Comparison of Estimated No Surprises Act Qualifying Payment Amounts and Payments to In-Network and Out-of-Network Emergency Medicine Professionals.

Importance: The No Surprises Act (NSA), which took effect on January 1, 2022, applies a qualifying payment amount (QPA) as an out-of-network payment reference point. An understanding of how QPA measures compare with the in-network and out-of-network payments physicians received before the NSA implementation may be useful to policy makers and stakeholders. Objective: To estimate the QPA for geographic and funding markets and compare QPA estimates with in-network and out-of-network payments for 2019 emergency medicine claims. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study of US commercial insurance claims assessed the Health Care Cost Institute's 2019 commercial professional emergency medicine claims (Current Procedural Terminology [CPT] codes 99281-99285 and 99291) and included enrollees in commercial health maintenance organizations, exclusive provider organizations, point of service, and preferred provider organizations self-funded and fully insured through Aetna, Humana, and some Blue Health Intelligence plans. Claims with missing or inconsistent data fields were excluded. Data were analyzed November 1, 2021, to April 7, 2022. Main Outcomes and Measures: The QPA was calculated as the median allowed amount of all observed claims within strata defined by geographic region, CPT code, and funding market. For each stratum, the ratio of mean in-network allowed amounts to QPAs and mean out-of-network allowed amounts to QPAs were calculated. Then the volume-weighted mean of these ratios was computed across CPT codes within each geographic and funding market stratum. Results: The analytic sample included 7 556 541 professional emergency claims with a mean (SD) allowed amount of $313 ($306) and mean (SD) QPA of $252 ($133). Among the 650 geographic and market strata in the sample, the mean in-network allowed amounts were 14% (ratio, 0.96) higher than the estimated QPA. For the subset of strata with a sufficient sample of out-of-network claims (n = 227), the mean out-of-network payments were 112% (ratio, 2.12) higher than the QPA. More generous out-of-network payments were from self-funded plans (120% [ratio, 2.20] higher than the QPA estimate) vs fully insured plans (43% [ratio, 1.43] higher than the QPA estimate). Mean in-network allowed amounts for nonphysician clinicians were 4% (ratio, 1.04) lower than the QPA, whereas mean in-network allowed amounts for physicians were 15% (ratio, 1.15) higher than the QPA estimates. These differences remained after adjusting for geographic region. Conclusions and Relevance: The findings of this cross-sectional study of US commercial insurance claims suggest that the NSA may have heterogeneous implications for out-of-network payments and negotiating leverage experienced by emergency medicine physicians in different geographic markets, with the potential for greater implications in the self-funded market.

Medicare Part D: Time for Re-Modernization?

OBJECTIVE: To understand the mechanisms that have held Part D beneficiary premiums stable despite increasing reinsurance subsidies. DATA SOURCES: Secondary data on Part D plan bids, federal subsidies, and claims from 2007 through 2015. STUDY DESIGN: Comparisons of standardized, enrollment-weighted average Part D plan bids and reinsurance bids with plan and reinsurance liability calculated from Part D claims data. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: Part D plan payment data were merged with premium data to derive plan bids, which were merged with claims-based spending measures. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Plan bids and reinsurance bids increasingly diverged from the spending observed in the claims data over the study period. This divergence was attributable to the growth in rebates and systematic under-bidding of expected reinsurance payments, enabling plans to hold premiums low and collect excess federal subsidies of approximately 3 percent of total Part D spending in 2015. CONCLUSIONS: Revenue from rebates and excess federal subsidies via reinsurance reconciliation has played an important role in holding Part D premiums low, despite increasing federal reinsurance subsidies. While policy makers should consider implementing reforms to address these misincentives in the program, doing so is likely to result in unavoidable premium increases to levels more reflective of actual net spending.

How do health insurer market concentration and bargaining power with hospitals affect health insurance premiums?

The US health insurance industry is highly concentrated, and health insurance premiums are high and rising rapidly. Policymakers have focused on the possible link between the two, leading to ACA provisions to increase insurer competition. However, while market power may enable insurers to include higher profit margins in their premiums, it may also result in stronger bargaining leverage with hospitals to negotiate lower payment rates to partially offset these higher premiums. We empirically examine the relationship between employer-sponsored fully-insured health insurance premiums and the level of concentration in local insurer and hospital markets using the nationally-representative 2006-2011 KFF/HRET Employer Health Benefits Survey. We exploit a unique feature of employer-sponsored insurance, in which self-insured employers purchase only administrative services from managed care organizations, to disentangle these different effects on insurer concentration by constructing one concentration measure representing fully-insured plans' transactions with employers and the other concentration measure representing insurers' bargaining with hospitals. As expected, we find that premiums are indeed higher for plans sold in markets with higher levels of concentration relevant to insurer transactions with employers, lower for plans in markets with higher levels of insurer concentration relevant to insurer bargaining with hospitals, and higher for plans in markets with higher levels of hospital market concentration.