Discriminatory attitudes against unvaccinated people during the pandemic.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, sizeable groups of unvaccinated people persist even in countries with high vaccine access1. As a consequence, vaccination became a controversial subject of debate and even protest2. Here we assess whether people express discriminatory attitudes in the form of negative affectivity, stereotypes and exclusionary attitudes in family and political settings across groups defined by COVID-19 vaccination status. We quantify discriminatory attitudes between vaccinated and unvaccinated citizens in 21 countries, covering a diverse set of cultures across the world. Across three conjoined experimental studies (n = 15,233), we demonstrate that vaccinated people express discriminatory attitudes towards unvaccinated individuals at a level as high as discriminatory attitudes that are commonly aimed at immigrant and minority populations3-5. By contrast, there is an absence of evidence that unvaccinated individuals display discriminatory attitudes towards vaccinated people, except for the presence of negative affectivity in Germany and the USA. We find evidence in support of discriminatory attitudes against unvaccinated individuals in all countries except for Hungary and Romania, and find that discriminatory attitudes are more strongly expressed in cultures with stronger cooperative norms. Previous research on the psychology of cooperation has shown that individuals react negatively against perceived 'free-riders'6,7, including in the domain of vaccinations8,9. Consistent with this, we find that contributors to the public good of epidemic control (that is, vaccinated individuals) react with discriminatory attitudes towards perceived free-riders (that is, unvaccinated individuals). National leaders and vaccinated members of the public appealed to moral obligations to increase COVID-19 vaccine uptake10,11, but our findings suggest that discriminatory attitudes-including support for the removal of fundamental rights-simultaneously emerged.

Pandemic fatigue fueled political discontent during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Health authorities have highlighted "pandemic fatigue" as a psychological consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and warned that "fatigue" could demotivate compliance with health-related policies and mandates. Yet, fatigue from following the policies of authorities may have consequences far beyond the health domain. Theories from the social sciences have raised that real and perceived costs of policies can also drive sentiments of discontent with the entire political establishment. Integrating theories from the health and social sciences, we ask how pandemic fatigue (i.e., perceived inability to "keep up" with restrictions) developed over the pandemic and whether it fueled political discontent. Utilizing longitudinal and panel surveys collected from September 2020 to July 2021 in eight Western countries (N = 49,116), we analyze: 1) fatigue over time at the country level, 2) associations between pandemic fatigue and discontent, and 3) the effect of pandemic fatigue on political discontent using panel data. Pandemic fatigue significantly increased with time and the severity of interventions but also decreased with COVID-19 deaths. When triggered, fatigue elicited a broad range of discontent, including protest support and conspiratorial thinking. The results demonstrate the significant societal impact of the pandemic beyond the domain of health and raise concerns about the stability of democratic societies, which were already strained by strife prior to the pandemic.

A practical agenda for incorporating trust into pandemic preparedness and response.

Despite widespread acknowledgement that trust is important in a pandemic, few concrete proposals exist on how to incorporate trust into preparing for the next health crisis. One reason is that building trust is rightly perceived as slow and challenging. Although trust in public institutions and one another is essential in preparing for a pandemic, countries should plan for the possibility that efforts to instil or restore trust may fail. Incorporating trust into pandemic preparedness means acknowledging that polarization, partisanship and misinformation may persist and engaging with communities as they currently are, not as we would wish them to be. This paper presents a practical policy agenda for incorporating mistrust as a risk factor in pandemic preparedness and response planning. We propose two sets of evidence-based strategies: (i) strategies for ensuring the trust that already exists in a community is sustained during a crisis, such as mitigating pandemic fatigue by health interventions and honest and transparent sense-making communication; and (ii) strategies for promoting cooperation in communities where people mistrust their governments and neighbours, sometimes for legitimate, historical reasons. Where there is mistrust, pandemic preparedness and responses must rely less on coercion and more on tailoring local policies and building partnerships with community institutions and leaders to help people overcome difficulties they encounter in cooperating with public health guidance. The regular monitoring of interpersonal and government trust at national and local levels is a way of enabling this context-specific pandemic preparedness and response planning.

