The performance of domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) on two versions of the object choice task.

Object choice task (OCT) studies are widely used to assess the phylogenetic and ontogenetic distribution of the understanding of communicative cues, with this understanding serving as a proxy for the discernment of communicative intentions. Recent reviews have found systematic procedural and methodological differences in studies which compare performances across species on the OCT. One such difference concerns the spatial configuration of the test set-up, specifically the distances between the two containers (inter-object distance) and the subject-experimenter distance. Here, we tested dogs on two versions of the task: a central version in which the containers were in the subjects' direct line of vision, and a peripheral version in which the position of the containers was distal to the subject. Half of the subjects were tested with a barrier in the testing environment (as nonhuman primates are tested) and the other half without. We found that dogs tested with a barrier performed significantly better in the central version and were more likely to fail to make a choice in the peripheral version. Dogs tested without a barrier showed comparable performance on the two versions. We thus failed to find support for the distraction hypothesis in dogs. We discuss potential explanations for this, highlighting how methodological differences in the presentation of the OCT can influence outcomes in studies using this paradigm.

Testing dogs in ape-like conditions: the effect of a barrier on dogs' performance on the object-choice task.

Recent reviews have found marked procedural and methodological differences in the testing of different taxonomic groups on the object-choice task. One such difference is the imposition of a barrier in the testing environment of nonhuman primates in the form of a cage, necessitated to ensure the experimenter's safety. Here, we conducted two studies with domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) in which we compared the performance of dogs tested from within a child's playpen and dogs tested without this barrier present. In Study 1, in a within-subjects design, we found no effect of the barrier on dogs' ability to use a pointing cue, but there was an increase in instances in which dogs failed to choose a cup. In Study 2, in a between-subjects design, dogs tested with a barrier failed to perform above chance, and were also more likely to fail to make a choice. When dogs tested without a barrier made an incorrect response, these were more likely to be incorrect choices than no choice errors. We discuss the implications of these differences in behavioural responses in function of the presence of a barrier and the necessity of ensuring matched conditions when comparing across species.

The mismeasure of ape social cognition.

In his classic analysis, Gould (The mismeasure of man, WW Norton, New York, 1981) demolished the idea that intelligence was an inherent, genetic trait of different human groups by emphasizing, among other things, (a) its sensitivity to environmental input, (b) the incommensurate pre-test preparation of different human groups, and (c) the inadequacy of the testing contexts, in many cases. According to Gould, the root cause of these oversights was confirmation bias by psychometricians, an unwarranted commitment to the idea that intelligence was a fixed, immutable quality of people. By virtue of a similar, systemic interpretive bias, in the last two decades, numerous contemporary researchers in comparative psychology have claimed human superiority over apes in social intelligence, based on two-group comparisons between postindustrial, Western Europeans and captive apes, where the apes have been isolated from European styles of social interaction, and tested with radically different procedures. Moreover, direct comparisons of humans with apes suffer from pervasive lapses in argumentation: Research designs in wide contemporary use are inherently mute about the underlying psychological causes of overt behavior. Here we analyze these problems and offer a more fruitful approach to the comparative study of social intelligence, which focuses on specific individual learning histories in specific ecological circumstances.

Distal Communication by Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): Evidence for Common Ground?

van der Goot et al. (2014) proposed that distal, deictic communication indexed the appreciation of the psychological state of a common ground between a signaler and a receiver. In their study, great apes did not signal distally, which they construed as evidence for the human uniqueness of a sense of common ground. This study exposed 166 chimpanzees to food and an experimenter, at an angular displacement, to ask, "Do chimpanzees display distal communication?" Apes were categorized as (a) proximal or (b) distal signalers on each of four trials. The number of chimpanzees who communicated proximally did not statistically differ from the number who signaled distally. Therefore, contrary to the claim by van der Goot et al., apes do communicate distally.

Apes communicate about absent and displaced objects: methodology matters.

Displaced reference is the ability to refer to an item that has been moved (displaced) in space and/or time, and has been called one of the true hallmarks of referential communication. Several studies suggest that nonhuman primates have this capability, but a recent experiment concluded that in a specific situation (absent entities), human infants display displaced reference but chimpanzees do not. Here, we show that chimpanzees and bonobos of diverse rearing histories are capable of displaced reference to absent and displaced objects. It is likely that some of the conflicting findings from animal cognition studies are due to relatively minor methodological differences, but are compounded by interpretation errors. Comparative studies are of great importance in elucidating the evolution of human cognition; however, greater care must be taken with methodology and interpretation for these studies to accurately reflect species differences.

