Examining interpersonal metacognitive monitoring in artificial grammar learning.

This study investigates the observers' ability to monitor the ongoing cognitive processes of a partner who is implicitly learning an artificial grammar. Our hypothesis posits that learners experience metacognitive feelings as they attempt to apply their implicit knowledge, and that observers are capable of detecting and interpreting these feelings as cues of the learner's cognitive state. For instance, learners might encounter affective signals linked to cognitive conflicts and errors at different processing stages, which observers can construe as manifestations of the learner's cognitive dissonance. The research involved 126 participants organized into dyads, with one participant acting as a learner, and the other as an observer. The observer's task was to judge whether the learner agrees with the information presented (consonance judgment) and was limited to reading the learner's nonverbal signals to avoid explicit mindreading. The findings suggest that observers possess mindreading abilities, enabling them to detect both learners' confidence and accuracy in stimuli classification. This extends our understanding of non-verbal mindreading capabilities and indicates that observers can effectively interpret early implicit metacognitive information, even in the absence of explicit self-evaluation from the learners. This research offers significant insights into how individuals interpret others' mental states during implicit learning tasks, particularly in the context of utilizing early affective cues within the Artificial Grammar Learning paradigm.

Principles of belief acquisition. How we read other minds.

Reading other minds is a pervasive feature of human social life. A decade of research indicates that people can automatically track an agent's beliefs regardless of whether this is required. But little is known about the principles t guide automatic belief tracking. In six experiments adapting a false belief task introduced by Kovács et al. (2010), we tested whether belief tracking is interrupted by either an agent's lack of perceptual access or else by an agent's constrained action possibilities. We also tested whether such manipulations create interruptions when participants were instructed to track beliefs. Our main finding: the agent's lack of perceptual access did not interrupt belief tracking when participants were not instructed to track beliefs. Overall, our findings raise a challenge: some of the phenomena that have been labelled mindreading are perhaps not mindreading at all, or-more likely-they are mindreading but not as we know it.

Canine perspective-taking.

An important question in the study of canine cognition is how dogs understand humans, given that they show impressive abilities for interacting and communicating with us. In this review, we describe and discuss studies that have investigated dogs' perspective-taking abilities. There is solid evidence that dogs are not only sensitive to the gaze of others, but also their attention. We specifically address the question whether dogs have the ability to take the perspective of others and thus come to understand what others can or cannot perceive. From the latter, they may then infer what others know and use this representation to anticipate what others do next. Still, dogs might simply rely on directly observable cues and on what they themselves can perceive when they assess what others can perceive. And instead of making inferences from representations of others' mental states, they may have just learned that certain behaviours of ours lead to certain outcomes. However, recent research seems to challenge this low-level explanation. Dogs have solved several perspective-taking tasks instantly and reliably across a large number of variations, including geometrical gaze-following, stealing in the dark, concealing information from others, and Guesser/Knower differentiation. In the latter studies, dogs' choices between two human informants were strongly influenced by cues related to the humans' visual access to the food, even when the two informants behaved identically. And finally, we review a recent study that found dogs reacting differently to misleading suggestions of human informants that have either a true or false belief about the location of food. We discuss this surprising result in terms of the comprehension of reality-incongruent mental states, which is considered as a hallmark of Theory of Mind acquisition in human development. Especially on the basis of the latter findings, we conclude that pet dogs might be sensitive to what others see, know, intend, and believe. Therefore, this ability seems to have evolved not just in the corvid and primate lineages, but also in dogs.

Abnormal visual scanning and impaired mental state recognition in pre-manifest Huntington disease.