Bien qu'il soit largement admis que la confiance est un facteur crucial lors d'une pandémie, peu de propositions concrètes ont été formulées quant aux modalités de son intégration dans la préparation aux prochaines crises sanitaires. L'une des raisons tient au fait qu'établir la confiance est considéré, à juste titre, comme un processus lent et complexe. La confiance mutuelle et celle placée dans les institutions publiques est essentielle dans la préparation aux pandémies, les pays devraient donc tenir compte de la possibilité que leurs efforts pour instaurer ou restaurer cette confiance échouent. Intégrer ce facteur dans la préparation aux pandémies signifie reconnaître que la polarisation, la partialité et la désinformation sont susceptibles de persister. Cela signifie aussi travailler avec les communautés telles qu'elles sont actuellement, et non telles que nous souhaiterions qu'elles soient. Le présent document dévoile un programme politique concret visant à inclure la méfiance comme facteur de risque dans la planification des mesures de préparation et de riposte aux pandémies. Nous suggérons deux types de stratégies fondées sur des données factuelles: (i) des stratégies visant à préserver la confiance préexistante au sein d'une communauté durant une crise, notamment en luttant contre la lassitude face aux pandémies par le biais d'interventions de santé et d'une communication honnête, transparente et sensée; mais aussi (ii) des stratégies qui favorisent la coopération dans les communautés dont les membres se méfient de leur gouvernement et de leurs voisins, parfois pour des raisons historiques légitimes. Lorsque des doutes subsistent, les mesures de préparation et de riposte aux pandémies doivent éviter de recourir à la contrainte et privilégier des politiques locales adaptées ainsi que des partenariats avec les responsables et les institutions de la communauté, afin d'aider les gens à surmonter les difficultés qu'ils rencontrent vis-à-vis des directives de santé publique. Un suivi régulier de la confiance envers les autres et les autorités à l'échelle régionale et nationale permet de planifier une préparation et une riposte spécifiques face aux pandémies.

A pesar del reconocimiento generalizado de que la confianza es importante en una pandemia, existen pocas propuestas concretas sobre cómo incorporarla a la preparación para la próxima crisis sanitaria. Uno de los motivos es que generar confianza se percibe, con razón, como algo lento y difícil. Aunque la confianza en las instituciones públicas y en los demás es esencial en la preparación para una pandemia, los países deben prever la posibilidad de que fracasen los esfuerzos por infundir o restablecer la confianza. Incorporar la confianza a la preparación ante una pandemia significa reconocer que la polarización, el partidismo y la desinformación pueden persistir y comprometerse con las comunidades tal y como son actualmente, no como desearíamos que fueran. Este documento presenta una agenda política práctica para incorporar la desconfianza como factor de riesgo en la planificación de la preparación y respuesta ante una pandemia. Proponemos dos conjuntos de estrategias basadas en la evidencia: (i) estrategias para garantizar que la confianza que ya existe en una comunidad se mantenga durante una crisis, como mitigar la fatiga pandémica mediante intervenciones sanitarias y una comunicación honesta y transparente que haga entrar en razón; y (ii) estrategias para promover la cooperación en comunidades donde las personas desconfían de sus gobiernos y vecinos, a veces por razones legítimas e históricas. Cuando hay desconfianza, la preparación y las respuestas ante una pandemia se deben basar menos en la coerción y más en la adaptación de las políticas locales y la creación de asociaciones con las instituciones y los líderes de la comunidad para ayudar a las personas a superar las dificultades que encuentran en la cooperación con las orientaciones de salud pública. El seguimiento periódico de la confianza interpersonal y gubernamental a nivel nacional y local es una forma de hacer posible esta planificación de la preparación y respuesta ante una pandemia específica para cada contexto.

