Using random assignment to measure court accessibility for low-income divorce seekers.

We conducted a field experiment in which 311 low-income individuals seeking a divorce were randomly assigned to receive access to a pro bono lawyer (versus minimal help) to assist with filing for divorce. Examining court records, we found that assignment to an attorney made a large difference in whether participants filed for and obtained a divorce. Three years after randomization, 46% of the treated group had terminated their marriages in the proper legal venue, compared to 9% of the control group. Among "compliers"-participants who obtained representation only if assigned to receive it-those with lawyers were far more likely to file for and obtain a divorce than those not assigned lawyers. Because divorce implicates fundamental constitutional interests and can be effectuated only by resort to the courts, the US Constitution requires that dissolution of marriage be made achievable regardless of ability to pay. Yet, we observed few low-income individuals who were able to initiate divorce suits on their own. Through interviews and archival research, we identified barriers that low-income litigants faced in navigating the divorce system, including mandatory wait times, limited hours at important facilities, and burdensome paperwork sometimes requiring access to photocopiers and typewriters. This study therefore documents a salient instance in which a civil legal process was inaccessible to those without lawyers, even though their legal issues were straightforward, involving few if any matters for courts to adjudicate.

Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for a Theory of False Signaling.

Why do people judge hypocrites, who condemn immoral behaviors that they in fact engage in, so negatively? We propose that hypocrites are disliked because their condemnation sends a false signal about their personal conduct, deceptively suggesting that they behave morally. We show that verbal condemnation signals moral goodness (Study 1) and does so even more convincingly than directly stating that one behaves morally (Study 2). We then demonstrate that people judge hypocrites negatively-even more negatively than people who directly make false statements about their morality (Study 3). Finally, we show that "honest" hypocrites-who avoid false signaling by admitting to committing the condemned transgression-are not perceived negatively even though their actions contradict their stated values (Study 4). Critically, the same is not true of hypocrites who engage in false signaling but admit to unrelated transgressions (Study 5). Together, our results support a false-signaling theory of hypocrisy.

Exploring public attitudes towards approaches to discussing costs in the clinical encounter.

BACKGROUND: Patients' willingness to discuss costs of treatment alternatives with their physicians is uncertain. OBJECTIVE: To explore public attitudes toward doctor-patient discussions of insurer and out-of-pocket costs and to examine whether several possible communication strategies might enhance patient receptivity to discussing costs with their physicians. DESIGN: Focus group discussions and pre-discussion and post-discussion questionnaires. PARTICIPANTS: Two hundred and eleven insured individuals with mean age of 48 years, 51 % female, 34 % African American, 27 % Latino, and 50 % with incomes below 300 % of the federal poverty threshold, participated in 22 focus groups in Santa Monica, CA and in the Washington, DC metro area. MAIN MEASUREMENTS: Attitudes toward discussing out-of-pocket and insurer costs with physicians, and towards physicians' role in controlling costs; receptivity toward recommended communication strategies regarding costs. KEY RESULTS: Participants expressed more willingness to talk to doctors about personal costs than insurer costs. Older participants and sicker participants were more willing to talk to the doctor about all costs than younger and healthier participants (OR = 1.8, p = 0.004; OR = 1.6, p = 0.027 respectively). Participants who face cost-related barriers to accessing health care were in greater agreement than others that doctors should play a role in reducing out-of-pocket costs (OR = 2.4, p = 0.011). Participants did not endorse recommended communication strategies for discussing costs in the clinical encounter. In contrast, participants stated that trust in one's physician would enhance their willingness to discuss costs. Perceived impediments to discussing costs included rushed, impersonal visits, and clinicians who are insufficiently informed about costs. CONCLUSIONS: This study suggests that trusting relationships may be more conducive than any particular discussion strategy to facilitating doctor-patient discussions of health care costs. Better public understanding of how medical decisions affect insurer costs and how such costs ultimately affect patients personally will be necessary if discussions about insurer costs are to occur in the clinical encounter.

What do consumers understand about predispute arbitration agreements? an empirical investigation.

