What do we manipulate when reminding people of (not) having control? In search of construct validity.

The construct of personal control is crucial for understanding a variety of human behaviors. Perceived lack of control affects performance and psychological well-being in diverse contexts - educational, organizational, clinical, and social. Thus, it is important to know to what extent we can rely on the established experimental manipulations of (lack of) control. In this article, we examine the construct validity of recall-based manipulations of control (or lack thereof). Using existing datasets (Study 1a and 1b: N = 627 and N = 454, respectively) we performed content-based analyses of control experiences induced by two different procedures (free recall and positive events recall). The results indicate low comparability between high and low control conditions in terms of the emotionality of a recalled event, the domain and sphere of control, amongst other differences. In an experimental study that included three types of recall-based control manipulations (Study 2: N = 506), we found that the conditions differed not only in emotionality but also in a generalized sense of control. This suggests that different aspects of personal control can be activated, and other constructs evoked, depending on the experimental procedure. We discuss potential sources of variability between control manipulation procedures and propose improvements in practices when using experimental manipulations of sense of control and other psychological constructs.

Characterizing the role of impulsivity in costly, reactive aggression using a novel paradigm.

A lack of self-control has long been theorized to predict an individual's likelihood to engage in antisocial behaviors. However, existing definitions of self-control encompass multiple psychological constructs and lab-based measures of aggression have not allowed for the examination of aggression upon provocation where self-control is needed most. We introduce two versions of a novel paradigm, the Retaliate or Carry-on: Reactive AGgression Experiment (RC-RAGE) to fill this methodological gap. Using large online samples of US adults (N = 354 and N = 366), we evaluate to what extent dispositional impulsivity, self-control, aggression, and state anger contribute to aggression upon provocation when there is a financial cost involved. Results showed that costly retaliation on this task was related to trait aggression and being in an angry emotional state, but not related to social desirability. Importantly, we show that the tendency to act impulsively is a better predictor of costly retaliation than other forms of self-control, such as the ability to delay gratification, resist temptation, or plan ahead. As a browser-based task, the RC-RAGE provides a tool for the future investigation of reactive aggression in a variety of experimental settings.

Reliability of the empathy selection task, a novel behavioral measure of empathy avoidance.

The empathy selection task is a novel behavioral paradigm designed to assess an individual's willingness to engage in empathy. Work with this task has demonstrated that people prefer to avoid empathy when some other activity is available, though individual differences that might predict performance on this task have been largely unexamined. Here, we assess the suitability of the empathy selection task for use in individual difference and experimental research by examining its reliability within and across testing sessions. We compare the reliability of summary scores on the empathy selection task (i.e., proportion of empathy choices) as an individual difference metric to that of two commonly used experimental tasks, the Stroop error rate and go/no-go commission rate. Next, we assess systematic changes at the item/trial level using generalized multilevel modeling which considers participants' individual performance variation. Across two samples (N = 89), we find that the empathy selection task is stable between testing sessions and has good/substantial test-retest reliability (ICCs = .65 and .67), suggesting that it is comparable or superior to other commonly used experimental tasks with respect to its ability to consistently rank individuals.

The Average Reward Rate Modulates Behavioral and Neural Indices of Effortful Control Allocation.

People tend to avoid exerting cognitive effort, and findings from recent behavioral studies suggest that effort allocation is in part determined by the opportunity cost of slothful responding-operationalized as the average reward rate per unit time. When the average rate of reward is high, individuals make more errors in cognitive control tasks, presumably owing to a withdrawal of costly cognitive processing. An open question remains whether the presumed modulations of cognitively effortful control processes are observable at the neural level. Here, we measured EEG while participants completed the Simon task, a well-known response conflict task, while the experienced average reward rate fluctuated across trials. We examined neural activity associated with the opportunity cost of time by applying generalized eigendecomposition, a hypothesis-driven source separation technique, to identify a midfrontal component associated with the average reward rate. Fluctuations in average reward rate modulated not only component amplitude but also, most importantly, component theta power (4-8 Hz). Higher average reward rate was associated with reduced theta power, suggesting that the opportunity of time modulates effort allocation. These neural results provide evidence for the idea that people strategically modulate the amount of cognitive effort they exert based on the opportunity cost of time.

Integrating Models of Self-Regulation.

