Nonlinear engagement of action observation network underlying action anticipation in players with different levels of expertise.

The goal of this study was to reconcile inconsistency of neural engagement underlying action anticipation between experts and nonexperts, as well as between correct and incorrect anticipations. Therefore, we asked novice, intermediate, and skilled baseball batters (N, IB, and SB) to anticipate their swing decisions in response to pitching videos of a strike or ball, using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Behavioral results confirmed the effect of expertise that is generally shown in a linear fashion. Imaging results instead revealed a nonlinear relationship between expertise level and the evoked response amplitude of nodes within the action observation network. The relationship was best captured by an inverted U-shaped quadratic response profile across the three groups such that IB exhibited higher activation than did both SB and N. These empirical findings extend the framework of predictive coding as well as of neural efficiency in anticipating the action of others, and they might be associated with the underlying process to interpret the goal of the observed action and prepare one's own response. Furthermore, the right anterior cerebellum showed different levels of activation for correct and incorrect anticipations in all groups, adding novel evidence of its subtle involvement in anticipation processes irrespective of expertise status.

Inflexibility in Autism Spectrum Disorder: Need for certainty and atypical emotion processing share the blame.

Although ASD (Autism Spectrum Disorder) diagnosis requires the co-occurrence of socio-emotional deficits and inflexible behaviors, the interaction between these two domains remains unexplored. We used an emotional Wisconsin Card Sorting Test adapted to fMRI to explore this question. ASD and control participants matched a central card (a face) with one of four surrounding cards according to one of three rules: frame color, facial identity or expression. Feedback informed participants on whether to change or maintain the current sorting rule. For each rule, we modeled feedback onsets to change, switch (confirming the newly found rule) and maintenance events. "Bias error", which measures participants' willingness to switch, was larger in ASD participants for the emotional sorting rule. Brain activity to change events showed no group differences. In response to switch events significantly larger activity was observed for ASD participants in bilateral Inferior Parietal Sulci. Inflexibility in ASD appears characterized by the unwillingness to switch toward processing socio-emotional information, rather than a major disruption in cognitive flexibility. However, a larger activity to switch events in ASD highlights the need for a higher level of certainty before setting into a stable processing stage, which may be particularly detrimental in the highly changeable socio-emotional environment.

Knowing what and where: TMS evidence for the dual neural basis of geographical knowledge.

All animals acquire knowledge about the topography of their immediate environment through direct exploration. Uniquely, humans also acquire geographical knowledge indirectly through exposure to maps and verbal information, resulting in a rich database of global geographical knowledge. We used transcranial magnetic stimulation to investigate the structure and neural basis of this critical but poorly understood component of semantic knowledge. Participants completed tests of geographical knowledge that probed either information about spatial locations (e.g., France borders Spain) or non-spatial taxonomic information (e.g., France is a country). TMS applied to the anterior temporal lobe, a region that codes conceptual knowledge for words and objects, had a general disruptive effect on the geographical tasks. In contrast, stimulation of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), a region involved in the coding of spatial and numerical information, had a highly selective effect on spatial geographical decisions but no effect on taxonomic judgements. Our results establish that geographical concepts lie at the intersection of two distinct neural representation systems, and provide insights into how the interaction of these systems shape our understanding of the world.