Huntington's disease (HD) is a genetic neurodegenerative disorder that affects not only the motor but also the cognitive and the neuropsychiatric domain. In particular, deficits in mental state recognition may emerge already at early pre-manifest stages of the disease. The aim of this research was to explore the relation between visual scanning behavior and complex mental state recognition in individuals with pre-manifest HD (preHD). Eighteen preHD and eighteen age- and gender-matched healthy controls took the revised "Reading the Mind in the Eyes" test while their eye-movements were tracked. In addition to the expected deficits in mental state recognition, preHD showed abnormalities concerning all three scanning variables we considered, namely the absolute number of fixations (FC), the average fixation duration (AFD), and the percentage of time spent fixating (FTR). In preHD, FC and FTR but not AFD predicted mental state recognition over and beyond general disease-related declines in cognition and motor functioning. Notably, preHD showed abnormal vertical and horizontal fixation patterns, and these patterns predicted mental state recognition, suggesting the involvement of mechanisms related to the embodied processing of emotional stimuli. Overall, our results suggest that impaired facial mental state recognition in pre-manifest HD is partly due to emotional-motivational factors affecting the visual scanning of facial expressions.

Mindreading and metacognition patterns in patients with borderline personality disorder: experimental study.

Current psychopathology attempts to understand personality disorders in relation to deficits in higher cognition such as mindreading and metacognition. Deficits in mindreading are usually related to limitations in or a complete lack of the capacity to understand and attribute mental states to others, while impairments in metacognition concern dysfunctional control and monitoring of one's own processes. The present study investigated dysfunctional higher cognition in the population of patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD) by analyzing the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in a mindreading task [reading the mind in the eyes Test (RMET)] and a subsequent metacognitive task based on self-report scales: a confidence rating scale (CR) versus a post-decision wagering scale (PDW). It turned out that people from the BPD group scored lower in the RMET. However, both groups had the same levels of confidence on the PDW scale when giving incorrect answers in the RMET test. As initially hypothesized, individuals with BPD overestimated their confidence in incorrect answers, regardless of the type of metacognitive scales used. The present findings indicate that BPD individuals show dysfunctional patterns between instances of mindreading and metacognition.

[Mentalizing deficit among patients with traumatic brain injury]. / Mentalizációs deficit traumás agysérült betegek körében.

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE: Mentalization or theory of mind as an aspect of our social cognition, is our ability to infer mental states of others (intentions, desires, thoughts, emotions) and to predict their behavior accordingly. This function significantly affects our participation and orientation in the social world and plays an important role in conversational situations, social interactions, social integ-ration and adaptation. The brain regions that serve as the basis for mind-reading function can be damaged as a consequence of traumatic brain injury, which frequently occurs among the younger population. Traumatic brain injury can cause focal or diffuse cerebral injuries, often leading to theory of mind deficit. METHODS: In this topic such publications were researched that compared theory of mind ability between traumatic brain injury patients and control subjects (comparative case-control studies). We searched for the studies in the following internet based/online databases: PubMed, Web of Science, ScienceDirect, Google Scholar, APA PsycNET (PsycARTICLES) and EBSCO Host. The search was performed using the following key word combinations: theory of mind or mentalizing or social cognition AND traumatic brain injury or head/brain injury or diffuse axonal injury. RESULTS: Based on the results of the included and processed studies (21 pc), traumatic brain injury often leads to mentalization deficit with different severity. CONCLUSION: With this present review we aim to draw attention to the fact that the appearance and severity of mind reading dysfunction can considerably affect the outcome of the disease, the length of rehabilitation time and the prognosis of traumatic brain injury patients. Besides this, with this review, we aim to take sides in whether theory of mind ability is domain-specific or domian-general based on studies including traumatic brain injury patients.

Evolutionary psychology, learning, and belief signaling: design for natural and artificial systems.

Recent work in the cognitive sciences has argued that beliefs sometimes acquire signaling functions in virtue of their ability to reveal information that manipulates "mindreaders." This paper sketches some of the evolutionary and design considerations that could take agents from solipsistic goal pursuit to beliefs that serve as social signals. Such beliefs will be governed by norms besides just the traditional norms of epistemology (e.g., truth and rational support). As agents become better at detecting the agency of others, either through evolutionary history or individual learning, the candidate pool for signaling expands. This logic holds for natural and artificial agents that find themselves in recurring social situations that reward the sharing of one's thoughts.

