs have involved claims about autism etiology, the nature of autism and autistic characteristics, and autism intervention. Common to these false leads have been ableist assumptions about autism that inform researcher perspectives. Negative impacts of this work have been mitigated in some areas of autism research, but these perspectives continue to exert influence on the lives of autistic people, including the availability of services, discourses about autism, and sociocultural conceptualizations of autistic people. Examining these false leads may help current researchers better understand how ableism may negatively influence their areas of inquiry. We close with a positive argument that promoting anti-ableism can be done in tandem with increasing scientific accuracy.

Consensus-based guidance for conducting and reporting multi-analyst studies.

Any large dataset can be analyzed in a number of ways, and it is possible that the use of different analysis strategies will lead to different results and conclusions. One way to assess whether the results obtained depend on the analysis strategy chosen is to employ multiple analysts and leave each of them free to follow their own approach. Here, we present consensus-based guidance for conducting and reporting such multi-analyst studies, and we discuss how broader adoption of the multi-analyst approach has the potential to strengthen the robustness of results and conclusions obtained from analyses of datasets in basic and applied research.

Autistic People Do Enhance Their Selves.

We investigated whether autistic people are less prone to self-enhance (i.e., portray themselves in socially desirable ways). Autistic (N = 130) and non-autistic (N = 130) participants first responded to social desirability items using the standard instruction to endorse each item as true or false about themselves. Then, all participants read an explanation of what social desirability items measure before responding again to the social desirability items. Self-enhancement was operationalized as participants endorsing more social desirability items before learning the explanation than after. All participants endorsed significantly more social desirability items before learning the explanation than after, F subjects(1,258) = 57.73, p < .001, η2 p = .183; F items(1,34) = 43.04, p < .001, η2 p = .559). However, autistic and non-autistic participants did not significantly differ in how many items they endorsed, either before or after reading the explanation, indicating that autistic people are as susceptible to social desirability and self-enhancement as non-autistic people are. Our results challenge the claim that autistic people are immune to reputation management.

Four Empirically Based Reasons Not to Administer Time-Limited Tests.

For more than a century, measurement experts have distinguished between time-limited tests and untimed power tests, which are administered without time limits or with time limits so generous that all students are assured of completing all items. On untimed power tests, students can differ in their propensity to correctly respond to every item, and items should differ in how many correct responses they elicit. However, differences among students' speed of responding do not confound untimed power tests; therefore, untimed power tests ensure more accurate assessment. In this article, we present four empirically based reasons to administer untimed power tests rather than time-limited tests in educational settings. (1) Time-limited tests are less valid; students' test-taking pace is not a valid reflection of their knowledge and mastery. (2) Time-limited tests are less reliable; estimates of time-limited tests' reliability are artificially inflated due to artifactual consistency in students' rate of work rather than authentic consistency in students' level of knowledge. (3) Time-limited tests are less inclusive; time-limited tests exclude students with documented disabilities who, because they are legally allowed additional test-taking time, are often literally excluded from test-taking classrooms. (4) Time-limited tests are less equitable; in addition to excluding students with documented disabilities, time-limited tests can also impede students who are learning English, students from underrepresented backgrounds, students who are older than average, and students with disabilities who encounter barriers (e.g., stigma and financial expense) in obtaining disability documentation and legally mandated accommodations. We conclude by offering recommendations for avoiding time-limited testing in higher educational assessment.

Gaze fixation and the neural circuitry of face processing in autism.

Diminished gaze fixation is one of the core features of autism and has been proposed to be associated with abnormalities in the neural circuitry of affect. We tested this hypothesis in two separate studies using eye tracking while measuring functional brain activity during facial discrimination tasks in individuals with autism and in typically developing individuals. Activation in the fusiform gyrus and amygdala was strongly and positively correlated with the time spent fixating the eyes in the autistic group in both studies, suggesting that diminished gaze fixation may account for the fusiform hypoactivation to faces commonly reported in autism. In addition, variation in eye fixation within autistic individuals was strongly and positively associated with amygdala activation across both studies, suggesting a heightened emotional response associated with gaze fixation in autism.

Empirical Failures of the Claim That Autistic People Lack a Theory of Mind.

The claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind-that they fail to understand that other people have a mind or that they themselves have a mind-pervades psychology. This article (a) reviews empirical evidence that fails to support the claim that autistic people are uniquely impaired, much less that all autistic people are universally impaired, on theory-of-mind tasks; (b) highlights original findings that have failed to replicate; (c) documents multiple instances in which the various theory-of-mind tasks fail to relate to each other and fail to account for autistic traits, social interaction, and empathy; (c) summarizes a large body of data, collected by researchers working outside the theory-of-mind rubric, that fails to support assertions made by researchers working inside the theory-of-mind rubric; and (d) concludes that the claim that autistic people lack a theory of mind is empirically questionable and societally harmful.