Emotional engagements predict and enhance social cognition in young chimpanzees.

Social cognition in infancy is evident in coordinated triadic engagements, that is, infants attending jointly with social partners and objects. Current evolutionary theories of primate social cognition tend to highlight species differences in cognition based on human-unique cooperative motives. We consider a developmental model in which engagement experiences produce differential outcomes. We conducted a 10-year-long study in which two groups of laboratory-raised chimpanzee infants were given quantifiably different engagement experiences. Joint attention, cooperativeness, affect, and different levels of cognition were measured in 5- to 12-month-old chimpanzees, and compared to outcomes derived from a normative human database. We found that joint attention skills significantly improved across development for all infants, but by 12 months, the humans significantly surpassed the chimpanzees. We found that cooperativeness was stable in the humans, but by 12 months, the chimpanzee group given enriched engagement experiences significantly surpassed the humans. Past engagement experiences and concurrent affect were significant unique predictors of both joint attention and cooperativeness in 5- to 12-month-old chimpanzees. When engagement experiences and concurrent affect were statistically controlled, joint attention and cooperation were not associated. We explain differential social cognition outcomes in terms of the significant influences of previous engagement experiences and affect, in addition to cognition. Our study highlights developmental processes that underpin the emergence of social cognition in support of evolutionary continuity.

Why vocal production of atypical sounds in apes and its cerebral correlates have a lot to say about the origin of language.

Ackermann et al. mention the "acquisition of species-atypical sounds" in apes without any discussion. In our commentary, we demonstrate that these atypical sounds in chimpanzees not only include laryngeal sounds, but also have a major significance regarding the origins of language, if we consider looking at their context of use, their social properties, their relations with gestures, their lateralization, and their neurofunctional correlates as well.

The Role of Life History and Familiarity in Performance of Working and Non-Working Dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) in a Point-Following Task.

Domestic dogs are very successful at following human communicative gestures in paradigms such as the object-choice task. Pet dogs also prefer responding to cues given by a familiar cue-giver and this had not been found in working dogs. Therefore, we tested three groups of dogs in the object-choice task (n = 54): the groups were "Actively working" dogs from working dog breeds, pet dogs from "Non-working breeds" and pet dogs from "Working breeds". We found that "Actively working" and "Working breeds" dog groups outperformed "Non-working breeds" in following a point in the object-choice task. We also found that both "Actively working" and "Working breeds" preferred a familiar cue-giver over an unfamiliar one, in contrast to previous findings. Therefore, we conclude that dogs' abilities to perform well in the object-choice task is influenced by the selective history of the breed, and this is then increased by life experience and training.

Fetching felines: a survey of cat owners on the diversity of cat (Felis catus) fetching behaviour.

Domesticated animals are famous for the ease with which they can accommodate to diverse human environments and roles, but less well-studied is the ease with which domestic animals can manipulate their human caregivers to their own ends. For example, domestic animals may start and end their play behaviour with humans at times of their choice. Here we present the results of a survey of 924 cat owners who report fetching behaviour in 1154 cats. The overwhelming majority (94.4%) of these owners report that fetching emerged in the absence of explicit training. Fetching was primarily first noticed when the cats were less than one year old (n = 701) or 1-7 years old (n = 415). Cats initiated and terminated fetching bouts more often than did their owners. Thus, cats who fetch demonstrate independent and co-ordinated agency in the onset and maintenance of fetching behaviour with their human partners. Additional findings highlight the diversity of objects fetched and the diversity in household demographics. Our thematic analysis reveals owners' perspectives on (a) the process of a fetching session, (b) the initial acquisition of fetching, and (c) the circumstantial factors that influence fetching patterns. In summary, cats who fetch largely determine when they engage in fetching sessions and actively influence the play behaviour of their owners.

Effects of cage mesh on pointing: hand shapes in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

It has been speculated that cage mesh exerts a shaping influence on reaching behavior by captive apes, which is then misconstrued as pointing by human observers. Although this notion is clearly falsified by the pointing of captive language-trained apes-who point in the absence of intervening cage mesh-nevertheless, the degree to which cage mesh might influence pointing hand shapes by captive great apes in other housing environments remains relatively unexplored. We examined 259 pointing gestures displayed in archival footage from over 18 h of observation by three nonlanguage-trained chimpanzees housed at a biomedical research center. We coded points in relation to how close to the boundaries of the diamond-shaped cage mesh their points were displayed. We found that points with the whole hand were significantly more likely to be displayed away from the mesh boundaries, relative to points with the index finger or other single-digit points. However, points of each hand shape were displayed at each location, demonstrating that these physical parameters do not fully account for the number of fingers extended while pointing by chimpanzees.

