Children gradually construct spatial representations of temporal events.

English-speaking adults often recruit a "mental timeline" to represent events from left-to-right (LR), but its developmental origins are debated. Here, we test whether preschoolers prefer ordered linear representations of events and whether they prefer culturally conventional directions. English-speaking adults (n = 85) and 3- to 5-year-olds (n = 513; 50% female; ~47% white, ~35% Latinx, ~18% other; tested 2016-2018) were told three-step stories and asked to choose which of two image sequences best illustrated them. We found that 3- and 4-year-olds chose ordered over unordered sequences, but preferences between directions did not emerge until at least age 5. Together, these results show that children conceptualize time linearly early in development but gradually acquire directional preferences (e.g., for LR).

You can't change the past: Children's recognition of the causal asymmetry between past and future events.

This study explored children's causal reasoning about the past and future. U.S. adults (n = 60) and 3-to-6-year-olds (n = 228) from an urban, middle-class population (49% female; ~45% white) participated between 2017 and 2019. Participants were told three-step causal stories and asked about the effects of a change to the second event. Given direct interventions on the second event, children of all ages judged that the past event still occurred, suggesting even preschoolers understand time is irreversible. However, children reasoned differently when told that the second event did not occur, with no specific cause. In this case, 6-year-olds and adults inferred that the past event also did not occur. In both conditions, inferences that future events would change emerged gradually between 4 and 6.

Spatial Metaphor Facilitates Word Learning.

Why are spatial metaphors, like the use of "high" to describe a musical pitch, so common? This study tested one hundred and fifty-four 3- to 5-year-old English-learning children on their ability to learn a novel adjective in the domain of space or pitch and to extend this adjective to the untrained dimension. Children were more proficient at learning the word when it described a spatial attribute compared to pitch. However, once children learned the word, they extended it to the untrained dimension without feedback. Thus, children leveraged preexisting associations between space and pitch to spontaneously understand new metaphors. These results suggest that spatial metaphors may be common across languages in part because they scaffold children's acquisition of word meanings that are otherwise difficult to learn.

What time words teach us about children's acquisition of the temporal reasoning system.

Here I consider the possible role of the temporal updating system in the development of the temporal reasoning system. Using evidence from children's acquisition of time words, I argue that abstract temporal concepts are not built from primitive representations of time. Instead, I propose that language and cultural learning provide the primary sources of the temporal reasoning system.

The mental timeline is gradually constructed in childhood.

When reasoning about time, English-speaking adults often invoke a "mental timeline" stretching from left to right. Although the direction of the timeline varies across cultures, the tendency to represent time as a line has been argued to be ubiquitous and primitive. On this hypothesis, we might predict that children also spontaneously invoke a spatial timeline when reasoning about time. However, little is known about how and when the mental timeline develops, or to what extent it is variable and malleable in childhood. Here, we used a sticker placement task to test whether preschoolers and kindergarteners spontaneously map temporal events (breakfast, lunch, and dinner) and deictic time words (yesterday, today, tomorrow) onto lines, and to what degree their representations of time are adult-like. We found that, at age 4, preschoolers were able to arrange temporal items in lines with minimal spatial priming. However, unlike kindergarteners and adults, most preschoolers did not represent time as a line spontaneously, in the absence of priming, and did not prefer left-to-right over right-to-left lines. Furthermore, unlike most adults, children of all ages could be easily primed to adopt an unconventional vertical timeline. Our findings suggest that mappings between time and space in children are initially flexible, and become increasingly automatic and conventionalized in the early school years.

Today is tomorrow's yesterday: Children's acquisition of deictic time words.

Deictic time words like "yesterday" and "tomorrow" pose a challenge to children not only because they are abstract, and label periods in time, but also because their denotations vary according to the time at which they are uttered: Monday's "tomorrow" is different than Thursday's. Although children produce these words as early as age 2 or 3, they do not use them in adult-like ways for several subsequent years. Here, we explored whether children have partial but systematic meanings for these words during the long delay before adult-like usage. We asked 3- to 8-year-olds to represent these words on a bidirectional, left-to-right timeline that extended from the past (infancy) to the future (adulthood). This method allowed us to independently probe knowledge of these words' deictic status (e.g., "yesterday" is in the past), relative ordering (e.g., "last week" was before "yesterday"), and remoteness from the present (e.g., "last week" was about 7 times longer ago than "yesterday"). We found that adult-like knowledge of deictic status and order emerge in synchrony, between ages 4 and 6, but that knowledge of remoteness emerges later, after age 7. Our findings suggest that children's early use of deictic time words is not random, but instead reflects the gradual construction of a structured lexical domain.