Fast mapping is a laboratory task, not a cognitive capacity.

Fast Mapping is a laboratory task that typically involves an experimenter creating a nonsense name for an object the participant has never seen before. We demonstrate how researchers' use of the term Fast Mapping has extended beyond its core meaning as a laboratory task to more abstractly denote an internal process, a skill that children employ in their everyday lives, and an inherent capacity. We argue that such over-extension is problematic.

A comparison of contexts for assessing joint attention in toddlers on the autism spectrum.

Children on the autism spectrum often demonstrate atypical joint attention, leading some researchers to consider joint attention deficits a core feature of the autism spectrum. Structured measures, such as the Early Social Communication Scales (ESCS), are commonly used to provide a metric of joint attention. To explore the assessment of joint attention in multiple contexts, we implemented an alternative system for coding joint attention behaviors. We compared initiation of joint attention (IJA) and response to joint attention (RJA) behaviors coded from naturalistic examiner-child play samples with similar IJA and RJA behaviors elicited within the structured ESCS protocol. Participants were 20 toddlers on the autism spectrum. Levels of IJA and RJA within the two assessment contexts were significantly and positively correlated, providing support for the use of naturalistic sampling of joint attention skills as a viable alternative, or supplement, to structured measures.

Rewarding Research Transparency.

Cognitive scientists are increasingly enthusiastic about research transparency. However, their enthusiasm could be tempered if the research reward system fails to acknowledge and compensate these efforts. This article suggests ways to reward greater research transparency during academic job searches, academic promotion and tenure evaluations, and society and national award selections.

More Shared Responsibility for "More Appropriate Communication".

The term "more appropriate communication" appears in more than 400 scholarly articles (according to Google Scholar). I examined the first 100 scholarly articles that pertained to communication between humans (rather than communication between computer networks). The question I sought to answer was who, according to the scholarly literature, bears responsibility for achieving "more appropriate communication?" Of the 100 scholarly articles examined, only a slim minority, N=7, imply that "more appropriate communication" is a responsibility shared among two or more communication partners, and most of these articles address "more appropriate communication" between literal peers, such as undergraduate students with other undergraduate students. The majority of scholarly articles, N=61, imply that the responsibility for "more appropriate communication" lies with the more powerful communication partners (i.e., people who have more status, experience, or resources). The remaining third of the scholarly articles (N=32) imply that responsibility for "more appropriate communication" lies 1with the less powerful communication partners, and these less powerful communication partners are frequently children with developmental disabilities. I conclude by suggesting that the responsibility for "more appropriate communication," particularly with developmentally disabled children, either should be assumed by the more powerful communication partners or should be shared.

Writing Empirical Articles: Transparency, Reproducibility, Clarity, and Memorability.

This article provides recommendations for writing empirical journal articles that enable transparency, reproducibility, clarity, and memorability. Recommendations for transparency include preregistering methods, hypotheses, and analyses; submitting registered reports; distinguishing confirmation from exploration; and showing your warts. Recommendations for reproducibility include documenting methods and results fully and cohesively, by taking advantage of open--science tools, and citing sources responsibly. Recommendations for clarity include writing short paragraphs, composed of short sentences; writing comprehensive abstracts; and seeking feedback from a naive audience. Recommendations for memorability include writing narratively; embracing the hourglass shape of empirical articles; beginning articles with a hook; and synthesizing, rather than Mad Libbing, previous literature.

Do puzzle pieces and autism puzzle piece logos evoke negative associations?

Puzzle pieces have become ubiquitous symbols for autism. However, puzzle-piece imagery stirs debate between those who support and those who object to its use because they believe puzzle-piece imagery evokes negative associations. Our study empirically investigated whether puzzle pieces evoke negative associations in the general public. Participants' ( N = 400) implicit negative associations were measured with an Implicit Association Task, which is a speeded categorization task, and participants' explicit associations were measured with an Explicit Association Task, which is a standard task for assessing consumers' explicit associations with brands (and images of those brands). Puzzle pieces, both those used as autism logos and those used more generically, evoked negative implicit associations ( t(399) = -5.357, p < 0.001) and negative explicit associations ( z = 4.693, p < 0.001, d = 0.491). Participants explicitly associated puzzle pieces, even generic puzzle pieces, with incompleteness, imperfection, and oddity. Our results bear public policy implications. If an organization's intention for using puzzle-piece imagery is to evoke negative associations, our results suggest the organization's use of puzzle-piece imagery is apt. However, if the organization's intention is to evoke positive associations, our results suggest that puzzle-piece imagery should probably be avoided.