Target animacy influences chimpanzee handedness.

We employed a bottom-up, quantitative method to investigate great ape handedness. Our previous investigation of gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) demonstrated that contextual information influenced an individual's handedness toward target objects. Specifically, we found a significant right-hand bias for unimanual actions directed toward inanimate target objects but not for actions directed to animate target objects (Forrester et al. in Anim Cogn 14(6):903-907, 2011). Using the identical methodological technique, we investigated the spontaneous hand actions of nine captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) during naturalistic, spontaneous behavior. We assessed both the frequencies and proportions of lateralized hand actions directed toward animate and inanimate targets employing focal follow video sampling. Like the gorillas, the chimpanzees demonstrated a right-handed bias for actions directed toward inanimate targets, but not toward animate targets. This pattern was evident at the group level and for the majority of subjects at the individual level. We postulate that a right-hand bias for only inanimate targets reflects the left hemisphere's dominant neural processing capabilities for objects that have functional properties (inanimate objects). We further speculate that a population-level right-hand bias is not a human-unique characteristic, but one that was inherited from a common human-ape ancestor.

Target animacy influences gorilla handedness.

We investigated the unimanual actions of a biological family group of twelve western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) using a methodological approach designed to assess behavior within social context from a bottom-up perspective. Measures of both the lateralization of unimanual actions (left, right) and the target of the action (animate, inanimate) were assessed during dual, synchronized video observations of naturalistic behavior. This paper demonstrates a corelationship between handedness and the animate quality of the target object. Analyses demonstrated a significant interaction between lateralized unimanual actions and target animacy and a right-hand bias for actions directed toward inanimate targets. We suggest that lateralized motor preference reflects the different processing capabilities of the left and right hemispheres, as influenced by the emotive (animate) and/or functional (inanimate) characteristics of the target, respectively.

The Referential Problem Space revisited: An ecological hypothesis of the evolutionary and developmental origins of pointing.

Pointing by great apes poses a significant challenge to contemporary theories about the evolutionary and developmental foundations of cognitive development, because pointing has long been viewed by theoreticians as an evolved, human-unique developmental stepping-stone to linguistic reference. Although reports of pointing by great apes have existed in the scientific literature for over a century, only in recent decades has it become clear that ape pointing is definitely an intentionally communicative signal, by the same criteria we adjudge human pointing to be intentionally communicative. Theoretical responses to this changed empirical landscape have generally taken the approach of asserting, without any direct evidence (indeed, in the absence of any possibility of direct evidence), that pointing by humans is psychologically distinct from and more cognitively complex than the pointing of apes. It is commonplace in the contemporary literature to appeal to imaginary, species-unique causal factors to account for human pointing, rendering a large body of contemporary theoretical work untestable with scientific methods: scientific arguments require the public availability of core theoretical entities. In this paper, I will analyze the circumstances of pointing by apes and humans and develop an alternative theoretical model of pointing that does not rely upon non-physical constructs. According to the view espoused, here, pointing develops as a solution to a particular kind of developmental problem, characterized by (a) a developing capacity for tool use, (b) barriers to direct action, and (c) a history of caregiver responsiveness. Pointing by both apes and humans is explicable without invoking imaginary, mental causes. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

Animal cognition: multimodal tactics of orangutan communication.

Orangutans select different tactics for repairing failed communication, depending upon how well they are understood: they repeat signals if they are partially understood and switch tactics entirely if completely misunderstood.

Multimodal communication by captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

Many studies have shown that apes and monkeys are adept at cross-modal matching tasks requiring the subject to identify objects in one modality when information regarding those objects has been presented in a different modality. However, much less is known about non-human primates' production of multimodal signaling in communicative contexts. Here, we present evidence from a study of 110 chimpanzees demonstrating that they select the modality of communication in accordance with variations in the attentional focus of a human interactant, which is consistent with previous research. In each trial, we presented desirable food to one of two chimpanzees, turning mid-way through the trial from facing one chimpanzee to facing the other chimpanzee, and documented their communicative displays, as the experimenter turned towards or away from the subjects. These chimpanzees varied their signals within a context-appropriate modality, displaying a range of different visual signals when a human experimenter was facing them and a range of different auditory or tactile (attention-getting) signals when the human was facing away from them; this finding extends previous research on multimodal signaling in this species. Thus, in the impoverished circumstances characteristic of captivity, complex signaling tactics are nevertheless exhibited by chimpanzees, suggesting continuity in intersubjective psychological processes in humans and apes.

