Thinking About God Encourages Prosociality Toward Religious Outgroups: A Cross-Cultural Investigation.

Most humans believe in a god or gods, a belief that may promote prosociality toward coreligionists. A critical question is whether such enhanced prosociality is primarily parochial and confined to the religious ingroup or whether it extends to members of religious outgroups. To address this question, we conducted field and online experiments with Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and Jewish adults in the Middle East, Fiji, and the United States (N = 4,753). Participants were given the opportunity to share money with anonymous strangers from different ethno-religious groups. We manipulated whether they were asked to think about their god before making their choice. Thinking about God increased giving by 11% (4.17% of the total stake), an increase that was extended equally to ingroup and outgroup members. This suggests that belief in a god or gods may facilitate intergroup cooperation, particularly in economic transactions, even in contexts with heightened intergroup tension.

Toward a psychology of Homo sapiens: Making psychological science more representative of the human population.

Two primary goals of psychological science should be to understand what aspects of human psychology are universal and the way that context and culture produce variability. This requires that we take into account the importance of culture and context in the way that we write our papers and in the types of populations that we sample. However, most research published in our leading journals has relied on sampling WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) populations. One might expect that our scholarly work and editorial choices would by now reflect the knowledge that Western populations may not be representative of humans generally with respect to any given psychological phenomenon. However, as we show here, almost all research published by one of our leading journals, Psychological Science, relies on Western samples and uses these data in an unreflective way to make inferences about humans in general. To take us forward, we offer a set of concrete proposals for authors, journal editors, and reviewers that may lead to a psychological science that is more representative of the human condition.

Thinking from God's perspective decreases biased valuation of the life of a nonbeliever.

Religious belief is often thought to motivate violence because it is said to promote norms that encourage tribalism and the devaluing of the lives of nonbelievers. If true, this should be visible in the multigenerational violent conflict between Palestinians and Israelis which is marked by a religious divide. We conducted experiments with a representative sample of Muslim Palestinian youth (n = 555), examining whether thinking from the perspective of Allah (God), who is the ultimate arbitrator of religious belief, changes the relative value of Jewish Israelis' lives (compared with Palestinian lives). Participants were presented with variants of the classic "trolley dilemma," in the form of stories where a man can be killed to save the lives of five children who were either Jewish Israeli or Palestinian. They responded from their own perspective and from the perspective of Allah. We find that whereas a large proportion of participants were more likely to endorse saving Palestinian children than saving Jewish Israeli children, this proportion decreased when thinking from the perspective of Allah. This finding raises the possibility that beliefs about God can mitigate bias against other groups and reduce barriers to peace.

Self-sacrifice for a cause: The role of ideas and beliefs in motivating human conflict.

The role of ideas and beliefs is generally underplayed in Whitehouse's account. However, just as people may feel that their identity is fused with a collective, they may also feel that their identity is fused with an idea (god, history, justice), which can motivate the same type of behaviors that Whitehouse seeks to explain.

Motive attribution asymmetry for love vs. hate drives intractable conflict.

Five studies across cultures involving 661 American Democrats and Republicans, 995 Israelis, and 1,266 Palestinians provide previously unidentified evidence of a fundamental bias, what we term the "motive attribution asymmetry," driving seemingly intractable human conflict. These studies show that in political and ethnoreligious intergroup conflict, adversaries tend to attribute their own group's aggression to ingroup love more than outgroup hate and to attribute their outgroup's aggression to outgroup hate more than ingroup love. Study 1 demonstrates that American Democrats and Republicans attribute their own party's involvement in conflict to ingroup love more than outgroup hate but attribute the opposing party's involvement to outgroup hate more than ingroup love. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate this biased attributional pattern for Israelis and Palestinians evaluating their own group and the opposing group's involvement in the current regional conflict. Study 4 demonstrates in an Israeli population that this bias increases beliefs and intentions associated with conflict intractability toward Palestinians. Finally, study 5 demonstrates, in the context of American political conflict, that offering Democrats and Republicans financial incentives for accuracy in evaluating the opposing party can mitigate this bias and its consequences. Although people find it difficult to explain their adversaries' actions in terms of love and affiliation, we suggest that recognizing this attributional bias and how to reduce it can contribute to reducing human conflict on a global scale.

Loss of control is not necessary to induce behavioral consequences of deprivation: The case of religious fasting during Ramadan.

Pepper & Nettle argue that the more present-oriented behavior associated with a low socioeconomic status is an adaptive response to having relatively little control over the future. However, a study of fasters during Ramadan shows that self-imposed deprivation, which carries no implications regarding the ability to realize deferred rewards, is associated with loss and risk aversion.