Self-regulation is a core aspect of human functioning that helps facilitate the successful pursuit of personal goals. There has been a proliferation of theories and models describing different aspects of self-regulation both within and outside of psychology. All of these models provide insights about self-regulation, but sometimes they talk past each other, make only shallow contributions, or make contributions that are underappreciated by scholars working in adjacent areas. The purpose of this article is to integrate across the many different models in order to refine the vast literature on self-regulation. To achieve this objective, we first review some of the more prominent models of self-regulation coming from social psychology, personality psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. We then integrate across these models based on four key elements-level of analysis, conflict, emotion, and cognitive functioning-specifically identifying points of convergence but also points of insufficient emphasis. We close with prescriptions for future research.

The Experience of Empathy in Everyday Life.

We used experience sampling to examine perceptions of empathy in the everyday lives of a group of 246 U.S. adults who were quota sampled to represent the population on key demographics. Participants reported an average of about nine opportunities to empathize per day; these experiences were positively associated with prosocial behavior, a relationship not found with trait measures. Although much of the literature focuses on the distress of strangers, in everyday life, people mostly empathize with very close others, and they empathize with positive emotions 3 times as frequently as with negative emotions. Although trait empathy was negatively associated only with well-being, empathy in daily life was generally associated with increased well-being. Theoretically distinct components of empathy-emotion sharing, perspective taking, and compassion-typically co-occur in everyday empathy experiences. Finally, empathy in everyday life was higher for women and the religious but not significantly lower for conservatives and the wealthy.

Self-control in daily life: Prevalence and effectiveness of diverse self-control strategies.

OBJECTIVE: What strategies do people use to resist desires in their day-to-day life? How effective are these strategies? Do people use different strategies for different desires? This study addresses these questions using experience sampling to examine strategy use in daily life. METHOD: Participants (N = 197, Mage  = 20.4, 63% female) reported on their use of six specific strategies (situation modification, distraction, reminding self of goals, promise to give in later, reminder of why it is bad, willpower) to resist desires (4,462 desires reported over a week). RESULTS: Participants reported using at least one strategy 89% of the time, and more than one strategy 25% of the time. Goal reminders and promises to give in later were more likely to be used for stronger desires. People also preferred different strategies for different types of desires (e.g., eating vs. leisure vs. work, etc.). CONCLUSION: In contrast to recent theoretical predictions, we find that many strategies, including inhibition, are similarly effective and that using multiple strategies is especially effective.

Willpower is overrated.

Any analysis of self-regulation that focuses solely on willpower in conflict-laden situations is insufficient. Research makes clear that the best way to reach one's goal is not to resist temptations but to avoid temptations before they arrive; it further suggests that willpower is fragile and not to be relied on; and that the best self-regulators engage in willpower remarkably seldom.

Strong Effort Manipulations Reduce Response Caution: A Preregistered Reinvention of the Ego-Depletion Paradigm.

People feel tired or depleted after exerting mental effort. But even preregistered studies often fail to find effects of exerting effort on behavioral performance in the laboratory or elucidate the underlying psychology. We tested a new paradigm in four preregistered within-subjects studies (N = 686). An initial high-demand task reliably elicited very strong effort phenomenology compared with a low-demand task. Afterward, participants completed a Stroop task. We used drift-diffusion modeling to obtain the boundary (response caution) and drift-rate (information-processing speed) parameters. Bayesian analyses indicated that the high-demand manipulation reduced boundary but not drift rate. Increased effort sensations further predicted reduced boundary. However, our demand manipulation did not affect subsequent inhibition, as assessed with traditional Stroop behavioral measures and additional diffusion-model analyses for conflict tasks. Thus, effort exertion reduced response caution rather than inhibitory control, suggesting that after exerting effort, people disengage and become uninterested in exerting further effort.

Is Ego Depletion Real? An Analysis of Arguments.

An influential line of research suggests that initial bouts of self-control increase the susceptibility to self-control failure (ego depletion effect). Despite seemingly abundant evidence, some researchers have suggested that evidence for ego depletion was the sole result of publication bias and p-hacking, with the true effect being indistinguishable from zero. Here, we examine (a) whether the evidence brought forward against ego depletion will convince a proponent that ego depletion does not exist and (b) whether arguments that could be brought forward in defense of ego depletion will convince a skeptic that ego depletion does exist. We conclude that despite several hundred published studies, the available evidence is inconclusive. Both additional empirical and theoretical works are needed to make a compelling case for either side of the debate. We discuss necessary steps for future work toward this aim.