Transparent communication about negative features of COVID-19 vaccines decreases acceptance but increases trust.

During the rapid development and rolling out of vaccines against COVID-19, researchers have called for an approach of "radical transparency," in which vaccine information is transparently disclosed to the public, even if negative information can decrease vaccine uptake. Consistent with theories about the psychology of conspiracy beliefs, these calls predict that a lack of transparency may reduce trust in health authorities and may facilitate the spread of conspiracy theories, which may limit the long-term capabilities of health authorities during and after the pandemic. On the basis of preregistered experiments conducted on large, representative samples of Americans and Danes (N > 13,000), the current study contrasts the effects of vague vaccine communication with transparent communication, which discloses either positive or negative vaccine features. The evidence demonstrates that transparent negative communication may indeed harm vaccine acceptance here and now but that it increases trust in health authorities. Furthermore, the alternative of vague, reassuring communication does not increase vaccine acceptance either and leads to both lower trust and higher endorsement of conspiracy theories.

Experimental and cross-cultural evidence that parenthood and parental care motives increase social conservatism.

Differences in attitudes on social issues such as abortion, immigration and sex are hugely divisive, and understanding their origins is among the most important tasks facing human behavioural sciences. Despite the clear psychological importance of parenthood and the motivation to provide care for children, researchers have only recently begun investigating their influence on social and political attitudes. Because socially conservative values ostensibly prioritize safety, stability and family values, we hypothesized that being more invested in parental care might make socially conservative policies more appealing. Studies 1 (preregistered; n = 376) and 2 (n = 1924) find novel evidence of conditional experimental effects of a parenthood prime, such that people who engaged strongly with a childcare manipulation showed an increase in social conservatism. Studies 3 (n = 2610, novel data from 10 countries) and 4 (n = 426 444, World Values Survey data) find evidence that both parenthood and parental care motivation are associated with increased social conservatism around the globe. Further, most of the positive association globally between age and social conservatism is accounted for by parenthood. These findings support the hypothesis that parenthood and parental care motivation increase social conservatism.

The Psychological Burden of the COVID-19 Pandemic Is Associated With Antisystemic Attitudes and Political Violence.

What are the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for people's political attitudes and behavior? We tested, specifically, whether the psychological burden of the COVID-19 pandemic relates to antisystemic attitudes (dissatisfaction with the fundamental social and political order), peaceful political activism, and political violence. Nationally representative two-wave panel data were collected via online surveys of adults in the United States, Denmark, Italy, and Hungary (ns = 6,131 and 4,568 in Waves 1 and 2, respectively). Overall, levels of antisystemic attitudes were low, and only a small share of interviewees reported behavioral intentions to participate in and actual participation in political violence. However, preregistered analyses indicated that perceived COVID-19 burden was associated with antisystemic attitudes and intentions to engage in political violence. In the United States, the burden of COVID-19 was also associated with self-reported engagement in violence surrounding the Black Lives Matter protests and counterprotests. We found less robust evidence that perceived COVID-19 burden was associated with peaceful activism.

Does face mask use elicit risk-compensation? Quasi-experimental evidence from Denmark during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.

BACKGROUND: Public use of face masks has been widely adopted to halter the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, but a key concern has been whether the effectiveness of face mask use is limited due to the elicitation of false feelings of security that decrease the observance of other protective behaviors, the so-called risk-compensation. METHODS: We exploit quasi-experimental variation, prompted by three major changes in policy, to assess whether public use of face masks elicit risk-compensation by increasing the number of close contacts or decreasing attention to distancing and hygiene measured in daily nationally representative surveys (N = 106 880). RESULTS: Number of close contacts: face mask use prompted by the policy changes decrease the number of contacts in two of the three interventions. In the remaining intervention, it has no effect. Attention to hygiene: across the changes, face masks use does not affect people's attention to hygiene. Attention to distancing: in two of three interventions, face mask use increase attention to distancing. In the remaining intervention, we see a decrease in attention. CONCLUSIONS: Overall, public use of face masks may occasionally elicit a narrow form of risk-compensation; specifically, reducing engagement in physical distancing. However, such narrow forms of risk-compensation are limited: the results do not reveal any effects on the actual number of physical contacts, only on the psychological attention to distancing advice. Moreover, the negative effect only appears for one of three interventions. The other two interventions suggest that face mask use increases attention to physical distancing.