Exposure to violence across the social ecosystem and the development of aggression: a test of ecological theory in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Bronfenbrenner's (1979) ecological model proposes that events in higher order social ecosystems should influence human development through their impact on events in lower order social ecosystems. This proposition was tested with respect to ecological violence and the development of children's aggression via analyses of 3 waves of data (1 wave yearly for 3 years) from 3 age cohorts (starting ages: 8, 11, and 14) representing three populations in the Middle East: Palestinians (N = 600), Israeli Jews (N = 451), and Israeli Arabs (N = 450). Results supported a hypothesized model in which ethnopolitical violence increases community, family, and school violence and children's aggression. Findings are discussed with respect to ecological and observational learning perspectives on the development of aggressive behavior.

Exposure to political conflict and violence and posttraumatic stress in Middle East youth: protective factors.

We examine the role of family- and individual-level protective factors in the relation between exposure to ethnic-political conflict and violence and posttraumatic stress among Israeli and Palestinian youth. Specifically, we examine whether parental mental health (lack of depression), positive parenting, children's self-esteem, and academic achievement moderate the relation between exposure to ethnic-political conflict/violence and subsequent posttraumatic stress (PTS) symptoms. We collected three waves of data from 901 Israeli and 600 Palestinian youths (three age cohorts: 8, 11, and 14 years old; approximately half of each gender) and their parents at 1-year intervals. Greater cumulative exposure to ethnic-political conflict/violence across the first 2 waves of the study predicted higher subsequent PTS symptoms even when we controlled for the child's initial level of PTS symptoms. This relation was significantly moderated by a youth's self-esteem and by the positive parenting received by the youth. In particular, the longitudinal relation between exposure to violence and subsequent PTS symptoms was significant for low self-esteem youth and for youth receiving little positive parenting but was non-significant for children with high levels of these protective resources. Our findings show that youth most vulnerable to PTS symptoms as a result of exposure to ethnic-political violence are those with lower levels of self-esteem and who experience low levels of positive parenting. Interventions for war-exposed youth should test whether boosting self-esteem and positive parenting might reduce subsequent levels of PTS symptoms.

Cumulative effects of exposure to violence on posttraumatic stress in Palestinian and Israeli youth.

We examine cumulative and prospective effects of exposure to conflict and violence across four contexts (ethnic-political, community, family, school) on posttraumatic stress (PTS) symptoms in Palestinian and Israeli youth. Interviews were conducted with 600 Palestinian and 901 Israeli (Jewish and Arab) children (ages 8, 11, and 14) and their parents once a year for 3 consecutive years. Palestinian children, males, and older youth were generally at greatest risk for exposure to conflict/violence across contexts. Regression analysis found unique effects of exposure to ethnic-political (Palestinian sample), school (Palestinian and Israeli Jewish samples), and family conflict/violence (Israeli Arab sample) during the first 2 years on PTS symptoms in Year 3, controlling for prior PTS symptoms. Cumulative exposure to violence in more contexts during the first 2 years predicted higher subsequent PTS symptoms than did exposure to violence in fewer contexts, and this was true regardless of the youth's level of prior PTS symptoms. These results highlight the risk that ongoing exposure to violence across multiple contexts in the social ecology poses for the mental health of children in contexts of ethnic-political violence. Researchers and mental health professionals working with war-exposed youth in a given cultural context must assess both war- and non-war-related stressors affecting youth. Based on this assessment, interventions may not be limited to individual-based, war-trauma-focused approaches but also may include school-based, community-based, and family-level interventions.

Thinking about God discourages dehumanization of religious outgroups.

In seven studies, six with American Christians and one with Israeli Jews (total N = 2,323), we examine how and when belief in moralizing gods influences dehumanization of ethno-religious outgroups. We focus on dehumanization because it is a key feature of intergroup conflict. In Studies 1-6, participants completed measures of dehumanization from their own perspectives and also from the perspective of God, rating the groups' humanity as they thought God would rate it, or wish for them to rate it. When participants completed measures from both their own and God's perspectives, they reported believing that, compared with their own views, God would see (or prefer for them to see) outgroup members as more human. In Study 7, we extend these findings by demonstrating that thinking about God's views reduces the extent to which religious believers personally dehumanize outgroup members. Collectively, results demonstrate that religious believers attribute universalizing moral attitudes to God, compared to themselves, and document how thinking about God's views can promote more positive intergroup attitudes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

War as a moral imperative (not just practical politics by other means).

