Incomplete preferences and rational framing effects.
Behav Brain Sci
; 45: e240, 2022 10 25.
Article
em En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-36281851
ABSTRACT
The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermúdez's insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.
Texto completo:
1
Bases de dados:
MEDLINE
Assunto principal:
Resolução de Problemas
/
Ciências do Comportamento
Limite:
Humans
Idioma:
En
Revista:
Behav Brain Sci
Ano de publicação:
2022
Tipo de documento:
Article