The results of a survey of 1,071 adults in the United States reveal that most consumers do not pay attention to, let alone understand, arbitration clauses in their everyday lives. The vast majority of survey respondents (over 97%) report having opened an account with a company that requires disputes to be submitted to binding arbitration (e.g., Netflix, Hulu, Cash App, a phone or cable company), yet most are unaware that they have, in fact, agreed to mandatory arbitration (also known as "forced arbitration"). Indeed, over 99% of respondents who think they have never entered into an arbitration agreement likely have done so. Over 92% of respondents report that they have never based a decision to use a product or service on whether the terms and conditions contain an arbitration agreement. When prompted, they largely endorse the following reasons: they were unaware of the arbitration clause, they did not read the terms and conditions, and they thought they had no choice but to agree to mandatory arbitration. Moreover, many respondents presume that if a dispute arises, they will still be able to access the public courts, notwithstanding that they agreed to the terms and conditions. Consumers are largely unaware of opportunities to opt out of mandatory arbitration. They generally do not pay attention to or retain information about the steps required to opt out successfully (e.g., contacting the company within a specified time period). Generally, consumers are unaware that companies like Cash App and Venmo (mobile payment systems utilized by nearly 60% of respondents) allow customers to opt out of mandatory arbitration if they act within a limited time period. Among the minority of respondents (21%) who stated that they had been given an opportunity to opt out, vanishingly few could name any of the steps required to opt out successfully. When presented with a run-of-the-mill contract, of the type consumers routinely encounter, most respondents did not take notice of the arbitration clause. Less than 5% of respondents could recall that the contract they were shown had said anything at all about arbitration. Furthermore, most consumers misperceive the consequences of signing a predispute arbitration agreement. Most mistakenly believe that, after agreeing to terms and conditions mandating binding arbitration, they can still choose to settle their dispute in court, have a jury decide their case, join a class action, and appeal a decision made based on a legal error. For instance, less than 5% of respondents correctly reported that they could neither appeal an erroneous decision to another arbitrator (or set of arbitrators) nor start all over again in court. Less than 1% of respondents correctly understood the full significance of the arbitration agreement, as indicated by their responses to questions about whether they retained the rights to sue, have a jury decide their case, access the public courts, and appeal a decision based on a legal error. In summary, consumers are generally unaware of arbitration clauses, and they tend to hold mistaken beliefs about how arbitration agreements affect consumers' procedural rights.

Giving people the words to say no leads them to feel freer to say yes.

We examine how to structure requests to help people feel they can say no (or yes) more voluntarily. Specifically, we examine the effect of having the requester provide the request-target with an explicit phrase they can use to decline requests. Part of the difficulty of saying no is finding the words to do so when put on the spot. Providing individuals with an explicit script they can use to decline a request may help override implicit scripts and norms of politeness that generally dictate compliance. This should make individuals feel more comfortable refusing requests and make agreement feel more voluntary. Hence, we hypothesized that telling people how to say no (by providing them with an explicit script) would make compliance decisions feel more voluntary above and beyond merely telling them they can say no. Across two experimental lab studies (N = 535), we find support for this prediction.

When does moral engagement risk triggering a hypocrite penalty?

Society suffers when people stay silent on moral issues. Yet people who engage morally may appear hypocritical if they behave imperfectly themselves. Research reveals that hypocrites can-but do not always-trigger a "hypocrisy penalty," whereby they are evaluated as more immoral than ordinary (non-hypocritical) wrongdoers. This pattern reflects that moral engagement can confer reputational benefits, but can also carry reputational costs when paired with inconsistent moral conduct. We discuss mechanisms underlying these costs and benefits, illuminating when hypocrisy is (and is not) evaluated negatively. Our review highlights the role that dishonesty and other factors play in engendering disdain for hypocrites, and offers suggestions for how, in a world where nobody is perfect, people can engage morally without generating backlash.

Autonomy and the folk concept of valid consent.

Consent governs innumerable everyday social interactions, including sex, medical exams, the use of property, and economic transactions. Yet little is known about how ordinary people reason about the validity of consent. Across the domains of sex, medicine, and police entry, Study 1 showed that when agents lack autonomous decision-making capacities, participants are less likely to view their consent as valid; however, failing to exercise this capacity and deciding in a nonautonomous way did not reduce consent judgments. Study 2 found that specific and concrete incapacities reduced judgments of valid consent, but failing to exercise these specific capacities did not, even when the consenter makes an irrational and inauthentic decision. Finally, Study 3 showed that the effect of autonomy on judgments of valid consent carries important downstream consequences for moral reasoning about the rights and obligations of third parties, even when the consented-to action is morally wrong. Overall, these findings suggest that laypeople embrace a normative, domain-general concept of valid consent that depends consistently on the possession of autonomous capacities, but not on the exercise of these capacities. Autonomous decisions and autonomous capacities thus play divergent roles in moral reasoning about consent interactions: while the former appears relevant for assessing the wrongfulness of consented-to acts, the latter plays a role in whether consent is regarded as authoritative and therefore as transforming moral rights.

Focus groups highlight that many patients object to clinicians' focusing on costs.

Having patients weigh costs when making medical decisions has been proposed as a way to rein in health care spending. We convened twenty-two focus groups of people with insurance to examine their willingness to discuss health care costs with clinicians and consider costs when deciding among nearly comparable clinical options. We identified the following four barriers to patients' taking cost into account: a preference for what they perceive as the best care, regardless of expense; inexperience with making trade-offs between health and money; a lack of interest in costs borne by insurers and society as a whole; and noncooperative behavior characteristic of a "commons dilemma," in which people act in their own self-interest although they recognize that by doing so, they are depleting limited resources. Surmounting these barriers will require new research in patient education, comprehensive efforts to shift public attitudes about health care costs, and training to prepare clinicians to discuss costs with their patients.