Anticipating cognitive effort: roles of perceived error-likelihood and time demands.

Why are some actions evaluated as effortful? In the present set of experiments we address this question by examining individuals' perception of effort when faced with a trade-off between two putative cognitive costs: how much time a task takes vs. how error-prone it is. Specifically, we were interested in whether individuals anticipate engaging in a small amount of hard work (i.e., low time requirement, but high error-likelihood) vs. a large amount of easy work (i.e., high time requirement, but low error-likelihood) as being more effortful. In between-subject designs, Experiments 1 through 3 demonstrated that individuals anticipate options that are high in perceived error-likelihood (yet less time consuming) as more effortful than options that are perceived to be more time consuming (yet low in error-likelihood). Further, when asked to evaluate which of the two tasks was (a) more effortful, (b) more error-prone, and (c) more time consuming, effort-based and error-based choices closely tracked one another, but this was not the case for time-based choices. Utilizing a within-subject design, Experiment 4 demonstrated overall similar pattern of judgments as Experiments 1 through 3. However, both judgments of error-likelihood and time demand similarly predicted effort judgments. Results are discussed within the context of extant accounts of cognitive control, with considerations of how error-likelihood and time demands may independently and conjunctively factor into judgments of cognitive effort.

Midfrontal theta and pupil dilation parametrically track subjective conflict (but also surprise) during intertemporal choice.

Many everyday choices are based on personal, subjective preferences. When choosing between two options, we often feel conflicted, especially when trading off costs and benefits occurring at different times (e.g., saving for later versus spending now). Although previous work has investigated the neurophysiological basis of conflict during inhibitory control tasks, less is known about subjective conflict resulting from competing subjective preferences. In this pre-registered study, we investigated subjective conflict during intertemporal choice, whereby participants chose between smaller immediate versus larger delayed rewards (e.g., $15 today vs. $22 in 30 days). We used economic modeling to parametrically vary eleven different levels of conflict, and recorded EEG data and pupil dilation. Midfrontal theta power, derived from EEG, correlated with pupil responses, and our results suggest that these signals track different gradations of subjective conflict. Unexpectedly, both signals were also maximally enhanced when decisions were surprisingly easy. Therefore, these signals may track events requiring increased attention and adaptive shifts in behavioral responses, with subjective conflict being only one type of such event. Our results suggest that the neural systems underlying midfrontal theta and pupil responses interact when weighing costs and benefits during intertemporal choice. Thus, understanding these interactions might elucidate how individuals resolve self-control conflicts.

The Psychology of Rituals: An Integrative Review and Process-Based Framework.

Traditionally, ritual has been studied from broad sociocultural perspectives, with little consideration of the psychological processes at play. Recently, however, psychologists have begun turning their attention to the study of ritual, uncovering the causal mechanisms driving this universal aspect of human behavior. With growing interest in the psychology of ritual, this article provides an organizing framework to understand recent empirical work from social psychology, cognitive science, anthropology, behavioral economics, and neuroscience. Our framework focuses on three primary regulatory functions of rituals: regulation of (a) emotions, (b) performance goal states, and (c) social connection. We examine the possible mechanisms underlying each function by considering the bottom-up processes that emerge from the physical features of rituals and top-down processes that emerge from the psychological meaning of rituals. Our framework, by appreciating the value of psychological theory, generates novel predictions and enriches our understanding of ritual and human behavior more broadly.

When Novel Rituals Lead to Intergroup Bias: Evidence From Economic Games and Neurophysiology.

Long-established rituals in preexisting cultural groups have been linked to the cultural evolution of group cooperation. We tested the prediction that novel rituals-arbitrary hand and body gestures enacted in a stereotypical and repeated fashion-can inculcate intergroup bias in newly formed groups. In four experiments, participants practiced novel rituals at home for 1 week (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) or once in the lab (Experiment 3) and were divided into minimal in-groups and out-groups. Our results offer mixed support for the hypothesis that novel rituals promote intergroup bias. Specifically, we found a modest effect for daily repeated rituals but a null effect for rituals enacted only once. These results suggest that novel rituals can inculcate bias, but only when certain features are present: Rituals must be sufficiently elaborate and repeated to lead to bias. Taken together, our results offer modest support that novel rituals can promote intergroup bias.

