Exploring the Obstacles to Implementing Economic Mechanisms to Stimulate Antibiotic Research and Development: A Multi-Actor and System-Level Analysis.

This Article examines the potential stakeholder-related obstacles hindering the implementation of mechanisms to re-ignite the development of novel antibiotics. Proposed economic models and incentives to drive such development include: Public Funding of Research and Development ("R&D"), Tax Incentives, Milestone Prizes, End Payments, Intellectual Property ("IP") and Exclusivity Extensions, Pricing and Reimbursement Incentives, Product Development Partnerships ("PDPs"), and the Options Market for Antibiotics model. Drawing on personal experience and understanding of the antibiotic field, as well as stakeholder consultation and numerous expert meetings within the DRIVE-AB project and Uppsala Health Summit 2015, the Authors identify obstacles attributable to the following actors: Universities and Research Institutes, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises ("SMEs"), Large Pharmaceutical Companies, Marketing Approval Regulators, Payors, Healthcare Providers, National Healthcare Authorities, Patients, and Supranational Institutions. The analysis also proposes a characterization and ranking of the difficulty associated with implementing the reviewed mechanisms. Public Funding of R&D, Pricing and Reimbursement Incentives, and PDPs are mechanisms expected to meet highly systemic barriers (i.e., obstacles across the entire antibiotic value chain), imposing greater implementation challenges in that they require convincing and involving several motivationally diverse actors in order to have much effect.

Challenges and shortcomings of antibacterial discovery projects.

OBJECTIVES: Antibacterial drug discovery activities are essential for filling clinical pipelines with promising clinical candidates. Little information is available about the challenges and shortcomings of small companies and academic institutions in performing these important discovery tasks. METHODS: We performed a content analysis of 463 reviewer comments on 91 funding applications of antibacterial drug discovery projects submitted to two major global funders between 2016 and 2020 that had not proceeded further in the selection process. This quality assessment was complemented with the inputs (via e-mail) from a panel involving six antibiotic research and development (R&D) experts with long-standing expertise and experience in antibiotic drug discovery. RESULTS: Common critical comments of reviewers are grouped into three main categories: scientific and technical shortcomings, unclear potential societal impact, and insufficient capability and expertise of the project team regarding the R&D process. Insufficient characterization of in vitro activity and/or testing of the hits/leads and insufficient antibacterial activity were the most common critical comments. Other areas of concern were insufficient or lack of differentiation from available drugs or projects with a long R&D history, and the research team's insufficient knowledge of a structured streamlined R&D process as reflected in severe gaps in the expertise of the R&D team. Little appreciation for the problem of the emergence of target-based resistance, especially in single-target approaches, and little awareness of toxicological issues, including approaches with historical liabilities were also commonly mentioned. The shortcomings identified through the analysis of funding applications are echoed by the results of the expert panel. DISCUSSION: Our analysis identified an urgent need of strengthening the support for antibacterial drug discovery teams to help more projects reach such a quality to be eligible for global funders and private investors.

Simulating Market Entry Rewards for Antibiotics Development.

We design an agent based Monte Carlo model of antibiotics research and development (R&D) to explore the effects of the policy intervention known as Market Entry Reward (MER) on the likelihood that an antibiotic entering pre-clinical development reaches the market. By means of sensitivity analysis we explore the interaction between the MER and four key parameters: projected net revenues, R&D costs, venture capitalists discount rates, and large pharmaceutical organizations' financial thresholds. We show that improving revenues may be more efficient than reducing costs, and thus confirm that this pull-based policy intervention effectively stimulates antibiotics R&D.

Insights into early stage of antibiotic development in small- and medium-sized enterprises: a survey of targets, costs, and durations.

BACKGROUND: Antibiotic innovation has dwindled to dangerously low levels in the past 30 years. Since resistance continues to evolve, this innovation deficit can have perilous consequences on patients. A number of new incentives have been suggested to stimulate greater antibacterial drug innovation. To design effective solutions, a greater understanding is needed of actual antibiotic discovery and development costs and timelines. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) undertake most discovery and early phase development for antibiotics and other drugs. This paper attempts to gather a better understanding of SMEs' targets, costs, and durations related to discovery and early phase development of antibacterial therapies. METHODS: DRIVE-AB, a project focused on developing new economic incentives to stimulate antibacterial innovation, held a European stakeholder meeting in February 2015. All SMEs invited to this meeting (n = 44) were subsequently sent a survey to gather more data regarding their areas of activity, completed and expected development costs and timelines, and business models. RESULTS: Twenty-five companies responded to the survey. Respondents were primarily small companies each focusing on developing 1 to 3 new antibiotics, focused on pathogens of public health importance. Most have not yet completed any clinical trials. They have reported ranges of discovery and development out-of-pocket costs that appear to be less expensive than other studies of general pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) costs. The duration ranges reported for completing each phase of R&D are highly variable when compared to previously published general pharmaceutical innovation average durations. However, our sample population is small and may not be fully representative of all relevant antibiotic SMEs. CONCLUSIONS: The data collected by this study provide important insights and estimates about R&D in European SMEs focusing on antibiotics, which can be combined with other data to design incentives to stimulate antibacterial innovation. The variation implies that costs and durations are difficult to generalize due to the unique characteristics of each antibiotic project and depend on individual business strategies and circumstances.