The long tail of COVID and the tale of long COVID: Diagnostic construction and the management of ignorance.

We bring together insights from the sociology of diagnosis and the sociology of ignorance to examine the early diagnostic unfolding of 'Long COVID' (LC). Originally described by patient activists, researchers set out to ponder its unwieldy clinical boundaries. Using a scoping review method in tandem with qualitative content analytic techniques, we analyse medicine's initial struggles to construct a LC diagnosis. Paying attention to the dynamics of ignorance, we highlight three consequential conceptual manoeuvres in the early classifications of LC: causal agnosticism concerning the relationship between COVID-19 and LC, evasion of lumping LC with similar conditions; and the predictable splitting off of medically explainable cases from the LC designation. These manoeuvres are not maleficent, inept or unreasonable. They are practical but impactful responses to the classificatory dilemmas present in the construction of diagnoses amidst ignorance. Although there are unique aspects to LC, we suggest that its early fate is nevertheless emblematic of medicine's diagnostic standardisation processes more generally. To varying degrees, diagnoses are ignorance management strategies; they create a pathway through the uncertainty at the core of disease realities. However, while diagnoses circumscribe some types of ignorance, they produce others through the creation of blind spots and paths not taken.

Uncertain and under Quarantine: Toward a Sociology of Medical Ignorance.

At the center of the COVID-19 pandemic lies a ubiquitous feature of medicine. Medicine is permeated with ignorance. Seizing this moment to assess the current state of medical sociology, this article articulates a sociology of medical ignorance. We join insights from earlier medical sociological scholarship on uncertainty with emerging research in the sociology of ignorance to help make sense of the omnipresent but sometimes invisible dynamics related to the unknowns in medicine. Then we examine two streams of inquiry with a focus on uncertainty and ignorance-(1) research on the interconnections between technology, medical authority, and ignorance and (2) research on lay expertise within the context of ever-present uncertainties. For decades, and to good effect, medical sociologists have asked, "What does medicine know, and what are the consequences of such knowing?" Going forward, we encourage medical sociologists to examine the unknown in medicine and the consequences of not knowing.

Diagnostic ambivalence: psychiatric workarounds and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.

In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association (APA), faced with increased professional competition, revised the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Psychiatric expertise was redefined along a biomedical model via a standardised nosology. While they were an integral part of capturing professional authority, the revisions demystified psychiatric expertise, leaving psychiatrists vulnerable to infringements upon their autonomy by institutions adopting the DSM literally. This research explores the tensions surrounding standardisation in psychiatry. Drawing on in-depth interviews with psychiatrists, I explore the 'sociological ambivalence' psychiatrists feel towards the DSM, which arises from the tension between the desire for autonomy in practice and the professional goal of legitimacy within the system of mental health professions. To carve a space for autonomy for their practice, psychiatrists develop 'workarounds' that undermine the DSM in practice. These workarounds include employing alternative diagnostic typologies, fudging the numbers (or codes) on official paperwork and negotiating diagnoses with patients. In creating opportunities for patient input and resistance to fixed diagnoses, the varied use of the DSM raises fundamental questions for psychiatrists about the role of the biomedical model of mental illness, especially its particular manifestation in the DSM.

Measuring mental disorders: The failed commensuration project of DSM-5.

Commensuration - the comparison of entities according to a common quantitative metric - is a key process in efforts to rationalize medicine. The push toward evidence-based medicine and quantitative assessment has led to the proliferation of metrics in healthcare. While social scientific attention has revealed the effects of these metrics once institutionalized - on clinical practice, on medical expertise, on outcome assessment, on valuations of medical services, and on experiences of illness - less attention has been paid to the process of developing metrics. This article examines the attempt to create severity scales during the revision to the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) as a case of failed commensuration. Using data from interviews with participants in the DSM-5 revision (n = 30), I reconstruct the problems that emerged in the DSM-5 Task Force's effort to develop viable psychometric instruments to measure severity. Framed as a part of a "paradigm shift" in psychiatry, the revision produced ad hoc, heterogeneous severity scales with divergent logics. I focus on two significant issues of metric construction in this case - diagnostic validity and clinical utility. Typically perceived as technical and conceptual challenges of design, I show how these issues were infused with, and undermined by, professional political dynamics, specifically tensions between medical researchers and clinicians. This case reveals that, despite its association with objectivity and transparency, commensuration encompasses more than identifying, operationalizing, and measuring an entity; it demands the negotiation of extra-scientific, non-empirical concerns that get written into medical metrics themselves.

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue. Part 4: general conclusion.

In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis - the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances' responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first - what is the nature of psychiatric illness - and that in some manner all further questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders - and future nosologies - as far more complex and uncertain than we have imagined.

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 1: conceptual and definitional issues in psychiatric diagnosis.

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 3: issues of utility and alternative approaches in psychiatric diagnosis.

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2 took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility, whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.

The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 2: Issues of conservatism and pragmatism in psychiatric diagnosis.

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM--whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.