Learning the language of time: Children's acquisition of duration words.

Children use time words like minute and hour early in development, but take years to acquire their precise meanings. Here we investigate whether children assign meaning to these early usages, and if so, how. To do this, we test their interpretation of seven time words: second, minute, hour, day, week, month, and year. We find that preschoolers infer the orderings of time words (e.g., hour>minute), but have little to no knowledge of the absolute durations they encode. Knowledge of absolute duration is learned much later in development - many years after children first start using time words in speech - and in many children does not emerge until they have acquired formal definitions for the words. We conclude that associating words with the perception of duration does not come naturally to children, and that early intuitive meanings of time words are instead rooted in relative orderings, which children may infer from their use in speech.

Crowding and eccentricity determine reading rate.

Bouma's law of crowding predicts an uncrowded central window through which we can read and a crowded periphery through which we cannot. The old discovery that readers make several fixations per second, rather than a continuous sweep across the text, suggests that reading is limited by the number of letters that can be acquired in one fixation, without moving one's eyes. That "visual span" has been measured in various ways, but remains unexplained. Here we show (1) that the visual span is simply the number of characters that are not crowded and (2) that, at each vertical eccentricity, reading rate is proportional to the uncrowded span. We measure rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) reading rate for text, in both original and scrambled word order, as a function of size and spacing at central and peripheral locations. As text size increases, reading rate rises abruptly from zero to maximum rate. This classic reading rate curve consists of a cliff and a plateau, characterized by two parameters, critical print size and maximum reading rate. Joining two ideas from the literature explains the whole curve. These ideas are Bouma's law of crowding and Legge's conjecture that reading rate is proportional to visual span. We show that Legge's visual span is the uncrowded span predicted by Bouma's law. This result joins Bouma and Legge to explain reading rate's dependence on letter size and spacing. Well-corrected fluent observers reading ordinary text with adequate light are limited by letter spacing (crowding), not size (acuity). More generally, it seems that this account holds true, independent of size, contrast, and luminance, provided only that text contrast is at least four times the threshold contrast for an isolated letter. For any given spacing, there is a central uncrowded span through which we read. This uncrowded span model explains the shape of the reading rate curve. We test the model in several ways. We use a "silent substitution" technique to measure the uncrowded span during reading. These substitutions spoil letter identification but are undetectable when the letters are crowded. Critical spacing is the smallest distance between letters that avoids crowding. We find that the critical spacing for letter identification predicts both the critical spacing and the span for reading. Thus, crowding predicts the parameters that characterize both the cliff and the plateau of the reading rate curve. Previous studies have found worrisome differences across observers and laboratories in the measured peripheral reading rates for ordinary text, which may reflect differences in print exposure, but we find that reading rate is much more consistent when word order is scrambled. In all conditions tested--all sizes and spacings, central and peripheral, ordered and scrambled--reading is limited by crowding. For each observer, at each vertical eccentricity, reading rate is proportional to the uncrowded span.

The uncrowded window of object recognition.

It is now emerging that vision is usually limited by object spacing rather than size. The visual system recognizes an object by detecting and then combining its features. 'Crowding' occurs when objects are too close together and features from several objects are combined into a jumbled percept. Here, we review the explosion of studies on crowding--in grating discrimination, letter and face recognition, visual search, selective attention, and reading--and find a universal principle, the Bouma law. The critical spacing required to prevent crowding is equal for all objects, although the effect is weaker between dissimilar objects. Furthermore, critical spacing at the cortex is independent of object position, and critical spacing at the visual field is proportional to object distance from fixation. The region where object spacing exceeds critical spacing is the 'uncrowded window'. Observers cannot recognize objects outside of this window and its size limits the speed of reading and search.

Parts, wholes, and context in reading: a triple dissociation.

Research in object recognition has tried to distinguish holistic recognition from recognition by parts. One can also guess an object from its context. Words are objects, and how we recognize them is the core question of reading research. Do fast readers rely most on letter-by-letter decoding (i.e., recognition by parts), whole word shape, or sentence context? We manipulated the text to selectively knock out each source of information while sparing the others. Surprisingly, the effects of the knockouts on reading rate reveal a triple dissociation. Each reading process always contributes the same number of words per minute, regardless of whether the other processes are operating.