The Emotional Path to Action: Empathy Promotes Physical Distancing and Wearing of Face Masks During the COVID-19 Pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic presents a major challenge to societies all over the globe. Two measures implemented in many countries to curb the spread of the disease are (a) minimizing close contact between people ("physical distancing") and (b) wearing of face masks. In the present research, we tested the idea that physical distancing and wearing of face masks can be the result of a prosocial emotional process-empathy for people most vulnerable to the virus. In four preregistered studies (N = 3,718, Western population), we found that (a) empathy indeed relates to the motivation to adhere to physical distancing and to wearing face masks and (b) inducing empathy for people most vulnerable to the virus promotes the motivation to adhere to these measures (whereas merely providing information about the importance of the measures does not). In sum, the present research provides a better understanding of the factors underlying the willingness to follow two important measures during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Dominance-Driven Autocratic Political Orientations Predict Political Violence in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) and Non-WEIRD Samples.

Given the costs of political violence, scholars have long sought to identify its causes. We examined individual differences related to participation in political violence, emphasizing the central role of political orientations. We hypothesized that individuals with dominance-driven autocratic political orientations are prone to political violence. Multilevel analysis of survey data from 34 African countries (N = 51,587) indicated that autocracy-oriented individuals, compared with democracy-oriented individuals, are considerably more likely to participate in political violence. As a predictor of violence (indexed with attitudinal, intentional, and behavioral measures), autocratic orientation outperformed other variables highlighted in existing research, including socioeconomic status and group-based injustice. Additional analyses of original data from South Africa (N = 2,170), Denmark (N = 1,012), and the United States (N = 1,539) indicated that the link between autocratic orientations and political violence reflects individual differences in the use of dominance to achieve status and that the findings generalize to societies extensively socialized to democratic values.

Detecting affiliation in colaughter across 24 societies.

Laughter is a nonverbal vocal expression that often communicates positive affect and cooperative intent in humans. Temporally coincident laughter occurring within groups is a potentially rich cue of affiliation to overhearers. We examined listeners' judgments of affiliation based on brief, decontextualized instances of colaughter between either established friends or recently acquainted strangers. In a sample of 966 participants from 24 societies, people reliably distinguished friends from strangers with an accuracy of 53-67%. Acoustic analyses of the individual laughter segments revealed that, across cultures, listeners' judgments were consistently predicted by voicing dynamics, suggesting perceptual sensitivity to emotionally triggered spontaneous production. Colaughter affords rapid and accurate appraisals of affiliation that transcend cultural and linguistic boundaries, and may constitute a universal means of signaling cooperative relationships.

Parasite stress and pathogen avoidance relate to distinct dimensions of political ideology across 30 nations.

People who are more avoidant of pathogens are more politically conservative, as are nations with greater parasite stress. In the current research, we test two prominent hypotheses that have been proposed as explanations for these relationships. The first, which is an intragroup account, holds that these relationships between pathogens and politics are based on motivations to adhere to local norms, which are sometimes shaped by cultural evolution to have pathogen-neutralizing properties. The second, which is an intergroup account, holds that these same relationships are based on motivations to avoid contact with outgroups, who might pose greater infectious disease threats than ingroup members. Results from a study surveying 11,501 participants across 30 nations are more consistent with the intragroup account than with the intergroup account. National parasite stress relates to traditionalism (an aspect of conservatism especially related to adherence to group norms) but not to social dominance orientation (SDO; an aspect of conservatism especially related to endorsements of intergroup barriers and negativity toward ethnic and racial outgroups). Further, individual differences in pathogen-avoidance motives (i.e., disgust sensitivity) relate more strongly to traditionalism than to SDO within the 30 nations.