BIZARRE chimpanzees do not represent "the chimpanzee".

Henrich et al. convincingly caution against the overgeneralization of findings from particular human populations, but fail to apply their own compelling reasoning to our nearest living relatives, the great apes. Here we argue that rearing history is every bit as important for understanding cognition in other species as it is in humans.

The effects of changes in the referential problem space of infants and toddlers (Homo sapiens): Implications for cross-species comparisons.

Recent reviews have highlighted the tendency in the comparative literature to make claims about species' relative evolutionarily adaptive histories based on studies comparing different species tested with procedurally and methodologically different protocols. One particularly contentious area is the use of the object-choice task, used to measure an individual's ability to use referential cues, which is a core attribute of joint attention. We tested human children with versions of the object-choice task that have been previously used with dogs and nonhuman primates to see if manipulating the setup would lead to behavioral changes. In Study 1, we compared the responses of 18-month-olds and 36-month-olds when tested with and without a barrier. The presence of a barrier between the child and the reward did not suppress performance but did elicit more communicative behavior. Moreover, the barrier had a greater facilitating effect on the younger children, who displayed more communicative behavior in comparison with older children, who more frequently reached through the barrier in acts of direct prehension. In Study 2, we compared the behavior of 36-month-olds when the reward was within reaching distance (proximal) and when it was out of reach (distal). The children used index-finger points significantly more in the distal condition and grabbed more in the proximal condition, showing that they were making spatial judgments about the accessibility of the reward rather than just grabbing per se. We discuss the implications of these within-species differences in behavioral responses for cross-species comparisons. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Ontogeny vs. phylogeny in primate/canid comparisons: A meta-analysis of the object choice task.

The Object Choice Task (OCT) is a widely used paradigm with which researchers measure the ability of a subject to comprehend deictic (directional) cues, such as pointing gestures and eye gaze. There is a widespread belief that nonhuman primates evince only a weak capacity to use deictic cues; in contrast, domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) tend to demonstrate high success rates. This pattern of canid superiority has been taken to support the Domestication Hypothesis, which posits enhancing effects of artificial selection on the sociocognitive abilities of dogs and humans. Here we review nearly two decades of published findings, using variants of the OCT. We find systematic confounds with species classification in task-relevant preparation of the subjects, in the imposition of a barrier between reward and subject, and in the specific deictic cues used to indicate the location of hidden objects. Thus, the widespread belief that dogs outperform primates on OCTs is undermined by the systematic procedural differences in the assessments of these skills, differences that are confounded with taxonomic classification.

Understanding of visual attention by adult humans (Homo sapiens): a partial replication of Povinelli, Bierschwale, and Cech (1999).

Povinelli, Bierschwale, and Cech (1999) reported that when tested on a visual attention task, the behavior of juvenile chimpanzees did not support a high-level understanding of visual attention. This study replicates their research using adult humans and aims to investigate the validity of their experimental design. Participants were trained to respond to pointing cues given by an experimenter, and then tested on their ability to locate hidden objects from visual cues. Povinelli et al.'s assertion that the generalization of pointing to gaze is indicative of a high-level framework was not supported by our findings: Training improved performance only on initial probe trials when the experimenter's gaze was not directed at the baited cup. Furthermore, participants performed above chance on such trials, the same result exhibited by chimpanzees and used as evidence by Povinelli et al. to support a low-level framework. These findings, together with the high performance of participants in an incongruent condition, in which the experimenter pointed to or gazed at an unbaited container, challenge the validity of their experimental design.

Pointing to Visible and Invisible Targets.

We investigated how the visibility of targets influenced the type of point used to provide directions. In Study 1, we asked 605 passersby in three localities for directions to well-known local landmarks. When that landmark was in plain view behind the requester, most respondents pointed with their index fingers, and few respondents pointed more than once. In contrast, when the landmark was not in view, respondents pointed initially with their index fingers, but often elaborated with a whole-hand point. In Study 2, we covertly filmed the responses from 157 passersby we approached for directions, capturing both verbal and gestural responses. As in Study 1, few respondents produced more than one gesture when the target was in plain view and initial points were most likely to be index finger points. Thus, in a Western geographical context in which pointing with the index finger is the dominant form of pointing, a slight change in circumstances elicited a preference for pointing with the whole hand when it was the second or third manual gesture in a sequence.