Metacognition and mindreading in young children: A cross-cultural study.

Prior studies document cross cultural variation in the developmental onset of mindreading. In particular, Japanese children are reported to pass a standard false belief task later than children from Western countries. By contrast, we know little about cross-cultural variation in young children's metacognitive abilities. Moreover, one prominent theoretical discussion in developmental psychology focuses on the relation between metacognition and mindreading. Here we investigated the relation between mindreading and metacognition (both implicit and explicit) by testing 4-year-old Japanese and German children. We found no difference in metacognition between the two cultural groups. By contrast, Japanese children showed lower performance than German children replicating cultural differences in mindreading. Finally, metacognition and mindreading were not related in either group. We discuss the findings in light of the existing theoretical accounts of the relation between metacognition and mindreading.

Relationships between implicit and explicit uncertainty monitoring and mindreading: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder.

We examined performance on implicit (non-verbal) and explicit (verbal) uncertainty-monitoring tasks among neurotypical participants and participants with autism, while also testing mindreading abilities in both groups. We found that: (i) performance of autistic participants was unimpaired on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task, while being significantly impaired on the explicit task; (ii) performance on the explicit task was correlated with performance on mindreading tasks in both groups, whereas performance on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task was not; and (iii) performance on implicit and explicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks was not correlated. The results support the view that (a) explicit uncertainty-monitoring draws on the same cognitive faculty as mindreading whereas (b) implicit uncertainty-monitoring only test first-order decision making. These findings support the theory that metacognition and mindreading are underpinned by the same meta-representational faculty/resources, and that the implicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks that are frequently used with non-human animals fail to demonstrate the presence of metacognitive abilities.

Social cognition in anorexia nervosa: Specific difficulties in decoding emotional but not nonemotional mental states.

OBJECTIVE: Building on recent models of anorexia nervosa (AN) that emphasize the importance of impaired social cognition in the development and maintenance of the disorder, the present study aimed at examining whether women with AN have more difficulties with inferring other people's emotional and nonemotional mental states than healthy women. METHOD: Social cognition was assessed in 25 adult women with AN and 25 age-matched healthy women. To overcome limitations of previous research on social cognition in AN, the processing of social information was examined in a more complex and ecologically valid manner. The Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) reflects complex real-life social interaction and allows for disentangling emotional and non-emotional mental state inference as well as different types of errors in mentalizing. RESULTS: Women with AN showed poorer emotional mental state inference, whereas non-emotional mental state inference was largely intact. Groups did not differ in undermentalizing (overly simplistic theory of mind) and overmentalizing (overly complex or over-interpretative mental state reasoning). Performance in the MASC was independent of levels of eating disorder psychopathology and symptoms of depression and anxiety. DISCUSSION: The findings suggest that AN is associated with specific difficulties in emotional mental state inference despite largely intact nonemotional mental state inference. Upon replication in larger samples, these findings advocate a stronger emphasis on socio-emotional processing in AN treatment. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.(Int J Eat Disord 2016; 49:883-890).

I know you see it wrong! Children use others' false perceptions to predict their behaviors.

Research on children's ability to attribute false mental states to others has focused exclusively on false beliefs. We developed a novel paradigm that focuses instead on another type of false mental state: false perceptions. From approximately 4years of age, children begin to recognize that their perception of an illusory object can be at odds with its true properties. Our question was whether they also recognize that another individual viewing the object will similarly experience a false perception. We tested 33 preschool children with a task in which distorting lenses caused a small object to appear large and a large object to appear small. To succeed, children needed to recognize that a naive agent would falsely perceive the relative size of the objects and to correctly anticipate the agent's actions on that basis. Children performed significantly better than chance in our false perception test, and there was a developmental progression in performance from 4 to 5years of age similar to that seen in standard false belief tests. Our findings demonstrate that preschool children are capable of understanding that other individuals will be perceptually misled by illusory objects and that these false perceptions will influence their actions in predictable ways.

Exploring Theory of Mind Use in Blind Adults During Natural Communication.

