Implementing human factors in anaesthesia: guidance for clinicians, departments and hospitals: Guidelines from the Difficult Airway Society and the Association of Anaesthetists: Guidelines from the Difficult Airway Society and the Association of Anaesthetists.

Human factors is an evidence-based scientific discipline used in safety critical industries to improve safety and worker well-being. The implementation of human factors strategies in anaesthesia has the potential to reduce the reliance on exceptional personal and team performance to provide safe and high-quality patient care. To encourage the adoption of human factors science in anaesthesia, the Difficult Airway Society and the Association of Anaesthetists established a Working Party, including anaesthetists and operating theatre team members with human factors expertise and/or interest, plus a human factors scientist, an industrial psychologist and an experimental psychologist/implementation scientist. A three-stage Delphi process was used to formulate a set of 12 recommendations: these are described using a 'hierarchy of controls' model and classified into design, barriers, mitigations and education and training strategies. Although most anaesthetic knowledge of human factors concerns non-technical skills, such as teamwork and communication, human factors is a broad-based scientific discipline with many other additional aspects that are just as important. Indeed, the human factors strategies most likely to have the greatest impact are those related to the design of safe working environments, equipment and systems. While our recommendations are primarily provided for anaesthetists and the teams they work with, there are likely to be lessons for others working in healthcare beyond the speciality of anaesthesia.

Human factors in anaesthesia: a narrative review.

Healthcare relies on high levels of human performance, as described by the 'human as the hero' concept. However, human performance varies and is recognised to fall in high-pressure situations, meaning that it is not a reliable method of ensuring safety. Other safety-critical industries embed human factors principles into all aspects of their organisations to improve safety and reduce reliance on exceptional human performance; there is potential to do the same in anaesthesia. Human factors is a broad-based scientific discipline which aims to make it as easy as possible for workers to do things correctly. The human factors strategies most likely to be effective are those which 'design out' the chance of an error or adverse event occurring. When errors or adverse events do happen, barriers are in place to trap them and reduce the risk of progression to patient and/or worker harm. If errors or adverse events are not trapped by these barriers, mitigations are in place to minimise the consequences. Non-technical skills form an important part of human factors barriers and mitigation strategies and include: situation awareness; decision-making; task management; and team working. Human factors principles are not a substitute for proper investment and appropriate staffing levels. Although applying human factors science has the potential to save money in the long term, its proper implementation may require investment before reward can be reaped. This narrative review describes what is known about human factors in anaesthesia to date.

Evaluation of the prototype Anaesthetic Non-technical Skills for Anaesthetic Practitioners (ANTS-AP) system: a behavioural rating system to assess the non-technical skills used by staff assisting the anaesthetist.

This study tested the reliability, validity and usability of a prototype behavioural rating system for the non-technical skills of assistants working with the anaesthetist. Anaesthetic nurses and operating department practitioners (n = 48) used the prototype Anaesthetic Non-technical Skills for Anaesthetic Practitioners (ANTS-AP) system to rate the non-technical skills of anaesthetic assistants in 12 videos of simulated theatre work. Test-retest reliability was assessed with a sub-sample (n = 12). The skill categories assessed were 'situation awareness', 'teamwork and communication' and 'task management'. The internal consistency for the ratings of elements in categories was acceptable (Cronbach's α of 0.78, 0.77 and 0.69, respectively), with more modest inter-rater reliability (intraclass correlations for categories 0.54, 0.70, 0.86), test-retest reliability (intraclass correlations 0.68, 0.58, 0.38) and accuracy (weighted kappa 0.39). Most participants considered the system complete (n = 42, 87%), the wording clear (n = 48, 100%) and the system useful for structuring observation (n = 48, 100%).

Human factors in the development of complications of airway management: preliminary evaluation of an interview tool.