What is seen and what is not seen in the economy: An effect of our evolved psychology.

Specific features of our evolved cognitive architecture explain why some aspects of the economy are "seen" and others are "not seen." Drawing from the commentaries of economists, psychologists, and other social scientists on our original proposal, we propose a more precise model of the acquisition and spread of folk-beliefs about the economy. In particular, we try to provide a clearer delimitation of the field of folk-economic beliefs (sect. R2) and to dispel possible misunderstandings of the role of variation in evolutionary psychology (sect. R3). We also comment on the difficulty of explaining folk-economic beliefs in terms of domain-general processes or biases (sect. R4), as developmental studies show how encounters with specific environments calibrate domain-specific systems (sect. R5). We offer a more detailed description of the connections between economic beliefs and political psychology (sect. R6) and of the probable causes of individual variation in that domain (sect. R7). Taken together, these arguments point to a better integration or consilience between economics and human evolution (sect. R8).

Healthy Out-Group Members Are Represented Psychologically as Infected In-Group Members.

A range of studies have demonstrated that people implicitly treat out-groups as the carriers of pathogens and that considerable prejudice against out-groups is driven by concerns about pathogens. Yet the psychological categories that are involved and the selection pressures that underlie these categories remain unclear. A common view is that human pathogen-avoidance psychology is specifically adapted to avoid out-groups because of their potentially different pathogens. However, the series of studies reported here shows that there is no dedicated category for reasoning about out-groups in terms of pathogens. Specifically, a memory-confusion experiment conducted with two large-scale samples of Americans (one nationally representative) yielded strong, replicable evidence that healthy out-group members are represented using the same psychological category that is used to represent manifestly infected in-group members. This suggests that the link between out-group prejudice and pathogen concerns is a by-product of general mechanisms for treating any unfamiliar appearance as an infection cue.

Folk-economic beliefs: An evolutionary cognitive model.

The domain of "folk-economics" consists in explicit beliefs about the economy held by laypeople, untrained in economics, about such topics as, for example, the causes of the wealth of nations, the benefits or drawbacks of markets and international trade, the effects of regulation, the origins of inequality, the connection between work and wages, the economic consequences of immigration, or the possible causes of unemployment. These beliefs are crucial in forming people's political beliefs and in shaping their reception of different policies. Yet, they often conflict with elementary principles of economic theory and are often described as the consequences of ignorance, irrationality, or specific biases. As we will argue, these past perspectives fail to predict the particular contents of popular folk-economic beliefs and, as a result, there is no systematic study of the cognitive factors involved in their emergence and cultural success. Here we propose that the cultural success of particular beliefs about the economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations to ancestral human small-scale sociality. These systems, for which there is independent evidence, include free-rider detection, fairness-based partner choice, ownership intuitions, coalitional psychology, and more. Information about modern mass-market conditions activates these specific inference systems, resulting in particular intuitions, for example, that impersonal transactions are dangerous or that international trade is a zero-sum game. These intuitions in turn make specific policy proposals more likely than others to become intuitively compelling, and, as a consequence, exert a crucial influence on political choices.

Birth Weight and Social Trust in Adulthood: Evidence for Early Calibration of Social Cognition.

Social trust forms the fundamental basis for social interaction within societies. Understanding the cognitive architecture of trust and the roots of individual differences in trust is of key importance. We predicted that one of the factors calibrating individual levels of trust is the intrauterine flow of nutrients from mother to child as indexed by birth weight. Birth weight forecasts both the future external environment and the internal condition of the individual in multiple ways relevant for social cognition. Specifically, we predicted that low birth weight is utilized as a forecast of a harsh environment, vulnerable condition, or both and, consequently, reduces social trust. The results of the study reported here are consistent with this prediction. Controlling for many confounds through sibling and panel designs, we found that lower birth weight reduced social trust in adulthood. Furthermore, we obtained tentative evidence that this effect is mitigated if adult environments do not induce stress.