Owning Up to Negative Ingroup Traits: How Personal Autonomy Promotes the Integration of Group Identity.

OBJECTIVE: Our experiences, attributes, and behaviors are diverse, inconsistent, and often negative. Consequently, our capacity to assimilate divergent experiences-particularly negative aspects-is important to the development of a unified self. Whereas this process of integration has received attention at the level of personal identity, it has not been assessed at the level of group identity. OBJECTIVE: We examined the mechanisms involved in integrating positive and negative ingroup identities, as well as related outcomes. METHOD: In three experiments, participants (N = 332) high and low in autonomy identified either positive or negative aspects of their ingroup and then indicated the extent to which they integrated the attribute. RESULTS: Those high in personal autonomy integrated both positive and negative identities, whereas those low in autonomy acknowledged only positive identities. Study 2 showed that, regardless of identity valence, those high in autonomy felt satisfied and close with their group. Conversely, those low in autonomy felt less close and more dissatisfied with their group after reflecting on negative identities. Finally, reflecting on a negative identity reduced prejudice, but only for those high in autonomy. CONCLUSIONS: Owning up to negative group traits is facilitated by autonomy and demonstrates benefits for ingroup and intergroup processes.

Mindful awareness of feelings increases neural performance monitoring.

Mindfulness has been associated with enhanced performance monitoring; however, little is known about the processes driving this apparent neurocognitive benefit. Here, we tested whether focusing present-moment awareness toward the nonjudgmental experience of emotion facilitates rapid neural responses to negative performance outcomes (i.e., mistakes). In particular, we compared whether directing present-moment awareness toward emotions or thoughts would enhance the neurophysiological correlates of performance monitoring: the error-related negativity (ERN) and the error positivity (Pe). Participants were randomly assigned to either a thought-focused or an emotion-focused group, and first they completed a preinduction go/no-go task. Subsequently, the groups followed inductions that promoted mindful attention toward either thoughts or emotions, before completing a final postinduction go/no-go session. The results indicated that emotion-focused participants demonstrated higher neural sensitivity to errors in the time course of the ERN, whereas focusing on thoughts had no effect on performance monitoring. In contrast, neither induction procedure altered the amplitude of the later Pe component. Although our manipulations also induced changes in behavior, the ERN effects remained significant after controlling for performance. Thus, our results suggest that mindfulness meditation boosts early neural performance monitoring (ERN amplitude), specifically through meditation's influence on affective processing.

Recognizing religion's dark side: Religious ritual increases antisociality and hinders self-control.

The target article develops an account of religious prosociality that is driven by increases in self-control. We suggest this account is incomplete. Although religion might increase prosociality to the in-group, it decreases it to the much larger out-group. Rituals, for example, lead to out-group derogation. We also challenge the link between religion and improved self-control, offering evidence that religion hinders self-control.

Preferences and motivations with and without inferences.

Pessoa (2013) makes an impressive case that emotion, motivation, and cognition are neurally intertwined. Our commentary broadens the discussion to the functional, "mind" level. We argue that philosophical and computational considerations justify some modern "separatist" views. We highlight several psychological phenomena that illustrate independence, including affective and motivational reactions to rudimentary inputs, and the guiding role of such reactions in cognition.

Confounding valence and arousal: What really underlies political orientation?

The negative valence model of political orientation proposed by Hibbing et al. is comprehensive and thought-provoking. We agree that there is compelling research linking threat to conservative political beliefs. However, we propose that further research is needed before it can be concluded that negative valence, rather than arousal more generally, underlies the psychological motivations to endorse conservative political belief.

An experimental manipulation of the value of effort.

People who take on challenges and persevere longer are more likely to succeed in life. But individuals often avoid exerting effort, and there is limited experimental research investigating whether we can learn to value effort. We developed a paradigm to test the hypothesis that people can learn to value effort and will seek effortful challenges if directly incentivized to do so. We also dissociate the effects of rewarding people for choosing effortful challenges and performing well. The results provide limited evidence that rewarding effort increased people's willingness to choose harder tasks when rewards were no longer offered (near transfer). There was also mixed evidence that rewarding effort increased willingness to choose harder tasks in another unrelated and unrewarded task (far transfer). These heterogeneous results highlight the need for further research to understand when this paradigm may be the most effective for increasing and generalizing the value of effort.