The 4th National Audit Project of the Royal College of Anaesthetists and the Difficult Airway Society (NAP4) analysed reports of serious events arising from airway management during anaesthesia, intensive care and the emergency department. We conducted supplementary telephone interviews with 12 anaesthetists who had reported to NAP4, aiming to identify causal factors using a method based on the Human Factors Investigation Tool (HFIT). We identified contributing human factors in all cases (median [range] 4.5 [1-10] per case). The most frequent related to: situation awareness (failures to anticipate, wrong decision) (nine cases); job factors (e.g. task difficulty; staffing, time pressure) (eight cases); and person factors (e.g. tiredness, hunger, stress) (six cases). Protective factors, such as teamwork and communication, were also revealed. The post-report HFIT interview method identified relevant human factors and this approach merits further testing as part of the investigation of anaesthetic incidents.

Teamwork, communication, and anaesthetic assistance in Scotland.

Teamwork involves supporting others, solving conflicts, exchanging information, and co-ordinating activities. This article describes the results of interviews with anaesthetic assistants (n=22) and consultant anaesthetists (n=11), investigating the non-technical skills involved in the effective teamwork of the anaesthetic assistants in the operating theatre. Anaesthetic assistants most commonly saw themselves as either being part of a theatre team or an anaesthetic subgroup and most commonly described the senior theatre nurse as their team leader. Examples of supporting others included the following: checking equipment, providing equipment, being a second pair of eyes, providing emotional and decision support, and supporting trainee anaesthetists. Of the 19 anaesthetic assistants who were asked if they would speak up if they disagreed with a decision in theatre, only 14 said that they would voice their concerns, and the most common approach was to ask for the logic behind the decision. The WHO checklist was described as prompting some anaesthetists to describe their anaesthetic plan to the anaesthetic assistant, when previously the anaesthetist would have failed to communicate their intentions in time for equipment to be prepared. The prioritization of activities to achieve co-ordination and the anaesthetic assistants becoming familiar with the idiosyncrasies of their regular anaesthetists were also described by anaesthetic assistants.

Non-technical skills of anaesthetic assistants in the perioperative period: a literature review.

Non-technical skills (NTS), which include communication, teamwork, leadership, decision-making, and situation awareness, are important in the maintenance of patient safety. NTS frameworks have been developed for anaesthetists, surgeons, and scrub practitioners. Most studies of NTS in operating theatres to date have focused on anaesthetists and surgeons. We have attempted to identify the NTS used by anaesthetic assistants in the perioperative period. An electronic search of the NHS e-library, PubMed, BioMed Central, ScienceDirect, and Scopus databases was performed in December 2010. The abstracts of the papers identified were checked for relevance and the article examined. Out of 308 papers initially identified, there were only three papers describing the use of NTS by anaesthetic assistants. Communication and situation awareness were described in three papers, teamwork and decision-making in two, and leadership in one. This search did not reveal any comprehensive description of the NTS required by anaesthetic assistants. The benefits of developing an NTS taxonomy for anaesthetic assistants are discussed.

Anaesthetists' non-technical skills.

This review presents the background to the development of the anaesthetists' non-technical skills (ANTS) taxonomy and behaviour rating tool, which is the first non-technical skills framework specifically designed for anaesthetists. We share the experience of the anaesthetists who designed ANTS in relation to applying it in a department of anaesthesia, using it in a simulation centre, and the process of introducing it to the profession on a national basis. We also consider how ANTS is being applied in relation to training and research in other countries and finally, we discuss emerging issues in relation to the introduction of a non-technical skills approach in anaesthesia.

Beyond monitoring: distributed situation awareness in anaesthesia.

Situation awareness (SA) is one of the essential non-technical skills for effective and safe practice in high-risk industries, such as healthcare; yet, there is limited research of its significance in anaesthetic practice. In this paper, we review this scant research that focuses on SA as patient monitoring alone and advocate for a more comprehensive view of SA in anaesthetic practice and training that extends beyond monitoring, namely, a distributed cognition approach. We identify further factors influencing anaesthetists' SA and provide a case that resulted in an anaesthetic fatality to illustrate the application of an alternative view of SA in anaesthesia. Distributed SA in anaesthetic practice provides the foundation for further research that may in turn influence the teaching and assessment of this important non-technical skill.