We present findings from one survey and five experiments carried out in the USA, Nigeria and the Middle East showing that judgements about the use of deadly intergroup violence are strikingly insensitive to quantitative indicators of success, or to perceptions of their efficacy. By demonstrating that judgements about the use of war are bounded by rules of deontological reasoning and parochial commitment, these findings may have implications for understanding the trajectory of violent political conflicts. Further, these findings are compatible with theorizing that links the evolution of within-group altruism to intergroup violence.

Exposure to conflict and violence across contexts: relations to adjustment among Palestinian children.

Despite extensive literatures on the impact on children of exposure to violence in families, neighborhoods, and peer groups, there has been relatively little effort evaluating their cumulative impact. There also has been less attention to the effects of exposure to political conflict and violence. We collected data from a representative sample of 600 Palestinian youths (3 age cohorts: 8, 11, and 14 years old) to evaluate the relation of exposure to political conflict and violence, and violence in the family, community, and school, to posttraumatic stress (PTS) symptoms and aggressive behavior. Results highlight the additive effects of exposure to political conflict and violence, suggesting that interventionists should consider the full spectrum of sources of environmental risk for PTS symptoms and aggressive behavior.

Religion and support for suicide attacks.

In four studies carried out across different cultural, religious, and political contexts, we investigated the association between religion and popular support for suicide attacks. In two surveys of Palestinians and one cognitive priming experiment with Israeli settlers, prayer to God, an index of religious devotion, was unrelated to support for suicide attacks. Instead, attendance at religious services, thought to enhance coalitional commitment, positively predicted support for suicide attacks. In a survey of six religions in six nations, regular attendance at religious services positively predicted a combination of willing martyrdom and out-group hostility, but regular prayer did not. Implications for understanding the role of religion in suicide attacks are discussed.

The Moral Logic of Political Violence.

There is a moral logic to reasoning about political violence. People will often fight not for individual or collective material gain, but because of their commitment to abstract moral and sacred ideas. Moreover, decisions to support or oppose war are descriptively deontological and are relatively insensitive to material costs or benefits.

Folk theories of gender and anti-transgender attitudes: Gender differences and policy preferences.

Transgender rights and discrimination against transgender people are growing public policy issues. Theorizing from social, cognitive, and evolutionary psychology suggests that beyond attitudes, discrimination against transgender people may derive from folk theories about what gender is and where it comes from. Transgender identity is met with hostility, in part, because it poses a challenge to the lay view that gender is determined at birth, and based on observable physical and behavioral characteristics. Here, in two pre-registered studies (N = 1323), we asked American adults to indicate the gender of a transgender target who either altered their biology through surgical interventions or altered their outward appearance: to what extent is it their birth-assigned gender or their self-identified gender? Responses correlate strongly with affect toward transgender people, measured by feeling thermometers, yet predict views on transgender people's right to use their preferred bathrooms above and beyond feelings. Compared to male participants, female participants judge the person's gender more in line with the self-identified gender than the birth-assigned gender. This is consistent with social and psychological theories that posit high status (e.g., men) and low status (e.g., women) members of social classification systems view group hierarchies in more and less essentialist ways respectively. Gender differences in gender category beliefs decrease with religiosity and conservatism, and are smaller in higher age groups. These results suggest that folk theories of gender, or beliefs about what gender is and how it is determined have a unique role in how transgender people are viewed and treated. Moreover, as evident by the demographic variability of gender category beliefs, folk theories are shaped by social and cultural forces and are amenable to interventions. They offer an alternative pathway to measure policy support and possibly change attitude toward transgender people.

Ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal interactions underlie will to fight and die for a cause.

Willingness to fight and die (WFD) has been developed as a measure to capture willingness to incur costly sacrifices for the sake of a greater cause in the context of entrenched conflict. WFD measures have been repeatedly used in field studies, including studies on the battlefield, although their neurofunctional correlates remain unexplored. Our aim was to identify the neural underpinnings of WFD, focusing on neural activity and interconnectivity of brain areas previously associated with value-based decision-making, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). A sample of Pakistani participants supporting the Kashmiri cause was selected and invited to participate in an functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) paradigm where they were asked to convey their WFD for a series of values related to Islam and current politics. As predicted, higher compared to lower WFD was associated with increased ventromedial prefrontal activity and decreased dorsolateral activity, as well as lower connectivity between the vmPFC and the dlPFC. Our findings suggest that WFD more prominently relies on brain areas typically associated with subjective value (vmPFC) rather than integration of material costs (dlPFC) during decision-making, supporting the notion that decisions on costly sacrifices may not be mediated by cost-benefit computation.

Neuroimaging 'will to fight' for sacred values: an empirical case study with supporters of an Al Qaeda associate.

