RESUMO
Coordinated pair bonds are common in birds and also occur in many other taxa. How do animals solve the social dilemmas they face in coordinating with a partner? We developed an evolutionary model to explore this question, based on observations that a) neuroendocrine feedback provides emotional bookkeeping which is thought to play a key role in vertebrate social bonds and b) these bonds are developed and maintained via courtship interactions that include low-stakes social dilemmas. Using agent-based simulation, we found that emotional bookkeeping and courtship sustained cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma in noisy environments, especially when combined. However, when deceitful defection was possible at low cost, courtship often increased cooperation, whereas emotional bookkeeping decreased it.
Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Corte , Animais , Emoções , Dilema do Prisioneiro , Simulação por Computador , Teoria dos JogosRESUMO
An individual-based model consisting of two dioecious populations in a two-dimensional environmental grid was constructed. Each population began with, and never exceeded, 1000 individuals; extinction was allowed. Genomes consisting of 30 biallelic loci for male sexual advertisement call, female mate preference, and population origin were constructed, and lineages of each individual in the starting populations were followed for 2000 generations. Type and level of hybrid disadvantage, initial population distribution, patchiness of environmental resources, and level of mate choice were varied. Persistence of bimodal hybrid zones was nonexistent at low levels of hybrid disadvantage and universal at high levels of hybrid disadvantage, with a narrow threshold in which persistence was unpredictable. Persistence occurred at lower levels of hybrid disadvantage when populations were initially parapatric rather than sympatric, and environments were patchy rather than homogeneous. Increased divergence in mating systems occurred when hybrid disadvantage was high, hybrids were infertile, populations were initially parapatric, and increased female choice was allowed. Mating system divergence was much higher in interacting populations compared with noninteracting populations, indicating that reinforcement caused most of the observed divergence. When hybrids were infertile, reinforcement contributed to speciation, because under hybrid infertility the probability of persistence at low levels of hybrid disadvantage was positively related to mate choice. The results agree with previous one-dimensional spatial models in finding that population persistence is more likely in parapatric and patchy population distributions. In addition, the results show that hybrid infertility may facilitate the process of reinforcement and speciation.
Assuntos
Evolução Biológica , Genética Populacional , Geografia , Hibridização Genética , Modelos Genéticos , Simulação por Computador , Infertilidade/genética , Dinâmica Populacional , Reprodução/fisiologia , Especificidade da EspécieRESUMO
We introduce the phenomenon of rapid self-organized criticality (RSOC) and show that, like some models of self-organized criticality (SOC), RSOC generates scale-invariant event distributions and 1/f noise. Unlike SOC, however, RSOC persists despite more than an order of magnitude variation in driving rate and displays extremely thick and dynamic branching geometry. Starting with an initial set of parameter values, we perform two numerical experiments in which nonequilibrium RSOC systems are tuned towards their critical points. The approach to the critical state is tracked using average branching rates, which must equal 1 if systems are genuinely critical.
RESUMO
Punishment offers a powerful mechanism for the maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies, but the maintenance of costly punishment itself remains problematic. Game theory has shown that corruption, where punishers can defect without being punished themselves, may sustain cooperation. However, in many human societies and some insect ones, high levels of cooperation coexist with low levels of corruption, and such societies show greater wellbeing than societies with high corruption. Here we show that small payments from cooperators to punishers can destabilize corrupt societies and lead to the spread of punishment without corruption (righteousness). Righteousness can prevail even in the face of persistent power inequalities. The resultant righteous societies are highly stable and have higher wellbeing than corrupt ones. This result may help to explain the persistence of costly punishing behavior, and indicates that corruption is a sub-optimal tool for maintaining cooperation in human societies.
Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Punição , Algoritmos , Altruísmo , Ética , Teoria dos Jogos , Humanos , Relações Interpessoais , Modelos Psicológicos , Modelos Teóricos , Poder Psicológico , Comportamento SocialRESUMO
Understanding the origins of complexity is a key challenge in many sciences. Although networks are known to underlie most systems, showing how they contribute to well-known phenomena remains an issue. Here, we show that recurrent phase transitions in network connectivity underlie emergent phenomena in many systems. We identify properties that are typical of systems in different connectivity phases, as well as characteristics commonly associated with the phase transitions. We synthesize these common features into a common framework, which we term dual-phase evolution (DPE). Using this framework, we review the literature from several disciplines to show that recurrent connectivity phase transitions underlie the complex properties of many biological, physical and human systems. We argue that the DPE framework helps to explain many complex phenomena, including perpetual novelty, modularity, scale-free networks and criticality. Our review concludes with a discussion of the way DPE relates to other frameworks, in particular, self-organized criticality and the adaptive cycle.