No simple fix for fixation errors: cognitive processes and their clinical applications.

Fixation errors occur when the practitioner concentrates solely upon a single aspect of a case to the detriment of other more relevant aspects. These are well recognised in anaesthetic practice and can contribute significantly to morbidity and mortality. Improvement in patient safety may be assisted by development and application of countermeasures to fixation errors. Cognitive psychologists use 'insight problems' in a laboratory setting, both to induce fixation and to explore strategies to escape from fixation. We present some results from a series of experiments on one such insight problem and consider applications that may have relevance to anaesthetic practice.

Detection of adverse events in a Scottish hospital using a consensus-based methodology.

OBJECTIVE: To determine, using a consensus based methodology, the rate and nature of adverse events (AEs) among patients admitted to acute medicine, acute surgery and obstetrics in a large teaching hospital in Scotland. METHODS: Retrospective case-note review of 450 medical, nursing and medication records to identify and classify adverse events. For 354 patients whose length of stay was greater than 24 hours, the overall adverse event rate was 7.9% which ranged from 0% in obstetrics, 7.2% in acute medicine to 13% in acute surgery. Among all AEs, 43% were deemed preventable by a consensus group and 59% of the AEs contributed to a proportion of the patients' hospital stay or led to hospital readmission. Whilst nurse identification of adverse events was highly specific (94%), its sensitivity was poor (43%). Only 10% of the identified AEs were identified by the hospital's voluntary reporting system for adverse events. The estimated additional cost of adverse events in terms of bed days was l69,189 which if extrapolated Scotland-wide could cost l297 million per annum. CONCLUSIONS: This study supports the need to continue the traditional retrospective record review to identify adverse events. The current hospital-based reporting of adverse events does not provide a complete measure of adverse events and needs to be complemented by other measures.

Teaching surgeons about non-technical skills.

BACKGROUND: Analyses of adverse events in surgery reveal that underlying causes are often behavioural, such as communication failures, rather than technical. Non-technical (i.e. cognitive and interpersonal) skills, whilst recognised, are not explicitly addressed in surgical training. However, surgeons need to demonstrate high levels of these skills, as well as technical proficiency, to maximise safety and quality in the operating theatre. This article describes a prototype training course to raise surgeons' awareness of non-technical skills. METHODS: The course syllabus was based on a new taxonomy of surgeons' non-technical skills (NOTSS) which has four principal categories: situation awareness, decision-making, communication and teamwork, and leadership. Three, one-day training courses were attended by 21 surgeons. RESULTS: All surgeons reported that they found explicit review and discussion of these skills and component behaviours helpful for self-reflection. They rated the content as interesting and relevant and the majority declared their intention to make some changes to their behaviour during surgery. CONCLUSIONS: It was concluded that this type of training could enhance the surgical training portfolio and should be an integral feature of the development and assessment of operative skills.

Non-technical skills for surgeons in the operating room: a review of the literature.

BACKGROUND: This review examines the surgical and psychological literature on surgeons' intraoperative non-technical skills. These are the critical cognitive and interpersonal skills that complement surgeons' technical abilities. The objectives of this paper are (1) to identify the non-technical skills required by surgeons in the operating room and (2) assess the behavioral marker systems that have been developed for rating surgeons' non-technical skills. METHODS: A literature search was conducted against a set of inclusion criteria. Databases searched included BioMed Central, Medline, EDINA BIOSIS, Web-of-Knowledge, PsychLit, and ScienceDirect. RESULTS: A number of "core" categories of non-technical skills were identified from 4 sources of data: questionnaire and interview studies, observational studies, adverse event analyses, and the surgical education/competence assessment literature. The main skill categories were communication, teamwork, leadership, and decision making. The existing frameworks used to measure surgeons' non-technical skills were found to be deficient in terms of either their psychometric properties or suitability for rating the full range of skills in individual surgeons. CONCLUSIONS: Further work is required to develop a valid taxonomy of individual surgeons' non-technical skills for training and feedback.

