Questioning the preparatory function of counterfactual thinking.

Why do individuals mentally modify reality (e.g., "If it hadn't rained, we would have won the game")? According to the dominant view, counterfactuals primarily serve to prepare future performance. In fact, individuals who have just failed a task tend to modify the uncontrollable features of their attempt (e.g., "If the rules of the game were different, I would have won it"), generating counterfactuals that are unlikely to play any preparatory role. By contrast, they generate prefactuals that focus on the controllable features of their ensuing behavior (e.g., "If I concentrate more, I will win the next game"). Here, we test whether this tendency is robust and general. Studies 1a and 1b replicate this tendency and show that it occurs regardless of whether individuals think about their failures or their successes. Study 2 shows that individuals generate relatively few controllable counterfactuals, unless explicitly prompted to do so. These results raise some questions regarding the generality of the dominant view according to which counterfactuals mainly serve a preparatory function.

External Time Monitoring in Time-Based Prospective Memory: An Integrative Framework.

We propose a new integrative framework of external time monitoring in prospective memory (PM) tasks and its relation with performance. Starting from existing empirical regularities and our theoretical analysis, the framework predicts that external monitoring in PM tasks comprises a first stage of loose monitoring to keep track of the passage of time, and a subsequent stage of finer-grained monitoring, based on interval reduction, to meet the PM deadline. Following our framework, we predicted and observed in three different datasets (N = 375): (1) a marked increase in external monitoring frequency in the final part of the period of the PM task, well captured by a proportional rate exponential growth function; (2) a positive association between individual compliance with this monitoring pattern and PM performance; (3) a positive relation between monitoring frequency in the time window immediately preceding the PM deadline and PM performance at the individual level; and (4) good individual compliance with an interval reduction pattern in external monitoring, especially in the time window closer to the PM deadline. These results support the proposed integrative framework, which has the potential to foster future research on external monitoring in PM and in other fields of cognitive science.

Intention framing in time-based prospective memory.

Research on prospective memory has paid no attention to the way in which the intentions to be remembered are framed. In two studies on time-based prospective memory, participants had to remember multiple delayed intentions framed as time rules (i.e., respond every 7 min, every 10 min) or as a series of corresponding instances (i.e., respond at Times 7, 10, 14, 20, 21, 28, 30, etc.). We appraised the effects of intention framing on intention learning, intention representation, strategies used to set the upcoming intention, cognitive load (monitoring cost), and prospective memory performance. Study 1 involved three time rules and corresponding instances. The results showed that time rules are learned faster than corresponding instances and that intention frames shaped the way intentions were mentally represented. Furthermore, the rule frame was associated with a more cognitively demanding incremental planning strategy to establish the upcoming intention, whereas the instance frame promoted the serial recall of intentions. Study 2 replicated the results on representations and strategies with four time rules and corresponding sets of instances, and it showed better prospective memory performance following the instance frame than rule frame. Together, these studies show that two alternative ways of framing multiple delayed intentions in the same prospective memory task induce significant differences in the way intentions are represented, in the cognitive strategies used to set the upcoming intention, and in performance. Theoretical and applied implications of the results for the prospective memory field are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Don't worry, be active: how to facilitate the detection of errors in immersive virtual environments.

The current research aims to study the link between the type of vision experienced in a collaborative immersive virtual environment (active vs. multiple passive), the type of error one looks for during a cooperative multi-user exploration of a design project (affordance vs. perceptual violations), and the type of setting in which multi-user perform (field in Experiment 1 vs. laboratory in Experiment 2). The relevance of this link is backed by the lack of conclusive evidence on an active vs. passive vision advantage in cooperative search tasks within software based on immersive virtual reality (IVR). Using a yoking paradigm based on the mixed usage of simultaneous active and multiple passive viewings, we found that the likelihood of error detection in a complex 3D environment was characterized by an active vs. multi-passive viewing advantage depending on: (1) the degree of knowledge dependence of the type of error the passive/active observers were looking for (low for perceptual violations, vs. high for affordance violations), as the advantage tended to manifest itself irrespectively from the setting for affordance, but not for perceptual violations; and (2) the degree of social desirability possibly induced by the setting in which the task was performed, as the advantage occurred irrespectively from the type of error in the laboratory (Experiment 2) but not in the field (Experiment 1) setting. Results are relevant to future development of cooperative software based on IVR used for supporting the design review. A multi-user design review experience in which designers, engineers and end-users all cooperate actively within the IVR wearing their own head mounted display, seems more suitable for the detection of relevant errors than standard systems characterized by a mixed usage of active and passive viewing.

Memory underpinnings of future intentions: Would you like to see the sequel?

In two studies, we investigated the memory underpinnings of future intentions related to past hedonic experiences. Preceding research did not make clear whether the specific memory processes supporting the expression of intentions about the future involve global judgments of the past experience (general affective evaluations formed on-line) or judgments derived from the episodic recollection of the past. Adapting a correlational paradigm previously employed to study future intentions, and applying it to the experience of watching a movie, we comparatively tested the influence of global retrospective evaluations vs. episodic-derived evaluations on future intentions. In Study 1, in which the intentions involved a future experience that was very similar to an overall past one (e.g., seeing the movie sequel), the findings showed that participants relied only on global judgments to form future intentions. In Study 2, in which the global judgment on the past was less diagnostic because the future intentions referred to specific parts of the past experience (e.g., watching a movie centered on a minor character in the previously seen movie), the results indicated that relevant episodic memories provided an essential contribution to the prediction of future intentions. These findings are in agreement with the predictions of the accessibility-diagnosticity framework and they show that global judgments and episodic memories of a past experience contribute differentially to diverse kinds of future intentions.

Improving the past and the future: a temporal asymmetry in hypothetical thinking.

Current views of hypothetical thinking implicitly assume that the content of imaginary thoughts about the past and future should be the same. Two experiments show that, given the same experienced facts of reality, future imagination may differ from past reconstruction. When participants failed a task, their counterfactual thoughts focused on uncontrollable features of their attempt (e.g., "Things would have been better if the allocated time were longer/if I had better logic skills"). But their prefactual thoughts focused on controllable features of their ensuing endeavor (e.g., "Things will be better next time if I concentrate more/if I use another strategy"). This finding suggests that compared with prefactual thinking, counterfactual thinking may be less subject to reality checks and less likely to serve preparatory goals.