The aim of this article is to explore whether people who are blind are as successful in recognising other people's mental states in communicative situations as people who are sighted. In the current investigation, a group of blind and sighted individuals were tested on their first and higher-order ToM abilities to recognise the intentions, feelings and beliefs of people engaged in natural conversations. The results revealed significant differences between the groups in the recognition of mental states, but no differences were found in their first-order and higher-order ToM use. The study shows that people who are blind may understand other people's intentions, feelings and beliefs differently than people who are sighted. This is not because of their ToM deficits or linguistic incompetence, but because during communication blind individuals have limited access to the information about others' mental states.

The intentional stance as structure learning: a computational perspective on mindreading.

Recent theories of mindreading explain the recognition of action, intention, and belief of other agents in terms of generative architectures that model the causal relations between observables (e.g., observed movements) and their hidden causes (e.g., action goals and beliefs). Two kinds of probabilistic generative schemes have been proposed in cognitive science and robotics that link to a "theory theory" and "simulation theory" of mindreading, respectively. The former compares perceived actions to optimal plans derived from rationality principles and conceptual theories of others' minds. The latter reuses one's own internal (inverse and forward) models for action execution to perform a look-ahead mental simulation of perceived actions. Both theories, however, leave one question unanswered: how are the generative models - including task structure and parameters - learned in the first place? We start from Dennett's "intentional stance" proposal and characterize it within generative theories of action and intention recognition. We propose that humans use an intentional stance as a learning bias that sidesteps the (hard) structure learning problem and bootstraps the acquisition of generative models for others' actions. The intentional stance corresponds to a candidate structure in the generative scheme, which encodes a simplified belief-desire folk psychology and a hierarchical intention-to-action organization of behavior. This simple structure can be used as a proxy for the "true" generative structure of others' actions and intentions and is continuously grown and refined - via state and parameter learning - during interactions. In turn - as our computational simulations show - this can help solve mindreading problems and bootstrap the acquisition of useful causal models of both one's own and others' goal-directed actions.

Social cognition in simple action coordination: A case for direct perception.

In this paper we sketch the outlines of an account of the kind of social cognition involved in simple action coordination that is based on direct social perception (DSP) rather than recursive mindreading. While we recognize the viability of a mindreading-based account such as e.g. Michael Tomasello's, we present an alternative DSP account that (i) explains simple action coordination in a less cognitively demanding manner, (ii) is better able to explain flexibility and strategy-switching in coordination and crucially (iii) allows for formal modeling. This account of action coordination is based on the notion of an agent's field of affordances. Coordination ensues, we argue, when, given a shared intention, the actions of and/or affordances for one agent shape the field of affordances for another agent. This a form of social perception since in particular perceiving affordances for another person involves seeing that person as an agent. It is a form of social perception since it involves perceiving affordances for another person and registering how another person's actions influence one's own perceived field of affordances.

Is a modular cognitive architecture compatible with the direct perception of mental states?

The Direct Social Perception Hypothesis maintains that we can perceive other people's psychological states. Furthermore, it claims that doing so does not require any cognitive process that is simulative or theory-like, putting it in sharp contrast with mainstream accounts of social cognition. This paper contrasts the DSPH against the modular account of mindreading as proposed by Peter Carruthers and H. Clark Barrett. It maintains that the modularity view can respond to the challenges levelled by the DSPH, and that the positions are not as distinct as they originally appear. Finally, the paper discusses the role of non-folk psychological state concepts in our perceptions of other people.

Direct social perception, mindreading and Bayesian predictive coding.

Mindreading accounts of social cognition typically claim that we cannot directly perceive the mental states of other agents and therefore have to exercise certain cognitive capacities in order to infer them. In recent years this view has been challenged by proponents of the direct social perception (DSP) thesis, who argue that the mental states of other agents can be directly perceived. In this paper we show, first, that the main disagreement between proponents of DSP and mindreading accounts has to do with the so-called 'sandwich model' of social cognition. Although proponents of DSP are critical of this model, we argue that they still seem to accept the distinction between perception, cognition and action that underlies it. Second, we contrast the sandwich model of social cognition with an alternative theoretical framework that is becoming increasingly popular in the cognitive neurosciences: Bayesian Predictive Coding (BPC). We show that the BPC framework renders a principled distinction between perception, cognition and action obsolete, and can accommodate elements of both DSP and mindreading accounts.