Attitudes to teamwork and safety in the operating theatre.

BACKGROUND: A survey was undertaken to assess surgical team members' attitudes to safety and teamwork in the operating theatre. METHOD: The Operating Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire (ORMAQ) measures attitudes to leadership, teamwork, stress and fatigue and error. A version of the ORMAQ was distributed to surgical teams in 17 hospitals in Scotland. A total of 352 responses were analysed, 138 from consultant surgeons, 93 from trainee surgeons and 121 from theatre nurses. RESULTS: Respondents generally demonstrated positive attitudes to behaviours associated with effective teamwork and safety. Attitudes indicating a belief in personal invulnerability to stress and fatigue were evident in both nurses and surgeons. Consultant surgeons had more positive views on the quality of surgical leadership and communication in theatre than trainees and theatre nurses. While the ubiquity of human error was well recognised, attitudes to error management strategies (incident reporting, procedural compliance) suggest that they may not be fully functioning across hospitals. While theatre staff placed a clear priority on patient safety against other business objectives (e.g. waiting lists, cost cutting), not all of them felt that this was endorsed by their hospital management. CONCLUSIONS: Attitude surveys can provide useful diagnostic information relating to behaviour and safety in surgical units. Discrepancies were found between the views of consultants compared with trainees and nurses, in relation to leadership and teamwork. While attitudes to safety were generally positive, there were several areas where theatre staff did not seem to appreciate the impact of psychological factors on technical performance.

The non-technical skills used by anaesthetic technicians in critical incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring System between 2002 and 2008.

The outcome of critical incidents in the operating theatre has been shown to be influenced by the behaviour of anaesthetic technicians (ATs) assisting anaesthetists, but the specific non-technical skills involved have not been described. We performed a review of critical incidents (n=1433) reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring System between 2002 and 2008 to identify which non-technical skills were used by ATs. The reports were assessed if they mentioned anaesthetic assistance or had the boxes ticked to identify "inadequate assistance" or "absent supervision or assistance". A total of 90 critical incidents involving ATs were retrieved, 69 of which described their use of non-technical skills. In 20 reports, the ATs ameliorated the critical incident, whilst in 46 they exacerbated the critical incident, and three cases had both positive and negative non-technical skills described. Situation awareness was identified in 39 reports, task management in 23, teamwork in 21 and decision-making in two, but there were no descriptions of issues related to leadership, stress or fatigue management. Situation awareness, task management and teamwork appear to be important non-technical skills for ATs in the development or management of critical incidents in the operating theatre. This analysis has been used to support the development of a non-technical skills taxonomy for anaesthetic assistants.

"They seem to be able to read your mind." An interview study to identify the cognitive non-technical skills of anaesthetic assistants.

The aim of this study was to identify the cognitive non-technical skills (i.e. situation awareness and decision making) used by anaesthetic assistants, as part of the development of a specialty-specific behavioural rating system for anaesthetic assistants. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with anaesthetic assistants (n=22), anaesthetic consultants (n=11) and trainee anaesthetists (n=12) in Scotland. The interviews were transcribed and thematically analysed. All 45 participants described the presence or failure of situation awareness (i.e. gathering information, its comprehension and anticipation) in 713 phrases. Decision making (i.e. considering options, selecting actions and reviewing decisions) by the anaesthetic assistants was reported much less frequently--only 34 participants described 89 phrases. Situation awareness is a key non-technical skill used by anaesthetic assistants, however decision making was less commonly described as required by anaesthetic assistants. This provides qualitative data to support the development of a non-technical skills taxonomy for anaesthetic assistants.

Identifying and training non-technical skills for teams in acute medicine.