Specificity, contexts, and reference groups matter when assessing autistic traits.

Many of the personality and behavioral traits (e.g., social imperviousness, directness in conversation, lack of imagination, affinity for solitude, difficulty displaying emotions) that are known to be sensitive to context (with whom?) and reference group (according to whom?) also appear in questionnaire-based assessments of autistic traits. Therefore, two experiments investigated the effects of specifying contexts and reference groups when assessing autistic traits in autistic and non-autistic participants. Experiment 1 (124 autistic and 124 non-autistic participants) demonstrated that context matters when assessing autistic traits (F(1,244) = 267.5, p < .001, η2p = .523). When the context of the Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire was specified as the participants' out-group (e.g., "I like being around non-autistic people" or "I like being around autistic people"), both autistic and non-autistic participants self-reported having more autistic traits; when the context was specified as the participants' in-group, participants reported having fewer autistic traits. Experiment 2 (82 autistic and 82 non-autistic participants) demonstrated that reference group matters when assessing autistic traits (F(2,160) = 94.38, p < .001, η2p = .541). When the reference group on the Social Responsiveness Scale was specified as the participants' out-group (e.g., "According to non-autistic people, I have unusual eye contact"), autistic participants reported having more autistic traits; when the reference group was their in-group, autistic participants reported having fewer autistic traits. Non-autistic participants appeared insensitive to reference group on the Social Responsiveness Scale. Exploratory analyses suggested that when neither the context nor the reference group is specified (for assessing autistic traits on the Autism-Spectrum Quotient), both autistic and non-autistic participants use the majority ("non-autistic people") as the implied context and reference group.

Autism: Common, heritable, but not harmful.

We assert that one of the examples used by Keller & Miller (K&M), namely, autism, is indeed common, and heritable, but we question whether it is harmful. We provide a brief review of cognitive science literature in which autistics perform superiorly to non-autistics in perceptual, reasoning, and comprehension tasks; however, these superiorities are often occluded and are instead described as dysfunctions.

Language and Speech in Autism.

Autism is a developmental disability characterized by atypical social interaction, interests or body movements, and communication. Our review examines the empirical status of three communication phenomena believed to be unique to autism: pronoun reversal (using the pronoun you when the pronoun I is intended, and vice versa), echolalia (repeating what someone has said), and a reduced or even reversed production-comprehension lag (a reduction or reversal of the well-established finding that speakers produce less sophisticated language than they can comprehend). Each of these three phenomena has been claimed to be unique to autism; therefore, each has been proposed to be diagnostic of autism, and each has been interpreted in autism-centric ways (psychoanalytic interpretations of pronoun reversal, behaviorist interpretations of echolalia, and clinical lore about the production-comprehension lag). However, as our review demonstrates, none of these three phenomena is in fact unique to autism; none can or should serve as diagnostic of autism, and all call into question unwarranted assumptions about autistic persons and their language development and use.

"Special needs" is an ineffective euphemism.

Although euphemisms are intended to put a more positive spin on the words they replace, some euphemisms are ineffective. Our study examined the effectiveness of a popular euphemism for persons with disabilities, special needs. Most style guides prescribe against using the euphemism special needs and recommend instead using the non-euphemized term disability; disability advocates argue adamantly against the euphemism special needs, which they find offensive. In contrast, many parents of children with disabilities prefer to use special needs rather than disability. But no empirical study has examined whether special needs is more or less positive than the term it replaces. Therefore, we gathered a sample of adult participants from the general population (N = 530) and created a set of vignettes that allowed us to measure how positively children, college students, and middle-age adults are viewed when they are described as having special needs, having a disability, having a certain disability (e.g., is blind, has Down syndrome), or with no label at all. We predicted and observed that persons are viewed more negatively when described as having special needs than when described as having a disability or having a certain disability, indicating that special needs is an ineffective euphemism. Even for members of the general population who have a personal connection to disability (e.g., as parents of children with disabilities), the euphemism special needs is no more effective than the non-euphemized term disability. We also collected free associations to the terms special needs and disability and found that special needs is associated with more negativity; special needs conjures up more associations with developmental disabilities (such as intellectual disability) whereas disability is associated with a more inclusive set of disabilities; and special needs evokes more unanswered questions. These findings recommend against using the euphemism special needs.