Collective behavior from surprise minimization.

Collective motion is ubiquitous in nature; groups of animals, such as fish, birds, and ungulates appear to move as a whole, exhibiting a rich behavioral repertoire that ranges from directed movement to milling to disordered swarming. Typically, such macroscopic patterns arise from decentralized, local interactions among constituent components (e.g., individual fish in a school). Preeminent models of this process describe individuals as self-propelled particles, subject to self-generated motion and "social forces" such as short-range repulsion and long-range attraction or alignment. However, organisms are not particles; they are probabilistic decision-makers. Here, we introduce an approach to modeling collective behavior based on active inference. This cognitive framework casts behavior as the consequence of a single imperative: to minimize surprise. We demonstrate that many empirically observed collective phenomena, including cohesion, milling, and directed motion, emerge naturally when considering behavior as driven by active Bayesian inference-without explicitly building behavioral rules or goals into individual agents. Furthermore, we show that active inference can recover and generalize the classical notion of social forces as agents attempt to suppress prediction errors that conflict with their expectations. By exploring the parameter space of the belief-based model, we reveal nontrivial relationships between the individual beliefs and group properties like polarization and the tendency to visit different collective states. We also explore how individual beliefs about uncertainty determine collective decision-making accuracy. Finally, we show how agents can update their generative model over time, resulting in groups that are collectively more sensitive to external fluctuations and encode information more robustly.

Two distinct networks for encoding goals and forms of action: An effective connectivity study.

Goal-directed actions are characterized by two main features: the content (i.e., the action goal) and the form, called vitality forms (VF) (i.e., how actions are executed). It is well established that both the action content and the capacity to understand the content of another's action are mediated by a network formed by a set of parietal and frontal brain areas. In contrast, the neural bases of action forms (e.g., gentle or rude actions) have not been characterized. However, there are now studies showing that the observation and execution of actions endowed with VF activate, in addition to the parieto-frontal network, the dorso-central insula (DCI). In the present study, we established-using dynamic causal modeling (DCM)-the direction of information flow during observation and execution of actions endowed with gentle and rude VF in the human brain. Based on previous fMRI studies, the selected nodes for the DCM comprised the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the premotor cortex (PM), and the DCI. Bayesian model comparison showed that, during action observation, two streams arose from pSTS: one toward IPL, concerning the action goal, and one toward DCI, concerning the action vitality forms. During action execution, two streams arose from PM: one toward IPL, concerning the action goal and one toward DCI concerning action vitality forms. This last finding opens an interesting question concerning the possibility to elicit VF in two distinct ways: cognitively (from PM to DCI) and affectively (from DCI to PM).

Reliability of dynamic causal modelling of resting-state magnetoencephalography.

This study assesses the reliability of resting-state dynamic causal modelling (DCM) of magnetoencephalography (MEG) under conductance-based canonical microcircuit models, in terms of both posterior parameter estimates and model evidence. We use resting-state MEG data from two sessions, acquired 2 weeks apart, from a cohort with high between-subject variance arising from Alzheimer's disease. Our focus is not on the effect of disease, but on the reliability of the methods (as within-subject between-session agreement), which is crucial for future studies of disease progression and drug intervention. To assess the reliability of first-level DCMs, we compare model evidence associated with the covariance among subject-specific free energies (i.e., the 'quality' of the models) with versus without interclass correlations. We then used parametric empirical Bayes (PEB) to investigate the differences between the inferred DCM parameter probability distributions at the between subject level. Specifically, we examined the evidence for or against parameter differences (i) within-subject, within-session, and between-epochs; (ii) within-subject between-session; and (iii) within-site between-subjects, accommodating the conditional dependency among parameter estimates. We show that for data acquired close in time, and under similar circumstances, more than 95% of inferred DCM parameters are unlikely to differ, speaking to mutual predictability over sessions. Using PEB, we show a reciprocal relationship between a conventional definition of 'reliability' and the conditional dependency among inferred model parameters. Our analyses confirm the reliability and reproducibility of the conductance-based DCMs for resting-state neurophysiological data. In this respect, the implicit generative modelling is suitable for interventional and longitudinal studies of neurological and psychiatric disorders.

Narrative as active inference: an integrative account of cognitive and social functions in adaptation.

While the ubiquity and importance of narratives for human adaptation is widely recognized, there is no integrative framework for understanding the roles of narrative in human adaptation. Research has identified several cognitive and social functions of narratives that are conducive to well-being and adaptation as well as to coordinated social practices and enculturation. In this paper, we characterize the cognitive and social functions of narratives in terms of active inference, to support the claim that one of the main adaptive functions of narrative is to generate more useful (i.e., accurate, parsimonious) predictions for the individual, as well as to coordinate group action (over multiple timescales) through shared predictions about collective behavior. Active inference is a theory that depicts the fundamental tendency of living organisms to adapt by proactively inferring the causes of their sensations (including their own actions). We review narrative research on identity, event segmentation, episodic memory, future projections, storytelling practices, enculturation, and master narratives. We show how this research dovetails with the active inference framework and propose an account of the cognitive and social functions of narrative that emphasizes that narratives are for the future-even when they are focused on recollecting or recounting the past. Understanding narratives as cognitive and cultural tools for mutual prediction in social contexts can guide research on narrative in adaptive behavior and psychopathology, based on a parsimonious mechanistic model of some of the basic adaptive functions of narrative.