The aviation domain provides a better analogy for the "temporary" teams that are found in acute medical specialities than industrial or military teamwork research based on established teams. Crew resource management (CRM) training, which emphasises portable skills (for whatever crew a pilot is rostered to on a given flight), has been recognised to have potential application in medicine, especially for teams in the operating theatre, intensive care unit, and emergency room. Drawing on research from aviation psychology that produced the behavioural marker system NOTECHS for rating European pilots' non-technical skills for teamwork on the flightdeck, this paper outlines the Anaesthetists Non-Technical Skills behavioural rating system for anaesthetists working in operating theatre teams. This taxonomy was used as the design basis for a training course, Crisis Avoidance Resource Management for Anaesthetists used to develop these skills, based in an operating theatre simulator. Further developments of this training programme for teams in emergency medicine are outlined.

Leadership for safety: industrial experience.

The importance of leadership for effective safety management has been the focus of research attention in industry for a number of years, especially in energy and manufacturing sectors. In contrast, very little research into leadership and safety has been carried out in medical settings. A selective review of the industrial safety literature for leadership research with possible application in health care was undertaken. Emerging findings show the importance of participative, transformational styles for safety performance at all levels of management. Transactional styles with attention to monitoring and reinforcement of workers' safety behaviours have been shown to be effective at the supervisory level. Middle managers need to be involved in safety and foster open communication, while ensuring compliance with safety systems. They should allow supervisors a degree of autonomy for safety initiatives. Senior managers have a prime influence on the organisation's safety culture. They need to continuously demonstrate a visible commitment to safety, best indicated by the time they devote to safety matters.

Training for emergency management: tactical decision games.

Training of the non-technical skills that are crucial to effective management of emergency situations is an issue that is currently receiving increasing emphasis in the petrochemical sector. A case study is presented of the explosion and fires at the Texaco Refinery, Milford Haven, UK, which occurred in July 1994 (HSE, The explosion and fires at the Texaco Refinery, Milford Haven, 24 July 1994. HSE: London, 1997), with particular focus on the human factors aspects of the event. A key issue identified by the official report into this incident was the importance of emergency management training. This paper outlines a novel, low-fidelity training intervention, the tactical decision game (TDG), which is designed to enhance the non-technical skills (decision making, situation awareness, communication and co-ordination, teamwork, and stress management) required for emergency management. It is proposed that enhanced learning of these non-technical skills, through experience and directed practice following repeated exposure to TDGs, will lead to more efficient emergency management, particularly when dealing with hazardous materials.

Development of face recognition: an encoding switch?

Two experiments were designed to examine Carey's (1978) theory that face recognition improves with age because young children (less than 10 years) encode predominantly piecemeal details from unfamiliar faces, whereas older children (greater than or equal to 10 years) and adults rely mainly on configurational information. In Expt 1, children (7-16 years) were tested for ability to recognize unfamiliar faces presented upright and inverted. Performance in the inverted condition was significantly poorer for all age groups. In a second experiment, subjects (4-8 years) were given a forced-choice, face recognition task. The tendency of young children to select incorrectly paraphernalia cues as a basis for identity judgements was found to be dependent on the similarity of the faces paired in each trial. These results suggested that Carey's original data were contaminated by floor effects. It was argued that there is insufficient evidence to endorse Carey's explanation of an encoding switch at age 10 years as a satisfactory account of the development of face recognition.

Close encounters of the witness kind: children's memory for a simulated health inspection.

A total of 128 children from each of two age groups (6-7 years and 10-11 years) took part individually in a simulated health check procedure. This involved direct confrontation between the child and an adult stranger in which the child was touched and an article of clothing (shoes) removed. One week later children took part in a series of tests which examined their testimony of the events in which they participated. Older children were superior to younger on both free and prompted recall of event and appearance information and made fewer errors, both relatively and absolutely, on recall of appearance but not events. The two age groups did not differ in their competence in the construction of Photofit pictures and showed no difference in performance on identification from a photographic array, irrespective of whether the adult was present or absent. The implications of these findings for the current debate over the legal admissibility of children's evidence are discussed.