Equity or equality? Moral judgments follow the money.

Previous research emphasizes people's dispositions as a source of differences in moral views. We investigate another source of moral disagreement, self-interest. In three experiments, participants played a simple economic game in which one player divides money with a partner according to the principle of equality (same payoffs) or the principle of equity (pay-offs proportional to effort expended). We find, first, that people's moral judgment of an allocation rule depends on their role in the game. People not only prefer the rule that most benefits them but also judge it to be more fair and moral. Second, we find that participants' views about equality and equity change in a matter of minutes as they learn where their interests lie. Finally, we find limits to self-interest: when the justification for equity is removed, participants no longer show strategic advocacy of the unequal division. We discuss implications for understanding moral debate and disagreement.

Individual differences in political ideology are effects of adaptive error management.

We apply error management theory to the analysis of individual differences in the negativity bias and political ideology. Using principles from evolutionary psychology, we propose a coherent theoretical framework for understanding (1) why individuals differ in their political ideology and (2) the conditions under which these individual differences influence and fail to influence the political choices people make.

Is something rotten in the state of Denmark? Cross-national evidence for widespread involvement but not systematic use of questionable research practices across all fields of research.

Questionable research practices (QRP) are believed to be widespread, but empirical assessments are generally restricted to a few types of practices. Furthermore, conceptual confusion is rife with use and prevalence of QRPs often being confused as the same quantity. We present the hitherto most comprehensive study examining QRPs across scholarly fields and knowledge production modes. We survey perception, use, prevalence and predictors of QRPs among 3,402 researchers in Denmark and 1,307 in the UK, USA, Croatia and Austria. Results reveal remarkably similar response patterns among Danish and international respondents (τ = 0.85). Self-reported use indicates whether respondents have used a QRP in recent publications. 9 out of 10 respondents admitted using at least one QRP. Median use is three out of nine QRP items. Self-reported prevalence reflects the frequency of use. On average, prevalence rates were roughly three times lower compared to self-reported use. Findings indicated that the perceived social acceptability of QRPs influenced self-report patterns. Results suggest that most researchers use different types of QRPs within a restricted time period. The prevalence estimates, however, do not suggest outright systematic use of specific QRPs. Perceived pressure was the strongest systemic predictor for prevalence. Conversely, more local attention to research cultures and academic age was negatively related to prevalence. Finally, the personality traits conscientiousness and, to a lesser degree, agreeableness were also inversely associated with self-reported prevalence. Findings suggest that explanations for engagement with QRPs are not only attributable to systemic factors, as hitherto suggested, but a complicated mixture of experience, systemic and individual factors, and motivated reasoning.

Hunger games: fluctuations in blood glucose levels influence support for social welfare.

Social-welfare policies are a modern instantiation of a phenomenon that has pervaded human evolutionary history: resource sharing. Ancestrally, food was a key shared resource in situations of temporary hunger. If evolved human psychology continues to shape how individuals think about current, evolutionarily novel conditions, this invites the prediction that attitudes regarding welfare politics are influenced by short-term fluctuations in hunger. Using blood glucose levels as a physiological indicator of hunger, we tested this prediction in a study in which participants were randomly assigned to conditions in which they consumed soft drinks containing either carbohydrates or an artificial sweetener. Analyses showed that participants with experimentally induced low blood glucose levels expressed stronger support for social welfare. Using an incentivized measure of actual sharing behavior (the dictator game), we further demonstrated that this increased support for social welfare does not translate into genuinely increased sharing motivations. Rather, we suggest that it is "cheap talk" aimed at increasing the sharing efforts of other individuals.