Measurement of the Mapping between Intracranial EEG and fMRI Recordings in the Human Brain.

There are considerable gaps in our understanding of the relationship between human brain activity measured at different temporal and spatial scales. Here, electrocorticography (ECoG) measures were used to predict functional MRI changes in the sensorimotor cortex in two brain states: at rest and during motor performance. The specificity of this relationship to spatial co-localisation of the two signals was also investigated. We acquired simultaneous ECoG-fMRI in the sensorimotor cortex of three patients with epilepsy. During motor activity, high gamma power was the only frequency band where the electrophysiological response was co-localised with fMRI measures across all subjects. The best model of fMRI changes across states was its principal components, a parsimonious description of the entire ECoG spectrogram. This model performed much better than any others that were based either on the classical frequency bands or on summary measures of cross-spectral changes. The region-specific fMRI signal is reflected in spatially and spectrally distributed EEG activity.

Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them.

Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing.

Targeting suicidal ideation in major depressive disorder with MRI-navigated Stanford accelerated intelligent neuromodulation therapy.

High suicide risk represents a serious problem in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD), yet treatment options that could safely and rapidly ameliorate suicidal ideation remain elusive. Here, we tested the feasibility and preliminary efficacy of the Stanford Accelerated Intelligent Neuromodulation Therapy (SAINT) in reducing suicidal ideation in patients with MDD. Thirty-two MDD patients with moderate to severe suicidal ideation participated in the current study. Suicidal ideation and depression symptoms were assessed before and after 5 days of open-label SAINT. The neural pathways supporting rapid-acting antidepressant and suicide prevention effects were identified with dynamic causal modelling based on resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging. We found that 5 days of SAINT effectively alleviated suicidal ideation in patients with MDD with a high response rate of 65.63%. Moreover, the response rates achieved 78.13% and 90.63% with 2 weeks and 4 weeks after SAINT, respectively. In addition, we found that the suicide prevention effects of SAINT were associated with the effective connectivity involving the insula and hippocampus, while the antidepressant effects were related to connections of the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC). These results show that SAINT is a rapid-acting and effective way to reduce suicidal ideation. Our findings further suggest that distinct neural mechanisms may contribute to the rapid-acting effects on the relief of suicidal ideation and depression, respectively.

Climate change and disorders of the nervous system.

Anthropogenic climate change is affecting people's health, including those with neurological and psychiatric diseases. Currently, making inferences about the effect of climate change on neurological and psychiatric diseases is challenging because of an overall sparsity of data, differing study methods, paucity of detail regarding disease subtypes, little consideration of the effect of individual and population genetics, and widely differing geographical locations with the potential for regional influences. However, evidence suggests that the incidence, prevalence, and severity of many nervous system conditions (eg, stroke, neurological infections, and some mental health disorders) can be affected by climate change. The data show broad and complex adverse effects, especially of temperature extremes to which people are unaccustomed and wide diurnal temperature fluctuations. Protective measures might be possible through local forecasting. Few studies project the future effects of climate change on brain health, hindering policy developments. Robust studies on the threats from changing climate for people who have, or are at risk of developing, disorders of the nervous system are urgently needed.

Inferring Trajectories of Psychotic Disorders Using Dynamic Causal Modeling.

Introduction: Illness course plays a crucial role in delineating psychiatric disorders. However, existing nosologies consider only its most basic features (e.g., symptom sequence, duration). We developed a Dynamic Causal Model (DCM) that characterizes course patterns more fully using dense timeseries data. This foundational study introduces the new modeling approach and evaluates its validity using empirical and simulated data. Methods: A three-level DCM was constructed to model how latent dynamics produce symptoms of depression, mania, and psychosis. This model was fit to symptom scores of nine patients collected prospectively over four years, following first hospitalization. Simulated subjects based on these empirical data were used to evaluate model parameters at the subject-level. At the group-level, we tested the accuracy with which the DCM can estimate the latent course patterns using Parametric Empirical Bayes (PEB) and leave-one-out cross-validation. Results: Analyses of empirical data showed that DCM accurately captured symptom trajectories for all nine subjects. Simulation results showed that parameters could be estimated accurately (correlations between generative and estimated parameters >= 0.76). Moreover, the model could distinguish different latent course patterns, with PEB correctly assigning simulated patients for eight of nine course patterns. When testing any pair of two specific course patterns using leave-one-out cross-validation, 30 out of 36 pairs showed a moderate or high out-of-samples correlation between the true group-membership and the estimated group-membership values. Conclusion: DCM has been widely used in neuroscience to infer latent neuronal processes from neuroimaging data. Our findings highlight the potential of adopting this methodology for modeling symptom trajectories to explicate nosologic entities, temporal patterns that define them, and facilitate personalized treatment.