Violent intergroup conflicts are often motivated by commitments to abstract ideals such as god or nation, so-called 'sacred' values that are insensitive to material trade-offs. There is scant knowledge of how the brain processes costly sacrifices for such cherished causes. We studied willingness to fight and die for sacred values using fMRI in Barcelona, Spain, among supporters of a radical Islamist group. We measured brain activity in radicalized individuals as they indicated their willingness to fight and die for sacred and non-sacred values, and as they reacted to peers' ratings for the same values. We observed diminished activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), inferior frontal gyrus, and parietal cortex while conveying willingness to fight and die for sacred relative to non-sacred values-regions that have previously been implicated in calculating costs and consequences. An overlapping region of the dlPFC was active when viewing conflicting ratings of sacred values from peers, to the extent participants were sensitive to peer influence, suggesting that it is possible to induce flexibility in the way people defend sacred values. Our results cohere with a view that 'devoted actors' motivated by an extreme commitment towards sacred values rely on distinctive neurocognitve processes that can be identified.

Folk theories of nationality and anti-immigrant attitudes.

Nationality governs almost every aspect of our lives, including where we may live and travel, as well as our opportunities for education, healthcare and work. It is a common-sense social category that guides us in making inferences about the social world1-4. Nationalism has been extensively studied within the social5-16 and cognitive sciences17-25, but there has been little empirical investigation into folk theories regarding what determines someone's nationality. In experiments carried out in the United States and India (N = 2,745), we used a variant of the switched-at-birth task26-31 to investigate the extent to which people believe that nationality is determined by biology or is a malleable social identity that can be acquired32-34. We find that folk theories of nationality seem remarkably flexible. Depending on the framing of the question, people report believing that nationality is either fluid or fixed at birth. Our results demonstrate that people from different cultures with different experiences of migration and different explicit stereotypes of their own nation may share similar folk theories about nationality. Moreover, these theories may shape attitudes towards immigrants-an important public-policy issue35-37. Belief that nationality is malleable is associated with more positive attitudes towards immigrants even when holding ideology constant.

Neural and Behavioral Correlates of Sacred Values and Vulnerability to Violent Extremism.

Violent extremism is often explicitly motivated by commitment to abstract ideals such as the nation or divine law-so-called "sacred" values that are relatively insensitive to material incentives and define our primary reference groups. Moreover, extreme pro-group behavior seems to intensify after social exclusion. This fMRI study explores underlying neural and behavioral relationships between sacred values, violent extremism, and social exclusion. Ethnographic fieldwork and psychological surveys were carried out among 535 young men from a European Muslim community in neighborhoods in and around Barcelona, Spain. Candidates for an fMRI experiment were selected from those who expressed willingness to engage in or facilitate, violence associated with jihadist causes; 38 of whom agreed to be scanned. In the scanner, participants were assessed for their willingness to fight and die for in-group sacred values before and after an experimental manipulation using Cyberball, a toss ball game known to yield strong feelings of social exclusion. Results indicate that neural activity associated with sacred value processing in a sample vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremism shows marked activity in the left inferior frontal gyrus, a region previously associated with sacred values and rule retrieval. Participants also behaviorally expressed greater willingness to fight and die for sacred versus nonsacred values, consistent with previous studies of combatants and noncombatants. The social exclusion manipulation specifically affected nonsacred values, increasing their similarities with sacred values in terms of heightened left inferior frontal activity and greater expressed willingness to fight and die. These findings suggest that sacralization of values interacts with willingness to engage in extreme behavior in populations vulnerable to radicalization. In addition, social exclusion may be a relevant factor motivating violent extremism and consolidation of sacred values. If so, counteracting social exclusion and sacralization of values should figure into policies to prevent radicalization.

How Moral Perceptions Influence Intergroup Tolerance: Evidence From Lebanon, Morocco, and the United States.

Intergroup boundaries are often associated with differences in moral codes. How does the perception of similarity and dissimilarity in moral worldviews influence tolerant relationships between members of different groups? We theorized that the relationship between perceived moral similarity and intergroup tolerance is domain specific. Specifically, because people treat autonomy values (e.g., caring for others, being fair) as denoting universal rights and obligations, but binding values (e.g., purity) as denoting rights and obligations that apply preferentially for their own group, perceived similarity on autonomy values should be more relevant than perceived similarity on binding values to intergroup tolerance. Here, we describe correlational and experimental evidence to support these predictions from studies carried out in Lebanon (with sectarian groups), in Morocco (with ethnic groups), and in the United States (with ideological groups). Implications for understanding intergroup relations and theories of morality are discussed.