Continuing debates on direct social perception: Some notes on Gallagher's analysis of "the new hybrids".

This commentary argues that Gallagher's account of direct social perception has remained underdeveloped in several respects. Gallagher has not provided convincing evidence to support his claim that mindreading is rare in social situations. He and other direct perception theorists have not offered a substantive critique of standard theories of mindreading because they have attacked a much stronger claim about the putative unobservability of mental states than most theories of mindreading imply. To provide a genuine alternative to standard theories of mindreading, the direct perception theorist needs to provide more detailed answers to the following questions: What are the criteria for distinguishing perceptual processes from non-perceptual processes? How exactly does direct social perception function on the subpersonal level? What is the content of direct social perception? How does direct perception theory relate to more recent developments in the mindreading literature?

Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading.

The direct social perception (DSP) thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic "Type 1" form of mindreading and a slow, effortful "Type 2" form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts' Type 1 mindreading serves as a rival to DSP or whether some Type 1 mindreading can be perceptual. I will focus on Apperly and Butterfill's dual process account of mindreading epistemic states such as perception, knowledge, and belief. This account posits a minimal form of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states called registrations. I will argue that general dual process theories fit well with a modular view of perception that is considered a kind of Type 1 process. I will show that this modular view of perception challenges and has significant advantages over DSP's phenomenological and psychological theses. Finally, I will argue that if such a modular view of perception is accepted, there is significant reason for thinking Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states is perceptual in nature. This would mean extending the scope of DSP to at least one type of epistemic state.

Are adolescents with anorexia nervosa better at reading minds?

INTRODUCTION: The present study aimed to investigate mindreading abilities in female adolescent patients with AN compared to healthy controls (HCs), analysing differences for emotional valence of facial stimuli. METHODS: The Eating Disorder Inventory) for evaluating psychological traits associated with eating disorders and the Children's version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test for evaluating mindreading abilities were administered to 40 Italian female patients (mean age = 14.93; SD = 1.48) with restrictive diagnosis of anorexia nervosa (AN) and 40 healthy females (mean age = 14.88; SD = 0.56). RESULTS: No significant differences between the AN group and HCs for the Eyes Total score were found. Even when analysing emotional valence of the items, the two groups were equally successful in the facial recognition of positive, negative and neutral emotions. A significant difference was revealed for the percentage of correct responses of item 10 and item 15, where the AN group was less able to correctly identify the target descriptor (Not believing) over the foils than HCs. A significant difference was revealed in discriminating for affective emotions versus cognitive states; only for affective but not for cognitive states, patients with AN were found to perform better than controls on the mindreading task. CONCLUSIONS: Our study highlighted the importance of analysing and discriminating for different valences of facial stimuli when assessing mindreading abilities in adolescents with AN, so that more precise and specific treatment approaches could be developed for female adolescents with AN.

A broad assessment of theory of mind in adolescence: the complexity of mindreading.

The aim of this research was to provide an articulated assessment of several different ToM components, namely first- vs. third-person, egocentric vs. allocentric, and first- vs. second-order ToM, in preadolescence and adolescence. Our expectations for the sample of 80 juveniles that participated in the research were that: (1) ToM abilities would improve with age; (2) participants would perform better at first-person than at third-person tasks; (3) participants would perform better at first-order than at second-order tasks; (4) girls will perform systematically better than boys. We also explored possible differences in performance (5) in the allocentric vs. the egocentric perspectives as well as (6) in the comprehension of different types of mental states, namely desires, beliefs and positive and negative emotions. Overall our expectations were confirmed. Our data confirmed that all ToM aspects we investigated keep maturing during preadolescence and adolescence.